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Introduction
The intention of this thesis is to examine the 
significance of intervention in civil strife for international 
order. Intervention is defined here in purely descriptive 
terms as a particular sort of international activity. It 
is distinguished not by its legality or illegality but by 
observable characteristics which, though complex, are 
independent of moral, political or legal values. Such a 
definition differs from the attitudes to intervention that 
states normally take. Some wish to define intervention as 
invariably wrong; others see it as justified on occasions, 
whether frequent or rare.  ^ The procedure here will be to 
propose a definition of intervention in civil strife and 
then to inquire into the circumstances in which it may be 
considered desirable or undesirable. The criteria of 
judgement are provided by the fundamental rules of 
international society which take the form of normative 
expressions about how states ought to behave. Unlike a 
system of states, which is defined simply by the interactions 
between them, the society of states may be said to interact 
for certain common purposes. The basic rules of that 
society are those which are essential to the achievement of 
such purposes, and the measure of order among states is the 
extent to which these rules are upheld and their purposes 
realized. Order is not simply the absence of intervention.
The task is to ascertain, as far as is possible, the 
circumstances in which intervention in civil strife accords 
or does not accord with these rules; and to give some 
account of the extent to which such intervention contributes 
to or detracts from order in the contemporary world.
Part One outlines the setting of the problem. Before 
considering how international society can regulate 
intervention in civil strife, it is necessary to understand
A variety of opinion was evident in the 1964 discussions 
of the United Nations Special Committee on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States. G.A.O.R., XX, 6th Committee, 
Annexes vol. Ill, Agenda item 90.
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something about the nature of that activity. Most obviously, 
definitions are required for civil strife and for intervention. 
These provide the essential skeleton but its true character 
cannot be known without some covering of flesh. Thus while 
primary attention is focused on civil strife since 1945 a 
number of historical perspectives indicate that only in 
some respects does it constitute a novel problem for 
international society. The chief novelty seems to lie in 
two interconnected factors: the proneness of many of the new
states to internal conflict; and the tendency of outside 
states to become involved in those conflicts. These 
pressures on civil strife to acquire international dimensions 
mean that intervention in civil strife is less of a sudden, 
dramatic reversal of existing patterns than a natural, but 
not inevitable, extension of them. At the same time, 
intervention in civil strife can be seen to have inherent 
limits as a mode of action. It can achieve only a certain 
range of effects which vary according to the circumstances 
of each case. Nor is the initial decision to intervene 
simply a matter of the intentions of the intervening state.
On the contrary, intervention in civil strife is a complex 
affair with manifold causes and consequences so that its 
regulation promises to be an equally complex matter.
Part Two relates the act of intervention in civil 
strife to some of the fundamental rules of international 
society. It is assumed that states desire to maintain 
their sovereign status and that respect for this 
sovereignty is therefore one of the primary rules of 
international behaviour. The institution of self-defence 
appears to be equally indispensable, being of fundamental 
and practical concern to all states. Doubts may be raised 
about the value of the concept of sovereignty and of the 
right of self-defence in the contemporary world but both 
appear to be sufficiently well-established to serve as 
standards against which to measure acts of intervention.
The questions to be asked, then, are whether and in what 
circumstances intervention in civil strife is consistent 
with respect for the sovereignty of a state and with the
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exercise of the right of self-defence on the part of the 
intervening state. Another central feature of international 
society is the authority which states as a body believe 
themselves to possess. It is apparent that the society of 
states has certain rights, however minimal or ill-defined, 
to impose standards of conduct on individual states. An 
attempt will therefore be made to clarify the nature of 
this authority and to examine the conditions under which it 
may lead to intervention in civil strife by international 
society or by states acting on its behalf.
These basic rules of the international community enjoy 
a greater measure of support and legitimacy than others 
although, as will become evident, there is much room for 
differences in interpretation. There are, however, a 
number of principles which claim universal validity but 
which are, in reality, more contentious than the rules 
which have been described as fundamental. These are political 
principles which, like the doctrines of anti-colonialism or 
national self-determination, relate in the first instance 
to questions of membership in international society, or 
which are primarily concerned with the internal political 
arrangements of existing states, as in the case of ideological 
precepts. Clearly, intervention in civil strife is one 
means of realizing either kind of goal. International 
society might in theory arrogate some of these principles to 
its own purposes - and this is, perhaps, what the states 
advocating them would wish to see - but they are at present 
objects of discord of varying intensity. Some measure of 
the nature and strength of these principles is necessary in 
order to indicate how far states resort to intervention in 
civil strife for purposes which diverge from those accepted 
by the community in general. The multiplicity of causes for 
particular states undertaking particular acts of intervention 
does not concern us here. What is significant about 
intervention for a political doctrine is that it is 
frequently put forward as a general rule for the whole of 
international society and that it usually draws upon some of 
the existing rules for support. Of course, intervention 
for any purpose may be simultaneously in accord with one of
Xthe primary rules - it may, for example, be duly invited by 
a legitimate government - but there are sufficient instances 
where this is not the case to make discussion of the nature 
and import of some of these political principles 
worthwhile.
The act of intervening in civil strife, whether or not 
it accords with the fundamental rules of the international 
community, is not undertaken in a political or legal 
vacuum. There are inevitably pressures which other states 
can and do bring to bear on the intervening state. The 
most obvious form of control is to be found in those precepts 
of international law which prohibit certain types of 
intervention. The specific demands of international law may 
generally be assumed to coincide with some of the primary 
rules of the society of states, but the fact that they are 
expressed in a binding legal form is significant. In so 
far as states feel obliged to account for their actions 
(and in particular their interventionary activities) their 
behaviour may thereby be explicitly regulated. It is 
apparent, however, that many of the traditional canons of 
international law dealing with intervention in civil strife 
have become redundant in contemporary circumstances; the 
important task now is to indicate the problems of legal 
regulation and also some of the directions in which solutions 
might be found.
Less formal but probably more effective are actions 
such as counter-intervention, defence and deterrence 
undertaken by other states or by the divided state itself 
in response to an act of intervention. These reactions may 
cause a state to refrain from initiating intervention, to 
abandon intervention already begun or to alter its 
original purposes. Such informal methods of controlling 
intervention, however, are not necessarily related to 
international society's primary rules. Controls of this 
kind, in other words, may reinforce orderly behaviour but 
they may equally well constrain such behaviour or be used 
to carry through disorderly behaviour. One factor that 
helps to ensure that these processes are used in an orderly
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fashion is international 1 aw which provides certain rules of 
conduct governing the responses of states to intervention 
in civil strife. The right of counter-intervention and the 
right of self-defence against intervention are of special 
importance in this context. It. should not be forgotten, 
of course, that both formal and informal methods of control 
themselves contribute to the interpretation and development 
of the primary rules of international relations.
Brief consideration is also given to the nature and 
limits of United Nations activity in regulating intervention 
in civil strife. There are both formal and informal aspects. 
As an international forum the U.N. assists in the explication 
and development of rules relating to intervention by 
individual states; as an organization which possesses a 
diplomatic and on occasions a military arm it is also in a 
position to contribute to the direct control of 
interventionary behaviour.
Finally, Part Four attempts to provide an answer to 
the original question about the relationship between 
intervention in civil strife and international order in 
the contemporary world. Acknowledgement must clearly be 
made of the importance of the major powers - the Soviet 
Union, the United States and Communist China - in determining 
the meausre of order achieved in this field. These countries 
are not only deeply concerned about civil conflicts and 
about intervention in them but also have particular ideas 
about the underlying purposes which they believe should 
govern intervention. These broad purposes, it will be 
argued, indicate divergent and in some degree contradictory 
conceptions of international society. In the light of these 
conclusions some assessment can be made of the elements 
or order and disorder to be found in the activities of 
states that intervene in civil strife.
PART ONE
CIVIL STRIFE AND INTERVENTION
CHAPTER I : THE NATURE OF CIVIL STRIFE
A : Civil Strife
The definition of civil strife is not self-evident, 
nor are the definitions of its two component parts. The 
term 'civil' appears to present the greater problem for 
while states can usually agree on whether or not a conflict 
exists, they may be in bitter disagreement about its nature. 
Since the criteria of interpretation are by no means 
universally accepted, the definition offered here must 
therefore be somewhat arbitrary. The definition of the term 
'strife' promises to be rather less arbitrary but at the 
same time a little less precise.
A necessary but not sufficient feature of civil 
strife would seem to be that the conflict occurs within the 
boundaries of a state or at least of a political entity which 
has the generally accepted characteristics of a state. This 
will form part of the definition used here, but it is quite 
possible to start from a totally different assumption. Thus 
in communist doctrine a civil war is above all a war between 
classes.'*’ Since class is a universal social category, civil 
wars of this kind need not be confined to national boundaries 
and may even occur between states which represent opposing 
classes. In some sense, therefore, the wars not only in 
China (prior to 1949) and in' North Vietnam (up to 1954) but
2also in Korea in 1950-53 could be represented as civil wars. 
The purpose of such a characterization may seem obvious i.e.
See L. Kotzch, The Concept of War in Contemporary History 
and International Law (Geneva, 1956) , p . 6 9 .
2 'The national-1iteration wars conducted by the peoples of 
China, North Korea and North Vietnam against the foreign 
invaders merged with civil wars against domestic reaction 
which served as a main support of colonialism. As a 
consequence the masses were freed not only from colonial, 
but also social oppression'. Y. Dolgopolov, 'National 
Liberation Wars in the Present Epoch' , International Affairs 
(Moscow) , (February 1962) , p.20.
3'to eliminate, or at least to minimize and to confuse, 
foreign attempts at intervention in cases where the war 
could equally legitimately be described as external'.'*’ But 
whether or not one sees this as a deliberate purpose, what 
is significant is a Soviet awareness of the distinction 
between internal and other conflicts even when both types are 
believed to involve antagonistic social classes. Differences 
in the interpretation of events do not preclude a certain 
consensus when it comes to actions. For this reason the 
distinction between conflicts within states and conflicts 
between states is a useful one.
But international wars take place somewhere and
may be physically confined to a single state. Moreover,
civil conflicts may involve war-like actions across an
international border. Hostilities may spill over in an
unintended fashion or they may be deliberately conducted
against external sources of supply to the other side. Clearly,
some further criteria are required which relate to the stakes
of the conflict and the identity of the participants. These
criteria may be combined by saying that civil strife is a
contest between factions within a country as to who is to
exercise political authority in that country or in at least
2part of it in the case of attempted secession. International
3war, by contrast, takes place between two or more states 
for a wide variety of stakes; these latter may include 
conquest and subsequent administration of a country but this 
is not the same thing as a contest for political authority.
G. Modelski, 'The International Relations of Internal War', 
in J.N. Rosenau (ed.), International Aspects of Civil Strife 
(Princeton, 1964), p.43.
2 The term 'civil strife' has no accepted technical meaning 
but the noun 'strife', cognate with the verb 'to strive', is 
commonly defined as a contention or contest or as a struggle 
for superiority. 'Ciyil' in this context is the antithesis 
of 'international' rather than of 'military'.
3 The classical distinction was between international war 
involving only states and 'mixed war' involving a state (or 
government) on the one side and a domestic faction on the 
other.
4The contest takes the form of efforts by each side 
to impose a result on the other. The faction challenging 
the incumbent or the factions challenging each other are by 
definition directing their efforts toward the capture of 
exclusive political power. It follows that these efforts 
must be on a scale and of a character which make achievement 
of this objective a feasible proposition. A faction must 
have some chance both of gaining power and also of exercising 
it. For this reason the factions must possess a certain 
degree of organization and must be capable of operating in 
more than a purely local area. Capabilities of this kind 
may be secured and built up by the faction itself so that it 
eventually possesses its own uniformed and disciplined army, 
an administrative apparatus and an ability to enter into 
agreements with outside states. On the other hand, the aim 
of a faction may be to take over such assets from the 
existing government. In this case a minimum of organization 
and resources is required and access to the powers of 
government becomes all important. Acts of disobedience such 
as riots, commotions, disturbances and so on do not in 
themselves constitute civil strife since there is present 
neither a capacity to supplant the authority of the 
incumbent nor an intention to do so.'*' At the same time
See also the distinction between insurrection and rebellion 
drawn by N.J. Padelford, International Law and Diplomacy in 
the Spanish Civil Strife (New York, 1939) , p . In . Vattel 
defines as rebels 'all subjects who unjustly take up arms 
against the ruler of the society, whether with the design of 
deposing him from the supreme authority, or of merely 
resisting his orders in some particular instance and making 
him accept their terms'; he goes on to distinguish sedition 
which includes positive disobedience or acts of violence 
toward public officials and insurrection which arises 'when 
the evil extends and wins over the majority of the citizens 
in a town or province, and gains such strength that the 
sovereign is no longer obeyed'. Civil war exists 'when a 
party is formed within the State which ceases to obey the 
sovereign and is strong enough to make a stand against him, 
or when a Republic is divided into two opposite factions, 
and both sides take up arms'. The Law of Nations, trans•
C.G. Fenwick (Washington, 1916), book III, ch. xviii, 
sections 288, 289, 292. The definition of civil strife
proposed here would include civil wars and, depending on 
scale and intentions, some instances of insurrection but 
would exclude seditions.
5attacks upon the authority of local officials may amount to
civil conflict if they are organized as part of a wider
campaign to undermine the authority of the central government.
Certainly, some local disorders may erupt into violence and
require suppression by troops rather than police but they do
not necessarily amount to civil conflicts.
It is apparent that a faction seeking political
power may have goals beyond the minimal one. Some of these
will be sketched briefly in order to clarify the sorts of
events that constitute civil strife. At the very least a
faction seeks to install itself as the incumbent government.
This may involve a very small number of people taking over
from an equally small number as, for instance, in a coup
d'etat. It is simply 'a stroke of force at the particular
rulers of an established system of government, usually
executed by members of the ruling group, but not aimed at
changing the system'.  ^ The stake is the necessary minimum,
namely 'the occupancy of existing roles in the existing
2structure of political au thority'. A broader purpose exists
in what Rosenau terms 'authority wars' which are 'perceived
as being fought over the arrangement (as well as the
occupancy) of the roles in the structure of political
authority' e.g. a clash between democratic and totalitarian 
3parties. At the furthest end of the scale is revolution
which involves 'a sharp, sudden change in the social location
of political power, expressing itself in the radical
transformation of the processes of government, of the
official foundations of sovereignty or legitimacy and of the
4conception of the social order' . By its very nature
C.J. Friedrich, 'An Introductory Note on Revolution' , in 
Friedrich (ed.) , Revolution (New York, 1966) , p.5.
2 J.N. Rosenau, 'Internal War as an International Event', 
in Rosenau (ed.), International Aspects of Civil S t r i f e , p.63. 
For an elaboration of the types of coup see A.C. Janos,
The Seizure of Power (Princeton, 1964) , p p . 21-39.
3 Rosenau, l o c . cit.
4 E. Kamenka, 'The Concept of a Political Revolution' , in 
Friedrich (ed.), Revolution, p.124.
6revolution must be bound up with the lives of most 
individuals in a society but civil strife generally may be 
marked by any degree of involvement and any variety of 
purposes. What is important is the element of conflict 
between two or more groups as to which shall possess ultimate 
authority in the country.
Something has been about the scale and scope of the
challenge for authority in a country but mention must also
be made of the nature of the contest itself. It is
characterized by two sides each attempting to impose a
result on the other but how, it must be asked, are these
endeavours made? The most obvious indication of an attempt
to impose an outcome on another party is the use of armed
force. The bombing of a palace, the occupation of a capital,
the raising of a rebel army all signify a fairly clear
effort to coerce an opponent, to compel him to vacate his
position. The use of violence in an organized way, however,
is essentially a means of imposing an outcome on the other
party, and other means can and do exist for achieving the
same result. Thus the mere threat of force may suffice to
achieve power as it did for the Fascists in Italy in 1922.
Now the abandonment of the criterion of the use of force
as a necessary characteristic of civil strife does give rise
to certain difficulties but they are not as great as they
appear at first sight. In the first place, what constitutes
a resort to force is in any case far from unambiguous though
it may be operationally defined with relative ease.^ The
line between the use and non-use of force is difficult to
2draw in both domestic and international society.
For an example see D. Wood, Conflict in the Twentieth 
Century , Adelphi Paper no. 48 (London, 1968) , p.l whose 
definition is cited in the following section.
2 In the latter case F. Grob has persuasively demonstrated 
The Relativity of War and Peace (Yale, 1949) .
7Nevertheless, it may be argued that war-like activity should 
be the distinguishing characteristic of civil strife since 
it is an abnormal state of affairs in domestic politics unlike 
international politics where its occurrence does not 
necessarily represent a breakdown of society. Against this 
it may be pointed out that what is abnormal in domestic 
society is open contention over political arrangements 
rather than simply the use of armed force. On the one hand, 
one does not need to go as far as Hobbes to accept that 
coercive force may be used in various ways by incumbent 
governments to maintain their authority in normal times. On 
the other hand, there are cases where groups do not agree on 
the legitimacy of the existing system and will not accept its 
authority but where the conflict remains below the level of 
organized violence. The anarchic conditions that prevailed 
in the Congo on the date of its independence in 1960 provide 
a good example.
A further objection to the criterion of attempting 
to impose an outcome is that the border-line between this 
and political persuasion or cajolery will be either indistinct 
or artificial. To expect a clear and natural division 
relevant to all cases, however, is to expect a similarity 
of conditions in all countries which does not seem warranted. 
For what would amount to coercion in one country will not 
necessarily mean coercion in another or at a later time in 
the same country. Coercion involves activities which are 
not accepted as part of the prevailing style of politics.
Thus the manner of conducting elections which is customary in 
the Philippines, for example, would indicate a breakdown of 
acceptance of the electoral system as a means of determining 
who is to rule were it to be adopted by some group in 
Britain. An interesting case arises with coups d'etat in 
Latin America where, some writers argue, it has become an 
established means of transfering control.'*' The question
In these countries 'the imagery of power is that of a 
physical attribute of the ruler, and, as power is physical, 
so it is obtained by physical means. So it is force that is 
characteristic of the 'typical Latin-American revolution', 
not its unconstitutiona1ity, which is merely a secondary 
attribute'. P. Calvert, 'The "Typical Latin-American 
Revolution" ' , International Affairs, vol. 43 (January 1967) ,
p . 88 .
8is not whether such coups occur regularly or whether those 
who are not involved accept the outcome; the question is 
whether or not they involve coercion of the incumbents. In 
the case of a coup this will depend on the attitude of those 
removed from power: do they accept this as the normal and
authoritative way of going about the transfer of power?
While one party may be attempting to coerce another 
in an effort to gain power, however, this does not mean that 
civil strife exists. It is necessary that both parties be 
seeking to coerce each other. A coup d'etat, for example, 
may be against the wishes of a leader but he may be in no 
position to compel the rebels to accept his authority. 
Certainly he will have been coerced into abandoning office, 
but this is not a sufficient condition for the existence 
of civil strife. If, on the other hand, he is able to 
organize some resistance, some efforts to secure a victory 
for himself, then civil strife may be said to occur. It is 
likely but not inevitable that the contending parties will 
find non-forcible methods of pursuing their aims inadequate 
and will be tempted to resort to the use of force against 
one another; the importance of the stakes and the fervour 
with which they are generally sought after can only increase 
the likelihood of violence. Moreover, as we have seen, 
force may already play some role in the existing system so 
that challenges can only be made with like means. Civil 
strife, then, need not mean the use of organized violence 
by both parties; still less need it involve warfare either 
in the conventional sense of standing forces arrayed against 
each other in a battle over territory or in the 
unconventional sense of a guerilla war or an insurgency.
The form taken by civil strife in a given case will depend 
on a variety of circumstances.
When groups within a country are competing for 
political authority, can one say that this is still a civil 
conflict if one or both are prompted or supported from 
outside? It is a rare instance of civil strife which runs 
its course without external involvement of one form or 
another but it would be absurd to suggest that instances of
9civil strife are therefore rare. For if outside influences 
operate upon a political system in normal times, there is 
no reason why they should disappear in time of strife; on 
the contrary, there are many reasons why such influences 
should increase in the event of conflict. Outside 
participation may reach a high level as it did in the 
Spanish Civil War and has done in the conflicts in Vietnam 
since 1945. As a result an internal conflict may be 
invested with major international significance and appear 
to be a form of international war. If the impact of outside 
powers passes a certain point, it may be argued, the conflict 
should cease to be regarded as civil strife and be treated 
as something else. But the actual importance of external 
influences on a conflict is impossible to assess with 
precision and certainty"*“; equally, the origins of a conflict 
may be inseparable mixture of local and international factors 
with neither clearly predominating. Certainly, states will 
respond to civil strife in different ways according to how 
they see the question of outside involvement, but it remains 
a civil conflict as long as the stake is the exercise of 
political power within the country by one party or another.
If an outside state participates on such a scale or in such 
a way that its aim is manifestly conquest of the country, 
then the element of civil strife may well be submerged.
Even in the case of a group of foreigners initiating a 
conflict, however, it is still possible that their aim is 
to change the political system in some way; the fact of their 
being aliens may severely limit their chances of success but 
it does not automatically rule out the possibility of what 
has been defined as civil strife.
Similar reasoning may be applied to conflicts in 
colonial, territories. Here it is the existing authority 
which is external in the sense that it is 'believed to be
In the Spanish Civil war, for instance, approximately 88,000 
foreign troops took part in the fighting but the 
Nationalists and Republicans each mobilized some one million 
men; the impact of outside states in such a situation 
evidently cannot be judged from numbers alone. Figures from 
Wood, Conflict in the Twentieth Century, p.25.
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foreign rather than indigenous to the society' and frequently
displays symbols of an alien culture."*" The colonial power
may be challenged by indigenous rebellion but its object in
resisting will be to secure acceptance of its political
authority; this contrasts with a rising against a country
which is militarily occupying another, although there may
be cases where colonial administration comes close to purely
military occupation. The nature and origins of colonial
authority frequently have important consequences for the
course of the rebellion and for the reactions of outside
parties; it is this which prompts Aron to suggest that
colonial conflicts are 'intermediary between civil and 
2foreign wars'. Certainly, these factors cannot be ignored 
in any study of the problem, but for the present primary 
attention is focused on the stakes of the conflict rather 
than the character of the contending parties. It is a 
conflict between indigenous and colonial authority and hence 
not essentially different from, say, a conflict between 
democratic and totalitarian factions.
B: The Age of Civil Strife
The years since 1945 have commonly been considered
an age of civil strife. A variety of factors appear to have
made internal conflicts more widespread and more frequent
than at any other time in history. The calculations that
have been made are impressive, though not necessarily
conclusive. Eckstein, for example, has counted more than
1,200 cases of civil war, guerrilla war, rioting, widely
dispersed turmoil, terrorism, mutinies and coups which were
3reported in the New York Times between 1946 and 1959.
In the period 1958-66, according to figures given by
W. Kornhauser, 'Rebellion and Political Development', in 
H. Eckstein (ed.) , Internal War (New York, 1964) , p.143.
2 Raymond Aron, Peace_and War (London, 1966) , p.33.
3 H. Eckstein (ed.), Internal W a r , p.3.
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American Defence Secretary McNamara, there were 149
'internationally significant outbreaks of violence' within
states; moreover, the incidence of these outbreaks seemed
to be increasing with 23 'prolonged insurgencies' under way
at the start of 1958 and 40 in existence by February 1966.’*’
A similar picture emerges from the figures on wars and armed
conflicts between 1898 and 1967 compiled by Wood. He lists
situations where 'the regular armed forces of a country or
community are involved (either on both sides or on one side
only) and where weapons of war are used by them with intent
2to kill or wound over a period of at least one hour'. This 
excludes some instances of civil strife as defined here but 
like the other figures they are helpful indicators. Since 
1945 a total of 55 internal conflicts are identified in 
contrast to only 20 in the period before 1939. Of the post­
war conflicts 19 began in the decade 1948-57 and 30 in the 
decade 1958-67.
It is tempting to compare the number of internal 
conflicts with that of conflicts between states. McNamara, 
for instance, contrasts the 149 internal conflicts in 1958-66 
with a mere 15 conflicts between states. Wood's figures 
place 55 internal conflicts since 1945 beside a total of 24 
inter-state conflicts. Comparisons of this sort, however, 
do not throw much light on the claim that conflicts within 
states have become more important than conflicts between 
states. If it were possible to establish criteria of 
significance - numbers involved or killed, money expended, 
weapons used, for example - one international war might 
count for more than ten internal wars, but the reverse 
might also hold good. What can be made of the fact pointed 
out by Quincy Wright that in the century before 1914 the 
number of deaths resulting from military action was greater 
within the United States than in the entire continent of
R.S. McNamara, The Essence of Security (New York 1968) , 
p .145.
Wood, Conflict in the Twentieth Century, p.l.2
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Europe? It is not simply a matter of finding acceptable 
definitions, counting and adjusting the figures. The events 
being compared are of a widely disparate character, and 
it may be less than meaningful to add up even those events 
which do fall into the same category. The picture is further 
obscured by the possibility of interdependence between 
internal and international conflicts. If the several 
rebellions in South-East Asia in 1948 were an outgrowth of 
World War II as many writers have claimed, who is to say 
that the one is more important than the other? The changed 
role of internal conflict in the international system cannot 
be assessed by numbers alone.
Even the figures on the occurrence of internal
conflicts do not permit more than tentative conclusions
either on the score of their greater numbers since 1945 or
2of their growing incidence. In the first place, as Wood 
points out, there were probably many local disorders in the 
first part of the century 'which because of the great 
difference in means of communication at that time, simply
3did not achieve a permanent record'. This contrasts with 
the rapid, extensive and vivid means of reporting which 
exist today. In addition, many such disorders would then 
have been local skirmishes in the outposts of European 
empires; were they to occur today they might endanger the 
independent governments which have succeeded the colonial 
powers. It is also necessary to distinguish between the 
absolute numbers of events and their incidence. This applies 
to pre-war and post-war periods, for the number of independent 
states differs markedly not only as between the two periods
Cited by I.L. Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, third 
edition (London, 1964), p.382.
2 The incidence of an event is determined by the number of 
times it occurs relative to the number of situations where 
it might occur, in this case the number of colonial 
territories and sovereign states.
3 op. cit. p .19 .
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but also as between 1945 and the present day (as a three­
fold increase in U.N. membership indicates). On the other 
hand, the total of independent states and colonial territories 
combined has probably not grown by a very wide margin since 
the pre-war period. Absolute figures for internal conflicts 
would in that case not vary widely from the figures for the 
incidence of internal conflict.
Accounting of this kind, however, can only provide 
an indication of the full extent of the problem of civil 
strife for international society.'*' So much depends on the 
attitudes taken by outside powers which accordingly furnish 
the chief subject-matter of this thesis. Numbers alone, 
moreover, do not assist greatly in understanding the nature 
of internal conflict and with this in mind certain 
historical perspectives on civil strife will be explored.
C: Historical Perspectives
Conflict over authority has existed as long as
authority itself. The problem was far from new when the
system of nation-states began to emerge in Europe during the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Machiave 11i 's intention
in The Prince, as he wrote in the letter of dedication to
Lorenzo de' Medici, was to 'discuss and lay down the law
2about how princes should rule'. It was natural that many 
of the chapters should be concerned with instructions on 
how to retain power within the state. The prince, Machiavelli 
warned, should have two chief fears, one on account of
Even in 1944 J.L. Brierly was writing that 'in the world 
as a whole civil wars always have been and still are much 
commoner events than international wars, though they may 
impress our imaginations less; but that is only because their 
effects are localized, and generally, though not always, 
less destructive'. The Outlook for International Law 
(Oxford, 1944) , pp.49-50. Since that time there appears to 
have been a change not only in the extensiveness of the 
effects of internal conflicts but also in the manner in 
which they impress our imaginations.
2 Trans. G. Bull, (Harmondsworth, 1961) , p.30.
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external powers, the other on account of sedition. Of
the latter danger he wrote:
Political disorders can be quickly healed if they are 
seen well in advance (and only a prudent ruler has 
such foresight); when, for lack of a diagnosis, they 
are allowed to grow in such a way that everyone can 
recognize them, remedies are too late.^
Bacon's essay, 'Of Seditions and Troubles', also warned of
'discontentments' which were inherent in the body politic,
always liable to erupt and rarely amenable to settlement
3by reason. In few countries were constant efforts not
required on the part of rulers simply to maintain their
position. Even the Italian city-states where, unlike the
medieval domains superimposed on the rest of Europe, 'the
smaller distances to be overcome brought the problems of
transport and communication, and consequently the problems
of collecting taxes and maintaining the central authority,
within the range of practical solution' were constantly on
the defensive against exiles or leaders of deposed groups,
against rival cities exploiting internal divisions and
4supporting secret conspiracies. One may doubt whether 
rulers of the present century could be more vulnerable to 
internal conflicts than the rulers of the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries.
This was the situation despite the fact that 
rulers saw themselves as members of a common society, sharing 
the same laws and moral obligations of the res publica 
Chris tiana. In their dealings with each other they felt 
bound to disclaim any intent to undermine another's authority, 
though the intense suspicion displayed towards the first
 ^ ibid., p . 10 3.
2 ibid., p p .39-40.
3 Cited by Brierly, Outlook for International Law, p.46.
4 G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Harmondsworth, 1965) ,
pp . 55 , 53 .
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reside nt ambassadors indicated not only that such e missaries
did indulge in subversive activities but also that the
danger they posed in this way was not seen as an empty one.'1
An early work on the role of ambassadors, Bernard du Rosier's
Short Treatise About A mbas sadors (completed in 1436)
str es se d that they must labour only for peace and the publ i e
good; they must refrain from fomenting diss ension and
re bel lion or e n c o u raging conspiracies; 'the office of an
amb as sa dor is always for good, never for discord or evil . . .
and the ambassador of evil, coming for a bad pu r p o s e  brings
2evil upon hi mself and will come to a bad e n d ' . For b r e aches
of this code the ambassador forfeited any immunity he
po s s e s s e d  and was liable to be tried and sentenced by the
ruler to whom he was accredited, for the latter was simply
the most convenient dispenser of the civil and canon laws
shared by the Christian princes. It was not any d i m i n u t i o n
in the threat which an alien ambassador could p r e s e n t  that
led to the p r a ctice of having ambassadors recalled in order
to be 'punished' at home. This custom which became
e s t a b l i s h e d  by the end of the sixteenth century r e s ulted
rather from the crumbling of the notion of a single
Chr is ti an Europe. The amba ssador's prime a llegiance came to
be to his own country and if this required fomenting strife
in other lands, then he was not to be p u n ished for doing his
duty, and certainly not by the local ruler whose p o s i t i o n  
3was at s t a k e .
The insecurity of rulers reflected the nature of 
their g o v e rnment which for the most part remained above and 
apart from society. It was something that could be seized, 
e x c h an ged or t r a n s ferred w i t hout touching upon the vast 
maj or it y of the population. Certain problems were raised 
in the event of usur pation  but the new ruler could g e n e r a l l y  
expect o b e d ience from his subjects both as a matter of fact
H. Nic olson, D i p l o m a c y , second edition (London, 1950) , 
pp o 4 3 -4.
2 Cited by Mattingly, Rena issance D i p l o m a c y , p.45.
3 ibid * / ch . i v .
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and as a matter of law. He possessed no legal rights himself,
according to Grotius, but the deposed ruler could be
assumed to transfer his rights in order to avoid anarchy
and chaos in his kingdom.^ It was essentially a matter
between monarchs and only in a few exceptional cases were
subjects permitted to resort to forcible methods against a 
2usurper.
Such was the ease of transferring the nominal
allegiance of populations that changes in the formal religion
of a country could be effected by a change of monarch (or
his conversion) on the principle of cuius regio, eius religio.
For more than thirty years Spain sought to make the England
of Elizabeth I Catholic by both war-like and conspiratorial
means. In the latter case the object was not to convert
the English people in great numbers but to supplant the
monarch herself through armed rebellion or court intrigues.
Thus it was that a series of Spanish ambassadors in England
involved themselves in conspiracies against the throne in the
3hope of serving the interests of Catholicism and of Spain.
This was also the time when the task of guarding internal 
security first became the responsibility of an official 
organization, directed during Elizabeth's reign by Sir 
Francis Walsingham.
Civil strife, it is clear, was liable to break out 
both in times of religious schism and of the earlier unity.
De Jure Belli ac Pacis, trans. F.W. Kelsey (New York, 1964) , 
book I, ch. iv, section 15. See also chapter III below, 
section D.
2 ibid., sections 15-19.
3 Mattingly describes the position of the Spanish envoys in 
the following way: 'Whether or not the English Catholics
made up a large or even a bare majority during the first 
twelve years of Elizabeth depends on what one means by 
"Catholics". The French and Spanish ambassadors who 
periodically reported such majorities had no me ans of 
estimating the religious opinions of the vast masses of 
Englishmen, and little interest in doing so. They were 
concerned with people who would support, or at least not 
oppose, a change in religion. The people they thought worth 
counting were those who counted politically, mainly the noble 
families and the gentry'. Renaissance Diplomacy, p.189.
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What differed was the interpretation that rulers placed on 
civil conflicts during each period rather than their form or 
the vulnerability of monarchs. There is a certain parallel 
with the contemporary period which will simply be indicated 
here but will emerge more clearly in the following section. 
Sixteenth-century government, it has been suggested, was 
essentially apart from the rest of society; relatively few 
people were engaged in the business of governing and it 
could be conducted largely independently of the mass of the 
population. Nevertheless, security of the regime was a 
constant concern since it could be challenged from many 
quarters, particularly the more influential citizens, 
politicians and soldiers. The change of religion that might 
be wished upon a country at that time resembles the 
contemporary conversion of a government to a new ideological 
outlook; in both -cases it is uncertain that the new beliefs 
would penetrate very deeply into the structure of society, 
even given that the modern regime may be better equipped to 
ensure such penetration. But the assessment of both sorts 
of change by parties inside and outside the country is 
markedly similar, especially in the shared tendency to view 
each conflict as part of a much wider confrontation.
This section is not intended to be a survey of the 
growth of the state but merely to provide a number of 
historical perspectives on the nature of civil conflicts as 
reflected by the changing nature of the state. It will 
suffice to outline the developments in the character of the 
state which transformed it into a new type of political 
entity in the three centuries or so before World War I.
These changes occurred almost exclusively in Europe, but 
they provide a model which has been and is still being 
exported more or less indiscriminately to the rest of the 
world.
Essentially, the pattern consisted of two inter­
related processes. Firstly, there was the increasing 
ability of the state to supervise and to regulate the life 
of the nation. Flourishing trade and commerce, and later 
rapid industrialization, provided a continuous and
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expanding source of revenue for the government, enabling it
to function on a wider and more permanent scale; it also
became necessary for the government to involve itself in
the economic life of a country through legislation and through
public enterprises, notably in the field of communications.
A larger administrative apparatus resulted from such
activities and set precedents for their extension into new
fields. At the same time standing armed forces became a
feature of European politics. Military service became more
professionalized, while the equipment of armies and then
navies became more dependent on an industrial base in terms
of heavy armaments, transport, technological advances in
weaponry, and the large-scale production of those items
required to keep great numbers of troops in action. The
size of armies also reflected the second process in the
development of the state. This was the growing participation
of the population at large in the functioning of the state.
In the course of the nineteenth century public support
became as important an element in the conduct of government
as the enlistment of the masses eventually became in the
conduct of warfare. In 1826 Canning referred with some
trepidation to 'the fatal artillery of popular excitation'.^
This artillery served the cause of nationalism, 'the most
potent general force in European politics ... an impulse
that could evoke a loyalty and a spirit of self-sacrifice
vastly more intense than the allegiance normally accorded
2to existing governments'. The French Revolution had 
demonstrated the power of mass participation, first in the 
revolutionary overthrow of the old order, then in the 
nationalistic urge to expand and conquer. It was an artillery 
which could prove difficult to control. The nineteenth 
century saw the establishment of nationalism as the 
indispensable companion of the state; where they did not 
already correspond there was pressure for the integration
1 Cited by Nicolson, Diplomacy, p.168.
2 D. Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon , second edition (London, 
1962), p . 208.
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or disintegration of existing states. The nationalization 
of the state meant a proportionate decline in the personal 
and dynastic element of government. Internal disputes 
centred as much on the issue of how people were to be 
governed as upon that of who was to rule.
For the most part such disputes in nineteenth- 
century Europe remained short of actual conflict, though 
the occasions on which they did erupt were dramatic and 
sometimes decisive. The positions taken up may be crudely 
labelled conservative, liberal and socialist. They advocated 
varying degrees and contrasting forms of popular participation 
in government, and only the most reactionary sought to 
reverse the direction of change. Even they, however, were 
aware that the state could and to some extent needed to 
exploit mass enthusiasm for its purposes. The changed 
situation was evident in the notion - and in the opposition 
that it aroused - that the state could be brought down by 
the denial of popular support. The most extreme challenge 
came from the anarchists who sought the total destruction 
by any means of the whole state organization and its 
replacement by local, voluntary associations. The syndicalists 
differed essentially in proposing the general strike as 
the chief instrument of revolution and in granting to the 
labour unions the central role after the destruction of 
state authority. Both groups accepted in some form the 
doctrine of class war and proletarian revolution, but it 
was Marxism which propounded the most comprehensive doctrines 
and attempted to elevate practically and philosophically the 
transnational community of interests shared by the workers 
of the world above loyalty to the nation. If the First and 
Second Internationals achieved anything, however, it was the 
modification of social and political attitudes within the 
existing system rather than its overthrow. Hopes of 
substituting a new loyalty among the proletariat foundered 
at the first call to patriotic duty in 1914. Subversion 
through the alienation of mass loyalty to governments 
evidently required more effective organization and more 
resources than the first Marxists could hope to have at their 
dispos al.
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These historical perspectives demonstrate that 
civil strife is not new to this century either in the form 
of direct blows at the ruler or in the form of efforts to 
undermine the loyalty of subjects. However, two changes in 
the general environment of the state appear to be novel 
in the twentieth century, at least in quantitative if not 
qualitative terms. These are, firstly, the growth of 
international communications and the interpenetration of 
populations at official and unofficial levels; and secondly, 
the availability of weapons and systems of warfare, the 
latter having received comprehensive theoretical and 
practical exposition.
The development of communications in this century 
has been remarkable in almost every aspect - radio, television, 
newspapers, printing, and transport, especially by road and 
by air. The effect has been twofold. Internally, it has 
drawn whole populations into politics in a deeper and more 
immediate fashion; as a result the control of the media or 
at least the avoidance of control by hostile elements has 
become essential to governments. Internationally, the growth 
of communications has permitted to an unprecedented degree 
'informal access' to the populations of countries by the 
officials of other countries."'' The change is typified in 
the intensity of international radio propaganda, the 
numbers of people serving their governments in foreign 
countries and the frequency of speeches by statesmen clearly 
directed at influencing the citizens of other countries 
(with or without the approval of their governments). 
International communication is now a vast, specialized and 
professional business undertaken by almost every government. 
Effective communications bear upon civil strife most 
obviously in that they create a wider audience and 
potentially a wider field of support than would otherwise
A.M. Scott, 'Internal Violence as an Instrument of Cold 
Warfare', in Rosenau (ed.), International Aspects of Civil 
S trife , p.154.
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be possible. This applies both inside and outside the
country concerned. It is not without reason that 'in modern
coups the capture of broadcasting facilities has become a
necessity'.1 Only if the government has lost all support
before its overthrow does gaining the acquiescence of the
population through the media cease to be absolutely
essential. At the same time the communication of contending
factions with the outside world has been greatly facilitated
in terms of both the capacity to make contacts and the ability
to transport physical resources. Yet there remains a gap
between making contacts and actually securing support.
Communications alone cannot be the decisive factor. Moreover,
one should beware of assuming that these are altogether novel
developments. Already in the mid-nineteenth century Mazzini
had concluded that 'the increase of our means for locomotion
and for intercommunication between one land and another is
reducing our earth to manageable compass, and making its
2inhabitants more conscious of being but one family'.
The availability of the means of war and of theories
on their effective use is the second twentieth-century
development which appears to have accentuated the problem of
internal conflict. In terms of sheer fire-power a given
number of combattants can now pose a far greater threat than
fifty or a hundred years ago. And there would seem to be
a ready supply of weapons to those who require them and who
are able to pay for them in some currency, whether financial
or political. It is not only other states that are prepared
to equip civil war factions but also private arms dealers,
3the scale of whose operations has mushroomed since 1945.
World War II itself left a surplus of weapons and military
D.G. Goodspeed, The Conspirators: A Study of the Coup
d 'Etat (New York, 1962), p.227.
2 'Non-Intervention' (1851), in Life and Writings of Joseph 
Mazzini (6 vols., London, 1890-91), vol. VI, p,307.
3 G. Thayer, The War Business (New York, 1969), ch. i.
equipment that were utilized, for instance, in the rebellions 
in South-East Asia in 1948 and which have constantly 
reappeared since. Soldiers as well as equipment have also 
proved available to those able to hire them; their 
employment is precluded by the nationalism or ideology of 
some rebel and incumbent groups but they have turned up 
on various sides in civil conflicts in Africa, notably in 
the Congo between 1960 and 1964 and in the Nigerian civil 
war. As with international communications there is the 
tantalizing question of the extent to which capacity has 
influenced decisions, in this case a capacity to wage war 
and a decision to fight. One can only point to the other 
side of the equation - the capacity to fight is at least 
equally available to the incumbent government, and this in 
itself may dissuade rebels from launching open warfare.
It is another question whether this century has 
produced new theories on the conduct of warfare, and in 
particular on warfare which is suited to civil conflicts.
It may be the case that theories of revolutionary war have 
made it possible for rebels to fight with some success 
against opposition which would otherwise be insurmountable. 
These theories rely on a harmonization of military principles 
and political goals. Their fullest exposition has come
from one man, Mao Tse-tung, though a number of lesser leaders
such as General Giap , Castro and Guevara have added their 
own glosses. The most important of Mao's doctrines will be 
briefly summarized for their relevance to the claim that 
revolutionary war is omnipotent and irresistible in civil 
conflicts. The fundamental teaching is the primacy of 
politics. Political power may result from the possession 
of guns but
Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and
the gun must never be allowed to command the Party.
Yet, having guns, we can create Party organizations.... 
Whoever wants to seize and retain state power must 
have a strong army. ■*•
Mao Tse-tung, 'Problems of War and Strategy', 6 November
1938, in Selected Works (4 vols., Peking, 1965), vol. II, 
pp. 224-5 . See also S.R. Schram, The Political Thought of 
Mao Tse-tung, revised edition (Harmondsworth, 1969) , p.290.
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China's Red Army, according to Mao, fought
not merely for the sake of fighting but in order to 
conduct propaganda among the masses, organize them, 
arm them, and to help them to establish 
revolutionary political power. Without these 
objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red 
Army loses the reason for its existence.1
The essence of victory is thus the political mobilization
of the whole people, for as this is achieved the guerillas
can move with ease and safety among the population, they can
obtain intelligence about the enemy and can move their
forces without his knowledge. Maintaining popular support
is crucial so that, for instance, guerrillas must be strictly
disciplined in their relations with civilians. On the
military side, the guerrillas must attempt to 'pit ten against
one' in tactical positions even though strategically they
2must 'pit one against ten'. Surprise, speed and mobility 
are prerequisites; large battles by which everything may be 
lost must be avoided. Retreat is often an indispensable 
preliminary to harassment, attack and then pursuit. At 
all times what is needed is a combination of effective 
organization, massive mobilization of support, judicious 
military tactics and perseverance. These components are 
generally envisaged as being held together by communist 
ideology which has something to say about all four. There 
appears to be no reason, however, why a different ideology 
should not be substituted. In practice nationalism seems 
to be the only feasible alternative; indeed, some would 
argue that all communist revolutionary warfare must depend 
to a certain extent on the forces of nationalism. Yet if 
nationalism is to be considered as a source of inspiration, 
revolutionary warfare may be seen to have origins far 
earlier than the Chinese Civil War.
The two elements of revolutionary warfare - 
political strategy and military tactics - can be separately
'On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party', December 1929, 
Selected Works, vol. I, p.106.
2 'Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War', 
December 1936, ibid., pp.236-7 .
traced back, the former to the French Revolutionary Wars 
and the latter to the Spanish resistance to Napoleon between 
1808 and 1813. The wars waged by revolutionary France were 
marked by ideological offensives intended to gain widespread 
support among the citizens of enemy countries. Propaganda 
and proselytism, however, remained adjuncts to the military 
defeat of the enemy and the conquest of territory. There 
was no attempt to make the gaining of mass support integral 
with the destruction of the opponent's forces. The 
Spanish guerrilleros who sorely harassed Napoleon's armies 
in the peninsula illustrate the military component of 
revolutionary warfare. They refused to accept as final the 
superiority of the invaders' regular forces and resorted 
to irregular operations against small enemy units. They 
exploited the inaccessibility of the terrain and made full 
use of the elements of surprise and mobility. While the 
guerri1leros benefited from popular hostility toward the 
invader and attachment to the church and monarchy, they 
were not seeking to undermine French control in any political 
way. While they certainly sought a psychological effect, 
their strategy was neither to substitute themselves for 
nor 'to destroy the French but to undermine their will to 
stay in the country'
The combination of military and political goals 
in a single concept of warfare appears first in the writings 
of Mazzini although the tenor of his language naturally 
differs from that of present-day theorists. Guerrilla 
methods, he maintained, offer the most effective road to 
freedom from foreign domination while simultaneously 
creating a national spirit. They must precede the creation 
of a regular army which will inflict the final defeat on
P. Paret, J.W. Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960s (New York, 
1962), p,7; on early guerrila warfare generally see chapter
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the enemy.' Before this stage, however, the guerrillas
must follow certain tactics outlined by Mazzini which are
not unfamiliar today. There must be control from the
centre and strong discipline at every point; surprise,
speed and intelligence must be exploited; attacks must be
frequent but always with lines of retreat left open:
Every band should be a living programme of the 
morality of the party. The most rigorous discipline 
is at once a duty and a necessity among them. It is 
a sacred duty towards their country, and a necessity 
for the bands themselves, which could not long exist 
if their conduct were such as to deprive them of the 
sympathy of the people.
... Guerrilla war is a war of judicious daring 
and audacity, active legs, and espionage.
... the greatest merit of the guerrilla chief is to 
contrive constantly to attack, do mischief, and 
retire . 3
Most importantly, there is the essence of all concepts of
revolutionary warfare - the primacy of political goals.
As Mao admonishes the purely military outlook, Mazzini issues
a warning about the limits of the guerrillas' function:
Guerrilla bands are the precursors of the nation, and 
endeavour to rouse the nation to insurrection. They 
have no right to substitute themselves for the nati o n . 3
Mazzini has been cited at some length to indicate 
that revolutionary warfare is not a totally novel phenomenon
'Insurrection - by means of guerrilla bands - is the true 
method of warfare for all nations desirous of emancipating 
themselves from a foreign yoke. This method of warfare 
supplies the want - inevitable at the commencement of the 
insurrection - of a regular army; it calls the greatest 
number of elements into the field, and yet may be sustained 
by the smallest number. It forms the military education of 
the people, and consecrates every foot of the native soil by 
the memory of some warlike deed.
'Guerrilla warfare opens a field of activity for 
every local capacity; forces the enemy into an unaccustomed 
method of battle; avoids the evil consequences of a great 
d e f e a t .....It is invincible, indestructible'. 'General 
Instructions for Members of Young Italy' (1831), Life and 
W r i t i n g s , vol. I, p.109.
2 'Rules for the Conduct of Guerrilla Bands' ( 1832) , ibid., 
pp .369 , 374 .
3 i b i d . , p . 369.
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of the twentieth century. To the extent that it is not 
new, therefore, it cannot be considered to have added of 
itself a unique dimension to the contemporary problem of 
civil strife. Yet a number of circumstances have combined 
in recent years to enhance its original significance. 
Nationalism as a doctrine is potentially universal in its 
application, but each application is not universal in scope. 
Communist ideology, by contrast, postulates a world-wide 
system based on class so that any civil conflict must also 
be seen in international terms. It also offers techniques 
for maintaining control over a movement which may be partly 
nationalist in character as well as communist. Most 
significantly, perhaps, communist ideology has become the 
Weltanschauung of the USSR and China. At once revolutionary 
warfare appears to have a potential not limited to national 
goals but extending to the international strategy of those 
who can direct it. It is frequently pointed out, moreover, 
that situations where guerrillas can exploit social, 
economic or nationalist discontent have multiplied enormously 
in the last decades. While the number of possible arenas 
for internal conflict may not have increased by that great 
a margin, most are now independent states rather than 
colonial territories. As such they are subject to considerable 
internal political stresses, a situation made all the more 
significant by the development of communications and of 
theories of revolutionary warfare.
D: The Instability of New States
The most striking general difference between the 
newly-independent states and the older states lies in their 
economic condition. While there are older countries which 
are poor - in Latin America, for example - it is almost 
without exception the case that the newer states lack 
economic viability. This weakness correlates strongly with 
the experience of internal conflicts. In the period 1958-66, 
according to the figures of Secretary McNamara,1 only one
1 Essence of Security, pp.145-6.
of the 27 nations in the World Bank category of 'rich' 
suffered a 'major internal upheaval'. This incidence of 
less than 4% compares with 48% among the 'middle-income' 
countries, 69% among the 'poor' countries and 87% among the 
'very poor' countries. One cannot conclude, however, that 
economic backwardness is a cause of civil conflicts. 
Certainly, the incidence of civil strife may diminish as 
states move up the scale from poorest to richest, but 
economic growth involves more factors than the purely 
economic. It is those other factors, for example the 
political consequences of central regulation of the economy, 
which may obviate the pressures for internal conflict.
At the same time, economic underdevelopment may be in part 
the result of political instability. The picture drawn by 
Hobbes of the consequences of the situation where 'men live 
without a common power to keep them all in awe' is not far 
removed from contemporary conditions in many parts of the 
world: 'there is no place for industry; because the fruit
thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the
earth'.1 Again, there are certain countries which enjoy 
political stability and yet remain economically backward.
The conclusion must be that there is no simple, direct 
relationship between economic conditions and civil strife; 
whatever connections exist must be more precisely specified.
The connection between underdevelopment and 
vulnerability to internal conflict is sometimes seen as 
being made by political leaders, often, but not necessarily, 
communists. Poverty is believed to produce grievances and 
discontent among the masses who are consequently ready to 
follow those who promise immediate and drastic changes; 
the process of agitation would include focusing attention 
on conspicuous consumption, corruption and the system of 
land-ownership. The concern of the people with their 
economic circumstances can thus be directed into political 
channels. Communist ideology stands out in this respect
1 Leviathan, ed. M. Oakeshott (Oxford, 1946), p.82.
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because its basic doctrines are materialist and because it 
appears more ready to encourage resort to open conflict and 
violence as means of changing the existing order. There 
are some flaws in this position. Communism flourishes as 
much, if not more, in the wealthier countries of Western 
Europe as in the poor nations; this indicates that support 
for communist goals has a greater variety of causes than 
economic needs alone. More important, however, is the 
argument that it is the political circumstances in which 
people find themselves that are decisive; thus while extremes 
of poverty may be borne for generations without leading to 
political discontent, serious dissatisfaction with political 
arrangements which is unrelated to economic conditions can 
erupt into conflict. Nevertheless, the possibility remains 
that energy latent in the economic sphere may in some cases 
be transformed into political action by deliberate efforts; 
it is a field of enquiry where little definite has been 
discovered.
The gap between the economic and political spheres 
may also be bridged by the notion of economic growth or 
modernization.'*' The mere desire for better material 
conditions becomes political when it has something to say 
about the way in which society must be changed in order 
to achieve the desired increase in production. This concern 
with economic development is a phenomenon peculiar to recent 
decades; countries that have been poor for centuries now see 
and embrace the possibility of raising their living standards 
at an unprecedented rate. The demand for improvement may be 
felt at the individual level, though, as the previous 
paragraph suggested, there are difficulties in relating such 
pressures to t-he political sphere. But at government level 
economic growth is often an urgent matter of high politics. 
Poor states today need to make decisions in order to develop,
On the nature of the modernization process see C.E. Black, 
'Revolution, Modernization, and Communism', in Black, T.P. 
Thornton (eds.) , Communism and Revolution (Princeton, 1964) , 
p p .8-13.
29
unlike the European economies which two centuries earlier
began to 'take off' without conscious direction.^- The
country may be pressed to choose between various types of
economic system in the search for maximum growth. This
pressure sometimes comes from outside. The Soviet Union,
for instance, developed the concepts of 'national democracy'
and 'revolutionary democracy' in order to encourage leaders
to extend state control of the economy and to establish
2one-party systems. The United States, China and Russia 
all offer competing models of rapid industrial growth, the 
latter two from conditions of basic underdevelopment. While 
this rivalry ordinarily involves little more than diplomatic 
bargaining, it becomes important when there is serious 
disagreement within a country about the economic methods 
to be adopted. In these circumstances the capture of 
political power may appear essential to a minority group 
which believes that modernization is being held up by the 
incumbent regime or is being inadequately pursued. 
Alternatively, the modernization process may itself produce 
instability, favouring some groups rather than others.
The favoured group, if not already in power, may seek to 
capitalize on and secure its position; the less favoured 
group may take political action in order to advance their 
interests. The coups in Nigeria in January and August 1966 
are to a certain extent examples of these two situations 
(respectively). It is true that the great powers may give 
encouragement and assistance to groups which follow their 
particular model, but this should not be taken for the
The crucial difference is that 'there is, generally 
speaking, no indigenous bourgeoisie and no indigenous 
accumulation of private capital. The desired economic 
development has therefore to be undertaken by state 
initiative, state accumulation and investment of capital, 
state planning and controls'. C.B. MacPherson, 'Revolution 
and Ideology in the Late Twentieth Century', in Friedrich 
( e d .) , Revolution, p .14 2.
2 For a fuller discussion see P.E. Mosely, 'Soviet Foreign 
Policy Since Krushchev', in R. Swearingen (ed.), Soviet 
and Chinese Communist Power in_the World Today (New York, 1966)
30
motive force behind conflicts over economic growth. Such 
aid may well exacerbate the conflict which, however, remains 
essentially indigenous.
The internal debate over economic growth is thus 
closely related to the level of political development. In 
most newly-independent states there is no broad and 
established consensus about political arrangements for the 
simple reason that there has been insufficient time to 
secure such agreement. One of the many arguments concerning 
the wisdom of granting independence to colonial territories 
has in fact centred around their readiness for effective 
self-government. To a certain extent the ability to govern 
can be taught to dependent peoples, notably through the 
development of institutions such as an impartial civil 
service, an efficient police force and political 
representation in one form or another. But the art of 
operating an independent, sovereign political system can 
only be learned through actual experience. At the moment 
of independence, therefore, no state is fully prepared 
to exercise self-government although some may be better 
prepared than others.
Many of the governments that have gained 
independence since 1945 enjoyed little opportunity to 
establish their authority either in their opposition to 
the colonialists or in collaboration with them. The task 
of the new leaders is often to justify their tenure of power 
at all rather than to justify simply their policies which 
is what a regime with established authority would normally 
expect to do. An essential feature of civil strife - a 
fundamental dispute about who is to govern - is thus 
immediately present. Nor is there necessarily any consensus 
about the area of affairs which politics covers or about the 
methods which may be legitimately employed for political 
ends. Dissension may be further deepened when the political 
system itself is the stake in an economic competition:
3 1
the state apparatus itself, and wage e m p l oyment in 
the public sector which it represents, are the main 
resources which the new 'political community' 
possesses. C o m p e t i t i o n  is primarily for jobs, not 
for changes of policy. It is difficult to avoid a 
'winner take all' situation, parti c u l a r l y  if the 
'successor class' appears to have been chosen through 
circumstances d i c tated by the departing colonial 
author ities.^-
The constant threat of a violent seizure of power by 
o p p o si tion groups may also compel the incumbent gov e r n m e n t  
to employ valuable resources simply in the task of m a i n t a i n i n g  
its pos it ion rather than in creating support for the 
p o l i ti cal system as a whole.
The d ifficulties are s e 1f -c o m p o u n d i n g , for an 
o p p o si tion that is totally excluded from political benefits  
may well look to outsiders for support and assistance.
Any inh ibitions on involving foreigners are so much the 
wea ke r on account of that very exclusion. In Western 
Africa, for instance,
because the concept of nation is not fully d e v eloped 
... the o p p o s i t i o n  group may find no i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y 
be tween its p o s i t i o n  as a national party seeking power 
and its acceptance of alien support. In fact, it may 
even define its objectives in n on-national terms, 
calling itself 'an African party' or a branch of an 
African Socialist movement.
Outs ide  i n t e r v e n t i o n  in the politics of a country - such as 
Nkrum ah 's support for various political refugees - may thus 
indicate an u n f i nished struggle for power. In a country 
where political authority is more firmly esta b l i s h e d  both 
the in clination to look for external assistance on the part
of opp osition groups and the potential influence of 
ou tsi ders are c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y  diminished.
One of the tasks in deve loping a 'political culture' 
is the creation of a sense of social and national 
cohesiveness. Lo yalty to the nation has often to be won in 
the face of racial, tribal, religious, linguistic and
J.M. Lee, Af rican Armies and Civil Order (London, 19 69) , 
p . 179.
2 I.W. Zartman, Inter n a t i o n a l  Relations in the New A f r i c a  
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966) , p.96.
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regional diversities and antipathies. Moreover, where
social conflicts are latent or have already erupted, the
inducement to intervene appears to be strong. National
boundaries often cut across tribal or linguistic groups
and governments tend to be sympathetic toward the plight
of minorities in other countries who belong to the s ame race
or share the same religion. The possibility of outside
intervention gives an added stimulus to the search for unity.
One solution has been the appeal to a transcendent ideology
which may draw upon both European and local ideas. Resort
to an alternative solution - stimulation of an outside threat
to the national unit - seems to have been relatively
uncommon. Another response, the ethic of anti- factiona1 ism
characterizes much African political thought. It derives
from 'the dogma that imperial powers once divided in order
to rule'.* 1 Anti-factionalism seeks to deny the 'ultimate
excuse' for outside intervention in African affairs,
manifesting itself in the doctrine of the one-party state,
in the notion of a classless Africa and in the denigration 
2of tribalism.
At the same time, however, it is not certain that 
internal conflicts arise from diversity as such, for even 
social antipathies need to be focused on political issues 
in some way. The civil war in Nigeria is again an 
instructive example. Certainly, the fighting was chiefly 
between Ibos on the Biafran side and non-Ibos on the 
Federal Government side, but their antagonism cannot be put 
down simply to tribalism or tribal rivalry. (It would be 
similarly unhelpful to ascribe World War II to German and 
British nationalism on the grounds that Germans fought on 
one side and Britons on the other.) In the Nigerian case 
as was suggested earlier, the conflict may be interpreted 
as a consequence of the process of modernization which 
produced a division of political benefits that was
A.A. Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africans (London, 1967), p.212.
2 1 o c . c i t .
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regarded as unequal and unfair. Even though one side 
defines its cause in tribal or racial terms this may conceal 
the true dimensions of the conflict.1 23 The real importance of 
social disunity among the new states is that it means the 
presence of underlying and conflicting loyalties which may 
be activated by political conflicts.
For a variety of reasons the military has played
a crucial role in the political life of the new states. On
numerous occasions the army has intervened in order to take
over the political system or to establish one of its own
choosing. This activity is not limited to the new states,
of course, as Finer's work shows. He deals mainly with the
older countries at three levels of 'political culture';
consequently there can be added to his list of motives for
military intervention the concern for modernization and
progress. Such a purpose was evident among the army
3officers who deposed Nkrumah in February 1966. There is 
always a risk that the army will seek to take over control 
in a politically underdeveloped country, but unless there 
are widespread and fundamental dissensions in the country - 
as was the case with Nigeria - the violence involved is 
likely to be short-lived and on a small scale. The reason 
is partly that the army itself frequently serves as the 
main instrument for guaranteeing internal security, a task 
which has generally taken first place over defence against 
outside attack. Moreover, the army is in many cases the 
most effective organization in the country, having 
overwhelming force at its disposal and a capacity for 
administration which sometimes leads army officers to 
believe that they could run the country more efficiently 
than politicians who are thought to be corrupt and self- 
seeking. In such circumstances there are few reasons to 
expect that the army will remain completely apolitical,
See, for example, S.K. Panter-Brick 'The Right to Self- 
determination: Its Application to Nigeria' , International
Affairs, vol. 44 (April 1968).
2 S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (London, 1962), ch. iv.
3 W. Gutteridge, The Military in African Politics (London, 
1969) , ch. vii .
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particularly when it is itself part of the modernization
process.^ The solution may be rather to incorporate the
armed forces into the political system so that the incentive
to take over completely is reduced. As President Nyerere
concluded a few months after the Tanganyika Army mutiny:
There is always some element of risk about having an 
army at all in a developing country, but since you 
can't do without an army in these times the task is 
to ensure that the officers and men are integrated 
into the Government and party so that they become no 
more of a risk than, say, the Civil Service.^
It might seem therefore that the military is an 
important channel for involving outside states in internal 
conflicts in view of the fact that the armed forces of many 
new states are heavily dependent on foreign training and 
equipment. The extent of outside influence resulting from 
this is problematical but even in the few cases where it is 
considerable the possibility of active determination of a 
struggle for power remains small. Gutteridge's analysis of 
the question concludes:
It is very often foreign aid which gives to armies the 
power to intervene in politics, but the purpose of 
intervention is more likely to be determined by 
particular local conditions than by the influence of 
a source of assistance. In fact, the professional 
traditions of the major powers who provide the 
majority of aid, be it in Latin America, Africa, or 
Asia, are more likely to inhibit the development of 
partisan attitudes than to encourage them: that there
is no consistency in the pattern of the military in 
politics is perhaps the best proof of this.^
Moreover, if the new states are in any case more susceptible
to internal strife than the older states, their armed forces
may prove to be the best instrument for ensuring internal
Sir Alec Douglas-Home was setting an unrealistically high 
standard in his remarks following the East African mutinies 
of January 1964: 'I was afraid that they would get their
independence before they had the two essential things that 
are necessary if you are to run a country. One is a police 
force, loyal to the Government; and another is armed forces, 
loyal to the elected government of the day.' Cited by 
Mazrui, op. cit., p.161.
2 Cited by Gutteridge, op. cit., pp.32-3.
3 ibid., p .140.
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stability and supervising political development. Success 
of the army in this role would reduce the sources of 
disorder as well as diminish the opportunities for outside 
intervention.
E : Conelusions
The international system has always contained a 
considerable number of relatively weak and unstable states 
which have been prone to internal conflict and subject to 
external intervention. Since the early part of the nineteenth 
century many of the Latin American countries have been in 
this position. Even powerful states have been liable to break 
down in internal dissensions at certain historical periods.
Nor is it the sheer number of states that is significant in 
the contemporary system, for the several hundred 
principalities and petty kingdoms in the old European system 
were not regarded as a comparable problem. What, then, has 
been the special significance of the new states since 1945?
The central features peculiar to the post-war world are to 
be found, firstly, in the needs of the new states themselves 
and, secondly, in the concern of outside powers with the 
course of their political and economic development. Any 
attempt to assess the importance of civil strife in the 
contemporary world must take these features into account.
The new nations are not only economically and 
militarily weak in general but must depend to a considerable 
extent on outside assistance to overcome these deficiencies. 
Such assistance may not be a matter of life and death for 
them but its supply or withdrawal can seriously affect their 
viability. The rate of economic growth will determine the 
level of government spending and the standard of living of 
the population; an adequate military capacity will enable 
the incumbent regime to put down or contain small-scale 
revolts and disturbances before they threaten to bring down 
the government. While poverty and military weakness are 
not direct causes of political instability, economic progress 
and military strength tend to be regarded as political issues. 
Few states, if any, can choose to disregard them; indeed,
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as Halpern suggests, 'the revolution of modernization ... 
is not a peculiar burden carried temporarily by the under­
developed, but is history's first common, world-wide 
revolution'.  ^ What is crucial for the new states is that 
this revolution must be carried out in a situation where 
established and secure political arrangements are lacking.
The government itself is the instrument for modernization 
and development and it can be captured relatively easily 
in a country where it is not yet fully integrated into 
society. Those initiating civil conflict frequently 
proclaim their intention to fulfil these goals more 
efficiently than the existing government. While reform 
coups and revolutions in the name of progress are by no 
means a thing of the present alone, what is unique today 
is the near-universal acceptance of the value of 
modernization. New and old states alike espouse, or at 
least claim to espouse, goals which require rapid and 
ceaseless change.
This introduces the second major factor, namely 
the concern which the major powers show for the future of 
the new states. In part, it is involuntary. The needs of 
the new nations press themselves upon those in a position to 
satisfy them. Wealthy and powerful states must not only 
give economic and military assistance but must also give 
some thought to the political protection of other governments 
from internal and external threats. For such conflicts 
threaten to expand and involve outside powers to the point 
where they cannot be ignored. Involvement may be necessitated, 
moreover, by the potential effects of internal strife on 
the relationship between the leading powers; this will be 
especially true if an outside power is believed to be 
already involved. Nor are civil war factions always averse
M. Halpern, 'A Redefinition of the Revolutionary 
situation', Journal of International Affairs, vol. XXIII n o . 1 
(1969), p.57. Falk uses a similarly wide definition of 
revolution in 'World Revolution and International Order' , 
in Friedrich (ed) , Revolution , p.155.
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to exploiting this tension. In part, this outside concern 
is voluntary. Nations do in a sense choose certain moral 
and political standards which may be relevant to particular 
internal conflicts. Concern for human suffering, for 
individual liberty, or for racial equality spring most 
obviously to mind. To some extent, therefore, states 
may have become more willing to intervene in others' affairs. 
In part, finally, this concern with the development of the 
new nations derives from a capacity to become involved; the 
ability to influence the course of events often stimulates 
an interest in them, an interest which is both voluntary 
and involuntary. Here it is necessary to say only that 
capacity includes both the physical ability and the 
knowledge required for intervention. Some writers have 
argued that power has outstripped knowledge in this respect.'*' 
It is certainly easier to show that the ability of the 
leading states to intervene in the affairs of the weaker ones 
has expanded enormously in the post-war years than to discover 
a corresponding increase in the knowledge of states, whether 
it be for the purpose of economic development, suppressing a 
rebellion or subverting a government. The new states, in 
short, live in a world that cannot shut itself off from 
them; nor can they isolate themselves from the rest of the 
world.
M. Halpern, 'The Morality and Politics of Intervention', 
in Rosenau (ed.) , International Aspects of Civil Strife, 
p p .260-9.
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CHAPTER II : CIVIL STRIFE AND OUTSIDE STATES
Civil strife creates a problem for international 
order in the first instance because states are frequently led 
to intervene in it but ultimately because they disagree 
about the purposes of such intervention. Before considering 
the wider aspect of the problem, however, it is necessary to 
provide a definition of intervention and to analyse more 
closely the pressures working for and against this phenomenon. 
The nature of intervention in civil strife, its limits and 
its potential are clearly relevant to the character of the 
broader problem of international order.
A: Intervention in Civil Strife
The term 'intervention' referring to a certain 
kind of activity of the part of states has been subject to 
a great number of definitions since international lawyers 
and others first became concerned with the topic.
Disagreement between them has resulted from the conflicting 
purposes of the definers and from clashing notions about the 
function and value of definition as well as from the 
complexity of the act of intervention itself.'1' These battles 
will be circumvented rather than settled by confining the 
term ’intervention' for present purposes to intervention in
civil strife; other varieties of intervention, for example
2in internal affairs generally, will be left undisturbed. 
Intervention in civil strife is to be defined as actions 
taken by a state which can be expected to affect the
For a critical discussion of the problems of defining 
intervention see J.N. Rosenau, 'Intervention as a Scientific 
Concept', Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. XIII (June 
1969) .
2 C. de Visscher suggests that intervention in the 
contemporary world, especially that which is subversive, 
'differs sharply from intervention as that was known in the 
nineteenth century; for even when its motives were political, 
intervention involved nothing more than occasional pressures 
for limited objectives'. Theory and Reality in Public 
International Law (Princeton, 1957) , p. 296 .
39
relations between an incumbent government and a rebel group 
or between two rival factions within another state. 
Intervention in this sense might include not only all forms 
of aid to incumbents or rebels but also attempts to mediate 
between the two sides or to encourage them to refrain from 
conflict; this study will be concerned primarily with 
intervention that assists one side to impose its goals on 
the other. Intervention might also include actions designed 
to create a rebel group in another state or to instigate 
active revolt by a group already in existence. The 
distinction between civil conflicts which originate 
externally and those which attract outside participation 
after breaking out is crucial for some purposes and these 
will be considered later. But the essence of the activity 
defined here is the action of an outside state on an existing 
or potential situation of civil strife in another country.
Naturally, this definition is not without problems. 
It seeks to avoid both purely subjective and purely objective 
criteria of definition by referring to an expectation that 
the course of a civil conflict will be affected. To define 
intervention as activity which actually has an effect on a 
civil conflict is in some cases to demand proof of what is 
unprovable or knowledge of what cannot be known, at least 
until after the event. The present definition designates 
actions which, taking into account all the circumstances 
which seem relevant, can generally be expected to have an 
influence on the course of a civil conflict. Consider, for 
example, the initiation of economic sanctions against a 
particular government. The question is whether or not such 
a policy is interventionary in the sense defined here. It 
will not do to ask that judgement be suspended until the 
actual effects of the policy are seen; the period of waiting 
may stretch out indefinitely and then the expected effects 
may not be observed, perhaps on account of some chance 
factor, perhaps on account of countermeasures taken by the 
government. On the other hand, it cannot simply be assumed 
that economic sanctions will automatically undermine the 
authority of the incumbent government and consequently
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promote opposition elements because they are intended to do 
so. 'The naive theory of the relation between economic 
warfare ... and political disintegration,' in Galtung's 
words, 'sees some kind of roughly proportionate relation: 
the more value-deprivation, the more political 
disintegration'.1 Galtung goes on to argue that economic 
sanctions, far from invariably promoting civil strife in 
the country concerned, may well diminish opposition to the 
existing regime. The community as a whole may resent being 
victim of outside pressures and feel more tightly integrated 
than before; it may adapt itself to new conditions of 
hardship and in the process lose some of its internal 
rivalries.
When such a policy is first undertaken, therefore, 
it is a matter of judging whether in this particular case it 
can be expected to produce civil strife within the target 
state. Knowledge is required both of the situation in the 
country concerned and of previous instances of economic 
sanctions since precedents can help determine whether a 
given action might generally be expected to have an 
interventionary effect. Thus continuous failure of a certain 
type of activity to have any effect at all will at some time 
produce the conclusion that such behaviour is no longer 
interventionary. Similarly, background knowledge of this 
kind is required by a judge in domestic courts who has to 
determine whether or not an allegedly obscene book does in 
fact tend to deprave and corrupt; it is a decision which 
must be informed by an awareness of many social and 
psychological factors and which cannot be made simply by 
reference to the statutes. Such factors, moreover, are 
liable to change over a period of time. Acts which are 
interventionary - like books which are corrupting - cannot 
be specified without reference to the general context in 
which they appear.
J. Galtung, 'On the Effects of International Economic 
Sanctions', World Politics, vol. XIX (April 1967), p.388.
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The present definition of intervention in civil 
strife also avoids the thorny problem of the intentions of 
the intervening state. To require that a state have an 
interventionary animus before intervention can be said to 
exist is to place an excessive burden on what is largely a 
fragile working hypothesis. In the first place, states do 
not have simple, unambiguous motives; they may even be unclear 
as to their own purposes. Thus a certain act on the part 
of a state may be designed to achieve a variety of purposes, 
only one of which might be called interventionary; again, 
a particular act may turn out to be interventionary although 
this was far from the minds of the statesmen undertaking 
it. Clearly, there are great practical difficulties in 
reaching definite conclusions about the motives of states 
when the idea of motives is in any case simply a convenient 
fiction for explaining complex behaviour. In the second 
place, the question of motives appears irrelevant for present 
purposes. In judging the actions of others, states tend 
to be less concerned with the intentions that may lie behind 
these actions than with the consequences that they 
themselves expect to follow. For states usually assume 
that intervention in civil strife is deliberately planned, 
and the impartial observer may almost as often reach the 
same conclusion. While the question of interventionary intent 
is of some importance in controlling intervention, a more 
significant factor would seem to be the freedom of choice 
that a state has in undertaking intervention.'*' The 
circumstances making for intervention, in other words, count 
for more than whether the interventionary effect is intended 
or unintended.
Intervention in civil strife may take any form from 
the despatch of large numbers of troops to simple verbal 
encouragement of a rebel group. The relevant test is whether 
any of these activities can be expected to affect the civil 
conflict in question. Now while it is true that an act such
1 See chapters VII and VIII.
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as the introduction of troops will invariably produce 
some effect whatever the circumstances, this is not the 
case with many other actions. The dissemination of 
propaganda in another country, for instance, cannot always 
be considered interventionary even when it takes the form of 
a clear call to revolt. An interesting example is to be 
found in General de Gaulle's remarks on a 'free Quebec' 
during his visit to Canada in July 1967. He had in mind 
the emergence of Quebec into the rank of a sovereign state 
and appeared to be encouraging secession by the province.  ^
But it was also apparent that any such attempt by Quebec was 
unlikely and that the President's remarks were not generally 
expected to alter this situation. It was certainly a lapse 
of diplomatic courtesy, since the federal government had 
long been embarrassed by seccessionist demands, but little 
more. In different circumstances, however, comparable 
remarks might be highly interventionary. In a weakly 
unified state explicit approval of secession on the part of 
an outside power might well be expected to encourage a 
province to break away, especially if the latter sees a 
promise of more concrete assistance in the future. Thus 
while words may most clearly announce an interventionary 
intent, it is their likely effect that must be assessed. ^
The President expounded his ideas at a press conference 
in Paris on 27 November 1967. The Time s , 28 November 1967.
2 The International Convention concerning the Use of 
Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, signed in 1936 and 
entering into force in 1938, obliged the parties to refrain 
from broadcasting matter of 'such a character as to incite 
the population of any territory to acts incompatible with 
the internal order or the security of a territory of a High 
Contracting Party'. Article 1, cited by D.W. Bowett, 
Self-Defence in International Law (Manchester, 1958) , p.50. 
This definition of hostile propaganda is broader than the 
present definition of intervention since it refers to acts 
likely to challenge the existing order generally rather than 
promote civil strife but it is of a similar nature. The 
test of interventionary propaganda put forward in A.V.W.
Thomas and A.J. Thomas Jnr., Nonintervention: The Law and
its Import in the Americas (Dallas, 1956) , p.274, by contrast, 
would take at face value the symbols that are manipulated 
and ignore the probability of success.
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It is obvious, moreover, that the location of the
activity concerned will not be of prime importance. What
may be the case is that actions on the territory of the
intervening state will prove more difficult to relate to a
civil conflict elsewhere than actions in the divided country
itself; a probable sequence of cause and effect must be
shown to exist between the original actions and the course
of the conflict. No simple assertion may be made either
that no such connection can exist or that one will exist
in every case. Stalin was somewhat less than frank when
he claimed that Soviet encouragement of the American
Communist Party within the Soviet Union could not be
construed as hostile to the U.S. Government:
In what do the activities of the Communist Party 
consist? ....These activities usually consist in 
the organization of the working masses, in 
organizing meetings, demonstrations,strikes, etc.
It is perfectly clear that American communists 
cannot perform all this on Soviet territory.^
Nevertheless, it may be true that the actions of the Soviet
Government in supporting foreign communist parties in
various ways did contribute to the overthrow of other
governments; the line of argument might not be sustained
but it has to be kept open. At the same time, however,
most states are jealous of the right of their citizens
to comment freely on the iniquity of certain other
governments; they do not wish to be accused of subversion on
each occasion that they criticize or allow to be criticized
the form of government of another state. The right of
granting asylum to political refugees, including rebels,
is similarly maintained by most states, regardless of their
ideological persuasion. Accordingly, it is reasonable to
require that accusations of subversion or intervention in
this kind of situation be accompanied by a demonstration
of the probable effects of the action concerned. The only
Interview with Roy Howard, 5 March 1936, text in J. Degras 
(e d .), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (3 vols., London, 
1951-52-53), vo1. Ill, pp.167-8.
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generalization that may be safely offered is that 
demonstration of interventionary consequences of purely 
verbal activity, unaccompanied by more concrete actions, is 
likely to prove elusive.'*' This will be so even when the 
words in question amount to a command to a rebel group in 
another country.* 2
The definition of intervention offered here has 
been influenced by the purpose of this study which is to 
discover the ways in which intervention in civil strife 
may be regulated. If the concern were primarily with the 
goals of states or with the effectiveness of interventionary 
policies, then a definition would be needed which focused 
more directly on the motives of states and on the actual 
consequences of their actions. The present definition, it 
has been argued, does not ignore such factors but treats 
them as part of the background knowledge which is required 
in order to say whether a given action might generally be 
expected to have an interventionary effect. Domestic law 
takes a similar approach to regulating the behaviour of 
individual citizens. A man may be deemed guilty if his 
actions could have reasonably been expected to lead to 
unlawful consequences. The man's motives may or may not 
have been malicious, but this is not of primary concern 
although it may affect the severity of any punishment 
inflicted. Again, the normal consequences of his actions 
may have been frustrated by chance or by deliberate
Lecturing on the role of propaganda in the cold war 
R.H.S. Crossman warned that 'Psychological warfare is no 
substitute for action. It is, at best, an accompaniment to 
action, something which slightly accelerates the process 
of military force or the process of diplomacy. It is not 
some mysterious trick of its own which can be used when you 
are prevented from using conventional weapons. ' Address 
to the Royal United Service Institution, 18 February 1953; 
excerpts in W.E. Daugherty, 'The Creed of a Modern 
Propagandist', in Daugherty, M. Janowitz (eds.),
A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore, 1958) , p.44.
2 See R .A . Falk, 'The Control of International Violence in 
a Disarming World' , in Legal Order in a Violent World 
(Princeton, 1968), p.515.
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countermeasures but this does not alter the prime question 
of guilt or innocence. Of course, this parallel should not 
be taken too far. Intervention in civil strife has not 
been defined as per se contrary to international law; one of 
the aims of this study is to determine the circumstances 
under which it is desirable to prohibit intervention.
Domestic law, moreover, differs in substantial respects 
from the sorts of international rules to be considered here 
(of which international law forms only one variety) but 
what is common is the manner in which rules or statements 
of law are applied to the behaviour of the persons to which 
they are addressed. It is the regulation of the 
interventionary behaviour of states that provides the focus 
of this study.
B: The Internationalization of Civil Strife
Civil strife takes place within the boundaries of 
a single state but almost without exception it arouses 
interest or concern among outside states. On occasions this 
concern is transformed into action of an interventionary 
kind. Some assessment thus needs to be made of the tendency 
evident in any civil conflict apart from the most minor to 
acquire international dimensions. The most obvious 
instance is provided by civil strife which is instigated or 
promoted from outside since an international element is 
already present at the outbreak of the conflict. This 
situation produces its own pressures for further 
internationalization. What will be considered here are the 
ways in which any existing internal conflict might involve 
outside states. This is part of the 'problem' of civil strife 
in any international system although, as will be seen, there 
are other factors making for the limitation of such conflicts 
to purely local affairs. More often than not, however, the 
balance of these forces seems to be on the side of 
internationalization.
The pressures for internationalization may 
originate in either the incumbent government or in the rebel 
group. In some conflicts both sides will be able to act
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effectively with their own resources or will lack 
sufficient time to call upon outside help. The essence of 
a coup d'etat from the rebels' point of view is speed and 
surprise; only a small quantum of armed force is usually 
considered necessary and as a rule this is provided by the 
army of the country concerned. An attempt to bring in 
outside forces would normally be superfluous and quite 
possibly self-defeating since the element of surprise could 
be lost. What the rebels are most likely to require is the 
acquiescence of interested outsiders and the promise of 
support for the new government. Similarly, the incumbents, 
unless forewarned, can only rely on the resources they 
possess at the moment the coup is attempted. If the coup 
lasts only a matter of hours the time factor will preclude 
outside support; but if it is prolonged for a matter of 
days this may prove long enough. Thus US military 
intervention in the Dominican Republic on 28 April 1965 
came only four days after the initial military revolt 
against the government of Reid Cabral. Pressures for 
internationalization of civil conflict may thus be 
restricted by the factors of time and the availability of 
adequate forces.
Even in a coup there is scope for outside support 
to be sought by incumbents and rebels both beforehand and 
afterwards. But it is when the conflict persists for any 
length of time that the two sides will tend to look 
outside. Modelski has argued as an empirical generalization 
that since
incumbents always and by definition have 
international connections, simply because they are 
in charge of the legitimate machinery of the 
state ... the insurgents, by virtue of having to 
approximate the incumbents as closely as possible 
in order to supplant them, must develop the same 
machinery.^
Modelski treats both incumbents and insurgents as political 
systems composed of four structures - authority, solidarity,
G. Modelski, 'The International Relations of Internal 
War', in Rosenau (ed.), International Aspects of Civil 
Strife, pp.14-15.
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culture and resources - each of which must be developed
and ma in t a i n e d . ^  Usually it is the insurgents who have the
most to do in these areas. In many cases rebel leaders have
made contacts with foreign countries before a civil conflict
2and will expand them in the course of the war. In addition 
to the personal element, of course, a rebel movement may 
be able to call upon connections with outside governments, 
o r g a n iz ations and political parties. 'Only in the most 
exc ep ti onal cases,' Modelski points out, 'does the structure 
of so li darity coincide with the boun daries of a political 
sy ste m such as that of a nation-state. Naturally, there 
are many bases of solidarity; nor is political solidarity 
so met hing which rebels alone can exploit. An incumbent 
regime may elicit support by representing itself as 
'democratic' or 'communist' , 'Arab' or 'African' , or even 
simply as 'legitimate'; and the appeal need not be to 
other governments alone, for individuals, groups and 
or ga n i z a t i o n s  may be induced either to assist directly or 
to put pressure on their governments to adopt certain 
policies. The language of such appeals is clearly important 
too; a common language or culture - in the sense of shared 
terms of reference - already implies feelings of sympathy 
and concern. To communists, for instance, the term 
'revolutionary' is normative rather than descriptive since 
it is used both of a rebel mo vement and of a regime in 
power in order to indicate that its cause is just and worthy
i b i d . , p p .15-18.
2 Long before Ho Chi Minh began the struggle against the 
French  in 1945, he had been dealing with foreign governments. 
In the 1920s he spent some time with the communist m o v ement 
in China, founding the V i e t namese Revolu t i o n a r y  Youth 
League there in 1925; early in World War II he was 
i mp ri so ned by the K u o m intang but released by them in 1943 
so that he could conduct an anti-Japanese campaign in 
Vietnam. Ho had also made contacts with the Soviet Union at 
various times. J.J. Zasloff, The Role of the Sanctuary in 
Insurgency: Com m u n i s t  China's Support to the V i e t m i n h ,
1946-1954 (Santa Monica, 1967), p p . 4-6; B.B. Fall, The Two
Viet-Nams: A Political and Mi litary A n a l y s i s , second
edi tion (London, 1967), pp.61-3.
3 op. c i t . , p.16.
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of support. The language of nationalism, democracy and 
so on has similar terms.
Finally, a civil conflict generates a demand for 
material resources which both sides must seek to satisfy.
In some cases the country concerned appears large enough 
to sustain the demands made upon it but even then assistance 
may be more easily gained from outside. The Civil War in 
Russia saw a variety of support given by Britain, France, 
the United States, Italy and Japan to the enemies of the 
Bolshevik regime. In the Chinese Civil War it was the 
government that received aid from a number of countries 
including Russia and the United States at various times.
It is not simply that the weaker side seeks outside aid in 
order to redress the internal balance but that both sides 
have an incentive to go outside in an attempt to improve on 
their position, whether one of inferiority or superiority. 
External resources, moreover, are often more readily 
available than local ones or are in a more usable form.
Both sides, for example, may be able to produce their own 
weapons but only after a time and at the cost of foregoing 
other uses of the resources employed, all this for a possibly 
inferior product; imports, by contrast, can be paid for in 
the future with gains yet to be secured but can be put to 
use immediately. The demand for outside aid may be 
strongest at the moment of impending defeat when one side 
must risk all in order to retain a chance of winning."^ An 
incumbent on the verge of defeat, like Chiang Kai-shek in 
the twelve months before October 1949, may be similarly
In April 1949 F.A. Voigt described the difficulties of the 
Greek communist rebels whose organization was being stretched 
to the point of collapse: 'The "Democratic Army" cannot renew
its cadre without assistance from the northern neighbours.
That is to say, the time is approaching, if it has not come, 
when Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria - and, of course,
Russia - must decide whether they can depart from the 
principle hitherto observed, namely that assistance to the 
Greek Communist Party shall be confined to the supply of 
arms, ammunition, equipment, rear bases, training, and so on, 
and make assistance include the active participation on 
Greek territory of a cadre which, whatever it may appear to 
be, will not consist of Greeks, but of trained and experienced 
men from those northern countries'. The Greek Sedition 
(London, 1949), p.13.
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desperate for external aid. In the final analysis an 
outside source of supply offers both government and rebel 
leaders a chance of continuing the struggle in exile or at 
least of a dignified retreat. This is but one illustration 
of the phenomenon whereby 'the presence of an international 
component in one of the internal war structures sets up 
pressures for "internationalizing" the other three 
structures'.  ^ It is not only that there are inherent 
tendencies in civil conflicts to involve outside powers 
but also that once given vent these pressures facilitate 
further assistance to the one side and stimulate aid to the 
other.
On the other hand, there are factors which tend 
to work against internationalization. Some are inherent 
in civil strife, relating to its intractability to outside 
management, while others depend on the domestic problems 
likely to encumber an intervening state. It is simple 
enough for an outside state to extend assistance but it is 
another matter to ensure that this support serves the 
purposes for which it is given. There are problems in
determining who is to receive aid and when it is to be
2given. There is even a possibility that intervention may 
produce effects quite the reverse of those intended. The 
goals which intervention cannot achieve thus become an
3important factor in limiting the actions of outside states. 
Even if the donor can be sure that whatever assistance reaches 
its friends will be used in ways which suit it, there is a 
danger that the external origin of such support will itself 
handicap the recipient. A government receiving external aid 
may become even more discredited in the eyes of a rebellious
Modelski, op. cit. , p.18.
2 On the problems of timing see G.K. Tanham, Communist 
Revolutionary Warfare (New York, 1961) , p.142.
3 Machiave11i 's discussion of the problems faced by 
outsiders in winning over dissident subjects for the 
purpose of conspiring against their prince remains 
instructive. The Prince, pp.45-6, 103-5.
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population by arousing suspicion of dependence on a foreign 
state and by diminishing its claim to legitimacy. An 
insurgent group may similarly damage its cause by appearing 
to be reliant on an outside state especially when nationalism 
is part of its appeal. On the other hand, a faction which 
is already largely alienated from the rest of the society 
may have little to lose and much to gain by accepting aid 
from outside; in this situation, of course, the unpopularity 
of the faction will minimize its ultimate chances of success. 
The intervening state must take these possibilities into 
account and more besides.
For in some cases foreign assistance may not only 
be welcomed by the party which requests it but also increase 
its appeal. The ability of a faction in a civil conflict 
to demonstrate a commitment on the part of an outside state 
to its goals can produce advantages beyond those flowing 
directly from whatever practical aid is given. The securing 
of aid from other countries may in fact serve to endorse 
the justness of the claims of the party that receives it.
This is true of conflicts where one side has adopted a 
political ideology that is shared by a number of other 
countries; their identification with the cause of the rebels 
or the incumbents not only encourages the faithful but also 
wins converts to the faith. A similar effect has been 
evident in many of the anti-colonial struggles that have 
been fought since 1945: the greater the international
endorsement of colonial rebellions the greater their 
legitimacy became even, one suspects, in the eyes of the 
colonial countries themselves. All this is apart from the 
more cynical calculations which suggest that people are 
attracted to the side which has the better prospect of 
winning and that external aid can often increase those 
prospects. In any event the existence of a request for 
intervention appears to be an important factor since it 
indicates that the party concerned itself believes that 
outside aid will prove more beneficial than harmful.
The fact that an intervening state is closely 
identified with the cause of one of the parties to a civil
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conflict does not necessarily mean that the former in any 
sense controls the latter,^ Strong identification may exist 
while only marginal influence is exercised; slight 
identification may conceal a high degree of control. Nor 
is control directly related to the absolute level of 
external aid. The possibility of external control is 
important when the aims of an existing faction differ from 
those of the intervening state or when an outside state 
seeks to initiate and sustain a rebellion for its own 
purposes. In either circumstance control is not to be 
achieved simply through close identification or large-scale 
assistance, and the factors which make this so constitute 
another set of practical limitations on the act of 
intervention. In this context control may consist of 
three elements: the power of authority which depends on
shared values and the habit of obedience? the offering of 
positive incentives; and the negative threat of sanctions. 
This analysis is relevant to the control or attempted 
control of both insurgents and incumbents although it may 
be that in practice one is likely to prove more susceptible 
to control than the other.
The element of authority will be considered first.
It has often been claimed that a group which subscribes to 
communist ideology will consequently accept the authority 
of outside communist states, in particular that of the 
Soviet Union or China according to the leanings of the group 
itself. Certainly, many Soviet and Chinese statements 
indicate that they believe themselves in possession of at 
least a moral or doctrinal authority on revolutionary issues 
which is born of their own experience and their contributions
The correct assessment of the degree of external control 
will be seen to be important in the matter of regulating 
interventionary behaviour. See chapters VII and VIII.
2 The discussion in this paragraph applies - with 
appropriate modification - to ideologies other than 
communism; the necessary condition is a system of political 
beliefs on which authority may be based.
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to Marxist-Leninist thought. Yet even if a common creed 
and shared values exist, obedience does not automatically 
follow. The recognition of common values and beliefs does 
not prevent them from being interpreted and applied in 
different and possibly incompatible ways. Many writers have 
pointed to the tendency of insurgent forces to follow their 
own independent line: they alone are in a position to
understand what policies the situation requires, they cannot 
rely on the judgement of outsiders, and they frequently have 
a distrust for 'politicians' abroad who are naturally 
concerned with a variety of other interests - this suspicion 
is even directed against governments-in-exile whose members 
are of the same nationality as the rebels.  ^ Thus Mao 
Tse-tung resisted Stalin's demand for an alliance with the 
Nationalist Government in China; thus Tito, Ho Chi Minh and 
Castro also worked for their own style of communism.
Indeed, it is generally true that those communist parties 
which actually fought to achieve power themselves have 
proved the most independently-minded both before and after 
their success. In the absence of ideological bonds there 
appears even less reason to expect an insurgent group to 
accept the authority of an outside state save in the 
extreme case of a conflict initiated by infiltrators who are 
for some reason individually committed to the intervening 
state. It is not a commitment, however, which can be 
easily created amongst potential recruits to the group.
See E. Ahmad, 'Revo1tuionary Warfare: How to Tell When the
Rebels Have Won', The Nation, vol. CCL (30 August 1965), 
p ,9 9; B.B. Fall, 'Viet-Nam in the Balance', Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 45 (October 1966) , p.13; Zasloff, Role of the Sanctuary 
in Insurgency, p.vi. But see Modelski's view of the 
Vietminh insurgency: 'Due to the distance from Moscow and
to the circumstances of war and of clandestine existence, 
the local leadership could on the whole pursue policies 
attuned to local conditions. Yet freedom from unthinking 
conformity did not weaken, and indeed may have strengthened, 
the ties of allegiance to the international movement as led 
by the Soviet Party' . 'The Viet Minh Complex' , in Black, 
Thornton (eds.) , Communism and Revolution, p . 2 0 5 .
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The exercise of authority over an incumbent 
government which is involved in civil strife would appear to 
be a somewhat unlikely proposition. A government will 
normally be accustomed to wielding authority itself even in 
the case of an ideologically committed regime. While a 
rebel cause may be closely bound up with goals and beliefs 
of an ideological nature, an incumbent government is likely 
to be primarily concerned with the instrumentalities of 
power which need to be defended against the efforts of the 
rebels. An outside government which sees intervention in 
civil strife as a potential form of control over an incumbent 
will thus be obliged to rely rather on some combination of 
incentives and sanctions, a conclusion that applies equally 
in the case of insurgents. Essentially, the efficacy of 
such a policy will depend on the situation in which it is 
pursued as much as on the amount of assistance actually 
given or the size of the sanction threatened. Three 
necessary conditions may be identified for the exercise of 
control in this context.
The first requirement is that the incumbent or the 
insurgent be in urgent need of the assistance which is 
offered; if the aid is wholly or partly dispensable, the 
outside state will find it correspondingly more difficult 
to exert an influence. In a civil war situation this 
requirement is more likely to be satisfied than at other 
times for the government may feel that it is fighting for 
its very existence and the rebels may believe that victory 
is worth some loss of independence. Even so, the fact that 
external aid is present in many civil conflicts does not 
necessarily mean that it is indispensable. A second 
requirement is that the intervening state be capable of 
withholding assistance in the event of its terms not being 
met. The difficulty here is that intervention is usually 
undertaken for a number of reasons, not all of which relate 
to the actions of the party which benefits from it. Thus 
intervention may be designed to serve pressing goals such 
as self-defence or the victory of certain political 
principles; to the extent that assistance mus t be given
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in such cases its potential as a means of control is 
diminished.  ^ The attempt to govern another's behaviour by 
threat of sanctions, moreover, always remains subject to 
the limitation that a threat which has to be carried out is 
a threat which has failed. The third and last requirement 
is that the state seeking control be the sole source of 
assistance, for clearly the more countries that are able and 
willing to give the aid which is needed the smaller will be 
the influence that each is capable of exercising. A 
monopoly position would appear more likely the higher the 
level of assistance required and the more specialized its 
nature; it is at this point that the strongest powers are 
most able to make their influence felt, given that the 
conflict concerned has generated large demands on the part 
of one or both of the factions.
It is obvious that in practice these requirements 
will never be so fully met that they allow an intervening 
state complete control over the policy of the faction 
receiving assistance. Whatever elements of control can be 
won by giving and threatening to withhold assistance are 
likely to fall far short of total direction, being subject 
to the fluctuating bargaining skills and strengths of those 
involved. The various stages of civil strife, for example, 
seem to differ in the ease with which they may be directed 
from outside. The initiation of a conflict is perhaps most 
easily achieved since only a handful of supporters may be 
required - though this is to say nothing about the ultimate
The U.S. has frequently been in the position of having to 
continue support for leaders about whom it had serious 
misgivings, simply because abandonment of them could worsen 
the situation. There was a reluctance to use sanctions of 
this kind against Chiang Kai-shek after 1945 an.d again i'n 
the case of President Diem.of South Vietnam when the 
possibility arose of a coup against him. According to Roger 
Hilsman, 'among both Americans and Vietnamese, the greatest 
concern of all was that a coup d'etat might result in a 
civil war between pro-Diem and anti-Diem forces that would 
give the Vietcong an opportunity'. To Move A Nation (New 
York, 1967), p.494. In February 1962 the U.S. did cut off
all aid to the Laotian leader Phoumi Nosavan but with 
apparently little effect.
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chances of success. The maintenance of a conflict in 
accord with desired objectives is rather more difficult for 
the reasons outlined in the preceding paragraph. The 
greatest problems would seem to arise in the termination of 
a civil conflict. A faction will certainly be unwilling to 
give up a struggle in accord with outside direction if 
it has any prospect of success, and even if its prospects 
are minimal the alternative of passive surrender may seem 
no better than continued struggle. Equally difficult 
problems arise for the intervening state in the event of 
victory by one of the factions. For then the needs of the 
faction lose their urgency; these needs, moreover, become 
those of a government in unchallenged power and hence more 
likely to find satisfaction through aid from other governments 
which might have been reluctant to intervene in an undecided 
civil conflict.
The general conclusion seems to be that an 
intervening state cannot hope to maintain a fixed degree 
of control over the party it supports and that this 
uncertainty must be regarded as a factor likely to limit 
intervention. Clearly, the degree to which the ultimate 
aims of the intervening state correspond with those of the 
faction assisted is important. The greater the similarity 
of objectives the more willing will the intervening state be 
to ignore the difficulties and uncertainties of controlling 
events. Yet the possibility always remains that this 
convergence of policy will not continue indefinitely.
Finally, it suffices simply to mention the possible costs of 
intervening on the losing side for, as we have seen, the 
success of intervention cannot be guaranteed. Aid to an 
incumbent who is eventually overthrown or to an insurgent 
who is ultimately defeated exacts a price in terms of future 
relations with the country concerned.^
'...in the case of Intervention, as in that of Revolution, 
its essence is illegality, and its justification is its 
success. Of all things, at once the most unjustifiable and 
the most impolitic is an unsuccessful Intervention' . Sir 
W.G.G. Harcourt, Letters by Historicus on some Questions of 
International Law (London and Cambridge, 1863) , p.41.
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The limits inherent in the act of intervention, it 
was suggested above, relate either to the conditions 
prevailing in the country where the interventionary effect 
is intended or to the domestic circumstances of the 
intervening state. In the latter case decision-makers 
considering intervention may be restrained by internal 
political pressures or by the limited resources available 
to them. These factors need not be discussed in great detail 
here although this is not to imply that they are of little 
importance. It is sometimes argued, for example, that 
democratic governments find intervention more difficult to 
conduct than totalitarian ones since the latter are 
relatively independent of popular opinion and are more easily 
able to undertake covert activities. Particular forms of 
intervention may indeed prove extremely difficult for a 
democracy. A drawn-out military action involving high 
casualties such as the American involvement in Vietnam seems 
likely to produce internal divisions which weaken and 
constrain national decision-making.  ^ Yet public opinion in 
democratic countries will not always prevent leaders from 
embarking on intervention of this kind and may in fact 
heartily endorse it before the full consequences become 
clear; it is also possible that a tradition of bipartisanship 
on foreign policy issues will encourage intervention and 
sustain it. Democratic and totalitarian leaders alike may 
be tempted by the promise of easy and rapid success but 
neither can guarantee it in every case; it is simply that 
failure may have more immediate consequences for the former 
than for the latter. Again, democratic governments have 
proved capable of initiating covert intervention, as did 
the United States over Guatemala in 1954 and Cuba in 1961, 
though it seems impossible that such operations could remain 
secret for any length of time in an open society. Perhaps
George Liska has argued the need for the United States 
to isolate its society and economy from the impact of 
military engagements by measures such as the professional­
ization of the armed forces. Imperial America (Baltimore, 
1967) , p.106.
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the most that a democratic country can achieve in this 
respect is to make at least some of its covert undertakings 
plausibly deniable so that there is an element of doubt as 
to its actual role in the events concerned.
The general conclusion seems to be that domestic 
inhibitions on intervention by a democratic government do 
exist but that while decision-makers may be constantly aware 
of this their calculations will not be closely constrained 
in advance of an intervention. Popular opinion may, on the 
contrary, increase the pressure for intervention to a point 
where the government believes it has no choice but to act.
In either case it is evident that no simple generalizations 
can be made about the relative ease with which democratic 
and totalitarian governments may intervene in civil conflicts. 
For the factors operating in each case - whatever the type 
of government - are usually complex and elusive. A similar 
conclusion seems warranted with regard to the role played 
by physical capacity in limiting intervention. It is a 
truism to say that the stronger a state the greater its 
potential for intervention. But it is important to note 
that power in the sense of physical resources is rarely the 
sole determinant of a civil conflict and that even massive 
superiority on this score cannot guarantee success. Also to 
be borne in mind is the possibility that limited resources 
for intervention may prove remarkably efficacious despite 
the apparent disadvantage that success may not be achieved 
as quickly. The limiting effect of resources on 
intervention thus needs to be qualified by considerations 
such as their relevance to the situation concerned and the 
expertise with which they are employed. Domestic restraints 
on intervention do exist but they are never simple ones.
C: Civil Strife and International Disorder
It is apparent that few civil conflicts take place 
without the involvement of at least one outside state.
The pressures tending to produce intervention are manifold.
On the one hand, there are forces within states that make 
for instability and for external participation in those
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conflicts which do break out. On the other hand, there 
are pressures among the members of international society 
making for concern about and on occasions for intervention 
in the private affairs of a state. These pressures are so 
much the greater in the event of an internal conflict, 
especially one that takes the form of a civil w a r .  ^ So far 
as pressures of this kind are concerned, a broad distinction 
may be drawn between those relating to the character, 
interests and outlook of particular states and those 
relating to the nature of international society in general. 
Instances of the former include the humanitarian concern 
displayed by many states in both normal times and during civil 
conflicts when human suffering seems to be particularly 
heightened; some states may feel unable to ignore this and 
may even feel a duty to intervene. Again, intervention for 
objectives relating to internal political arrangements has 
become bound up with ideologies that prescribe particular 
forms of government or, like anti-co1onialism, proscribe 
certain forms. At the same time an increase in the capacity 
of states to intervene appears to have permitted an 
expansion in the range of goals which they can hope to 
achieve by participating in or instigating civil conflicts. 
Lastly, states have always been concerned about defending 
what they conceive to be their interests, vital and not so 
vital. The breakdown of order in a foreign country can 
impinge on these interests in a variety of ways, sometimes 
directly if hostilities endanger the lives or property of 
nationals, sometimes indirectly if a civil conflict ruptures 
normal relations or threatens to precipitate international 
conflicts. As states differ and perhaps clash in these 
various characteristics, so will their responses to civil 
strife in other countries; the very diversity of states
J.N. Rosenau suggests that human psychology plays some 
part in determining the reactions of outsiders to violence; 
he points to a morbid interest in the plight of others, 
to a propensity to ignore rules in reacting to violent events 
and to a fear of situations over which little control is 
exercised. 'Internal War as an International Event' , in 
Rosenau (ed,), International Aspects of Civil Strife, 
p p .50-60.
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is an indication that they will approach the question of 
civil strife with a wide range of attitudes and intentions.
Another set of pressures making for the internation­
alization of civil conflicts relates to the nature of 
international society in general. Civil strife can, by its 
very nature, involve the character of a state - whether, 
for example, it is communist or non-communist, democratic 
or totalitarian, and so on - and this character may be 
considered an important factor in determining the general 
nature of international relationships. It is not simply 
that one type of regime is preferred for intrinsic reasons 
but that the international consequences of its being adopted 
are also taken into account. In a world divided ideologically 
into blocs and alliances the character of a state can affect 
the balance of strength between these groupings. In 
addition, the actions and reactions of outside states with 
regard to internal conflicts may give cause for concern 
about the rules - or lack of rules - governing intervention.
If another state has instigated civil strife or is 
intervening in an existing conflict, others may consider 
it desirable that this behaviour should as a general rule be 
punished or at least denied success. In so far as 
intervention makes up an important part of international 
activity, civil strife is likely to create situations in 
which rules of behaviour need to be determined. Finally, 
internal conflicts have a bearing on the 'culture' of 
international society which is taken to mean the sum of ideas 
and moral values about government and politics which flow 
across international boundaries at both official and 
unofficial levels. One can point, for instance, to the 
ethic of revolution which is propagated by Communist China 
or Castro's Cuba; it is an ethic which is echoed by the more 
extreme groups in many Western countries. This sort of 
concern with civil strife is the most difficult to pin down 
since it takes the form of ideas about the legitimacy of 
governments, the justice of revolution, the purpose of 
international society and so on. It is even harder to 
identify occasions when it has contributed to a decision to
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intervene in a civil conflict. However, there is no doubt 
that states have experienced a growing materia1 
interdependence in recent years which emerges in all their 
concerns about civil strife; it would be surprising if there 
were no corresponding interdependence at the level of ideas 
and moral values.
Some writers, looking at the complex interdependence 
of states, have concluded that it is impossible to do 
anything other than 'intervene' in a civil conflict.
Modelski, for instance, argues that there is no way for an 
outside state
to avoid involvement in internal war. Even though 
a country may decide not to act at all, to do 
nothing and to say nothing, then by this very fact 
it, too, helps - sometimes unwittingly - to mold the 
outcome of the process; for by refusing to act it 
helps the stronger party to suppress the weaker, 
irrespective of the merits of the case.l
In one sense this is obviously true. The course of a civil
conflict must be determined in part by what other states do
and what they fail to do. Indeed, one side of the problem
of civil strife in international society is the fact that
in many cases states are in a position to influence it and
are consequently pressed to make a decision between acting
and not acting. And even if in practice there is nothing
that looks like a deliberate decision on this score, this
may also be taken as a negative decision. It is not very
helpful, however, to regard positive decisions, negative
decisions and non-decisions about involvement in a civil
conflict as acts of intervention. To use the term
'intervention' to cover any act or omission is useful only
in that it demonstrates the pervasiveness of the problem of
civil strife in international society.
Intervention has been defined here as actions 
which can be expected to affect the relations between an 
incumbent government and an insurgent group. Failure to act
G. Modelski, 'The International Relations of Internal War' , 
in Rosenau (ed.) , International Aspects of Civil Strife, 
pp . 2 3-4.
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is thus not an act of intervention in this sense. Yet
actions which are designed to prevent or limit interventionary
behaviour on the part of others can be construed as acts of
intervention themselves. A non-intervention agreement, for
example, is interventionary not because it has a direct
effect on the civil strife about which it is made but
because it in some way alters the behaviour of those who
would otherwise intervene; it is one thing simply not to give
assistance to one or both of the contending factions and
another thing altogether to attempt to prevent assistance
from reaching them. The Non-Intervention Agreement
formulated by a number of European powers in response to
the Spanish Civil War provides the best illustration of
this. The British Foreign Secretary Eden and the French
Premier, Leon Blum, both believed that the Agreement favoured
the Spanish Government (and for this reason among others
supported it). The incumbents were more likely to benefit
because, in Eden's words,
the dictator powers could supply arms much more 
readily to the insurgents than the democracies could 
to the Spanish Government. The manufacture of arms 
in the dictatorships was multiplying rapidly whilst 
both France and ourselves were still woefully short, 
even of necessities. This unpleasant reality was 
not understood by opinion in Britain and France at 
the time, nor could it be publicly proclaimed, but it 
influenced both Governments.!
A non-intervention agreement, it can be seen, does not
necessarily aid the stronger party more than the weaker as
Modelski argues, for the latter may gain more if its
opponent is prevented from acquiring major support. It can
also be assumed that a non-intervention agreement is
concluded because it is found necessary i.e. because states
would otherwise intervene; such an agreement cannot always
be dismissed either as superfluous (because the states
concerned do not wish to intervene) or as ineffective
(because they will intervene anyway). Again, if an effective
Lord Avon, The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (London,
1962) , p .409 .
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non-intervention agreement can be classed as interventionary, 
one which is only partially effective can also be regarded 
in this way. And the effect on the course of the war is 
even more apparent when as a result assistance is being given 
to one of the parties by some outside states while others 
are refraining from helping its opponent.^ Asymmetrical 
intervention of this kind may be produced by design or by 
accident. In either case it is still interventionary in the 
sense used here, for intervention depends in the first 
instance neither on intention nor on actual effect.
Finally, on the possibility of non-intervention,
it is worth noting that certain actions cannot but be
interventionary, however sincerely the intention is
disclaimed and however strenuously the avoidance of
interventionary effects is sought. The United Nations' Congo
operation bore both of these features. A Security Council
Resolution on 9 August 1960 stated clearly that the ONUC
force 'will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or
be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict,
2constitutional or otherwise'. True, it was HammarskjoId's
Such a situation aroused the wrath of the Soviet 
Ambassador in London during the Spanish Civil War:
'The violation of the agreement has ... created a 
privileged situation for the rebels, which was certainly not 
the purpose of the agreement. As a result of this abnormal 
situation the civil war in Spain has been prolonged and the 
number of victims increased.
'Not wishing to remain in the position of persons 
unwittingly assisting an unjust cause, the Government of 
the Soviet Union sees only one way out of the situation 
created - to restore to the Spanish Government the rights 
and facilities to purchase arms outside of Spain, which 
rights and facilities are enjoyed at present by all the 
Governments of the world.'
Note to the Chairman of the Non-Intervention Committee, 23 
October 1936; text in Degras (ed.) Soviet Documents, vol. Ill, 
p . 213 .
2 Cited by A.M. James, The Politics of Peace-Keeping 
(London, 1969), p.412.
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intention to remove the Belgian presence and to prevent
further intervention in the Congo by other powers. But in
doing this ONUC had to deal with matters which are central
to any civil war. Its mandate was, in Claude's words,
to uphold order without enforcing orderliness, 
to assist the government without taking sides 
in controversies regarding the location of 
governmental authority, and to prevent civil war 
without becoming involved in efforts to suppress 
dissident and secessionist movements.1
Clearly, where any international organization or individual
state sets out to create conditions of stability in a
situation of political chaos, it must intervene. The
motive of non-intervention can have little, if any, meaning 
2in practice. Nor would such actions be any the less 
interventionary if they affected both sides equally; they 
may be impartial in that case but they remain likely to 
alter the relationship between incumbent and rebels, if only 
from conflict to coexistence.
Swords into Plowshares, p.289.
2 A report by Dayal, the U.N. representative in the Congo, 
described the inevitable results: 'almost every significant
measure taken by ONUC in the impartial fulfilment of its 
mandate had been interpreted by one faction or another as 
being directed against itself'. Report of 2 November 1960, 
cited by L.B. Miller, World Order and Local Disorder 
(Princeton, 1967), p.79.
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PART TWO : INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RULES
Intervention in civil strife has been described as 
a problem for international society. While Part One sought 
to outline the measure of the problem, Part Two will look at 
the relationship between such intervention and a number of 
fundamental international rules. In this way it is hoped 
to assess its impact on the bases of international society as 
it exists in the contemporary world. These rules or principles 
take the form of directives about the course of action which 
states may properly take or which they ought to avoid in 
specified circumstances. They are to be found not only in 
the more or less codified body of international law but also 
in the informal and imprecise 'political' rules which states 
take to be binding upon themselves. It is not to be 
expected that all the rules of a diverse and heterogeneous 
society will be expressed or expressible in simple and 
certain terms. Their interpretation promises to be complex 
and possibly contentious, particularly in view of the fact 
that states tend to regard intervention as a matter touching 
their vital interests.
These fundamental principles may be stated briefly: 
respect for the sovereignty of states, the right of self- 
defence, and the collective authority of the international 
community. Each is potentially relevant to intervention in 
civil strife; the problem is to determine how they apply to 
particular cases. The rule requiring respect for the 
sovereignty of states is generally taken to mean that 
intervention in a conflict must be properly invited. In 
many instances the invitation is issued by a government that 
claims to be entitled to receive assistance from other 
states for the purpose of suppressing a rebellion. It is 
therefore important to examine the nature of the right to 
invite (and to give) assistance in these circumstances as 
it is established in international society. The manner of 
invitation, moreover, is a question of concern to 
international society in that it cannot allow 'invitations' 
to be imposed by the intervening state. Invitations by
65
governments to intervene in civil strife have their 
counterpart in the device of recognizing a rebel movement.
The government of a state normally enjoys the sole right of 
invitation but if a rebel group is able to supplant the 
incumbent in some way, then it too may be entitled to 
invite outside assistance. Examination of the conditions of 
recognition indicates the circumstances in which aid to a 
rebel movement may also be consistent with the rule requiring 
respect for the sovereignty of states.
While intervention that is duly invited may be said 
to serve the interests of the divided state, intervention in 
self-defence is based on the fundamental concern of states to 
protect themselves. Again, the right of self-defence is far 
from being self-explanatory and the conditions of its 
exercise need to be considered at some length. Certain rights 
of intervention in civil strife are also claimed by the 
international community itself. It may determine that 
particular goals - humanitarian action or the protection of 
fundamental rules, for example - can be rightly pursued by 
individual states or by the society as a body. Clearly, 
much will depend upon the manner in which these determinations 
are made as there is a possibility that they will contradict 
other basic principles of state behaviour. There are, in 
fact, many doctrines claiming the authority of international 
society which would permit states to intervene in order to 
promote certain political arrangements in the divided state. 
Some assessment of their standing in international society 
is thus in order.
The task is to elaborate on these rules in order 
to discover when intervention accords with them and when it 
does not. It is apparent, however, that disagreement is 
probable not only over their interpretation in particular 
cases but also over their order of priority in the event of 
a clash between them. Thus a state may intervene in self- 
defence against the wishes of both factions, thereby 
breaching the sovereignty of that state. The resolution of 
such a clash of rules will depend on the prevailing 
interpretation of the ultimate purposes for which they exist:
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are they designed primarily to allow states to protect 
themselves or to ensure that peoples are allowed to manage 
their own affairs without interference? The issue will be 
decided not by abstract discussion but by the actual 
policies that states pursue on these matters. It is 
improbable, therefore, that these basic principles of 
international society will be precisely and unambiguously 
interpreted and applied; indeed it is more likely that much 
of their content will remain subject to debate, if not to 
open disagreement.
CHAPTER III : SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION IN CIVIL STRIFE
International society depends upon each of its 
members enjoying a separate existence, the fundamental 
condition of which is the capacity of states to conduct 
their own affairs more or less independently of others. In 
formal terms, the essential quality of a state is its 
sovereignty. The fundamental postulate of a society of 
states must therefore be that members do not conduct their 
affairs in a manner that involves intrusion into affairs 
properly the concern of others; sovereignty, in other words, 
is to be respected. How does the act of intervention in 
civil strife relate to the notion of sovereignty and mutual 
respect for sovereignty? It is apparent that a society 
of sovereign states can survive as such despite gross and 
frequent breaches of sovereignty; the history of the world 
since 1945 provides some evidence for this (though this is 
not to imply that intervention in civil strife is always a 
breach of sovereignty or that it is the only way to commit 
such a breach). The level of infringement of sovereignty 
at which a society of states ceases to exist has so far 
remained problematic since it has not yet been reached in 
the contemporary world. Nevertheless, three important 
questions remain to be answered. Firstly, does the rule of 
respect for sovereignty require complete abstention from 
intervention in all circumstances? Secondly, does the 
condition of civil strife detract in any way from the 
attribute of sovereignty? Thirdly, under what circumstances 
is intervention in civil strife compatible with the 
sovereignty of a state and hence with the basic rule 
requiring respect for sovereignty? In considering this last 
question the natural distinction will be followed between 
assistance to an incumbent government and that given to a 
rebel movement since each raises substantially different 
problems.
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A: Sovereignty and Non-intervention
The principle of non-intervention in internal 
affairs (including the conduct of civil strife) may be 
argued either from fundamental international rules or from 
basic precepts concerning the internal management, of a 
country.^ As a principle of international relations 
non-intervention can only be derived from the rule that, 
states respect each other's sovereignty, for other 
fundamental rules relating to self-defence and the authority 
of the international community may be invoked to justify 
acts of intervention which breach state sovereignty. The 
attribute of sovereignty in a state, it is argued, signifies 
a certain measure of independence in policy-making and a 
certain freedom to conduct domestic affairs; an act such as 
intervention impairs this independence and therefore 
constitutes a failure to respect the sovereignty of the state 
concerned. Some writers find this attribute of states 
established in natural law. According to Wolff, one of the 
first writers to expound the idea of non-intervention at 
length,
to interfere in the government of another, in 
whatever way indeed that may be done is opposed to 
the natural liberty of nations, by virtue of which 
one nation is altogether independent of other 
nations in its actions.2
Other writers take a positivist view, arguing that the
obligation to respect the sovereignty of others originates
in the practice of states, in particular through their
consenting to be bound by the rules they establish. Thus
Hall takes the view that any act of intervention in civil
strife impairs the independence of a state:
Supposing the intervention to be directed against 
the existing government, independence is violated by 
an attempt to prevent the regular organs of the 
state from managing the state affairs in its own way. 
Supposing it, on the other hand, to be directed against 
the rebels, the fact that it has been necessary to
Precepts of the latter kind will be examined in the 
following section.
2 Jus Gentium Methode Scientifica Pertractatum (1764) trans. J. 
Drake (Oxford, 1934), ch. i, section 256.
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call in foreign help is enough to show that the 
issue of the conflict would without it be 
uncertain...olf, again, intervention is based upon 
an opinion as to the merits of the question at 
issue, the intervening state takes upon itself to pass 
judgment on a matter which, having nothing to do 
with the relations of states, must be regarded as 
being for legal purposes beyond the range of its 
vision.1
Both naturalist and positivist approaches to international 
rules thus seem to permit the deduction of a rule of 
absolute non-intervention from the norm of respect for 
sovereignty.
Now it should be noted that intervention cannot be 
defined in this context as a breach of sovereignty in 
itself for then the prohibition of intervention becomes 
simply a re-statement of the rule that sovereignty should be 
respected. Intervention in civil strife must therefore be 
defined in factual rather than normative terms if the rule of 
non-intervention is to clarify the rule of mutual respect 
for sovereignty. Once intervention is seen simply as an 
international action, certain flaws in the argument for 
absolute non-intervention become apparent. It is clear that 
any action may be directed toward a variety of ends and, 
especially with such a complex social activity as 
intervention, it is impossible to determine in advance what 
ends will be served or even that particular ends can never 
be served by it. More specifically, it is impossible to 
prove that an act of intervention will necessarily impair the 
sovereignty of a state or that intervention will never be 
necessary for a state to maintain respect for its own 
sovereignty. Thus intervention invited by a government may 
restore to a country the capacity to act independently and 
to conduct its own affairs. Again, intervention in civil 
strife may be successful in countering prior intervention by
W.E. Hall, A Treatise on International Law, eighth 
edition, ed. A. Pearce Higgins (Oxford, 1924) , p. 347 . Hall, 
it may be noted, permitted intervention solely on the grounds 
of self-defence which for this purpose he placed above 
respect for sovereignty of the divided state.
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another state. To put it another way, even given that the 
sovereignty of states is an attribute of overriding 
importance, no specific rule of international behaviour can 
logically be deduced from it. Similarly, the condition of 
individuals in society, however it is interpreted, does not 
permit deduction of simple rules for their behaviour toward 
each other; the fact that men are necessarily alive cannot, 
for example, give rise of itself to a rule that killing is 
forbidden in all circumstances.
An absolute rule of non-intervention must therefore 
be to some extent laid down rather than derived strictly 
from first principles. It is possible to argue, once this 
principle has been posited, that as a matter of observation 
it is more conducive to the maintenance of states' 
sovereignty than a principle which allows exceptions. The 
argument for non-intervention may thus be based on the 
hypothesis that this rule best achieves the purpose of 
international society, namely respect for the sovereignty 
of its members. Returning to the domestic analogy, a 
comparable hypothesis would be that a prohibition of all 
killing - including, for example, capital punishment - will 
lead to fewer deaths than would any other rule. Such 
hypotheses may be examined in both theoretical and practical 
terms but it is in the real world that they must ultimately 
be proved or disproved (in so far as such things do admit 
of proof or disproof). The more valid the hypothesis in 
the international field, for example, the more one would 
expect to find states endorsing the principle of non­
intervention. However, it has been the practice of states 
to regard intervention in civil strife as a feasible, 
necessary or desirable undertaking on various occasions.
Some states have acknowledged this, incorporating it into 
their approach to international relations.'*' Other states
Part of the Western tradition, according to Martin Wight, 
is to regard intervention in internal affairs as an 
occasional, if unfortunate, necessity of international 
politics and to look upon certain goals of intervention with 
more favour than others. 'Western Values in International 
Relations' , in H. Butterfield, M. Wight (eds.) Diplomatic 
Investigations (London, 1966), p . 116.
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declare adherence to the principle of absolute non-intervention 
but they too have found that intervention commends itself as 
a course of action from time to time. Certainly, the idea of 
non-intervention has strong appeal to many but it is an ideal 
divorced both from fundamental rules of international society 
and from the realities of international relations.
B: Sovereignty and Civil Strife
If, in international society, sovereignty is to be 
respected, it is pertinent to ask what this attribute of 
states entails. In general terms sovereignty may be taken to 
mean supreme legal competence within territorial boundaries, 
subject only to certain limitations with regard to the 
citizens and physical assets of foreign states.1 A sovereign 
state can thus be expected to display certain characteristics 
which will be generally accepted as necessary and sufficient 
conditions for its existence as such. A standard formulation 
of these characteristics is to be found in the Montevideo 
Convention of 1933, Article 1 of which specifies four basic 
qualifications for sovereignty: a permanent population, a
defined territory, a Government (understood as one to which 
the population renders habitual obedience), and a capacity 
to enter into relations with other states. These criteria 
refer to particular factual circumstances and it is possible 
to conceive of a political entity or the people in a given 
area of land not displaying these characteristics. Equally, 
it is possible that a sovereign state might cease to possess 
the necessary qualities that make up sovereignty.
At this point, a number of questions may be asked 
concerning the relationship between civil strife and the 
sovereignty of a state. Firstly, does this notion of 
sovereignty in international relations have any implications 
for the right to states to resort to civil strife if they 
so choose? Secondly, does a condition of civil strife
See, for example, W.D. Coplin, The_Functions of
International Law (Chicago, 1966) , pp. 30-55 .
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detract from the attribute of sovereignty, in particular 
through the loss of an effective government? Thirdly, 
whether sovereignty is lost or not in the course of civil 
strife, are there nevertheless precepts of some sort 
requiring outside states to refrain from intervention? These 
questions will be considered in turn.
(i) The 'right' of revolution. Sovereignty has 
been defined as supreme legal competence within a given 
territory so that a state would appear quite free of 
restrictions in the matter of arranging its system of 
government. Vattel held that this freedom was a self-evident 
right of states:
Since the results of a good or a bad constitution 
are of such importance, and since a Nation is 
strictly obliged to procure, as far as is possible, 
the best and most suitable one, it has a right to 
all the means necessary to fulfil that obligation.
Hence it is clear that a Nation has full right to 
draw up for itself its constitution, to uphold it, 
to perfect it, and to regulate at will all that 
relates to the government, without interference on 
the part of anyone.^
Vattel goes on to argue that there are certain restrictions
on the manner and the circumstances of a resort to civil
2strife as a means of regulating a constitution but these he 
derives from natural law, not international law. Certainly, 
international law may draw upon natural law but the former 
cannot itself lay down these sorts of conditions. The 
position of the positivists is even clearer. The writ of 
international law derives from and applies to relations 
between states only; states which are endowed with 
sovereignty are hence perfectly free to manage or mismanage 
their affairs from the point of view of international law.
Nevertheless, the notion of sovereignty itself 
indicates one limitation on a state's freedom to resort to 
civil strife. Since every state must respect the sovereignty 
of others it is clearly barred from embarking on a civil
The Law of Nations , book 1, ch. iii, section 31. 
ibid., sections 32-3.
conflict which is likely to endanger or impair the 
independence of another. In general terms, a state has a 
duty to ensure that affairs within its territorial boundaries 
are conducted in such a way that they do not impinge unduly 
on the freedom of others. Thus it is that a state is 
obliged to take reasonable precautions to protect the lives 
and property of aliens living within its borders. Now while 
it is true that states are normally freed from this 
particular obligation in the event of civil war, this does 
not mean that they are also absolved from the duty of 
respecting the territorial integrity or the political 
independence of another state. The clearest and most 
obvious case is a civil conflict which spills over on a large 
scale into the territory of a neighbouring state. Certainly, 
the latter state has a right of self-defence but this only 
indicates that it has in fact been threatened in some way. 
Moreover, the notion of self-defence may be extended to 
include, for example, the maintenance of political stability 
in a state which plays a crucial role in another's security 
system or in a state where the breakdown of internal order 
is likely to produce rival interventions with possibly 
disastrous consequences for all.'*'
Against this it may be argued that the rule of 
respect for sovereignty simply requires a government to 
take all reasonable precautions to prevent the outbreak of 
civil strife and to contain the effects of any conflict that 
does erupt - at least in so far as there is a possibility 
of such conflict impairing the rights of other states. Nor 
does this appear an excessive demand since any government 
can be assumed to be seeking these goals in its own interest 
anyway. Strictly speaking, however, this requirement means 
that a government threatened by rebellion which it cannot 
contain must abdicate its authority in favour of a group
1 See also Chapter IV on the notion of self-defence.
which can ensure that no injury will be done to any outside 
s t a t e d  The choice for the incumbent is between, on the 
one hand, plunging the country into a civil war which it 
may or may not win but which will certainly injure other 
states and, on the other hand, placing the aim of respecting 
others' sovereignty before the aim of staying in power.
The latter alternative, of course, may not appear to be a 
reasonable one to ask a government to take but it is a 
logical consequence of the rule requiring respect for 
sovereignty.
In one way at least, therefore, rules of 
international society have something to say about the resort 
to civil strife by a particular state. But there is also 
a very real and practical sense in which the normal conduct 
of international relations may influence the resort to 
civil war. For in their day-to-day dealings with one another 
governments inevitably affect each other's capacity to cope 
with potential or actual outbreaks of civil strife; these 
effects, resulting from arms sales, economic aid, trade and 
so on, may be unintended and incidental but they are none­
theless present. Clearly, none of this has a direct bearing 
on the notional freedom of a state to conduct its internal 
affairs as it wishes, including the resort to civil war, 
but there is the possibility that developments in the 
ability of states to assist in the prevention or 
suppression of civil strife in other states will reveal a 
need for international regulation of such activity. The 
purpose of this regulation would be to ensure that the 
sovereignty of states which at present happens to include 
the possibility of revolution does not come to exclude 
that possibility altogether. It is something akin to this
This is not contrary to the conclusion that Lauterpacht 
reaches in the context of civil strife that 'there is no 
warrant for holding a State liable for injurious events 
which it could not prevent'. Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition 
in International Law (Cambridge, 1947), p.248; see also 
pp. 247-9. It is not unreasonable to maintain that a 
government may have some control over the outbreak of civil 
strife, though it may be unreasonable to expect it always 
to avoid conflict.
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position that the Soviet Union and Communist China have 
taken up at various times'1' although no accepted international 
rules on the matter can be said ever to have existed. 
Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind when the right of 
aiding an incumbent who is fighting a civil war is 
considered later in this chapter.
(ii) Civil strife and loss of sovereignty. A state 
which becomes divided by internal conflict may have 
difficulty in manifesting the third characteristic specified 
by the Montevideo Convention, namely the existence of a 
government to which the population renders habitual 
obedience. In some cases the fourth criterion may also be 
unfulfilled if a civil conflict produces the collapse of 
all political institutions and the breakdown of executive 
capacity. In these criteria there is thus the implication 
that a state is no longer sovereign if it becomes involved 
in a civil conflict which destroys or incapacitates 
government in the country. It is an implication which is 
rarely drawn in practice. Even the situation of total 
anarchy in the Congo immediately after its independence in 
1960 did not rouse any country to claim that the Congo could 
not or need not be treated as a sovereign state. For there 
is a natural reluctance on the part of states to admit that 
sovereignty is lost easily and simply. The fact that a few 
malcontents are able to incapacitate a government for a 
short while clearly cannot be taken to constitute a loss 
of sovereignty without serious consequences. On the contrary, 
the assumption is that a government in such a position 
retains supreme legal competence which it will exercise in 
suppressing the rebellion. As the scale and scope of a 
rebellion increase, however, difficulties are encountered 
in maintaining this assumption. Ultimately, of course, 
rebels may succeed in establishing themselves as a separate 
and widely recognized entity which is treated as a 
sovereign state. At this point the sovereignty of the
1 See Chapter X.
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original state over the area concerned has undoubtedly been 
lost; the detailed steps in this process will be examined 
in a subsequent section.
There are strong reasons, moreover, for regarding
civil strife, not as a condition in which sovereignty is
lost, but as an exercise of the freedom granted to states
to manage their own affairs. Internally, civil strife is
a break with existing patterns, but other states do not
take this break to mean a loss of sovereignty. In the same
way that war between states is 'nothing but a continuation
of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means''*',
so civil war may be regarded as a continuation of domestic
politics. In support of this view a number of propositions
may be mentioned which, though not strictly in the cognizance
of states, do influence their attitudes toward the question
of the sovereignty of a divided state. There is the view,
for instance, that armed force in a civil war is simply
the instrument of the popular will and that the conflict
2represents a testing of opinion. Guerrilla warfare, in
particular, is often seen as a form of referendum in that
3victory requires mobilization of widespread support. On 
the other hand, it is possible that civil war may be a means 
for a small number of rebels to gain control from the 
majority, especially in view of the fact that, as Mao's 
strategy claims, one rebel is able to maintain a threat 
against ten opponents. Yet even in normal times the same 
sort of result may occur. The political processes of a 
state often lead to the exploitation of the majority by a
Clausewitz, On W a r , ed. A. Rapoport (Harmondsworth, 1968) ,
book V, ch. v i , p.402.
2 In Mazzini's words, 'Great revolutions are the work rather 
of principles than of bayonets, and are achieved first in 
the moral, and afterwards in the material sphere. Bayonets 
are truly powerful only when they assert or maintain a 
right; the rights and duties of society spring from a 
profound moral sense which has taken root in the majority'. 
'Manifesto of Young Italy' (1831), Life and Writings, 
vo1. I , p .118.
' W. Millis, Jo Real, The Abolition of War (New York, 1963) 
p . 14 3 .
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minority. Equally, a government may rely on the armed forces 
to retain its position; the outbreak of civil strife means 
simply that those forces have to be used actively rather
than passively. From the point of view of international
#
society, therefore, civil war cannot be distinguished from
the political process by the forms it assumes. On the
contrary, civil strife is a time when the political
arrangements within a country are in the balance and when
intervention by an outside state is likely to disrupt the
process of decision - perhaps more so than in times of
domestic peace. It seems desirable, therefore, that states
regard civil strife as no detraction from the sovereignty
of a state; respect for sovereignty, indeed, appears all
the more necessary during an internal conflict.
(iii) Non-intervention in civil strife. There are
a number of arguments for non-intervention in internal
affairs which supplement the fundamental rule of respect
for sovereignty by referring specifically to the situation
of civil strife. The first type of argument to be
considered is that even a genuinely popular or genuinely
national rebel movement ought not to be assisted and that
intervention in such a case is in fact unnecessary. It
sometimes betrays a rather naive belief that right will
always triumph in the end, as the comments of an American
international lawyer writing in 1921 reveal:
No state can remain permanently strong which 
continues needlessly to oppress a subject people.
The authority exercised over them must be 
tempered with humanity, or control will sometime 
surely be lost.1
The same argument has been made in more hard-headed terms by 
the Soviet Union and a number of other communist countries.
As a scientific doctrine, Marxism-Leninism is held to permit 
accurate analysis of the existing situation and prediction 
of future trends; hence the liberation of the oppressed 
nations as well as the revolution of the proletariat in 
the industrialized countries is regarded by orthodox
E.C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law 
(Washington, 1921), p.351.
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communists as an inevitable development which will take place 
even without outside help. Comments by Stalin in 1936 
have become a familiar theme in Soviet policy. Revolution 
is a matter for the people themselves: if they desire it,
then it is possible; if they do not desire it, then it cannot 
be forced upon them.
You see, we Marxists believe that revolution will 
occur in other countries as well. But it will come 
only when it is considered possible or necessary 
by the revolutionaries in those countries. Export 
of revolution is nonsense. Each country, if it so 
desires, will make its own revolution, and if no 
such desire exists, no revolution will occur.1
On occasions, of course, this theme becomes a minor one as
when, for instance, the Soviet Union feels obliged to
declare in some way its support for revolutionary movements.
Western countries also allow themselves the luxury of
definite predictions about the ultimate and inevitable
overthrow of the communist system. Such a notion was
inherent in the American doctrine of containment in the
1950s. According to Mr. Dulles the communist system of
government 'is going to collapse through the fact that in the
long run people are not going to allow themselves being
exploited. Whether this evolution will require decades or
2centuries is totally irrelevant'.
A second form of this argument is that intervention 
in civil strife is incapable of establishing particular 
principles of government on behalf of another country.
J.S. Mill, for example, claimed that political freedom was 
an objective which a people had to gain by its own efforts
Interview with Roy Howard, 5 March 1936, text in Degras 
(ed.) • Soviet Documents, vol. Ill, p.166.
2 28 October 1958, cited by P. Peeters, Massive Retaliation 
(Chicago, 1959), p.219.
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and that it -could not be properly valued and enjoyed if it 
came as a gift.'*' In recent years the same problem has been 
presented in terms of intervention for the sake of democracy, 
especially in the American hemisphere. The preamble to 
the Charter of the Organization of American States declares 
the necessity of developing democratic institutions, based 
on individual liberty and social justice, but the same 
document prohibits all forms of interference in the 'internal 
or external affairs of any other State' (Article 15). The 
implication is that intervention whether in time of 
domestic peace or conflict is not capable of establishing 
democracy - a proposition for which there is considerable 
evidence in practice - and that even if it were capable it 
would not be a desirable or appropriate means. Acceptance 
of this view resolves the apparent contradiction in the 
Kantian formulation: each state shall be democratic and no
state shall interfere in the affairs of another. The 
imperatives are addressed, one to peoples, one to states.
The idea that intervention in a civil conflict can 
be self-defeating when it is undertaken for certain 
purposes has a counterpart in the importance which 
revolutionary movements frequently attach to self-reliance.
We are not concerned at this stage with the calculations 
of prudence which might require a rebel faction to act
Mill's remarks, it should be noted, applied only to a 
purely domestic conflict, not to a situation where the 
incumbent was being assisted by outside powers: 'there
can seldom be anything approaching to assurance that 
intervention, even if successful, would be for the good of 
the people themselves. The only test possessing any real 
value, of a people's having become fit for popular 
institutions, is that they, or a sufficient portion of them 
to prevail in the contest, are willing to brave labour and 
danger for their 1iberation....if they have not sufficient 
love of liberty to be able to wrest it from merely domestic 
oppressors, the liberty which is bestowed on them by other 
hands than their own, will have nothing real, nothing 
permanent..... If a people ... does not value it sufficiently 
to fight for it, and maintain it against any force which 
can be mustered within the country, even by those who have 
command of the public revenue, it is only a question of time 
in how few years or months that people will be enslaved.... 
Men become attached to that which they have long fought for 
and made sacrifices for'. 'A Few Words on Non-Intervention' 
(1859), reprinted in R.A. Falk (ed.), The Vietnam War and 
International Law (Princeton, 1968), pp.36-7.
80
independently in order to function more efficiently but 
with the notion that victory ought to be achieved by its 
own efforts. Thus a revolution in the name of nationalism 
may find some incongruity in the prospect of receiving 
outside aid. This is especially true when the national 
element must be stressed and developed in order to promote 
the right kind of victory. Mazzini, for instance, argued 
that the goal of creating a national consciousness was of 
prime importance:
Convinced that Italy is strong enough to free herself 
without external help; that, in order to found a 
nationality, it is necessary that the feeling and 
consciousness of nationality should exist; and that 
it can never be created by any revolution, however 
triumphant, if achieved by foreign arms.1
Communist revolutionary warfare has also been marked at
times by expressions of independence and self-reliance.
Mao Tse-tung was able to win a political and military
victory in China with the very minimum of outside aid and
he has preached the doctrine of self-reliance to successive
2generations of guerrillas. The lesson that victory must
be achieved primarily with internal resources was emphasized
again by Lin Piao in 1965:
In order to make a revolution and to fight a 
people's war and be victorious, it is imperative to 
adhere to the policy of self-reliance, rely on the 
strength of the masses in one's own country and 
prepare to carry on the fight independently when all 
material aid from outside is cut off. If one does 
not operate by one's own efforts, does not 
independently ponder and solve the problems of the 
revolution in one's own country and does not rely on 
the strength of the masses, but leans wholly on 
foreign aid - even though this be aid from socialist 
countries which persist in revolution - no victory 
can be won, or be consolidated even if it is won.3
'General Instructions for Members of Young Italy' (1831) , 
Life and Writings, vol. I, pp.107-8.
2 See C. Johnson, 'The Third Generation of Guerrilla 
Warfare', Asian Survey, vol. VIII (June 1968), p.438.
3 'Long Live the Victory of People's War', Peking Review,
3 September 1965, p.22.
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It is probable that he had in mind the growing level of 
Soviet assistance to the Vietnamese liberation movement and 
that this was causing some concern in China. But his 
remarks do contain a genuine element of warning for they 
are consistent with the fundamental communist teaching that 
the common people - peasant or proletarian, and led by a 
vanguard party as they must be - are the indispensable basis 
of any revolution.
A parallel form of this argument is that an
incumbent ought to be able to retain his position without
outside assistance, or at least with only a minimum of
such aid. If the government is unable to exercise its
primary function of maintaining law and order, the argument
runs, it should not be helped to keep from power another
faction which could fulfil its function. This view is
sometimes presented as an open and shut case: either the
government survives on its own resources or it does not
survive at all. A more realistic view, however, accepts
the fact that an incumbent government already possesses
benefits simply from being a recognized member of
international society and that these benefits inevitably
help its domestic position. The problem then becomes one
of not giving more assistance than is considered 'fair'
in the light of the situation of the receiving government.
Concern not to go too far in supporting the existing
government was evident in 'the American landings in the
Lebanon in 1958. Eisenhower wrote later that
The decision to occupy only the airfield and capital 
was a political one which I adhered to over the 
recommendations of some of the military. If the 
Lebanese army were unable to subdue the rebels when 
we had secured their capital and protected their 
government, I felt, we were backing up a government 
with so little popular support that we probably 
should not be there.1
While there was concern that the United States should not 
take over functions that the Lebanese government ought
1 Waging Peace: 1956-1961 (London, 1966) , p.275n.
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properly to perform, the situation was somewhat complicated 
by the charges that the rebels had been infiltrated into the 
country. Also discernible in Eisenhower's remarks is the 
notion that the military outcome of such a conflict will to 
some extent reflect the popularity of the government. A 
clearer example of this attitude toward intervention on 
behalf of an incumbent in a civil war is to be found in the 
comment of U,S. Under Secretary of State, George Ball, on 
the American role in Vietnam: 'if the Vietnam war were
merely what the Communists say it is, an indigenous 
rebellion, then the United States has no business taking 
sides in the conflict and helping one side to defeat the 
other by force of arms 1 .  ^ Since the use of armed force is 
an undesirable form of political activity, Ball seems to be 
saying, it is not proper for another state to assist one side 
to defeat the other by such means.
A third argument against intervention in civil 
conflicts rests on the assumption that more benevolent 
approaches to the problem are available. It is not that 
intervention is unnecessary or likely to prove self- 
defeating but that benefits can be more easily bestowed on 
the country concerned by policies other than participation 
in civil conflicts. This view is frequently associated with 
the advocacy of various international panaceas. Cobden , 
for example, believed that trade and education rather than 
political manoeuvres were the only means of guaranteeing 
the progress of freedom in other countries. He believed, 
too, in the power of example, in particular that which 
Britain could exercise in Europe by refraining from
30 January 1966, cited by T. Draper, Abuse of Power (New 
York, 1967), p.91,
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involvement in both international and domestic conflicts.'
In his view, intervention in civil strife could do nothing 
but harm for it imported into the conflict elements inimical 
to freedom of thought and freedom of government and it 
impaired the example which the intervening state might 
otherwise have set. A modern equivalent of Cobden ' s position 
is difficult to find for there are few matters which are 
today considered altogether beyond the scope of politics. 
International trade and education, for instance, have become 
a concern of many governments. A creed such as that of the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization - namely, that war begins in the minds of men - 
runs the risk of being totally irrelevant if it abstains 
from political issues. For education, trade, science and 
so on may themselves become important factors in a civil 
conflict so that it is impossible for an outsider to take an 
impartial stand on these matters.
The fourth and final argument of this kind 
addresses itself to intervention which has no hope of 
success. The effect on the politics of the country 
concerned would be simply to encourage a futile attempt at 
rebellion which could only result in pointless loss of life 
and wasted effort. Clearly, there are elements of prudence 
in this view but it amounts to more than a mere profit and 
loss calculation. The American policy of 'liberation' 
enunciated in the 1950s by John Foster Dulles did not,
'Nor do we think it would tend less to promote the 
ulterior benefit of our continental neighbours than our 
own, were Great Britain to refrain from participating in the 
conflicts that may arise around her. An onward movement of 
constitutional liberty must continue to be made by the less 
advanced nations of Europe, so long as one of its greatest 
families holds out the example of liberal and enlightened 
freedom....
'For, let it never be forgotten, that it is not by 
means of war that states are rendered fit for the enjoyment 
of constitutional freedom; on the contrary, whilst terror 
and bloodshed reign in the land, involving men's minds in 
the extremities of hopes and fears, there can be no process 
of thought, no education going on, by which alone a people 
can be prepared for the enjoyment of rational liberty' . 
'England, Ireland and America' ( 18 35) , The Political 
Writings of Richard Cobden (London, 1886) , pp.35-6.
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despite its high-sounding tones, contemplate indiscriminate 
encouragement of rebel movements in the communist states of 
Eastern Europe. President Eisenhower certainly did not 
intend to support any rebellion that might break out, 
explaining that the United States 'doesn't now, and never 
has, advocated open rebellion by an undefended populace 
against force over which they could not possibly prevail'
The language chosen by the President indicated that in 
certain circumstances - an armed populace, for example - 
the U «■ S . might intervene but it also constitutes a clear 
statement that a rebel group would not be encouraged to 
destroy itself. The wish of a people to postpone a 
possible rebellion can thus be interpreted as a question for 
the country concerned and hence not subject to outside 
interference.
C: Intervention by Invitation
It is frequently the case that an incumbent 
government requests assistance from outside powers in order 
to retain its dominant position in a country. The 
arguments for permitting this kind of intervention are 
several and weighty. In the first place, reference may be 
made to the function of governments, to the fundamental 
purposes for which they exist. One of these functions must 
be considered to be the maintenance of a degree of law and 
order sufficient to secure the lives and property of its 
citizens. If the internal condition of a country dissolves 
into civil strife, the incumbent government may well find 
itself in need of assistance to restore order and security.
2 December 1956, cited by Peeters, Massive Retaliation, 
p. 217; see also L .L . Gerson, John Foster Dulles (New York, 
1967) , p p .87-8.
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In this way the right to invite intervention may be 
established.^ As regards the right to accept such an 
invitation, it is possible to argue that international 
society depends on the existence of established governments 
capable of maintaining order among their citizens and of 
fulfilling their international obligations. This was the 
view taken by Stowell:
The efficacy of international society is ... 
dependent upon the cooperation by the states 
whenever such cooperation is required to preserve 
the existence of a member state or to enable its 
government to fulfil its obligations under 
international law .... Reasoning a priori from 
this indisputable premise, international law would 
appear to justify states in coming to the 
assistance of a sister state to help it to suppress 
rebellion and preserve its orderly life.2
On this view, intervention is permitted when an incumbent
government requires it for the purpose of maintaining or
restoring order within its boundaries.
There is a difficulty, however, in that any 
outbreak of civil strife represents a challenge to the 
incumbent government. Its very legality is challenged as 
well as its de facto position and the main basis of its 
claim for preferential treatment seems to be chiefly that 
of priority. For the rebel group is in effect proposing to 
take over its functions and one of the points at issue may 
be the claim that the new government would perform these 
functions in a more satisfactory manner. Nevertheless, 
the matter of priority contains a deeper significance in
It is for this reason that an international act such as the 
Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos remains an exceptional 
undertaking. In Article 6 of the Protocol to the 
Declaration, signed 23 July 1962, the guarantors agreed that 
'The introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and 
war material generally, except such quantities of 
conventional armaments as the Royal Government of Laos may 
consider necessary for the national defence of Laos, is 
prohibited'. Text in C.E. Black and others, Neutralization 
and World Politics (Princeton, 1968) p .17 7. The nature of 
the exception is perhaps a less than ingenuous acknowledgement 
of the need of governments to have some access to armed 
force for domestic purposes.
2 Intervention in International L a w , p . 3 2 9 .
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that the incumbent government is in some way the representative 
of the nation in general and cannot be considered to lose its 
mandate immediately upon the outbreak of any internal conflict. 
After all, one of its mandates is to maintain law and 
order within the country. The incumbent government, then, 
is entitled to act on behalf of a country in a way that a 
rebel group is not.
Yet in some cases the insurgents may claim to be in 
a better position to restore and uphold order, perhaps on 
account of their superior military strength or their 
greater measure of support from the population. Even if 
this is conceded to be true of a particular conflict, it 
does not necessarily follow that assistance should be 
withheld from the incumbent. For while order may be most 
effectively brought about in that country by denying aid 
to the incumbent, it can be argued that this establishes a 
precedent which will encourage rebel groups elsewhere to 
challenge their governments. The net effect might thus be 
to increase the level of disorder among the members of 
international society as a whole for the sake of denying 
support to one particular government which happens to be 
weaker than the insurgents. It is evident that these 
arguments and counter-arguments omit considerations of 
justice; they show no concern for which side has the more 
rightful cause or for the relationship between popular 
support for a government and domestic order, tenuous as 
that relationship might be. Their purpose is the 
maintenance of internal order which does require that 
attention be given to established institutions and physical 
capacities. Hobbes observed that 'covenants, without 
the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure 
a man at all'.  ^ If the covenant and the sword are not 
to be supported under all circumstances, the consequence 
may well be a loss in their effectiveness.
The next level of argument concerning intervention 
by invitation of the incumbent looks to the nature of the
1 Leviathan, p.109.
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relationships that tend to develop between established 
governments. It claims that governments naturally and 
inevitably form relations with each other which are difficult 
to rupture simply on account of the outbreak of civil 
strife. These relationships may exist between governments 
as such i.e. the leadership of a country as determined 
by its existing political processes, or between 
particular individuals or groups of individuals who 
happen to hold office in a country. An example of the 
former is to be found in the support which the United 
Kingdom felt obliged to give to the Nigerian Federal 
Government during its war with secessionist Biafra.
This support arose in large part out of the previous 
relationship between the two governments. Thus Britain 
continued what the Minister of State for Commonwealth 
Affairs, Mr George Thomas, called her 'traditional 
exports' to Nigeria; they had been on a 'normal 
commercial basis' and 'could not have been stopped without 
our being far from neutral and, in fact, taking sides'.^
What was meant by 'traditional' became a little clearer 
at a later date when the Minister maintained that it
2referred to both the quality and the quantity of exports.
According to the Foreign Secretary, Mr Michael Stewart,
Britain was providing 75 per cent of the Federal
Government's supply of arms at the start of the war and
to withhold them would be tantamount to saying:
We have put you in a position where you are 
very heavily dependent on us for the instruments 
of power. Now, when you are faced by a challenge 
to your authority, we will put you at a very 
serious disadvantage.^
Against this is possible to argue that in some 
cases at least - and Nigeria was almost certainly not one
30 January 1968, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 
fifth series, vol. 757, col. 1063.
2 5 March 1968 , ibid., vol . 760, col. 215 .
3 12 June 1968 , ibid., vol . 766, col. 290 .
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of them - aid is given for limited purposes only and 
that these purposes do not include the killing or suppression 
of fellow citizens in the event of civil strife. It 
seems improbable that any such stipulation could be 
formally incorporated into a written agreement or that any 
understanding, whether formal or informal, could realistically 
be expected to stand up should a challenge to the government 
arise. Of course, it may be the hope of the donor or 
seller that his supplies will not be used in a civil 
conflict, but the only way to guarantee this is to refuse 
aid altogether before the event. The arms embargo which 
the United Kingdom instituted against South Africa was 
apparently based on the fear that any weapons supplied 
might be used to put down an uprising by the coloured 
population against the white government. One object of the 
embargo was thus to avoid the predicament of being 
committed to the incumbent government in the event of a 
civil war where sympathies would most probably lie with the 
insurgents.
The relations which lead one government to support 
another in the event of civil strife are in some cases 
formalized by a written treaty. The emphasis in such a 
treaty may be simply on the maintenance of good relations 
and the continuance of mutual support and it would be 
unusual for specific provisions to be made concerning 
civil strife. Few governments are prepared to admit the 
likelihood of purely internal strife or are prepared to 
give an open and unconditional commitment to support an 
incumbent government should it come under attack from 
inside the country.''" In practice, however, support in those
Lauterpacht argues that states are not bound to supply 
arms to a government unless a treaty exists since they 
possess a right to remain impartial. 'Even then the 
provisions of the treaty may have to be read subject to 
the implied condition of its fulfilment not involving 
the danger of international complications following upon 
interference, implied in an unilateral grant of advantages, 
in a civil war of considerable dimensions'. H. Lauterpacht, 
Recognition in International Law, p . 2 3 2 .
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circumstances is clearly implied and is generally given; 
it is the attempts to break off such support that are, as 
has already been argued, exceptional.
The situation is more complex when a treaty seeks 
to establish a right of intervention for one of the 
parties. The idea behind a provision of this nature is 
that the established government may not be able to issue 
an invitation to intervene if it is incapacitated or 
intimidated by a rebel group. The invitation is, as it 
were, extended in advance so that the recipient is at 
liberty to accept or decline when the occasion arises.
The Platt Amendment of 2 March 1901 contained such a 
provision:
The government of Cuba consents that the United 
States may exercise the right to intervene for the 
preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance 
of a government adequate for the protection of life, 
property, and individual liberty.^
The Amendment, originally attached by the US Congress to
the Army Appropriation Bill for 1901-2, was embodied in
the Permanent Treaty of December 1902 and eventually
became an Appendix to the Cuban Constitution. It is clear
that an agreed right to intervene is likely to exist only
when the holder of the right enjoys a strong influence
over the other state. The existence of this sort of
provision is a visible sign of one state's, inferiority,
and perhaps for this reason it has not found much popularity
in recent years. It is deliberately eschewed, for example,
by the countries of the Soviet bloc where ideological
factors might be expected to make it more acceptable if
not mandatory.
Treaties which have in the past been concerned 
with civil strife were usually intended to guarantee the 
security of a particular regime or an individual ruler.
Thus a king or prince might seek to secure his position 
through an agreement with other monarchs providing for 
assistance against rebellion. The inhibitions on
1 Cited by Thomas and Thomas, Non-Intervention, p.23.
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requesting and granting help of this kind appear to have
been much less powerful at one time than those working
against guarantees concluded between governments. The
main reason for this was the strength of the idea in
early modern Europe that the Christian princes were
united by the sanctity of their office, an idea which
corresponded to the deep horizontal divisions in society.
Intervention was something of a right and a duty for a
royal ruler who would view anti-monarchical forces in
any country with concern and would feel obliged to assist
in their suppression. The Holy Alliance of 1815 was one
of the last examples of a community of sovereigns coming
together to guarantee one another against revolutionary
uprisings. In that case the undertakings were mutual
but it is also possible for them to work one way only.
Thus the Treaty of Fez between France and the Sultan of
Morocco in 1912 guaranteed support for the latter against
all internal challenges to his authority:
The Government of the Republic pledges itself to 
lend constant support to His Majesty against all 
dangers which might threaten his person or throne, 
or endanger the tranquillity of his state.* 2
There is some doubt, however, as to whether Morocco could
then be considered an independent sovereign state, and
In 1712 Saint-Pierre could happily propose a European 
confederation intended to secure any existing government 
against rebellion: 'In return for joining the Union
each prince will be assisted against rebels by the 
forces of his confederates. So that by this means... 
they will always be reduced to obedience'. Memoires 
pour rendre la Paix perpetuelle en Europe ( 17 3 8 ed .) , 
cited by F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of 
Peace (Cambridge, 1963), pp.42-3.
2 Cited by M.S. Rajan, United Nations and Domestic 
Jurisdiction (Calcutta, 1958), p.205n.
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indeed an arrangement like that contained in the Treaty 
of Fez does indicate a relationship of protection and 
dependence. For this reason, as well as the decline in 
the importance of hereditary rule, the twentieth century 
has seen few, if any, treaties between fully sovereign 
states whereby one guarantees a particular regime in 
another.
International lawyers have taken diverse views 
on the validity of treaties which guarantee the position 
of an individual ruler or of a form of government.
Vattel, writing of a Europe which remained an essentially 
monarchical community, asserted that agreements to support 
a particular sovereign were unquestionably proper and 
often necessary.
Kings do not always treat solely and directly for 
their Kingdom; at times, by virtue of the power 
they possess, they conclude treaties relating to 
themselves personally, or to their family, and they 
may lawfully do so, since the safety and the true 
good of the sovereign is bound up with the welfare 
of the S t a t e d
In the event of rebellion, Vattel continues, the treaty
must remain valid and binding, even if the King and his
family are driven from the country by the rebels, for
it would be absurd to hold that the alliance terminates 
at the moment they have need of it, and by the very 
event which it was intended to provide against. 
Moreover, the King does not lose his royal character 
by the sole fact that he loses possession of his 
Kingdom.^
Vattel clearly makes a presumption in favour of the rights
of the monarch although he suggests that there are
conditions under which a king might be justly deprived of
his position; in that case 'the personal ally of the
deposed King should not assist him against the Nation
3which has rightfully deposed him'. In a very different 
atmosphere Hall attacked the idea that individual rulers
The Law of Nations, book I, ch. xii, section 195. 
ibid., section 196.
3 loc. cit.
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or even p articular forms of gov e r n m e n t  could be the pr oper
objects of international guarantees:
the doctrine that inter v e n t i o n  on this ground is 
either due or perm i s s i b l e  involves the assumption 
that i ndependent states have not the right to change 
their gove rnment at will, and is in reality a relic 
of the exploded notion of ownership on the part of 
the sovereign.
It was not so much the international agreement itself that 
worr ied  Hall as the p r o posed interference in the political 
proc ess es of the country concerned. Internal affairs were 
a matter for the people as a whole and no longer the 
person al business of the ruler; 'a promise of illegal 
i n t e r f e r e n c e , 1 23 he maintained, 'cannot give a stamp of
2legality to an act which without it would be unlawful'.
Finally, consi d e r a t i o n  needs to be given to the 
ma nne r in which an invi tat ion to intervene is issued.
Each state has certain regular or constitutional processes  
through which any such request must ordinarily be made.
It is clear that the mere fact of an invi tation having 
been made in acco rdance with these normal arrangements 
does not n e c e s s a r i l y  mean that other states are entitled 
to accept it. There may, for example, be international  
rules requiring n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n  in a p a r t i c u l a r  case 
which are not to be o v e r r i d d e n  by an act of the country
3itself. If, on the other hand, an invitation is not 
made in a way that is valid by the standards of the 
inviting state, difficult problems may arise. It is 
gen er al ly assume d that the internal processes of another 
state are not to be ques t i o n e d  by outside states and that 
the actions of a g o v e r n m e n t  must be taken at their face 
value. Yet the manner in w h ich and the purposes for 
which an i n v i tation to intervene in a civil conflict is 
made may be of crucial importance to the responses of other 
states. They may feel en titled to assist only a legi timate
Tre atise on Inter n a t i o n a l  L a w , p . 34 5 .
2 ibid., p.356.
3 The neut r a l i z e d  country of Laos is one modern example.
government which has issued a valid invitation; failure 
to inspect the credentials of such a request may lead them 
to breach this obligation. Nevertheless, the circumstances 
of civil conflict, even if they do not throw the legitimacy 
of the government into doubt, may make the normal channels 
for inviting assistance inoperative. Clearly, some 
discretion must be permitted for states to accept invitations 
to intervene which are not strictly valid or constitutional. 
The United States was aware of these difficulties when it 
received an inquiry from President Chamoun of Lebanon 
about possible assistance in 1958. Eisenhower, by 
making it clear that he 'would not send United States 
troops to Lebanon for the purpose of achieving an additional 
term for the President',  ^ sought to deter Chamoun from 
acting on his own initiative and without the approval of 
his cabinet. In this case, as in others, the presumption 
seems to be that intervention by invitation generally 
requires a valid request on the part of a government 
although this is by no means always a decisive factor in 
determining the propriety of intervention.
On some occasions states may charge that an 
invitation has been rigged or arranged by the intervening 
state. Such charges have been made not only of invitations 
which are patently invalid but also of invitations which 
by most standards would be considered genuine. In many 
cases, of course, there is room for sincere disagreement 
while in others charges of this sort are simply political 
manoeuvres designed to discredit the intervening state.
All of this, however, is quite consistent with the notion 
that intervention is permitted in accordance with what 
is accepted as a genuine invitation. To return to the 
example of American support for the government of President 
Chamoun in 1958, the latter's invitation was denounced 
as invalid by the Soviet Union on the grounds that it 
had been brought about by the United States. Addressing 
the UN Security Council, the Soviet Representative,
1 Eisenhower, Waging Peace , p.267 .
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Mr A. Sobolev, claimed that the situation in Lebanon 
was a purely internal conflict. Whether or not this was the 
case his comments are relevant to any instance of civil 
con f1ict:
In an attempt to justify his country's aggressive 
actions, the United States representative alleges 
that it was requested by the present rulers of 
Lebanon. It is no secret, however, that these 
rulers are simply political puppets of the United 
States State Department.^
The essence of the Soviet charge was that the nominally 
legitimate government of Lebanon, being subordinate to the 
United States, did not represent the people of the country 
and that the invitation which was issued originated not 
from the government but from the intervening state. The 
implication is that were these allegations not the case 
(and most observers do believe them false) then the invitation 
itself would have been a valid one.
Comparable charges of manipulation were levelled 
against the Soviet Union at the time of its intervention 
to suppress the Hungarian uprising in 1956. In this case, 
however, it would seem that the allegations were substantially 
true. At the end of October the two leaders of the country 
were Imre Nagy as Premier and Janos Kadar as First Secretary 
of the Communist Party. Nagy encouraged the liberalization 
movement in Hungary, abolishing the one-party system of 
government on 30 October and withdrawing from the Warsaw 
Pact on 1 November. In this he was opposed by Kadar who 
on 2 November called Soviet armed forces into Budapest to 
crush the growing revolt. The invitation was challenged 
on three grounds: firstly, that Kadar could not be
considered the legitimate representative of a nation 
which for the most part favoured political reform; 
secondly, that the request was not approved by the political 
leader of the country, Premier Nagy; thirdly, that the 
Soviet Union had in some way compelled Kadar and a number of
1 Official Records, XIII, 827th Meeting, 15 July 1958, para 114.
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other leaders to issue an invitation. These arguments 
were countered by the claim that the leadership of Nagy 
had lost its legitimacy by taking the path of revisionism 
and 'counter-revolution'. If that had been so, Radar's 
invitation could have been treated as a more or less 
authorized expression of the wishes of the people as a 
whole. But there is still the problem of where the 
initiative for the invitation lay: did Radar voluntarily
ask for this assistance or did he have it thrust upon 
him? There are, moreover, degrees of pressure which an 
outside state may exercise in order to obtain the issue of 
an invitation, and it would be unreasonable to declare 
invalid any invitation which was in the slightest way 
influenced by external considerations. The dividing line 
between permissible and impermissible influence will 
necessarily vary from case to case and must remain to some 
extent undefined. One can only say with certainty that 
an invitation which is issued after intervention has 
taken place is scarcely likely to be valid.
D: The Recognition of Rebels
The device of inviting intervention in civil 
strife has been seen to be necessary for an incumbent 
government in a variety of circumstances. The device 
is also useful to the intervening state since a valid 
invitation indicates to the outsider that its actions will 
be welcomed at least by the legitimate government of the 
country. At the same time an invitation will help to 
rebut charges of aggression or invasion which third parties 
may bring against the intervening state. It is a one­
sided situation, however, if there are no circumstances in 
which a rebel group can be properly assisted from outside. 
But there are several important arguments which do lead 
to this conclusion i.e. that a rebel movement may not 
invite outside aid and that any aid of this nature runs 
the risk of being condemned as aggression or invasion.
There is, first of all, the proposition of absolute non-
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intervention which applies to assistance to both incumbents 
and insurgents. More significant in this context, however, 
are those arguments which are based on an interpretation 
of the sovereignty of states. Sir William Harcourt, 
writing in 1863, argued that the principle of sovereignty 
in international society necessitated a mutual restraint 
from disrupting the exercise of authority by other 
governments:
Sovereignty, by the very definition of the term, 
implies a right to the obedience of subjects, 
whether the Sovereign be a despot, a monarch, or 
a repub1i c ....To deal with the insurgent subjects 
of another State on a footing of independence, is 
to violate the sovereignty of the State which has 
hitherto exercised dominion over them.l
Harcourt's view is in accord with the accepted definition
of a sovereign state which includes the characteristic
of habitual obedience to the government on the part of
its subjects. Consequently, actions by another state
which are designed to destroy that obedience amount to an
attack on the sovereignty of the state concerned. While
international society may have nothing to say about the
conditions of rebellion, it is thus naturally concerned with
the intervention of a state which attacks the sovereignty
of another member of that society by subverting its
government.
Subversive intervention in international relations 
may be distinguished from two other forms of state 
interaction. On the one hand, a state may attempt to 
affect the decisions of another state through, for example, 
persuasion, diplomatic pressure, constraints, coercion and 
threats. So much is a necessary and established part of 
international intercourse, the limit on such behaviour
Letters by Historicus, pp.3-4. Oppenheim states that 
'a foreign state commits a delinquency by assisting 
insurgents in spite of being at peace with the legitimate 
Government'. International Law (vol. II, Disputes ,
War and Neutrality) , seventh edition (London, 1952) ,
p .6 60 .
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being the point where a state loses its independence in 
decision-making altogether and hence ceases to be a 
sovereign state. On the other hand, a state may launch 
an armed invasion or attack against another in an attempt 
to conquer some or all of its territory. This is the core 
of the notion of 'aggression' which has perturbed statesmen 
for some considerable time„ Actions of this kind are 
intended to deprive a state of territory, possession of 
which is again a necessary feature of a sovereign state.
If, then, it is posited that a third characteristic of 
sovereign states i.e. the existence of a government, is 
as important as the first two, the conclusion must be that 
intervention of a subversive nature is as much disruptive 
of the fundamental norms of international society as 
armed attack or influence which amounts to actual control. 
However, even granting this to be the case for the moment, 
it may be pointed out that international society has found 
occasion to tolerate and even to encourage armed attack or 
domination of one state over another for certain purposes. 
It is conceivable, therefore, that subversive intervention 
might be considered permissible in certain circumstances 
as a means of upholding international rules or existing 
rights such as self-defence. Some of these possibilities 
will be raised in later chapters.
The authority of a government as a constituent 
element of a sovereign state, however, differs from the 
other elements in significant ways. It concerns, 
essentially, a relationship between government and citizens 
which involves the whole population of a country. This 
population is in theory, as we have seen, free to manage 
its own affairs without interference. Now it frequently 
occurs that some citizens seek to alter the current 
political arrangements or to replace office-holders 
and are unable to do so in accord with the prevailing 
rules. If they then attempt to impose their demands on 
the rest of the population, there may be some grounds for 
granting them certain rights, including that of asking 
for and receiving outside assistance. The grounds are
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in a sense the converse of those on which a legitimate 
government may invite external aid to secure its position.
A rebel movement may represent a general desire for change 
in the country against which the incumbent is able to hold 
out purely by virtue of his advantageous position, 
especially his control of the armed forces. Here the 
argument that certain types of civil strife constitute 
a form of political choice is again relevant. For 
example, the authority of a government may be substantially 
impaired even though the rebels control no territory.
Thus it would be unrealistic to argue that an outside 
state should abstain from attacking an authority which 
scarcely exists. Again, a rebel movement may by armed 
force gain control of a considerable proportion of the 
country's territory with the result that it bears some 
resemblance to a state itself, with a capacity for 
rights and duties which approximate those of the incumbent. 
In either of these cases there are grounds for allowing 
outside states to assist the rebels and this is often done 
in practice through the device of recognizing the rebel 
movement. The conditions and consequences of recognition 
need to be discussed at some length.
In the centuries after 1500 when the modern state 
system was beginning to emerge the preceding arguments 
would have found little support. The sovereignty of a 
state was embodied in the sovereign himself, the monarch 
carried legitimate government in his person. Any act 
against the sovereign was an act against the state for 
there was no area of relations between peace on the 
one hand and war on the other.1 Encouragement to rebels 
was no less an affront than an attack or invasion and 
constituted sufficient grounds for a declaration of 
war. In these circumstances no right of rebellion could 
be accorded to the subjects of a ruler save where this 
right derived from the existing constitution of the state.
1 De Jure Belli ac Pacis, book III, ch. xxi, section 1.
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Thus the seven cases listed by Grotius where resistance
to a monarch was lawful were all based on explicit or
implicit stipulations of the law of the country.'*’ It
was a natural corollary of this that were the position of
the legitimate monarch in fact usurped he alone could
2provide legitimation for the new ruler. Equally, the 
usurper could acquire no rights by force of arms or by 
virtue of popular support. Grotius was bound by the 
concept of legitimacy. He could see no alternative source 
of authority either in the state itself or in the 
international community. While he allowed a foreign prince 
to intervene on behalf of rebels whose rights had been 
violated, the possibility of outside states conferring 
some sort of recognition on a rebel movement was beyond 
his fundamental terms of reference and outside the experience 
of the international society of his day.
The eighteenth century witnessed a retreat 
from this position although not until the following 
century did the process come near completion. Indications 
of the impending change can already be detected in 
Pufendorf's De Jure Naturae et Gentium published in 1672. 
Arguing that 'he who actually holds the supreme sovereignty 
should, despite the fact that he seized it by base methods, 
be held for the time by the citizens as a lawful prince', 
Pufendorf continues:
ibid., book I, ch. i v , sections 8-14.
2 'Now while such a usurper is in possession, the acts 
of government which he performs may have a binding force, 
arising not from a right possessed by him, for no such 
right exists, but from the fact that one to whom the 
sovereignty actually belongs, whether people, or king, 
or senate, would prefer that measures promulgated by him 
should meanwhile have the force of law, in order to 
avoid the utter confusion which would result from the 
subversion of laws and suppression of the courts'.
Ibid., section 15.
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These conclusions are all the more to the point 
with respect to foreigners, who have no concern in 
examining the title whereby a man secures sovereignty, 
but merely follow along with the possession, 
especially when the usurper of the sovereignty 
can rely upon great resources.^
Elaborating on this view, Barbeyrac maintained that a
ruler held his position by the validity of his acts as
recognized by the people and that a usurper could therefore
2acquire legitimacy if he performed the same valid acts.
The idea that all international rights derived from the 
person of the legitimate monarch was clearly on the 
retreat.
Vattel was one of the first writers on international
law to recognize that a rebellion which had reached certain
proportions could by that fact acquire a certain legitimacy.
This was possible regardless of the origins of the
conflict and of the issues involved:
Civil war breaks the bonds of society and of 
government, or at least suspends the force and 
effect of them; it gives rise, within the Nation, 
to two independent parties, who regard each other 
as enemies and acknowledge no common judge. Of 
necessity, therefore, these two parties must be 
regarded as forming thenceforth, for a time at 
least, two separate bodies politic, two distinct 
Nations. Although one of the two parties may have 
been wrong in breaking up the unity of the State 
and in resisting the lawful authority, still they 
are none the less divided in fact.3
This was the conclusion deduced from the relations between
the legitmate ruler and the rebels, but Vattel went on to
suggest that third parties had an interest in treating
the contending factions in this way:
Trans. C.H. and W.A. Oldfather (1688 edition) , (New 
York, 1934), book VII, c h . viii, section 9.
2 J. Goebel, The Recognition Policy of the United States 
(New York, 1915), p.40.
3 The Law of Nations, book III, ch. xviii, section 293.
101
Moreover, who is to judge them, and to decide which 
side is in the wrong and which in the right? They 
have no common superior upon earth. They are therefore 
in the situation of two Nations which enter into 
a dispute and, being unable to agree, have recourse 
to arms.^
Whereas the international 1 aw of sovereigns had to insist 
on the primacy of personal sovereignty, an international 
law of nations could take into account the actual 
achievements of the citizens of those nations even if they 
amounted to a seizure of power by force. At the same time, 
the position of outside states changed from one of strict 
obligation to the principle of legitimacy to one which 
allowed them some freedom to shape their policies according 
to the necessity of events.
If a civil war is to be regarded at some point
as a war between two separate states, it follows that
third parties are free to remain neutral or to ally with
either side subject only to the laws relating to any
international war. This could not be considered 'an
interference in the constitution of the other state
2(for it is then in a state of anarchy)'. Assistance to 
a rebel movement thus became as legitimate as a declaration 
of war, but it was a war in alliance with the rebel 
entity rather than simply an act of war against the 
parent state. The policy of France towards Britain's 
rebellious North American colonies after 1776 provides an 
important example of intervention in civil strife which 
amounted to a war against Britain in alliance with the 
rebels. The first contacts were made in 1776 when North 
American representatives arrived in Paris to negotiate 
questions of military supplies, trade and diplomacy.
The choice facing France was not simply between recognizing 
the colonies as belligerents and refusing recognition,
lo c . ci t .
2 Kant, Perpetual Peace, trans. and ed. by L.W. Beck 
(Indianapolis, 1957), Fifth Preliminary Article, p.7.
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for the former course implied an alliance with the rebels
and a guarantee of their security. Even if France had not
wished to treat the matter as one of war with England,
there was no doubt that the latter would see it in this
way. The treaties of commerce and alliance which were
signed in 1778 thus constituted a declaration of war
against Britain which the French King justified as an
attempt to avenge injuries and as self-defence against
England's domination of the high seas.1 The fact that
France withheld her intervention until the colonists had
achieved some measure of success, however, did not mean
that France was greatly concerned that the possibility
of de facto independence for the rebels should be
demonstrated. The delay was due more to diplomatic
2tactics than to any legal considerations. For although 
Vattel and others had indicated the significance of the 
actual performance of a rebel movement, the practice of 
states had not yet developed empirical criteria for 
assessing that performance from which legal consequences 
could be drawn. The major developments in this direction 
were to occur in the nineteenth century.
The ideals of the American Revolution itself
provided considerable motive force for these changes.
'It accords with our principles,' declared Jefferson as
Washington's Secretary of State, 'to acknowledge any
government to be rightful which is formed by the will of
3the people, substantially declared'. It is clear that 
for Jefferson recognition of a rebel movement as the legal 
government of the country was due only after it had 
succeeded in replacing the previous government. While 
recognition at this point is not our main concern here, it 
is a natural extension of Jefferson's ideas to anticipate
See Stowell, Intervention in International L a w , p .3 4 6 n . 
Goebel , Recognition Policy of the United States , p . 9 3 .
3 Cited by Thomas and Thomas, Non-Intervention, p.247.
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the successful conclusion of a rebellion, especially if 
the rebel cause is believed to have more justice than that
of the incumbents. Madison's Message to Congress in 
November 1811 took an early step in this direction in 
declaring that the United States regarded
with friendly interest the establishment of 
independent sovereignties by the Spanish provinces 
in America, consequent upon the actual state of the 
monarchy to which they belonged; that, as neighbours 
and inhabitants of the same hemisphere, the United 
States feel great solicitude for their welfare.
Within a few years the United States was giving limited
assistance to the Latin American colonies in their conflict
with Spain, though carefully avoiding an open commitment
2which might have provoked retaliation. Despite popular
enthusiasm and political agitation, official American 
policy continued in cautious vein. The independence of 
the Latin American republics was recognized only after 
Spain had effectively abandoned its efforts to maintain or 
restore its sovereignty. The Monroe Doctrine proclaimed 
in 1823 set a formal seal on the progress of events, 
indicating also that the United States was prepared to 
offer some form of guarantee of the continued independence 
of the former colonies:
Cited by Goebel, op. cit., p.118.
2 In 1820 Monroe wrote to General Jackson setting out 
the American position: 'The policy here hath been to
throw the moral weight of the U. States in the scale of 
the Colonies without so deep a compromitment [sic] as 
to make ourselves a party to the war....Our ports were 
open to them for every article they wanted, our good 
offices are extended to them with every power in 
Europe and with great effect. Europe has remained 
tranquil spectators of the conflict whereas had we joined 
the Colonies, it is presumable that several powers would 
have united with Spain' . Cited ibid. , p.140.
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With the existing colonies or dependencies of any 
European Power we have not interfered and shall not 
interfere. But with the Governments who have 
declared their independence and maintained it, and 
whose independence we have, on great consideration 
and on just principles, acknowledged, we could 
not view any interposition for the purpose of 
oppressing them, or controlling in any other 
manner their destiny, by any European Power, in any 
other light then as the manifestation of an unfriendly 
disposition toward the United States.1
British policy toward Latin America followed on
similar lines though at some distance behind the United
States. For both countries it was a delicate matter of
balancing the measure of actual independence against
respect for the nominal sovereignty of Spain. If the
former were allowed undue influence, the act of recognition
was likely to provoke hostility. The 1829 edition of
Martens' The Law of Nations stressed the political factors
operative in this type of situation:
In fact, when we speak of the passive conduct observed 
in such circumstances, or of the succours furnished, 
by foreign powers, it is state policy that generally 
decides, whether he who feels himself offended shall 
dissemble, or, at most, complain of the injury, or 
whether he shall seek retaliation by violent means.^
It was increasingly the case in the nineteenth century
that the desire of some of the leading states to see the
independence of subject peoples in various parts of the
Americas and of Europe made for passive encouragement of
revolutionary movements, though not always active assistance
and rarely formal recognition. There is a twentieth
century parallel in the anti-colonial movement which
enjoyed comparable favour in international opinion together
with strong internal pressures within the dependent
countries themselves. One of the most important differences,
however, lies in the development of doctrines concerning
Cited by Thomas and Thomas, Non-Intervention, p.ll.
2 G.F. von Martens, The Law of Nations (1788), trans. 
W. Cobbett, fourth edition (London, 1829), book III, 
ch. ii, section 10.
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the status accorded to revolutionary movements in the
last hundred years or so.
Prior to 1865 there appears to have been no
mention of the term 'recognition of belligerency' in the
writings of international lawyers s ^  At times, however,
state policy had in fact come close to according such a
recognition. In 1825, for example, Canning sent
a despatch to the British Ambassador in Constantinople
concerning the Greek revolt against Turkey; 'the character
of belligerency,' he argued, 'was not so much a principle
as a fact, that a certain degree of force and consistency
acquired by a mass of population engaged in war entitled
2that population to be treated as a belligerent'. This 
affirmed the idea that the actual independence of a territory 
justified treatment of it as a state for certain purposes 
at least, belligerency being a status that involved 
particular kinds of rights and duties. This passage in 
Canning's despatch was adopted as one of the grounds for 
Britain's recognition of the belligerency of the Confederate
3States in 1861. The problems raised by the American 
Civil War proved more complex than earlier cases and their 
effect was to precipitate a change in state practice 
regarding rebel movements which reached certain dimensions 
but which were not yet independent states. In Hall's 
words,
WoL. Walker, 'Recognition of Belligerency and Grant of 
Belligerent Rights', Transactions of the Grotius Society, 
vo1. XXIII ( 1937), p .17 8.
 ^ Cited ibid., p p . 180-1.
3 Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, 
p p . 188-9 .
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full independence at a given moment is consistent 
with entire uncertainty as to whether it can be 
permanently maintained, and without a high probability 
of permanence a community fails to satisfy one of 
the conditions involved in its conception as a 
legal person. Frequently however it is admitted, 
through what is called recognition as a belligerent, 
to the privileges of law for the purposes of the 
hostilities in which it has engaged in order to 
establish its legal independence .
It is not important here that the nature of the recognition
of belligerency has been (and still is) a matter of legal
debate between those who believe it declaratory and those
who believe it constitutive. The relevant point is that
a rebel movement could achieve a status which entitled
it to act in the manner of a state, and in particular to
seek certain assistance from outside states. This assistance
did not in itself constitute an act of war against the
parent government by the outside state. Nor did it require
from the latter a recognition of the rebel movement as a
fully sovereign state, much less a guarentee of its
existence; for one problem in recognizing a rebel
community as a state is that in the nature of things its
boundaries remain unsettled. The emergence of the status
of belligerency indicated that a government ceased to be
the sole authoritative organ of a state even while it still
had a chance of defeating insurgents; there were, of course,
several conditions which the latter had to fulfil in order
to achieve this but they were certainly something less
than the establishment of de facto independence.
Before going on to look at some of these conditions, 
it is important to note that the American Civil War also 
raised the problem of the relationship between recognition 
of belligerency and the interests of outside states. For 
the War inevitably produced effects which other parties 
saw as detrimental to their interests; if the protection of 
their interests required continuance of relations with the 
rebels including, for example, trade on a regular basis,
1 Treatise on International Law, p.36.
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then recognition of belligerency might provide a legitimate 
way of defending one's position. Some writers go so far 
as to argue that the 'true ground of recognition' for a 
third party must 'be based solely upon a possibility that 
its interests may be so affected by the existence of 
hostilities in which one party is not in the enjoyment of 
belligerent privileges as to make recognition a reasonable 
measure of self-protection'.  ^ The same writer consequently 
finds the geographical location of a rebellion to be a 
significant factor. Thus an insurgency which is 'isolated 
in the midst of loyal provinces, and consequently removed 
from contact with foreign states' can rarely have 
international repercussions; a revolt which occupies 
territory adjacent to another state may affect the latter 
but the onus is on the neighbour to demonstrate a threat 
to its interests; lastly, a revolt which involves maritime 
warfare is considered likely by its very nature to affect 
the commerce of third parties - in this case it is the 
absence of a threat which must be demonstrated (usually by
the parent state) if recognition of belligerency is to be
2ruled out. On this view rebels could expect to acquire 
rights only if their activities became sufficiently 
disruptive of international intercourse; success in this 
direction would thus depend largely on nuisance value 
which in turn is likely to be determined by chance factors 
such as the type of war and its location.
At this point the first of two major objections 
to this view may be raised. The criteria developed by Hall 
must be dependent on the nature of the military struggle
Hall, op. cit., p.39; see also R.H. Dana's commentary 
in H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law, ed. Dana 
in 1866 (Oxford, 1936) , pp. 29-32n. Chapter IV below 
deals with intervention in civil strife as a form of 
self-defence.
Hall, op. cit,, p.40.2
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and on the prevailing conception of national interests.
Both of these factors have been subject to overwhelming 
changes in the twentieth century. On the first score, 
it appears that there are now few civil conflicts which 
can be conducted in total isolation from the rest of the 
world. More often than not rebels are sufficiently well 
equipped to make an attempt on the seat of government; 
they are not likely to be confined to a particular area by 
limitations of transport and communications. The capture 
of territory, moreover, has tended to become less important 
in post-1945 civil wars than mobility or speed of operations, 
except in the case of regions attempting secession from 
the parent state, Even here, however, the scale of 
operations is unlikely to be on such a small scale - 
militarily and geographically - that outside states 
remain unaffected. Those events which are isolated from 
the rest of the world may in fact be something less than 
struggles for the control of a country or part of a 
country 0
Furthermore, the political isolation of civil 
conflicts has tended to diminish as states have defined 
their interests increasingly in terms of the character 
of the government adopted by fellow states. This is a 
phenomenon not confined to the three great ideological 
powers but one which has suffused the policies of many 
lesser nations. Consider, for example the goals of anti­
colonialism, socialism, democracy or national independence. 
All these signify a concern on the part of outside powers 
with internal political struggles, a concern which may 
easily be translated into interests to be defended or 
promoted as a matter of state policy. These interests 
clearly differ from those conceived to be important 
in the second half of the nineteenth and early part of the 
twentieth century. While it might have been possible to 
achieve some sort of consensus as to when a threat to, 
say, trading interests was sufficient to justify recognition, 
it is unlikely that states today would find it easy to
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agree that their ideologically defined interests were 
unaffected by any civil conflict in which the character 
of the country's government was at stake. It is 
unrealistic, therefore, to propose that as a matter of 
principle the status of rebel movements should be related 
to the interests of outside states and that interests 
should therefore be the operative factor in any decision 
for or against intervention. Nor has it been the practice 
of states to determine their policy toward civil conflicts 
solely according to what is conceived to be defence of 
their interests; there has also been a place for other 
sorts of rules to govern such behaviour.
The second major objection to the position based 
on the protection of interests is that it does not always 
correspond with the degree of progress made by the rebels 
towards creating a new government. Certainly, there may 
be cases where the correspondence is great but the approach 
based on the achievements of a rebel community appears 
sounder and more in line with the practice of states.'*' In 
the first place, the interests of outside states can only 
be interpreted by those states themselves. This might be 
feasible if such interests were limited and clearly defined 
but this has clearly not been the case in recent years. 
There is consequently no common starting-point from which 
a number of states can approach a given civil conflict; 
indeed the criterion of interests makes for starting-points 
which are not only diverse but also antagonistic. If, 
on the other hand, it is accepted that the question at 
issue is the degree of success of the insurgents in a 
certain direction, then there is an agreed set of facts 
(or, if they are disputed, at least an agreement on the 
sort of facts that would be relevant) and a more or less
See, for example, T,C. Chen, The International Law of 
Recognition (London, 1951) , ch. xxi where this question is 
related to the dispute between declaratory and constitutive 
theories of recognition.
110
agreed set of criteria to be applied. In the second place, 
there is due to a rebel movement as a matter of justice 
and of order some acknowledgement of what it has been 
able to achieve, even though some argue that strictly 
speaking it cannot acquire by its own efforts the status 
of a subject of International law,'*' Strong grounds for 
such an acknowledgement can be found in the argument that 
the creation of an effectively, if not permanently, 
independent political unit may be seen as an act of self- 
determination on the part of those involved. The factual 
element of the situation, in other words, may embody a 
normative principle which is by some standards worthy of 
support. Considerations of order may also come into play 
in that
the application of international law to a situation 
of domestic war arises from the desire and the 
necessity to regulate, for the orderly conduct of all 
parties concerned, the belligerents as well as 
neutrals.^
Nevertheless, much will still depend on the various 
criteria which have been proposed for judging the status 
of a rebel movement with a view to recognizing it as a 
belligerent. The arguments in favour of accepting the 
position won by a rebel movement may be nullified by ill- 
chosen or ineffective criteria.
Until recent years there has been general agreement 
on the conditions which must be fulfilled by a rebel 
community before recognition of its belligerent status is 
justified. Even those who maintain the interest of outside 
states to be a legally relevant factor do not ignore other 
conditions. Thus Lauterpacht defines three elements which 
must be present in a civil conflict if belligerency is 
to be acknowledged:
Oppenheim, International Law (vol. II, Disputes, War 
and Neutrality) , p .209 .
Chen, op. cit., p.367 and generally pp.366-8.2
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first, there must exist within the State an armed 
conflict of a general (as distinguished from a 
purely local) character; secondly, the insurgents 
must occupy and administer a substantial portion 
of national territory; thirdly, they must conduct 
the hostilities in accordance with the rules of war 
and through organized armed forces acting under a 
responsible authority.
It follows that to grant recognition of belligerency in
the absence of these conditions or even in the anticipation
of their being fulfilled constitutes an international
wrong against the legitimate government, though not one
2amounting to a declaration of war. Taken together these 
conditions are a requirement that the rebel community 
should resemble a state in appearance and in function.
The fact that armed hostilities are conducted on a general 
scale signifies two things: firstly, that the insurgents
are in reality seeking to gain control of the powers of 
government either of the whole state or of a region large 
enough to form a viable state in itself; secondly, that 
the rebel community - like an established state - is 
capable of maintaining a military organization and of 
performing the task of physically protecting its members. 
Another function of a regular state is contained in the 
requirement of administrative capacity which in practice 
may mean anything from primitive military government to 
sophisticated administration that includes taxation, 
economic regulation, social services and so on. Finally, 
there is the condition that a rebel community behave like 
a state - and a law-abiding one at that - in its military 
activities; it amounts to a demand that the insurgents 
conform to that limited part of international law which is 
relevant to them in their existing circumstances.
Recognition in International L a w , p.176.
2 1o c . cit.
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In general it seems correct to say that the
traditional international law relating to civil conflicts
imposes close restrictions on the granting of privileges
or assistance of any sort to insurgents. In a world where
such restrictions are frequently and blatantly ignored by
a large number of states it is natural to conclude that
the old law has lost its relevance. In part, this must
be put down to the rigidity which it displays on these
matters despite the various changes it has undergone in
the course of its development. With one exception, the
condition of belligerency is the only intermediate
category of civil conflict that is envisaged between small-
scale revolts and coups on the one hand and regular
international war on the other; it is a category,
moreover, which lies very close to the latter end of the
spectrum. The single exception referred to is the status
deriving from a 'recognition of insurgency'. While some
writers argue that this is a distinct grade of recognition
which gives rise to a formal status /  it is in reality an
extremely vague and indefinite condition. Insurgency
does not involve definite rights and obligations (in
contrast to belligerency) but derives from whatever specific
rights have been conceded in a particular instance of
2civil conflict. In this context recognition requires no
formal act or declaration, but means simply that a state
is acknowledging the fact of insurrection and is dealing
3with it in the way considered most appropriate. The 
condition of insurgency thus seems to be relevant to any 
case of civil conflict in which outside powers become 
involved. Inevitably, this makes it a redundant concept for
See, for example, Oppenheim, International_L aw (vol. I,
Peace) , eighth edition (London, 1955) , pp.140-1.
2 Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, p p .2 7 0-1.
3 Chen, International Law of Recognition, p.399.
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it is so broad in scope that it can offer nothing to the 
regulation of civil war situations by international law.
The weakness of international law in this field 
is due in part also to the nature of the criteria that 
are supposed to determine the behaviour of outside states 
in the event of a civil conflict. As far as the incumbents 
are concerned the relevant criteria are both factual and 
normative. No external assistance may be given to those 
opposing an incumbent government strong enough to put down 
any revolts directed against it. An incumbent/ moreover, 
is presumed to be the legitimate government of a country 
and consequently entitled to invite outside states to 
assist it in maintaining its position. As far as the 
insurgents are concerned these criteria all relate to the 
factual character of their efforts, whether, for example, 
they disrupt the interests of other powers or approximate 
to the creation of a sovereign state. Nor would it be a 
useful enterprise to undertake an exhaustive classification 
of civil conflicts and to propose standards of behaviour 
based on each category. For this is to overlook the 
importance which states nowadays attach to evaluating the 
contending claims of the parties involved in a civil 
conflict, a situation which traditional international law 
sought to avoid (and to some extent did avoid). It has 
already been suggested that states in the present era 
view their interests in large measure in terms of the 
political arrangements adopted by other states and that 
they are more liable to become involved in civil conflicts 
on account of their growing capacity to influence events 
in other countries, whether intentionally or unintentionally 
Political factors, it is clear, must occupy some place in 
any rules which might be applied to civil war situations.
The manner in which normative elements might be 
introduced has already been hinted at in the suggestion that 
the efforts of an insurgent group could be taken as in 
some respects an exercise of the right of seif-determination
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Exercise of this right might be defined in a way that 
excludes the participation of outsiders, but the situation 
is different if a civil conflict is seen as a struggle 
for the right of self-determination i.e. as an effort by 
a community to put itself in a position where it can 
make its own political choices» In that situation it may 
be argued that outside states are free, or even obliged, to 
assist the rebel group. This view, however, must be based 
on the assumption that the community seeking self- 
determination is entitled to it while their antagonists 
are not. It is an assumption likely to be contentious, 
being strongly held by one side and equally strongly denied 
by the other. For international society in general such 
a dispute is essentially one about which side should 
constitute the state rather than one about which faction 
should form the government to rule over both of them.
If, for example, in a colonial situation the claims of 
the subject people to self-determination are accepted by 
the international community, then that people may be said 
to have a case for some kind of recognition. Their 
position is basically that of possessing the rights which 
a state normally has to independence and seif-government 
while lacking the external characteristics such as a 
government and territory. Acknowledgement of this status 
is thus an extension forward in time of the usual process 
of recognition. But since recognition precedes the 
achievement by the rebel community of the physical 
features of a state (and to some extent actually promotes 
them), there is an element of choice in deciding whether 
or not to treat a community in this way. It is a choice 
between acceptance of the incumbent regime on the one 
hand and recognition of a potential state on the other.
It is a broader choice than that in the case of recognition 
of belligerency where the determining factor is the 
actual performance of a given rebel group.
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Selection of the sort of group to be recognized 
as a state or potential state tends to be simple in theory 
but obscure in practice. Consider, for instance, Soviet 
concepts about the right of peoples or nations to be 
independent whatever their situation, whether one of 
colonial subjection or internal oppression. It is easy to 
claim that
the Soviet state applies the principle of self- 
determination to all peoples, above all those in the 
colonial and dependent countries.
In contrast to the bourgeois reformist 
interpretation, the principle of the self- 
determination of nations is understood by the 
Soviet Government to embrace the right of nations 
to secede and form an independent state. In its 
new form the principle is thus directed against 
any form of national oppression or forcible 
annexion.^
But there is obviously considerable discretion in
determining which groups will in practice be treated as
forming a nation or a people. Most Soviet writers
maintain that certain conditions must be fulfilled if a
nation is to have any recognized status at all. These
conditions are far short of those required for a recognition
of belligerency in traditional international law but once
satisfied they are held sufficient to make the group
concerned a full subject of international law. This
school of Soviet thought is, in the sense suggested earlier,
a development of traditional approaches:
There is also the problem of the inclusion of nations 
among the subjects of International Law. In practice, 
this question arises after a nation has acquired 
the characteristics of a State having formed some 
organ (national committee, etc.) which at first 
acts in the name of the nation. When such organs
G. Tunkin, 'The Soviet Union and International Law' , 
International Affairs (Moscow) , (November 1959) , p.43. 
See also F.I. Kozhevnikov (ed.), International Law 
(Moscow, n.d.), p.141.
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exist, a nation fighting for its independence and 
at the stage of establishing its own State, is as 
a rule a subject of International Law.-*-
The example is given of the Polish and Czech peoples in
1917-8, a time when they were still some way from possessing
the attributes usually required of sovereign states.
Nevertheless, the emphasis here is clearly on at least
partial fulfilment of the traditional qualities of a state
and on the imminent fulfilment of the remaining ones.
A more recent school of thought, however,
seeks to dispense with even these minimal conditions.^
Essentially, their position is that every nation is naturally
in possession of the quality of sovereignty. This
'national sovereignty' is the 'sum total of those
inalienable rights of a given human group which stamp
it as a nation' and it entails all the rights of a full 
. 3subject of international law. It is independent of the 
capacity for self-government which may in reality be totally 
lacking and it can never be lost, only destroyed by an 
act of genocide against the nation concerned. While 
this is only a minority view in the Soviet Union, it is 
a radical break with the traditional line of development.
For it ignores all the factual criteria by which sovereignty 
is normally assessed and even remains silent on the 
defining characteristics of a nation. Consequently, 
any social group is in theory capable of being defined as 
a nation and, equally significantly, any existing sovereign 
state is open to the claim that it is not a nation and 
therefore lacks sovereignty. This doctrine, in other 
words, does not involve recognition in any sense of the
Kozhevnikov (ed.), op. cit., p.90.
2 For a fuller discussion see G. Ginsburgs, ’"Wars of 
National Liberation" and the Modern Law of Nations - the 
Soviet Thesis', in H.W. Baade (ed.), The Soviet Impact 
on International Law (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. , 1965) ,
p p . 6 8-7 0.
3 ibid, p .6 9.
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word but rather the attribution of certain qualities to 
undefined entities in a subjective fashion. The potential 
for disruption in the attempt to transfer the basic 
ordering concept of sovereignty from states to nations in 
this way needs no elaboration.^
In conclusion, one can say that the granting of 
some form of recognition to a rebel movement serves a 
number of useful functions in international society.
Firstly, it does permit an insurgent group to receive 
certain outside assistance if it has achieved some measure 
of success. International law has sought to express this 
condition in fairly precise terms and for this reason the 
present section has been much concerned with legal questions. 
But rules need not be formal law in order to regulate 
state behaviour and this section has also been intended to 
illustrate the common assumptions which underlie state 
policies on the matter of recognition and which contribute 
to the particular formulations of international law. Thus 
the development of the notion that the legitimacy of a 
government could not only be embodied in the person of 
the rightful successor to a throne but also derive from 
the de facto establishment of a state-like entity has 
signified important changes in international society.
In particular, it has meant that states have been prepared 
to accept as legitimate changes within members of that 
society that have not originated from the incumbent 
government; and there have been occasions when intervention 
has precipitated or accelerated changes which have been 
widely considered to be desirable. Greater flexibility 
on this score, it may seem, has been purchased at the 
price of increased potential for intervention in the 
internal affairs of sovereign states. Essentially, however,
In the latter half of the 1960s, however, Soviet writing 
generally moved away from regarding the nation as necessarily 
a state. See W. Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives on 
International Relations, 1956-1967 (Princeton, 1969) , 
p p .71, 107.
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it is a matter of substituting one set of rules for 
a rather different set in order to cope with new conditions» 
Order is not the same thing as rigidity; it is clear, 
for example, that the continued maintenance of the principle 
of personal legitimacy to the exclusion of other forms 
would have been highly dangerous in the twentieth 
century. The most important development, it has been 
suggested, relates to the recognition of the success of 
rebels in capturing and controlling a viable portion 
of territory within the parent state. This rule has 
been informally expanded in recent years to include rebel 
organizations which do not control territory in the 
traditional way - for example, recognition of the F.LcN. 
in Algeria and the N.L.F. in South Vietnam. This 
situation is in part the result of a change in the 
nature of some civil wars, a change which has not been 
incorporated into international law and may never be. 
Nevertheless, such rebel organizations may control a 
proportion of the population of a country without actually 
being able to hold permanently the territory in which 
they are located or even to administer them for the 
whole twenty-four hours of each day. The statistics 
published frequently at one time concerning the number 
of Vietcong-held villages in South Vietnam and their 
degree of control over the inhabitants bear testimony - 
regardless of their accuracy - to the possibility of 
rebels achieving partial success in unconventional ways.
It is nonetheless possible to observe some degree of 
consistency in the policies of outside states which 
grant recognition and other forms of assistance to such 
organizations.
Many writers seem to 1 ament the fact that 
recognition is often accorded for reasons which are
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purely or largely political. But it is not the fact
that political motives play a large part in such decisions
that is to be regretted. States act in accord with rules
out of a great variety of motives and under innumerable
pressures; the important factor is not so much why they
act as what they actually do. It is not as if only
'legal' motives are necessary for rules to be observed.
What is true is that where political considerations come
to the fore it may well follow that the prevailing
international rules are largely ignored. Even in cases
where recognition is given that would normally be excluded
by the traditional or commonly accepted standards, however,
there is frequently some acknowledgement that certain
rules of recognition are still relevant. They may be
different rules but they indicate a wish to regulate the
emergence of new sovereign states or changes of government 
2within states. Moreover, one of the most important 
(and possibly most effective) methods of changing rules is 
to challenge them by deeds. The question is whether the 
changes advocated can be seen as a development of existing 
rules or as a move towards their overthrow. In the case of 
recognition of rebel movements there generally remains a 
clear factor of development despite the fact that action of 
this kind may also serve a number of other purposes.
Raymond Aron, for example, points out that 'the FLN, 
established in Cairo or Tunis, was recognized by most 
governments of the Arab nations, though it exercised no 
regular authority over any portion of the Algerian 
territory. In a heterogeneous system, recognition is a 
means of diplomatic or military action. It aims at morally 
reinforcing improvised or revolutionary organizations. The 
recognition of the FLN was a proclamation of sympathy for 
the Nationalist Algerian camp, the affirmation that French 
policy was condemned and the rebel action sanctified by the 
principle of self-determination'. Peace and W a r , p.121.
2 Some of these principles are discussed in chapter VI.
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CHAPTER IV : SELF-DEFENCE AND INTERVENTION IN CIVIL STRIFE
The institution of self-defence is co mm on to all 
views of international society. It is accepted as a 
fundamental right of states by both natural law and 
positivist approaches to the relations between states.
The right of self-defence is above all one which must be 
exercised by the individual state and in this one of the 
actions it may take is to intervene in civil strife«^
The purpose of this chapter will therefore be to examine 
the ways in which intervention in an internal conflict can 
properly be regarded as an exercise of the right of self- 
defence. Intervention which exceeds the proper limits 
clearly undermines international order, unless it can be 
shown to be in accord with other objectives of international 
society more fundamental than the protection of individual 
members.^
While the right of self-defence must be taken as 
a given of international society, its nature and dimensions 
are by no means self-evident. Indeed, intervention in 
civil strife has for at least two hundred years been one of
Acts of self-defence are also important to a state in 
civil conflict and to its allies as a procedure for 
controlling intervention - see Part Three.
2 Mill saw the distinction between intervention out of 
self-interest and intervention in self-defence as a moral 
one: 'But of all attitudes which a nation can take up on
the subject of intervention, the meanest and worst is to 
profess that it interferes only when it can serve its own 
objects by it'. It was obvious to Mill, however, that 
such a posture on England's part misleadingly concealed 
the genuine concerns of her rulers: 'The thought they
have in their minds, is not the interest of England, 
but her security. What they would say, is, that they are 
ready to act when England's safety is threatened, or any 
of her interests hostilely or unfairly endangered'.
'A Few Words on Non-Intervention', in Falk (ed.), Vietnam 
War and International L a w , pp.27, 27-8.
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the international activities most often questioned as a 
legitimate means of self-defence; it has also been equally 
vigorously upheld as such and has contributed to clarification 
of the idea of self-defence. The simplest case of self- 
defence is that of a state whose territory, citizens or 
property are endangered by the existence of a conflict 
within another country; this idea of self-protection 
may at times be extended to cover principles of government 
if these seem to be jeopardized by antagonistic principles 
brought to prominence by civil strife elsewhere. The 
defence of a state, however, is a complex task and such 
an elementary form of self-protection is unlikely to prove 
adequate in any international system. The idea of defence 
has thus come to be extended in a number of ways both 
generally and with regard to civil conflict* Firstly, it 
may be extended forwards in time to the point of preventing 
the outbreak of civil strife altogether. This clearly 
falls under a broader heading than intervention as defined 
here although it does have a bearing on the problem.
Secondly, defence may require anticipation of particular 
outcomes of a civil conflict in terms of the policies 
that the winning faction would pursue* A faction that 
was committed to military expansion, for example, would 
constitute a potential danger to neighbouring countries* 
Thirdly, certain outcomes of a civil conflict might upset 
the existing distribution of power or make its maintenance 
more difficult; again, the ideological confrontation of 
great powers may lead them to place great importance on 
the favourable outcome of civil conflicts. Since states 
do in fact seek security, indeed self-preservation, 
through maintaining a balance of power and in some cases 
through the advancement of ideological objectives, they 
do have some claim to intervention as self-defence* A 
final section will consider the merits of intervention in 
collective defence.
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A; Protective Intervention
A civil conflict may affect an outside state in a 
way that arouses its concern and possibly leads it to 
intervene. What is activated in these circumstances is 
the instinct of self-defence or self-preservation, a 
desire inherent in all states to protect their territory, 
their assets and their nationals. Since some of a 
country's citizens and assets may be located in a nation 
where civil war breaks out, the possibility of foreign 
lives and property being endangered immediately arises, A 
civil conflict where the struggle for power lasts for any 
length of time tends to destroy the whole political basis 
of the existing legal system, while strife which involves 
widespread armed conflict removes the physical conditions 
of order and security. In such a situation states feel 
the need to take defensive measures in respect of their 
citizens and property in order to guarantee them that 
element of law and order which is considered minimal.
Assets may be narrowly or widely defined, from the extreme 
of referring only to government property, such as embassies 
or ships, to the other extreme of including all the private 
trading and commercial assets that their individual 
citizens may possess. What a government seeks to protect 
in practice, of course, will depend in part on what it is 
capable of protecting; it may indeed be quite incapable 
of doing anything. It is not to be denied, however, 
that pressure to take action in such circumstances can 
still as a rule be found within states whether or not 
they decide to act. Nor does it detract from this view 
that states have many times used the protection of nationals 
and property to justify intervention for basically political 
purpose s .
Intervention which is for the purpose of protecting 
nationals and property does not in the first instance 
entail taking sides in the dispute. It may be possible 
to conduct an operation to evacuate nationals and protect
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property in such a way that neither of the factions is
unduly or unnecessarily favoured. Less simple/ however, is
a civil war situation in which life and property can only
be effectively guaranteed through cessation of the
conflict. The same is often true of the defence of a
state's territory (including/ by extension, ships on the
high seas) if this is affected by fighting which spills
over a border or onto the high seas as a result of hot
pursuit, blockades and the like. The fighting may also
create disturbanees within the neighbouring state on
account of popular feelings or necessitate close supervision
1of traffic moving near and across the borders. In the 
event that an end must be made to the conflict itself, 
what is required is the imposition of an outcome on one 
side and possibly on both sides. The motive of self- 
defence which initially makes no reference to the issues 
involved in a civil war may thus lead to intervention of 
a sort which does in fact settle issues. Even if the 
apparently impartial criterion of supporting the side 
which can restore law and order most easily is followed, 
the result is still the same. For this reason the purpose 
of self-defence is easily denied by critics of an act of 
intervention; at the same time, of course, self-defence 
is not always the sole motivation of an intervening state.
The whole range of concerns is illustrated in President 
McKinley's Special Message of 11 April 1898 on the occasion 
of American intervention in the war in Cuba: 'The present
condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our 
peace, and entails upon this government an enormous expense. 
With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us 
and with which our people have such trade and business 
relations; when the lives and liberty of our citizens are 
in constant danger and their property destroyed and 
themselves ruined; where our trading vessels are liable to 
seizure and are seized at our very door by war-ships of a 
foreign nation, the expeditions of filibustering that we are 
powerless to prevent altogether, and the irritating questions 
and entanglements thus arising - all these and others that 
I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, 
are a constant menace to our peace, and compel us to keep on 
a semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace1. 
Cited by Thomas and Thomas, Non-Intervention, pp.22-23.
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'Peoples, as states, like individuals may be 
judged to injure one another merely by their coexistence 
in the state of nature (i.e. , while independent of 
external laws)'„  ^ If this is the case, it is clear that 
the right of a state to protect itself against injury 
must be restricted in some way for fear of permitting any 
deprivation or inconvenience to serve as a valid reason 
for taking counter-measures. The need for limitations of 
this kind would seem to be even greater in the event of 
self-defence based on the threat created in the course 
of a civil conflict. For a divided state is particularly 
vulnerable to outside interference and has not the strength 
of a united state to check any tendency on the part of other 
states to abuse the right of self-defence. Moreover, 
there is some difficulty in saying that one state threatens 
another when the former is divided and it is only one of 
the parties that is causing the threat; alternatively, if 
it is the conflict itself that is creating a danger, there 
can be no question of a hostile animus providing grounds for 
self-defence. Nevertheless, the existence of a civil 
conflict can harm another state and it would be impossible 
to deny the latter any right to look after its own interests. 
The question is whether, if at all, such a right can extend 
to intervention in civil conflict in the sense of actions 
designed to alter the relations between a rebel group and 
the incumbent government,
First of all, it is necessary to mention some of 
the criteria usually associated with the exercise of the 
right of self-defence. They will not be considered at 
length but will be relevant to all of the subsequent 
discussion. Six major criteria may be listed:
(a) proportionality requires that counter-measures 
correspond in some way to the magnitude of the threat
1 Kant, Perpetual Peace, p . 16.
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itself; (b) comparability demands that the methods used 
in response do not exceed those used in the threat such 
that only a forcible threat may be met with force and a 
non-forcible one may be met only by non-forcible methods;
(c) the threat may be merely repelled or its underlying 
causes may be removed in order to provide varying degrees 
of security in the future, a condition which is primarily 
one of objectives rather than of methods; (d) self- 
defence may be permitted in response only to illegal acts 
or to legal and illegal acts provided that in the latter 
case they do constitute a genuine threat; (e) the 
location of the defensive measures may be a criterion of 
limitation, depending on whether they take place on a 
country’s own territory or across an international 
frontier; (f) the directness of the threat is a condition 
which refers to its imminence in point of time or to the 
directness of its operation (an indirect threat, for 
example, would be one posed by political principles which 
by informal propagation undermine another state's system 
of government). All these criteria are relevant to the 
exercise of self-defence but this is not to say that all 
may be expected to find application in each case. The 
important thing is the extent to which states, in 
considering intervention in civil strife as a form of 
self-defence, bear in mind at least some of these conditions 
as factors which ought to govern their behaviour.
The classic case of intervention in civil strife 
as an act of self-defence arises when a condition of anarchy 
in one state leads to hostilities spilling over a frontier 
or to the endangering of the property or the lives of 
citizens of another country. Such threats may create 
'a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, 
leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation'.^
One of the widely accepted conditions formulated by the 
American Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, in respect of 
the Caroline incident of 1837; the other condition was that 
the act of self-defence involve 'nothing unreasonable or 
excessive' „ See J .L 0 Brierly, The Law of Nations, sixth 
edition (London, 1963), p p „405-6,
126
This is a rather narrow definition of the circumstances in 
which self-defence may be undertaken and there are strong 
arguments for widening them; nevertheless, if they are 
fulfilled, the right of self-defence cannot be denied.
There remains the problem, however, whether the defence of 
territory, nationals or property justifies intervention 
in civil strife, an act which may alter the course of the 
war and thereby the future political life of the country.
In some circumstances, it may be argued that the property 
and assets of a country - and possibly the security of 
its citizens abroad - are not proper objects of protection. 
The right of a state to engage in civil conflict without 
interference may have some priority over the right of an 
outside state to defend those of its components threatened 
by hostilities abroad. Certainly the usual practice of 
states intervening in these circums tances is to stress 
an intention not to affect the course of the civil war, 
a goal which may indeed be feasible where the lives of 
nationals are concerned. For these latter are unlikely 
to be of any value to either faction, whereas commercial 
assets may be. If Britain and France, for example, had 
intervened in the Nigerian civil war to protect oil 
installations owned by companies of their nationality, 
this would inevitably have made an important difference to 
the relative strengths of the two sides. On the other 
hand, it is evident that the right to protect frontiers 
against incursions, whatever the effects of this on the 
civil conflict, remains unchallenged, at least to the 
point of passive protection on the state's own territory.
The situation is somewhat different in the case 
of threats which arise as the result of deliberate actions 
by the parties to a civil conflict. A frequent instance 
is the crossing of international frontiers by insurgents or 
incumbents as a manoeuvre in order to retreat to a
On the extent to which the protection of nationals falls 
under the concept of self-defence in international 1 aw 
see Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law, ch.v.
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relatively secure area, to re-group or to obtain supplies.
It is undertaken as a matter of deliberate policy though a 
threat to the country into which the incursion has been made 
is not necessarily (and frequently is not) intended. The 
knowledge that such an incursion may be taken as a threat, 
however, is significant in that it allows one to assume that 
the action is seen by the party taking it as a calculated 
risk. Certain advantages are sought but at the risk of 
inviting retaliation. Any response by the threatened 
state which sought to deal with the situation would thus 
not seem to be unwarranted interference in a civil 
conflict even if it significantly harmed the cause of the 
party which had posed the threat. Indeed, one may conceive 
of a duty on the part of states not to allow either or 
both of the factions in a civil conflict to make advantageous 
use of their territory for this in itself may amount to 
intervention. Even mere toleration of such activity may be 
governed by this consideration, while active encouragement 
of it certainly will constitute intervention.
A minor instance of deliberate threat to an 
outside state is the seizure of its nationals to serve 
as hostages or for similar purposes. Again, intervention 
to the detriment of the faction concerned seems to have 
stronger justification than intervention to protect 
nationals who are incidentally threatened in the course 
of a civil conflict. The question of protecting property 
involves rather different considerations. Assets of this 
sort, it has been suggested, could play an important 
part in deciding the outcome of a civil conflict so that 
even their deliberate capture or destruction by either 
faction are insufficient to justify intervention. This 
view is strengthened by the fairly widely accepted rules 
relating to the expropriation of foreign property in 
normal times. The incumbents may in time of war have a 
strong claim to be acting out of necessity, while the 
insurgents are fighting to acquire the rights of the
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incumbents and may in fact do so. Certainly, compensation 
of some sort may be in order for the state concerned'*' but 
this is far from allowing a right of intervention in the 
conflict itself.
The idea that the political and social principles
adopted by a rebel group within one country may also
threaten established regimes elsewhere is an old one. The
monarchs who formed the Holy Alliance in 1815 were concerned
to maintain their internal power against upheaval from
below; their fundamental beliefs amounted to 'a social
rather than a political theory in the sense that it dealt
more with conflict between the strata of the society of
Europe than with relations among the members of the
2states-system'. The circular despatch of the three powers
from Troppau on the occasion of the insurrection in Naples 
indicated the importance which was attached to counter­
revolutionary intervention:
the powers have exercised an incontestable right in 
occupying themselves with taking in common measures 
of security against states in which the overthrow 
of the government by a revolt, even could it be 
considered only as a dangerous example, must have 
for its consequence a hostile attitude against all 
constitutions and legitimate governments.3
On the legal question of responsibility for acts of 
insurgents see Lauterpacht, Recognition in International 
Law, p p .247-50.
2 C . Holbraad, The Concert of Europe in German and British 
International Theory: 1815-1914 (Ph.D. thesis, Sussex,
1967) p .6 8.
3 8 December 1820, cited by Westlake, The Collected Papers 
of John Westlake on Public International Law, e d .
L. Oppenheim (Cambridge, 1914), p.124.
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The active propagation of revolt in other countries, it may 
be noted, simply made the exercise of this right 'more 
urgently necessary'; the possible contagion of revolution 
was deemed sufficient to create the right. Typically 
accompanying such a view was the notion of a transnational 
conspiracy directed against legitimate rule - Metternich, 
for example, believed that one had its centre in Paris - so 
that defence against such a Hydra demanded forceful action 
wherever it raised a head. The concern of the monarchs 
was not only with the fate of the principle of legitimacy 
in each country but also with the indirect and elusive 
potential effects elsewhere of a victory by anti-monarchi cal 
doctrines. The world has seen nothing quite like it since. 
Certainly, there has been fear of revolutionary principles 
and suspicion of subversive international conspiracies 
but they have derived primarily from concern with the 
interventionary behaviour of a particular state and/or 
the adverse effects on the distribution of power. The 
threat seen in contagious social and political beliefs 
seems to have diminished as many states have grown more 
confident of controlling their domestic circumstances.
It is possible to criticize this doctrine of 
contagion from two general standpoints. The first looks to 
the merits of each particular case, finding principles 
that are preferable to monarchical legitimacy (or whatever). 
There were some, for example, who opposed the Holy 
Alliance on the grounds that it prevented the development 
of liberal constitutionalism or the emergence of suppressed 
nations. It might have been added that if some countries 
were harmed by such principles then this was all to the 
good; they deserved whatever fate befell them, having - 
it was implied - little or no right to protect themselves.^
'A state which can be ruined in this wise, must either 
be tottering, or out of touch with higher civilization, or 
the ideas and danger-laden system which has gained 
recognition in the state from which the danger threatens 
must have truth in them'. Heiburg, Das Princip der 
Nichtintervention (1842), cited by Stowell, Intervention 
in_International Law, p. 386n.
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The second line of attack which is more important here
applies to the doctrine of contagion certain criteria of
self-defence and finds it lacking in several respects.
Thus Castlereagh objected to the Troppau Protocol as a
dangerous interpretation of the principle of self-defence.
His circular of 19 January 1821 stressed the right of a
state to protect its interests but maintained that these
were not automatically touched upon by any revolution:
it should be clearly understood that no government 
can be more prepared than the British government is 
to uphold the right of any state or states to 
interfere, where their own immediate security or 
essential interests are seriously endangered by the 
internal transactions of another state. But as 
they regard the assumption of such right as only to 
be justified by the strongest necessity, and to be 
limited and regulated thereby, they cannot admit 
that this right can receive a general and 
indiscriminate application to all revolutionary 
movements, without reference to their immediate  ^
bearing upon some particular state or states....
Castlereagh could conceive of a threat created by
revolutionary principles alone but demanded evidence of
its directness on the rare occasions that one did arise;
if this could be shown, he was prepared to sanction
intervention. By contrast, Canning found it impossible
to accept that a conflict physically confined to a single
state could pose a threat by virtue of ideas alone. He
was one of the first of many to point out that intervention
based on supposed contagion of principles tends to lack
2hard evidence for the allegations made. Canning would
Cited by Westlake, op. cit., p.125.
2 In a forthright despatch to the British Ambassador in 
Paris on 21 March 1823 concerning French intervention 
against an insurrection in Spain Canning wrote: 'No proof
was produced to His Majesty's plenipotentiary of the 
existence of any design on the part of the Spanish 
government to invade the territory of France, of any 
attempt to introduce disaffection among her soldiery, or 
of any project to undermine her political instituions ; 
and so long as the struggles and disturbances of Spain 
should be confined within the circle of her own territory, 
they could not be admitted by the British government to 
afford any plea for foreign interference'. Cited ibid.,p.126.
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almost certainly have permitted intervention if a threat 
could have been shown to exist but it should be pointed out 
that, by other standards of limitation, intervention in such 
a case could be considered to exceed the requirements of 
self-defence. In fact, both Castlereagh and Canning were 
agreed that a genuine threat was more likely to arise in 
the event of a revolutionary movement attempting to spread 
its principles by more direct methods. The doctrine of 
contagion, in short, could not properly call on the right 
of self-defence save in exceptional circumstances.
B; Preventive Intervention
It is a quite different situation, however, when
a revolutionary movement threatens to spread its principles
by force of arms. This was a point on which all statesmen
were able to agree, whether committed to monarchical rule
or not. Thus Canning, after his tirade against the
doctrine of contagion, naturally supported a right of
self-defence in these circumstances:
If the end of the last and the beginning of the 
present century saw all Europe combined against 
France, it was not on account of the internal changes 
which France thought necessary for her own political 
and civil reformation, but because she attempted 
to propagate first her principles, and afterwards 
her dominion, by the sword.1
Although taking a different route, Metternich could reach
the same conclusion. He argued that a revolutionary movement
was likely to lead to aggression, especially when it
produced anarchy in a large state:
L'anarchie consommee dans un grand Etat le conduit 
toujours ä la guerre intestine ou ä la guerre 
exterieure, et souvent aux deux fleaux a la fois.2
Intervention in a civil conflict could thus be justified by
an extension of the right of self-defence forward in time in
order to anticipate a threat in the event of a revolutionary
victory. Attention is focused on the possible
1 o c . c i t .
2 Memoires, vol.V, p.57, cited by Holbraad, Concert o f 
Europe, p.43n.
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international consequences of a civil conflict, in 
particular the potential for acts such as armed invasion 
or active subversion. True, a Metternich would have 
ulterior purposes in advocating intervention in these 
circumstances which a Canning would not share but such 
differences could be ignored when aggression was at issue. 
In fact, of course, there was much scope for differing 
judgements on the actual potential for threats in each 
case, a disagreement which reflected contrasting views 
on the dangers of revolution.
There is much to be said for this interpretation 
of the right of self-defence and it has not been without 
support in the post-1945 world. It does not, admittedly, 
measure up to the criterion of instant and overwhelming 
necessity proposed in the Caroline case but the danger 
envisaged, if permitted to eventuate, would satisfy the 
criterion. For what is feared is a threat, direct or 
indirect, which may place in jeopardy a state's territorial 
integrity or political independence. In the event a 
proportionate and comparable response might amount to total 
war and would certainly include intervention (for 
intervention in civil war is surely appropriate to meet 
the threat of indirect aggression - in the sense of 
intervention in civil war). It is only logical and 
practical to anticipate such an occurrence, especially in 
view of the fact that later action may prove far more 
costly and possibly ineffective. Preventive intervention, 
moreover, anticipates a manifestly illegal act and it must 
needs be taken on the territory of the state which is 
the potential source of danger. Arguments of this kind 
have been frequently heard from the United States which has 
sought to depict the consequences of a communist victory 
in certain civil wars as aggression and intervention 
elsewhere. The attempts of the Castro regime to subvert 
the governments of a number of Latin American countries 
after 1959, for example, provided a justification for
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having intervened earlier in the civil war, an undertaking 
which, as far as is known, remained hypothetical.^
Preventive intervention does, of course, do more 
than repel a threat, it seeks to remove a potential danger 
altogether. Here lies the central objection to it as 
an exercise of self-defence. The danger can never be 
demonstrated with certainty since it is a future event; 
and if after intervention has been undertaken the threat 
fails to materialize, nothing is proved since this was the 
very purpose of the intervention. The question resolves 
itself into the degrees of certainty a state must possess 
about the prospect of its being attacked. Clearly, it
would be absurd to deny a right of self-defence when only
a small doubt existed; it would be equally unwise to 
permit such a right when only flimsy evidence of a threat 
could be produced. This problem is common to all situations 
of self-defence (and has become acute in the age of nuclear 
missiles) but certain considerations apply specifically to 
civil strife. For a civil conflict is itself a source of
uncertainty, being fought to decide whether incumbents or
rebels will rule the country, and even if the latter do 
win out there is still doubt as to their intentions with 
regard to aggression. The uncertainty lies in the situation 
itself; no general guide-lines can be offered without 
serious qualification.
On the one hand, there is the assertion that a 
civil war is a debilitating process in which the 
participants are absorbed with internal matters. Thus 
Cobden wrote of Revolutionary France:
It also provided a justification for later attempts 
to initiate a civil conflict in Cuba, but this is a 
different matter.
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Great as was at that time the dread of French 
principles, no foreign power felt any fear of the 
physical force of France; for everybody shared the 
opinion of Burke, that that country had reduced 
itself to a state of abject weakness by its 
revolutionary excesses.1
On the other hand, there are the views that foreign conquest 
provides a solution for domestic quarrels or that certain 
types of revolutionary movement are by their very nature 
committed to expansion - this was widely held of the 
Bolsheviks in the period 1917-20 and few can doubt that 
their victory in the civil war did lead to efforts against 
non-communist countries at a later date. It may well be 
true that certain revolutionary movements turn out to 
be aggressive and interventionist (tendencies which, 
incidentally, may be increased by the attempts of outsiders 
to prevent their coming to power). The right of self- 
defence in these circumstances seems clear. Yet the fact 
that what is at issue here is the character of a potential 
member of international society indicates that the society 
as a whole should have some concern with the situation.
If a prospective regime is committed to breaking the 
fundamental rules of intercourse between states, then this 
is a threat to all states and ought accordingly to be met 
by them and not simply by those states which fear that 
they will be directly involved. Of course, these latter 
may act on behalf of international society since they have 
the strongest motivations to do so. It is clear, however, 
that intervention of this kind needs to be judged by the 
standards of international society and not by the criteria 
of self-defence. For while ideological issues easily cloud 
the concept of self-defence, particularly in any extended 
form, they are a little less likely to intrude into discussion 
of the basic norms of international society. If this does 
occur, however, any disagreement will be focused on these norms 
rather than on irreconcilable ideological issues. Thus
1 1793 and 1853' (1853), Political Writings, p.292.
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it may at least be agreed that if certain types of regime 
are to be branded as aggressive this can properly be done 
only with a measure of assent from international society."*'
The effect is not to reduce the protection accorded to 
states but to remove certain actions from the scope of 
self-defence and place them in an international rather than 
a national context.
C: Intervention and the International System
If a certain distribution of power is essential 
to the security of a state, intervention in a civil 
conflict which threatens to alter that distribution may be 
justifiable as an act of self-defence. In considering this 
question it is necessary, first of all, to ask how the 
defence of a state can relate to the distribution of power 
and in what ways civil strife might disturb this situation. 
Attention must be given both to the nature of the 
international system itself and to the conceptions that 
states hold about it; the important factors, it is suggested, 
are thus not only power in the traditional sense of military 
capacity but also the ideological outlook of the major 
wielders of that capacity. An instructive comparison may 
be made between nineteenth century Europe and the post-war 
world. The former exemplifies a balance of power system 
in which there were several states of comparable strength.
Any increase in the power of one state was likely to be of 
concern to the others for the margin of acceptable changes 
was so much the less on account of their initial similarity. 
Thus the Turkish Empire was a problem for the European 
system because of its 'sickness', its internal instability, 
which repeatedly offered opportunities for accretions of 
power through intervention to the alarm of other countries.
1 See chapter V .
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Constant attention needed to be given not simply to one 
major relationship of power but to the whole mechanism. At 
the same time, these calculations were influenced by the 
attitudes of states toward such political questions as 
nationalism, constitutionalism and monarchical government. 
The character of states was likely to have some bearing on 
their general strength - depending, for example, on whether 
or not they retained control over subject nationalities - 
and on the prospects of forming alliances - the autocratic 
rulers, for instance, seemed to maintain a special 
relationship amongst themselves. But these factors do not 
seem to have been overriding ones; in cases of necessity 
they were generally subordinated to the requirements of the 
balance of power. Thus the sympathy that existed at times 
between Kaiser, Tsar and Emperor did not mean that Germany, 
Russia and Austria-Hungary were not concerned about each 
other's power and policies. Equally, British attitudes 
toward nationalism and constitutionalism did not lead that 
country to ignore the dictates of prudence and balance.
Civil strife, in short, had a potential significance which 
it was by and large not allowed to realize.
The loose bipolar structure that has characterized 
the world since 1945 presents a number of contrasts. Most 
importantly, the emergence of the two superpowers has made 
it unlikely that the outcome of a single internal conflict 
could seriously disturb the central balance between them 
(ruling out the possibility of one or both of the polar 
powers collapsing into civil strife of some duration) . The 
Communist victory in the leading power of the Asian region 
in 1949 and Castro's success in the American hemisphere did 
not destroy the global strength of the U.S. Even the 
establishment of Soviet missiles in Cuba which was in some 
sense a consequence of that country's move to communism may 
not have proved unacceptable as far as the central balance 
was concerned; today Soviet missile-carrying submarines 
probably come even closer to the American mainland. The
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only other state apart from Cuba to defect from a 
multilateral Western alliance as a result of civil conflict 
was Iraq in 1958; in this case the United States, despite 
early fears, recognized General Kassim's government within 
two weeks."'" The outcome of a particular conflict, it would 
seem, will not in itself disturb the balance between the two 
leading powers; the preponderance of strength enjoyed by 
each over the rest of the world has been so great as to be 
virtually unassailable. This is not to say that maintenance 
of the central balance does not require constant attention 
and effort but that it is not to be upset by a single civil 
conflict, even in a country such as Cuba or Czechoslovakia.
At the same time, however, it is evident that the 
superpowers do manifest intense concern with the course and 
outcome of many internal conflicts. Three main reasons for 
this may be discerned, each of which may be related to the 
goal of maintaining the distribution of power in the 
international system and hence to the principle of self- 
defence. In the first place, the central balance - which 
prevents either side from gaining hegemony and ensures a 
more or less stable condition of peace between them - is 
in certain ways dependent on events taking place within the 
other members of the system. Secondly, the result of one 
conflict may be taken as a precedent for future conflicts 
elsewhere; this fear is usually associated with a belief 
that a hostile state has been involved in the conflict and 
that it will subsequently promote strife in other countries. 
These two concerns relate to the balance of power chiefly in 
the sense of relative military strengths but a third factor 
must also be considered. This is the ideological 
confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States 
which has profoundly affected their notions about the 
international system and has provided pressures for action 
on the part of both powers. Such ideas and forces cannot 
be ignored in considering the nature of self-defence in 
the contemporary world.
1 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp.269-70 , 286.
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The conflicts in China, Iraq and Cuba which moved 
those countries away from alignment with the United States 
did not cause the central balance to collapse but they did 
make the position of the U.S. that much more uncomfortable. 
For the strength of either superpower is not a thing apart 
which can be placed in invulnerable underground silos or 
in submarines scattered around the oceans. It depends on 
their economic and technological capacities, on their 
political and military decisions and on their international 
alliances and relationships. A threat to any of these 
makes the task of maintaining their power relative to each 
other that much more difficult. A civil conflict which 
threatens to add weight to one side of the balance - 
perhaps by transferring it from one to the other, perhaps 
by moving it from a position of neutrality, perhaps by 
weaning it away from one side - must enter into this 
reckoning. Measures by the other to achieve a counter­
balancing increase in strength may involve a heavy 
opportunity-cost. Intervention may thus be necessary in 
order to protect, if not the central balance itself, at 
least the elements which assist in its maintenance.
Moreover, there are likely to be several other states 
which find shelter under the overarching balance between 
the superpowers and which consider its support a matter of 
seif-de fence.1
The balance of power may be more gravely threatened 
by a series of unfavourable changes in the status quo rather 
than simply one. The outcomes of a number of internal 
conflicts may be such as to bring this about. Of course, 
these events might be quite independent of one another, 
resulting from purely internal factors; but the fact remains 
that they may be of benefit to one of the superpowers and 
that a threat may be perceived by the other. Intervention 
to prevent such changes may thus be an act of self-defence
The nature of collective defence in this context is 
discussed in the following section.
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although there is no hostile intent in the origins of these 
conflicts. What is frequently the case, however, is that 
another is believed - with varying degrees of truth - to 
have instigated or encouraged a particular conflict in 
order to secure changes favourable to itself. And if it 
has been able to do this in one case, then it may well seek 
to repeat the endeavour. The external promotion of civil 
strife may thus be feared as a subtle and progressive means 
of upsetting the balance of power, requiring intervention 
in the conflict (or conflicts) as a form of self-defence.
The question of which side to support will be determined 
automatically, regardless of considerations of the propriety 
of the intervention and regardless of local political 
factors .
This fear is by no means a new one among states.
In December 1791, for example, Edmund Burke drew attention 
to the proselytizing and therefore dangerous spirit of the 
French revolutionaries.  ^ At all times greatest concern has 
naturally been aroused by the advent of revolutionary 
governments which proclaim the overthrow of the existing 
order, a concern which is naturally intensified when such 
a government achieves some success in this direction. Thus 
the regime of Bela Kun in Hungary in 1919 was regarded by 
the Allies as a communist advance which had to be 
repulsed by all possible means; the Big Four disagreed 
over how to overthrow Kun but were united in considering
'Dreadful, indeed, will be their hostility, if they 
should be able to carry it on according to the example of 
their modes of introducing liberty. They have shown a 
perfect model of their whole design, very complete, though 
in little'. This referred to the conquest of Venaissin and 
the city of Avignon, but none were to be spared: 'As to the
greater nations, they do not aim at making a direct conquest 
of them, but by disturbing them through a propagation of 
their principles, they hope to weaken, as they will weaken 
them, and to keep them in perpetual alarm and agitation, and 
thus render all their efforts against them utterly 
impracticable, whilst they extend the dominion of their 
sovereign anarchy on all sides'. 'Thoughts on French 
Affairs' , reprinted with Reflections on the Revolution in 
France (London, 1967), p.327, 307.
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'Soviet Hungary, presently coached and prospectively
supported by Soviet Russia, a dangerous center for the
political subversion of East-Central Europe'.  ^ The policy
of subversive intervention, however, is not the sole
prerogative of revolutionary governments and it may be
employed by a regime of any character which is set on
expansion. To Hitler and Mussolini in the 1930s the
promotion of revolt in other countries was a means of
strengthening their position either by securing a friendly
regime or by facilitating armed conquest at a later time.
The dictators' support for Franco was seen by many as an
activity which had to be stopped before it could be pursued
more widely. Thus in a memorandum of 7 January 1937 the
British Foreign Secretary Eden argued that failure to act
over Spain would lead to pressure being put on Memel,
Danzig and Czechoslovakia:
It is therefore my conviction that unless we cry 
a halt in Spain, we shall have trouble this year in 
one or other of the danger points I have referred 
to. ... It is to be remembered that in the language 
of the Nazi Party any adventure is a minor adventure 
.... It is only by showing them that these dangerous 
distinctions are false that we can hope to avert a 
greater calamity.* 2
Eden's concern was shared, though expressed in different
terms, by the Soviet Union. In a statement to the Non-
Intervention Committee on 28 October 1936 Maisky, the
Russian ambassador to Britain, depicted the conflict in
Spain as 'a great duel between the forces of peace and the
forces of war' and warned that:
if ... success goes to the rebel generals . . . 
then not only will Spain suffer internal disaster, 
but the whole outlook in Europe will be blackened 
in the last degree, because the victory of the 
rebels would mean such a tremendous encouragement 
to all the forces of aggression, hatred, and 
destruction in Europe.2
A.J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking (London, 
1968), p.522.
2 Text in Lord Avon, Facing the Dictators, p.434.
3 Degras (ed.) , Soviet Documents, vol. Ill, pp.214-5.
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Common to all these attitudes is the notion that certain 
forms of international behaviour, in particular the 
instigation and promotion of civil strife, are unacceptable 
because they threaten to permit one or two states to upset 
the existing balance. The response is therefore to 
demonstrate in a given case that success can and will be 
denied or to punish the wrong-doer in a way that will deter 
him and others from similar activity in the future. To 
achieve these goals intervention may be called for; it will 
have as its purpose not simply the victory of one side but 
also the dissuasion and deterrence of the other intervening 
power. For this reason self-defence under such circumstances 
is likely to be a particularly complex activity.^
This has been evident in the post-war world in 
which the United States and some of her allies have 
manifested an almost continuous concern with subversive 
intervention. The reason for this is essentially that the 
Soviet Union and Communist China, first together then 
separately, appear to have developed a policy of 
intervention which is systematic and geographically 
extensive to an unprecedented degree. The facts of the 
matter are less important for present purposes than the 
existence of deep concerns about the effects which 
international communism might produce if permitted to 
operate unchecked. From time to time the United States has 
been moved to declare its opposition to the establishment 
of communist regimes through the instigation and promotion 
of civil strife. Generally these declarations have claimed 
that certain international behaviour is in itself a threat 
to international peace and that if allowed to succeed its 
cumulative effects would be disastrous. Thus President 
Truman undertook to help the Greek government against the 
communist rebels who were being assisted by neighbouring 
communist countries because he believed that 'it must be 
the policy of the United States to support free peoples
The goals of dissuasion and deterrence in this context 
are discussed more fully in Chapter VII.
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who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities 
or by outside pressures'. Sweeping as it was, he considered 
this pledge
no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian 
regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or 
indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of 
international peace and hence the security of the 
United States.
The consequences of the defeat of the Greek government were 
also stressed:
It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize 
that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation 
are of grave importance in a much wider situation.
If Greece should fall under the control of an armed 
minority, the effect upon its neighbour, Turkey, would 
be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder 
might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.
Support for the Greek government was manifestly an urgent
matter of defending the United States' position in the world
and hence of defending itself.
The Truman Doctrine had other important features, 
in particular its statement of the cold war confrontation 
in ideological terms. The Eisenhower Doctrine, formulated 
in a joint resolution of the U.S. Congress and signed by 
the President on 9 March 1957, was less exercised by the 
ideological purity of the Middle Eastern countries it sought 
to protect. The United States proposed to assist in 'the 
maintenance of national independence' for this was regarded 
as 'vital to the national interest and world peace'. The 
character of the regimes to be supported was ignored. 
Accordingly, the President was authorized, as he found 
necessary, 'to use armed forces to assist any such nation 
or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed 
aggression from any country controlled by international
Speech on 12 March 1947, Department of State Bulletin, 
vo1 . XVI (23 March 1947), p.536.
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communism'. The first application of the Doctrine - to
the civil conflict in Lebanon in 1958 - demonstrated that
its terms would be widely interpreted. Part of the
reason for this was the fear that the existing order in the
Middle East would collapse as a result of the activities
of the United Arab Republic which was also believed to have
2inspired the coup in Iraq. The aim of protecting the
existing distribution of power against a series of changes
can thus give rise to actions in self-defence - or believed
to be in self-defence - which are remote from the country
intervening and which must ignore local circumstances in
preference to wider considerations.
Another area of the world which has prompted
American concern about the use of subversive methods and
their effects is South East Asia. As early as April 1954
President Eisenhower likened the countries of this region
to a row of dominoes, implying that no-one should be
allowed to push the first one over (in this case Vietnam)
and that if it was pushed the whole row would very soon
fall. This concern about Vietnam in 1954 was repeated over
3Laos in 1960-61 and again over South Vietnam throughout 
the Johnson Administration. Only on the first occasion did 
U.S. forces not become involved at some point in the 
conflict. The strength with which this concern has been 
felt, however, derives not only from a belief in the 
efficacy of the methods of subversive intervention but also
ibid., vo1. XXXVI (25 March 1957), p.481. The preamble of 
the resolution as first proposed demonstrated the overriding 
concern with methods of subversive intervention: 'the
peace of the world and the security of the United States 
are endangered as long as international Communism and the 
nations it controls seek by threat of military action, use 
of economic pressure, internal subversion, or other means 
to attempt to bring under their domination peoples now free 
and independent'. Ibid., (28 January 1957), p .12 8.
2 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p.270.
3 ibid., p.607; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p . 12 9.
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from assessments of the internal situation of the 
countries seen to be threatened. The 'domino theory', as 
it is sometimes called, rests both on the possibility of 
instigating and promoting civil strife from outside and on 
the potential for civil strife within the countries 
concerned. The American conception of a country's internal 
vulnerability to civil strife, defined as it is in terms of 
economic underdevelopment,makes the threat of subversive 
intervention on the part of a hostile power urgent and 
extensive. It should not be thought, however, that threats 
of this nature are perceived by the United States alone.
A People ' s Daily editorial on 16 April 1965 described 
Chinese fears:
If the U.S. aggressors, instead of being driven 
out, are allowed to hang on in south Viet Nam, 
then U.S. imperialism will still more unscrupulously 
push forward its plot to subjugate its victims one 
by one, more furiously suppress the national- 
liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
launch 'special wars' everywhere and more truculently 
commit aggression and intervention in the new- ^
emerging independent countries in Asia and Africa.
Instead of economic conditions permitting subversive
intervention hostile to the West, China envisages the equally
widespread factor of struggle for national liberation
provoking the United States into support for reactionary
governments. The Chinese also see intervention in civil
strife as a matter of self-defence. The problem is not
so much to decide which one of these is in the right and
which in the wrong on this question (both may be right) as
to develop acceptable and accepted criteria for determining
the claim of self-defence.
It is clear that threats to international 
alliances and relationships or threats to the existing 
distribution of power arising from internal conflicts are 
distinct from direct threats to the territory, government,
1 Reprinted in Peking Review, 23 April 1965, p.16.
145
citizens or property of a state. They are threats not to 
its attributes or elements but to its security. This is 
a condition enjoyable in varying degrees but which can 
never be absolute; in defending their security, therefore, 
states will require a large measure of discretion in 
determining for themselves what constitutes adequate or 
necessary security. It is clear that conceptions about 
defence are also likely to be influenced by ideological views 
of the world for these provide standards by which the 
hostility of actual or potential changes can be measured.
This is far from saying that such threats are not real or 
that they are insignificant, but they are diffuse and to 
some extent uncertain. The need to abandon an alliance 
following an internal conflict, for instance, does not 
necessarily involve clear and obvious dangers to the state 
concerned; moreover, while such a conflict is still in 
progress the threat remains only a potential one which 
cannot easily be assessed. Thus one of the main limits on 
a defensive response is immediately lost since the threat 
involves no certain and direct objective which can be 
simply denied or frustrated. It becomes a matter of 
removing the source of the threat altogether by intervention 
or of accepting the consequences of non-intervention. The 
decision to intervene is made that much more difficult 
because the nature of the threat is not easily demonstrated.^ 
Moreover, since the threat is not made in 
physical terms there is little possibility of a response 
being made only in comparable terms. There is a non- 
forcible threat but it is so bound up with considerations 
of force that the distinction cannot apply meaningfully. 
Prevention of an antagonistic faction acquiring power seems 
feasible only through intervention against it so that
This fact has led some, such as Cobden, to dismiss the 
theory of the balance of power as a 'mere chimera - a 
creation of the politician's brain - a phantasm, without 
definite form or tangible existence'. Political Writings,
p . 202 .
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effective measures in this context almost certainly mean 
active participation on one side. The variable element in 
response is thus the level of intervention rather than a 
choice between intervention and some other method. Given 
that there are factors restricting the initial intervention, 
there seem to be few accepted or salient limits on the 
extent of subsequent actions. The main controls are to be 
found in considerations of prudence.^ Nor has international 
law proved to be of great relevance. A change of regime 
may be quite permissible in the eyes of international law 
but this does not guarantee that other states will not be 
adversely affected and will not claim a right to act in 
self-defence. True, international law generally condemns 
intervention of a subversive kind but it provides no clear 
or effective criteria for regulating the responses of other 
states. Counter-intervention may be proper in these 
circumstances but it must almost always take the form of 
intervention on the side of the group not already assisted. 
Again, the only clear limit to such action is victory for 
that faction and defeat for the other.
In that it is equated with the idea of self- 
defence, therefore, the pursuit of security in terms of the 
structure of the international system permits wide scope 
for intervention in civil strife. While certain rules may 
be said to govern defence of territory, government, nationals 
and property in the context of civil war, the maintenance 
of a state's security as a form of self-defence seems 
scarcely susceptible to regulation, particularly when such 
issues are determined partly by ideological pressures. The 
much-remarked growth of interdependence in international 
relations has served to extend the narrow notion of self- 
defence which might be thought to refer only to the immediate 
protection of definable and easily identifiable things.
If an element of order is to be found in the pursuit of 
security, it is not likely to be in the extended - and, it 
seems, infinitely extensible - notion of self-defence. The
1 See Chapter VII.
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possibility of the concept of collective defence providing 
some sort of order in this context will be considered in 
the following section.
Ideology has helped to make systems of government 
a currency of international dealings and civil conflicts 
into one of the market-places. This phenomenon has been 
most marked in the post-1945 era but it cannot be concluded 
that older currencies have therefore been superseded. On 
the contrary, the ideological confrontation has added to 
the complexity of states' concerns about the distribution 
of power. A change in the existing distribution may be 
seen not only as a threat to the structure of the 
international system but also as objectionable on ideological 
grounds. In many cases it may be difficult, if not 
impossible, to disentangle these concerns. For ideological 
beliefs may themselves constitute a form of power both 
domestically and internationally; and situations of civil 
strife provide one arena where that sort of power can be 
exercised and can be won and lost. The contemporary 
ideological conflict is certainly in some ways a conflict 
of and about power, but only at the cost of severe 
distortion can it be treated as that and nothing more.
This would be to lose sight of the particular dynamics of 
ideology which account in part for the way that states 
perceive and react to events abroad.
Intervention in civil strife which is intended to 
assist a particular faction on account of its ideological 
commitment is not in itself defensive. On the contrary, 
there are many political principles which appear to be 
aggressive or expansionist. But an important defensive 
element does enter into the pursuit of political 
principles when there are two comprehensive systems of 
political beliefs contending against each other. Thus if 
an internal conflict is being fought over rival forms of 
government one or both of which can be identified with the 
ideology of another state, the outcome is immediately an 
international issue - as well as internal - in that two
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outside states are brought into opposition. In the event 
of one power pursuing a certain doctrine through 
intervention in civil strife there are, by contrast, no 
distinct and antagonistic outside forces; certainly, the 
affair may become an international one between the 
intervening state and a faction of the divided state but 
this situation should be distinguished from that where 
rival outside powers are involved more or less automatically 
on account of their ideologies. True, one or both of these 
powers may be harbouring aggressive (or at least non­
defensive) designs, but insofar as neither feels it can 
afford to lose out in the conflict their concerns are 
genuinely defensive. The more countries are divided by 
antagonistic ideologies, the more likely it is that changes 
within other states favouring one country at the expense of 
the other will be regarded as dangerous and as requiring 
action in self-defence.
Ideological confrontation, of course, is not 
peculiar to the twentieth century, although the last fifty 
years have undoubtedly seen an enormous growth in the 
tendency of states to view the world in ideological terms.
The religious struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries in Europe, which were not without political 
implications, aroused similar passions and produced 
intervention on a comparable scale to that of recent years. 
Nor have communist and democratic ideologies been the only 
ones in contention during the twentieth century. German 
and Italian participation in the Spanish Civil War 
represented a challenge by totalitarianism to constitutional, 
if not democratic, government. The present confrontation 
between communist and democratic ideologies (the latter 
being less systematic than the former but almost as 
comprehensive) is, however, the first to exist on a truly 
global scale. It becomes even more important in view of 
the large number of states in the contemporary system 
which are experiencing rapid and extensive internal change. 
For communism it is a basic tenet that socialist forms of 
government will win out over capitalism in the long
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run;1 but this also puts a premium on victory in particular
conflicts and especially on the maintenance of victories 
2already gained. The ideology of democracy, on the other 
hand, is less insistent on the inevitability of its progress 
yet it can be as determined as communism on the need to 
prevent regression. The democratic belief is that civil 
conflict is important, in the first place, to the citizens 
of the country concerned and, secondly, to the security of 
democratic societies in that the victory of anti-democratic 
forces in any situation is likely to endanger those 
societies. It is worth looking in some detail at the 
communist view of internal conflict since it is an ideology 
which in its original form at least interpreted such 
conflict as essentially a local manifestation of a worldwide 
conflict between social classes.
The 'founding fathers' of communism, Marx and
Engels, maintained that as a matter of fact the proletariat
3of the world had no country, no fatherland. In order to 
win political power, it had first to rebel against the state 
in which it was located, for this institution was the 
immediate instrument of its oppression. But the capture of 
political power remained essentially transnational rather 
than national in a number of ways. Firstly, political 
revolution came as the momentous climax of underlying 
changes in material conditions, in particular the state of 
technology and the 'social relations' of production; these 
factors were worldwide though only in Europe had they 
reached their historically most advanced stage. Secondly, 
the entire proletariat of the world was held to be united
'History is developing in such a way that the level in 
the capitalist vessel will be dropping while the socialist 
vessel will be filling up'. Krushchev, Pravda, 4 June 1960,
cited by Modelski, The Communist International System 
(Princeton, 1960), p.l.
2 See also Chapter VI, section C.
3 Manifesto of the Communist Party (Moscow edition, n.d.) , 
p . 84 .
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by common interests that were independent of nationality.
The proletarian movement was seen as 'self-conscious,
independent movement of the immense majority, in the
2interest of the immense majority'. In the ultimate
analysis, therefore, the international system would not
simply be improved but would be transformed altogether into
a situation of world proletarian cooperation; each civil
conflict was part of this inevitable process.
The thesis of class conflict has remained at the
centre of communist ideology through all its adaptations
by Lenin and Stalin and their successors. The cause of
colonial liberation, espoused by the Soviet Union from the
earliest days of the Revolution, was seen in terms of the
global confrontation of classes. Lenin interpreted
imperialism as the inevitable extension of advanced capitalist
development, 'the monopoly stage of capitalism' which was
characterized by the 'monopolist possession of the
territory of the world, which has been completely divided 
3up' . Stalin sought to develop and apply this view of 
Lenin ' s :
under imperialism there must necessarily ensue a 
coalition between the proletarian revolution in 
Europe and the colonial revolution in the East, 
this leading to the formation of a united world- 
front of revolution against the world-front of 
imperialism.^
The liberation of colonial territories was thus expected to 
be a severe blow to capitalism; the 1928 Programme of the 
Communist International defined 'wars of national
ibid., p.72.
2 ibid., p.69. Moreover, once a proletariat had made 
itself the nation, its subsequent actions would be of the 
sort to diminish national differences and antagonisms at 
an even greater rate than that at which they were already 
diminishing between bourgeois states; the end of 
exploitation and hostility within states could only serve 
to bring international antagonisms to an end. Ibid., p.85.
3 Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism (mid-1917) 
in Selected Works (3 vols. , Mos cow, 19 6 3) rvol. I, p.745.
4 Foundations of Leninism (1924), text in The Strategy and 
Tactics of World Communism, U.S. House of Reps. Committee 
on Foreign Affairs (Washington, 1948), pp.90-1.
151
liberation, or colonial revolutions' as one of the constituent 
processes of the 'international proletarian revolution'.^
This theme never died out in communist thinking but 
regained its lost prominence after World War II when the 
Soviet Union and the United States confronted each other as 
the two most powerful states in the world. The onset of 
the cold war in 1946-7 has many causes but the important 
consequence to note is that the Soviet Union formally 
included among its allies the liberation movements in the 
colonies:
This has placed the rear of the capitalist system 
in jeopardy. The peoples of the colonies no 
longer wish to live in the old way. The ruling 
classes of the metropolitan countries can no longer 
govern the colonies in the old lines....The 
anti-imperia1ist camp is backed by the labour and 
democratic movement and by the fraternal Communist 
parties in all countries, by the fighters for' 
national liberation in the colonies and dependencie s .2
Subsequently, Moscow sent instructions to the Communist
Parties of South East Asia concerning the actions they were
expected to take. Soviet policy met with varying degrees
of success (and failure) but there is no doubt that these
conflicts were seen as manifestations of a worldwide and
transnational confrontation. Each was important for the
gain or loss that stood to be made on behalf of communism.
Communist ideology, in short, predisposes a state to see
internal strife as in many ways transnational. Moreover,
since the state has become an instrument of communism,
it is inevitable that such conflicts which are initially
between classes should also become international.
J. Degras (ed.) , The Communist International, 1919-1943: 
Documents (3 vols., London, 1956-60-65), vol. II, p.505.
2 Zhdanov, address at the founding conference of the 
Cominform, September 1947; text in Strategy and Tactics, 
pp .214, 217.
3 For details see J.H. Brimmel, Communism in South East 
Asia (London, 1959), pp.184-246.
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D: Collective Defence
Intervention in civil strife by or on behalf of 
a group of states has generally been regarded, other things 
being equal, as enjoying greater legitimacy than intervention 
by one state alone. Thus Metternich always believed that 
an act of intervention was best carried out in concert 
rather than by an individual state.'*' It is a belief which 
has not lost its force in recent years. Certainly, there 
are elements of Realpolitik present in that the greater 
the number of powers participating in an intervention the 
higher their chances of success on all fronts, but there 
are to be found as well notions of an authority to intervene 
which are separate from considerations of power. Whence does 
this authority derive?
One basis for collective rights is to be found 
in the concept of security. It has been argued above that 
the security of states depends in part on their international 
relationships and that these may be proper objects of 
protection. The states involved in these relationships 
may combine to give formal expression to the 
interdependence of their security by, for example, 
entering a defensive alliance. A collective arrangement 
of this kind has an important quality which is not possessed 
by the concept of individual security, namely the advance 
specification by international agreement of the areas to be 
treated as security interests. True, member states may 
have other interests outside the alliance area but these, 
it is suggested, do not have as great a claim to protection 
as those within it. This phenomenon is evident in 
multilateral alliances such as NATO or SEATO in that civil 
conflict in one of their number which perhaps threatened 
to remove it from the organization could be interpreted as
'Une consideration qui a nos yeux a la plus haute valeur, 
c'est celle de la difference immense qu'offrira toujours, 
dans son point de depart et dans ses consequences, tout 
secours prete a un Etat par une puissance voisine agissant 
d'apres une impulsion particuliere ou des calculs isoles 
et celui qui serait l'effet d 'une solidarity avouee par 
les puissances'. Memo ires, vol. V, p.56, cited by Holbraad,
Concert of Europe, pp.49-50.
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undermining the collective security of other members. This 
is the justification underlying SEATO's Committee of 
Security Experts which makes recommendations to Council 
Representatives on questions of subversion from within as 
well as from without.^
The phenomenon is most apparent in the great 
power practice of carving out spheres of influence which 
are in essence lop-sided alliances. They do not simply 
seek to exclude the influence of other powers but also 
endeavour to establish for themselves a widely accepted 
priority of concern which may on occasions justify 
intervention. Again, the possible replacement of a friendly 
regime by a hostile one within such a sphere of influence 
creates a certain prerogative of intervention which would 
not be present were the state concerned outside the area. 
Thus the geographical boundaries drawn by alliances and 
spheres of influence provide limits of a kind to defensive 
action, not only for their own members but also for those 
states outside which accept the rights created by such 
arrangements. The fact that an area of security is 
proclaimed in advance reduces the force of the argument that 
acts of self-defence cannot properly be undertaken hundreds
or even thousands of miles away from a state's own
2territory, but at the same time limits on such acts are 
imposed by the need to generate widespread acceptance of 
these security areas.
Its terms of reference require that the Committee 'shall 
identify, assess and exchange information on the nature and 
extent of the threat of Communist subversion, internal 
and external, to the Treaty Area'. Cited by G. Modelski, 
'SEATO: Its Function and Organization' , in Modelski (ed.) ,
SEATO: Six Studies (Melbourne, 1962), p.32.
2 An editorial in International Affairs (Moscow) commented 
on the British and U.S. landings in Jordan and Lebanon: 'As
for "self-defence", how can this be the case when the Powers 
landing the aggression are situated thousands of miles from 
the area into which they have sent their troops?' (August 
1958) , p.16. The measures which a friendly state may 
properly take in defending another against subversive 
intervention are discussed in chapter VIII, section C.
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The fact that a number of countries have found it 
possible to form an alliance of some kind does indicate that 
they are at least tolerably well-disposed (perhaps by dint 
of necessity) toward one another and that they are of some 
importance to each other's security. A government which is 
already hostile or indifferent towards its neighbours will 
neither form an element in their security nor consider 
joining an alliance. However, there may be an important 
difference between an indifferent government and a hostile 
one; this difference may be treated by neighbouring countries 
as a matter of security. Accordingly, they may attempt to 
establish their case in advance and thereby develop a certain 
prerogative in respect of that country. The Manila Treaty, 
for example, designated Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (South) 
as territories of importance to the peace and security of 
the area though it did not go as far as to assert a right 
of intervention in civil conflict not inspired from outside. 
While the principle of advance specification of interests 
is present, however, it is not reinforced by agreement of 
the countries concerned. That element of collective action 
is accordingly lost and there remains simply the element 
of agreement among the members of the alliance or group of 
powers.
There is in theory no -inherent limit on the area 
of common security which states may designate. In this 
case, as in the case of a collective defence arrangement, 
however, the states involved must reach a consensus as to 
what their common defence includes. This need does place 
some practical limits on their claims, limits which have 
also found some support in international law. Thus Bowett 
argues that a treaty alone is not sufficient to 
demonstrate a real interdependence of defence although this 
may be asserted by the fiction of 'an attack against one is 
an attack against a l l ' B o w e t t  points to the situation 
in domestic law where self-defence may be exercised on 
behalf of another person who is in 'proximate
1 Self-Defence in International Law, p .2 3 5 .
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relationship'. ’^ The parallel in international relations
seems to be in those states which are geographically close
to each other and which are also sufficiently friendly to
2form an arrangement for common defence. Those arguments 
derive primarily from the context of an armed attack 
(widely defined to include military aid to rebels) but 
they may also apply to a situation of purely internal 
conflict. For if the loss of a friendly regime through 
external action is a proper matter for collective defence, 
then such a loss through civil strife may constitute a 
comparable threat. In practice, intervention in collective 
defence is usually accompanied by charges of prior hostile 
interference in the country concerned n.b. Warsaw Pact 
intervention in Hungary in 1956 and Western intervention 
in the Lebanon in 1958. In some cases, of course, these 
charges may be true but there is some reason to suppose 
that their purpose is essentially to give an added 
legitimacy to a necessary act of self-defence. Thus 
collective intervention in the event of a purely domestic 
conflict may possess a certain validity in itself even 
though its purposes are denounced by others as illegitimate.
ibid., pp.201-2.
2 Bowett maintains that even this situation does not 
necessarily afford an adequate basis for collective 
exercise of the right of self-defence. Ibid., p.237.
156
CHAPTER V : INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND INTERVENTION IN
CIVIL STRIFE
It is conceivable that the international community 
itself may possess certain rights of intervention in civil 
strife which are not enjoyed by individual states. This 
right would be clearly distinguishable from a simple 
aggregate of the rights of self-defence held by each state 
or of the claims of each to have their sovereignty 
respected. Indeed, it may be the case that a right vested 
in the international community takes priority over the 
rights of individual states to defend themselves and to enjoy 
undisturbed sovereignty. The first task, therefore, is 
to ascertain whether such a right can be said to exist at 
all and, if so, to inquire into its nature and origins.
The second task is to show how this right - which up to 
this point has remained an abstraction - can be exercised 
in practice. Three major examples will be considered: 
intervention for humanitarian purposes, United Nations 
intervention, and intervention to uphold primary 
international rules. A final section will look at the 
rights which regional groupings, as partial international 
communities, can be said to enjoy regarding intervention 
in civil strife among their members.
A: The Authority of International Society.
In theory, the authority of international society 
might originate in any of three ways. It might derive, 
firstly, from some authority which exists above states; 
secondly, from the individuals who constitute the population 
of states; or thirdly, from the relations between states 
themselves. The validity of each of these sources will be 
examined in turn, bearing in mind the possibility that 
whatever authority does exist may derive from more than one 
source.
(i) The 1civitas maxima1. Christian Wolff 
postulated the existence of a civitas maxima, a society of 
which states were members in the same way that individuals
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were members of the state (or civitas) It was a fiction
designed to explain the presence among nations of rules
which could be seen to amount to something more than the
necessary rules imposed by a state of nature. While it
would be wrong to regard Wolff's notion of a civitas maxima
as an intellectual antecedent to supranational organization
2and world government, it does warrant attention as a 
possible origin of an international right of intervention.
If there is an authority, however nominal, over individual 
states, then those representing that authority are entitled 
to coerce others on the same basis that government officials 
are entitled to coerce individual citizens in domestic 
society. However, since this international authority is a 
fictional rather than a working political institution, it 
must remain rather static and artificial in its nature and 
functions. Once posited, it cannot change naturally, 
except in accordance with the same 'scientific method' by 
which it was originally deduced. For Wolff the purpose 
of the civitas maxima was the promotion of the common good 
of states as such and international rules were designed 
for this end, The abstract definition of a state was thus 
the sole and essential content of the principles by which 
the civitas maxima could undertake intervention.
A more fundamental objection to a concept such as 
the civitas maxima, however, is that it finds no 
correspondence in the actual behaviour and attitudes of 
states. Nor did it do so in Wolff's time. Certainly, 
great powers have at times set themselves up as arbiters 
of the international system but their sway over lesser 
states has not amounted to an authority transcending all 
states. Certainly, states have banded together to form 
near-universal organizations but these enjoy no powers over 
and above those extended to them by a political consensus
Jus Gentlurn, Prolegomena, sections 7-10.
2 A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, 
second edition, (New York, 1954) , p.153.
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of their members. On the other hand, the mere fact that 
no supranational government has been established does not 
in itself demolish Wolff's conception for it may be that 
such an authority could exist in supernatural form/ But 
what is destructive of Wolff's fiction is the fact that no 
state believes it or accepts it as a working hypothesis; it 
is an abstraction with no reference point in the real world. 
In practice, this view of international society did not 
prove popular either with theorists or with practitioners 
partly, one suspects, because of its presentation but more 
importantly because the notion of civitas maxima seemed 
'neither reasonable nor well enough founded to deduce 
therefrom the rules of a Law of Nations at once universal 
in character, and necessarily accepted by sovereign States'.
(ii) The Community of Mankind. The natural 
community of mankind is frequently held to impose certain 
obligations on man in his behaviour toward his fellow 
creatures; these obligations are natural and necessary by 
virtue of the fact that man is a social animal whose 
needs can only be satisfied by some degree of mutual 
cooperation. The creation of civil socieites may have been 
necessary to the survival and prosperity of individuals, 
it is held, but this does not relieve man of his primary
This conception permeated the political ideas of medieval 
and early modern Europe in that rulers were held to be 
bound by the laws of Christendom. They held their position 
by virtue of those laws which, however, also imposed duties 
on them toward their subjects, duties which it was the 
responsibility of all rulers to see fulfilled. Thus the 
author of Vindiciae contra Tyrannos, writing in the late 
sixteenth century, maintained that since there was but a 
single church 'so is she recommended and given in charge to 
all Christian princes in general, and to every one of them 
in particular ... Insomuch that if a prince who has 
undertaken the care of a portion of the church, as that of 
Germany and England, and, notwithstanding neglect and 
forsake another part that is oppressed, and which he might 
succour, he doubtless abandons the church'. Reprinted 
in A Defence of Liberty Against Tyrants, ed. H.J. Laski 
(London, 1924), p.217.
2 Va11e1, The Law of Nations, Preface, p.9a.
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obligations. Indeed, states provide a powerful instrument 
for carrying out these duties. All this, however,does 
not mean that states as such are under an obligation to 
do anything. For if the community of mankind has an 
authority it is over individuals as such. They may happen 
to be politicians or diplomats or soldiers, they may be in 
public positions which give them greater power to do good 
or evil, but their obligations to mankind derive not from 
these offices but from their being individuals. Certainly, 
political leaders may be invested with authority by their 
followers and perhaps owe special obligations toward this 
particular group of people, but again this says nothing 
about their duty to mankind as a whole. Fulfilment of this 
duty may or may not be consistent with other obligations 
they have undertaken, but it is required of them essentially 
as individuals. Only by an absurd personification of the 
state - absurd because the state lacks altogether the 
intrinsically human qualities which make for a conception 
of human brotherhood - can it be invested with the same 
rights and duties as an individual. Nevertheless, it will 
be surprising if this strength of human sentiment is found 
to have no impact at all on the society of states which is 
after all manifested in the words and actions of individuals.
(iii) International Society. If the body of 
states derives no collective authority either from a 
superior power or from mankind itself, we must look for 
such authority among states themselves. This requires 
a complex and sophisticated notion of international society 
and one is available, Wight maintains, in the mainstream 
of Western thinking about international relations.  ^ Its 
essence is that while men are the ultimate members of this 
society, states are the immediate members; it is the states 
which act as the chief instruments of human action and which 
are able to create rules for their common benefit (although 
this ability may not always be used to the full) . Now
'Western Values in International Relations', in 
Butterfield, Wight (eds.) , Diplomatic Investigations, 
pp . 9 5-102 .
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this society may be seen to contain elements of both 
previous conceptions. On the one hand, there are rules 
which bind states as much as if they had been handed down 
by a superior authority. A state in other words, is not 
the final arbiter of its rights and duties but must accept - 
and does in practice accept - that its behaviour is in 
certain circumstances governed by something wider than 
itself which may be termed the international community.
On the other hand, states do display a concern for the fate 
of individuals regardless of their nationality and they 
have retained the institution of humanitarian intervention 
as a means of carrying this concern into practice. It is 
not the community of mankind which is the immediate 
foundation of this institution, however, but the fact that 
states have incorporated it into their society.
This right of humanitarian intervention is open 
to all states but it is one which has not received clear 
articulation. Its basis, forms and proper limits will 
therefore be examined in some detail. In an organization 
such as the U.N., by contrast, it is possible to discern 
a slightly more formal process whereby actions, including 
intervention in civil strife, are authorized by 
international society. The nature and limits of this 
authority also require elaboration.
The fact that international society has certain 
rules binding on its members means not only that states 
are obliged to obey them but also that they are obliged 
to protect these rules against attempts to overthrow them.
We are talking here of the more fundamental rules, in 
particular that requiring respect for sovereignty, not of 
the thousand and one lesser rules of international conduct 
which are breached, challenged, changed or rejected with 
great frequency. From the duty upon all states to uphold 
basic principles may be deduced a right to act against those 
who seek to reject them either in toto or in sufficient 
degree to threaten the order which they are designed to 
achieve in international society. Such a threat is often 
associated in practice with the ambitions of a revolutionary
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movement fighting to gain control of a particular state.
An announced intention to ignore the basic rules of 
international intercourse may thus arouse the collective 
concern of other states and be a signal for intervention 
on their part against such a movement. This situation may 
in fact resemble the case of a rebel faction which is 
threatening to spread its principles by force of arms and 
against which one or more outside states believe they may 
intervene in legitimate self-defence. But here it is the 
territory and independence of other states that is being 
threatened rather than the bases of international society 
in which all states may be said to have a legitimate stake.
Before going on to consider the three instances 
of intervention in civil strife which, it has been argued, 
are founded on the authority of international society as a 
whole, some clarification is in order on the question of 
who is to carry out such intervention. Only in the case of 
United Nations action is it likely to be literally collective 
intervention in the sense of being conducted directly on 
behalf of the body of international society. In other cases 
intervention is undertaken by individual states or by a 
group of states which are acting with the authorization of
4»the others. Difficulties arise here, of course, in 
deciding whether such action was properly authorized, if 
at all. For states are apt to claim - with varying degrees 
of self-deception - that their actions are justified by 
virtue of their being for the common good.1 Since 
international society's right of intervention remains 
constantly present, it is always open to states to act
An old but illustrious example is to be found in the 
United States' justification for its encouragement of the 
secession of Panama from Colombia: 'By the rules of right
and justice universally recognized among men and which are 
the law of nations, the sovereignty of Colombia over the 
Isthmus of Panama was qualified and limited by the right of 
the other civilised nations of the earth to have the canal 
constructed across the Isthmus and to have it maintained 
for their free and unobstructed passage'. Address by 
Elihu Root, 22 February 1904, cited by Stowel1, Intervention 
in International L a w , p . 2 8 7 n .
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first and claim authorization after the event» Ex post facto 
justification, therefore, is not out of the question but it 
does make judgement of the issue more difficult than in 
the case of approval given in advance.
B :__ Humanitarian Intervention
Two kinds of objectives are generally considered
to fall under the heading of humanitarian intervention:
the first kind relates to the physical and mental suffering
of individuals, the second to the inhumanity of those rulers
who cause unnecessary suffering among their subjects.
Concern with the inhumanity of man appears to precede
concern for human suffering pure and simple as a motive for
intervention. It can only arise where strong feelings exist
about the duties of rulers. As long as temporal authority
was believed to derive from divine sources, kings and
princes were held responsible for carrying out God's will
on earth. They could be punished for evils committed
against their subjects whose suffering, however, was
primarily important for the wrongdoing that it indicated.
By the nineteenth century the idea of Christendom still
survived, though decreased in vigour, in terms of a family
of civilized states. Thus for some, such as Stratford de
Redcliffe, the Concert of Europe was a potential instrument
for correcting Turkey's administration of her Christian
subjects.'*' At the same time, however, there was growing
concern about the fate of persecuted subjects in other
countries for their own sake. In 1827, for instance,
the preamble to the Treaty of London, by which France,
Britain and Russia agreed to intervene in support of the
Greek insurgents, referred, albeit as a secondary motive,
to ’the sentiment of humanity and interest in the repose 
2of Europe'. The rest of the century saw a considerable
Holbraad, Concert of Europe, p p . 2 4 6 -7 .
2 Cited by Wight, 'Western Values in International Relations', 
in Butterfield, Wight (eds.) , Diplomatic Investigations , 
p. 119.
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number of cases of intervention in civil strife for reasons 
of humanity and even more numerous expressions of concern 
at human suffering which did not lead to intervention.
In the period since World War I humanitarian 
intervention to correct the delinquency of rulers seems to 
have disappeared altogether and to have been replaced by 
intervention on account of human suffering. The reason for 
this is essentially that the common standards for judging 
a ruler or a regime have been lost. In part, this is due 
to the inclusion in international society of nations from a 
variety of civilizations. In part, also, it is because 
the standards for judging the treatment of individuals in 
a society have become basically a political rather than a 
humanitarian matter. The relationship of the individual 
to society is now generally believed to reflect the conscious 
adoption of a political system by a people; rulers no 
longer receive their mandate from God but from the 
citizenry itself which cannot be presumed to be inflicting 
injury upon itself. Thus what was once a form of 
humanitarian intervention must now have a political 
motivation. Today, therefore, humanitarian intervention 
is characterized by a concern for the plight of individuals 
without reference to the political circumstances.
Whence, it may be asked, do states derive the 
right to concern themselves with the fate of individuals in 
other countries who are not their own nationals? It may 
be argued that this concern is not proper and cannot be so 
since human suffering is outside the cognizance of 
international society except in so far as that society has 
competence to demand certain minimum standards of its 
members.^ In practice, of course, humanitarian intervention 
is usually tolerated, even welcomed, but this, according to 
some, strikes at one of the cardinal principles of
See, for example, Hall, Treatise on International L a w , 
p . 342 .
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international law. The dispute between those who interpret 
the right of humanitarian intervention narrowly and those 
who give it a more liberal interpretation does not indicate 
a lack of concern with the fate of individuals on the part 
of the former. It is a question of how this well-being is
best achieved. Is it through the prevention of
international conflict by means of an international law 
based on the strict paramountcy of the sovereign state 
and enforcement of the principle that each
state is solely responsible for affairs within its borders?
Or can deviation from this position be permitted in 
necessary or urgent cases or when moral feelings are 
outraged ?
The arguments for the latter view are considerable. 
It is founded, first of all, on a simple appeal to the 
feelings of men for their fellow creatures, an appeal which 
postulates an overriding duty of man toward man. Mazzini, 
for example, argued that if 'some glaring wrong' is done 
even in an independent nation 'other nations are not 
absolved from all concern in the matter simply because there 
may interpose between them and the scene of the wrong, seas,
2tracts of continent, and traditional diplomatic courtesies' . 
But the appeal to the community of man does not, as we 
have seen, automatically apply to the community of states.
It is only because states have in fact taken up this appeal, 
at least in certain limited circumstances, that it has 
acquired international validity. An expression of this 
acceptance can be found in the notion of trusteeship i.e. 
the idea that it is right to do for someone what he 
himself is not in a position to do on account of his status 
or condition. Thus if individual citizens are unable or 
forbidden to protect themselves against oppression, then 
others - including outside states - are entitled to
ibid. , p . 34 3 .
2 'Non-Intervention' (1851) , Life and Writings, vol. VI, 
p . 307 .
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intervene in order to provide protection.
In the second place, it may be argued not that
human happiness depends on international peace but that
respect for human rights is itself a major ingredient
in peaceful international relations and that where those
rights are disregarded peace cannot long be maintained.
In the words of Ali Mazrui humanity is 'a more fundamental
moral concept than peace' since the importance of peace
must derive from the importance of 'the dignity and worth
2of the human person'. By this standard Chinese territorial
aggrandizement is less important and less dangerous than
South Africa's apartheid policy for the latter is by its
very nature a human and emotional issue of the highest 
3order. At the United Nations African and Asian nations 
have claimed that South Africa's internal policies 
constitute a threat to international peace and security in 
that they create repugnance and antagonism among the rest of 
mankind. It is only realistic, the argument concludes, to 
acknowledge the powerful feelings that can be aroused over 
such issues and to permit states to express their righteous 
indignation in practical ways.
They also claim to be realists, however, who argue 
that international peace must take precedence over the 
rights of individuals. Their view is based on an analysis 
of international relations which suggests that in the long
Grotius, who maintained that as a rule citizens were 
forbidden to take up arms even in cases of extreme need, 
nevertheless acknowledged that 'whenever the check imposed 
upon some action arises from the person concerned and not 
the action itself, then what is refused to one may be 
permitted to another on his behalf, provided that the matter 
is such that the one may therein be of service to the 
other.. ..The restriction, in fact, which prevents a subject 
from resisting does not arise from a cause which is 
identical in the case of a subject and of one who is not 
a subject, but from the personal condition which is not 
transferred to others'. De Jure Belli ac Pacis , book II, 
ch. xxv, section 8 (3).
2 Pax A f r i c a n a , p .13 7.
3 1 o c . cit.
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run conflict between states is more destructive of human
values (and human life) than the maintenance of principles
which grant states greater freedom in the treatment of
their citizens but which limit the potential for international
conflict. Jessup puts the matter bluntly: 'the interest
of the world community in peace is greater than the assertion
of an individual or group of individuals that his or their
rights are being disregarded'.'1' Certainly, this is a
position closer to the traditional notions on which
international society has rested for a number of centuries
and it is one which has been reinforced in the post-1945
world by the massive increase in the destructive powers of
war. Moreover, those African nations which Mazrui believes
to proclaim the sovereignty of man over the state have in
practice moved with caution. Concern for the integrity of
the state as such was strongly in evidence, for example,
in the reactions of many of them to Biafra's successful
2humanitarian appeals during the Nigerian civil war.
Firm conclusions about the extent to which 
international society can tolerate intervention for 
humanitarian purposes cannot be reached without further 
empirical study beyond the scope of this thesis; but the 
presumption must be that the sovereign state should take 
priority over the individual as it has done in the past and 
that any actions which deviate from this position must be 
shown to be more productive of human happiness than inaction 
in both the short and the long run. The burden of proof 
that this is the case thus lies with the state undertaking 
humanitarian intervention. For the protection of the
Quoted by L.B. Sohn, 'The Role of the United Nations in 
Civil Wars', American Society of International Law 
Proceedings (April 1963) , p.214.
2 As Kaye Whiteman pointed out in 1968, 'the more head of 
feeling is raised in Europe, much of it genuinely 
humanitarian in inspiration, the more suspicions are going 
to be aroused in Africa over the whole affair, and the 
more other African states are going to place their weight 
behind Nigeria'. 'The O.A.U. and the Nigerian Issue', 
World Today (November 1968) , p.450.
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ultimate members of international society i.e. mankind, 
requires in both theory and practice protection of the 
immediate members. Indeed, the institution of humanitarian 
intervention itself depends on the society of states so 
that while it is well established in international practice 
it must also pay due regard to the fundamental rules and 
purposes of the international community. Before considering 
the proper limits of such intervention, however, some 
mention must be made of the forms which it may take.
Humanitarian intervention, pure and simple, may
take two forms. The first is designed to alleviate or
remove whatever suffering is being caused by a civil war.
Yet even the most disinterested actions are almost certain
to favour one side more than the other unless relief can
be shared between the sides with the wisdom of a Solomon.
When governments are conducting humanitarian operations
what generally happens is that the political consequences
of their actions are simply ignored or, on occasions,
surreptitiously welcomed.^ The Nigerian Civil War saw a
number of countries whose political sympathies lay with the
Federal Government pressing strongly for food and medical
supplies to be made available to Biafra in spite of the
fact that this would most likely prolong the war. President
Johnson's appeal of 11 July 1968 illustrates these conflicting
pressures. He called upon 'all those having responsibility'
to permit relief food supplies to reach Biafra, declaring
that 'We do not believe innocent persons should be made the
2victims of political maneuvering'. Neither the United 
States nor Britain, however, was prepared to go as far as 
to intervene officially without the permission of the
The attitude of the British Foreign Secretary, Eden, 
after the bombing of Guernica in the course of the Spanish 
Civil War is typical in this regard: 'The Basque Government
told us that they wanted to evacuate women, children and the 
sick, and asked us to give naval protection for the 
operation....Despite his [Franco's] protests, the British 
and French navies both gave protection to this humanitarian 
operation. Our Ambassador's comment, that by removing 
useless mouths from Bilbao, the British Government had 
prolonged the city's resistance, had also some truth in it'. 
Facing the Dictators , p . 4 44 .
2 New York Times, 12 July 1968.
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Federal Government. Nevertheless, the judgement had been 
made that it was more important to save lives which were 
being lost at that very moment than to refrain from saving 
them in the expectation (rather than in the certainty) that 
in the long run fewer lives would be lost by not intervening. 
It was not simply a moral calculus, discounting future 
lives against present, the lives of soldiers against those 
of civilians, the lives of the more guilty against those 
of the less guilty; for there was an urgent moral imperative 
to save human life which was restrained only partly by 
the uncertainty of the moral calculus and the belief that 
the Nigerians must be free - at least within certain limits - 
to resolve their own affairs.
The second form of humanitarian intervention 
seeks to remove or decrease the causes of suffering in a 
civil war. The possible remedies vary widely in scope 
according to the extent of relief that is sought. The 
minimum aim is to prevent unnecessary violence by the forces 
of each side against civilians and against each other, 
necessity in this case being interpreted as military - and 
perhaps more broadly as political - necessity. On the 
broader scale the whole conduct of one or both of the sides 
may be condemned by outside states. Thus the Nigerian 
Government was accused of using starvation as a weapon of 
war and with attempting genocide against the Ibo people. 
Intervention to prevent such policies - whether or not they 
are in fact being pursued - falls not far short of imposing 
a settlement on both sides or of crippling the effort of 
one side. Such action resembles intervention to correct 
the wrongs of a ruler but differs essentially in that it 
derives from a concern with the fate of individuals or, more 
precisely, of non-po1itica1 groups of individuals (such as 
racial, tribal or religious groups). While the post-1945 era 
has seen few, if any, cases of forcible intervention in 
civil strife for such purposes, it has been characterized 
by a high level of verbal activity against 'international 
crimes' of this nature. It is almost impossible to assess 
accurately the extent to which this activity has in fact 
modified the policies of states.
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The most extreme of such demands is that a conflict 
should be brought to a halt altogether. It is not unusual 
for states simply to wish to see an end to fighting which 
they regard as futile and destructive for both sides.
The right of mediation in civil conflicts is long-established 
and based on a genuine concern for the welfare of others.
This concern is strongest in the case of a protracted war 
in which both sides seem incapable of winning or of 
surrendering and in the case of a war which could be 
settled through the good offices of a third party. The 
mechanisms of settlement are delicate for, again, they may 
easily lead to unintended benefits for one side. This is 
notably true of a war in which the contending factions are 
using vastly different modes of combat as when a guerrilla 
force is facing a conventionally-armed government.'*’ This 
is not to say that satisfactory methods of settlement are 
never to be found or that side-effects of the sort described 
necessarily deter states from undertaking humanitarian 
intervention. But it is apparent that even the purest of 
motives do not inevitably produce purely humanitarian 
effects. Some restrictions must therefore be placed either 
on the nature of the activity itself or on the circumstances 
in which it may be undertaken.
The right of states to offer their good offices 
to the factions in a civil war with the intention of 
promoting a settlement of differences either by mediation 
or by facilitating direct negotiations is sufficiently well 
established to require no elaboration. Since it depends on
Draper describes the one-sided effect of a cease-fire 
in a situation such as South Vietnam: 'The relatively
compact, traditionally organized American military forces 
could easily be regrouped and supplied during a cease-fire; 
their morale was likely to rise in the absence of combat. 
The Vietcong guerrillas were by their very nature difficult 
to coordinate ... their morale was bound to fall in the 
absence of combat'. Abuse o f Power, p.205 .
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the acquiescence of both sides it is in a sense invited by 
the incumbent while at the same time granting a degree of 
recognition to the insurgents that is at least tacitly 
approved by the legitimate government. Moreover, as long 
as the outcome is determined essentially by the two factions, 
there can be no valid claim that the country's right to 
manage its own affairs has been infringed. Good offices, in 
other words, are interventionary only in that they seek 
to facilitate the change in the relationship between 
factions from one of conflict to one of conciliation. In 
some instances, however, the change in the relationship will 
be to the detriment of one side or the other. The important 
question then becomes one of determining the circumstances 
under which humanitarian principles might be imposed.
A number of writers have argued that the nature 
of the civil war itself may provide adequate grounds for 
intervention. Their case rests on the proposition that the 
conduct of the war has either got out of control or has 
never been in the control of the factions. The latter 
situation might obtain, for instance, in the event of warfare 
in an uncivilized community where the laws of combat which 
are generally considered appropriate to large-scale conflicts 
are either unknown or ignored. Thus J.S. Mill suggested 
that a barbarian country had very limited rights as against 
a civilized community:
barbarians have no rights as a nation, except a right 
to such treatment as may, at the earliest possible 
period, fit them for becoming one. The only moral 
laws for the relation between a civilized and a 
barbarous government, are the universal rules of 
morality between man and m a n .1
'A Few Words on Non-Intervention", in Falk (ed.) , Vietnam 
War and International L a w , p.33. Stowell also seems to
accept a right of intervention in uncivilized warfare for 
humanitarian purposes. Intervention in International Law,
p . 1 2 6 .
171
The implication is clear that feuds between barbarians are 
a proper object of humanitarian intervention regardless of 
political considerations, and indeed that the rights of the 
contending factions are almost solely of a humanitarian 
nature. In practice such intervention was - virtually by 
definition - undertaken by a stronger power against a 
weaker so that the likelihood of prolonged conflict 
resulting was minimal. Uncivilized countries, moreover, 
were clearly defined, at least in the eyes of the intervening 
states, and there was little prospect of their ever 
becoming strong enough to retaliate. The past tense is used 
in this connection since none of these factors seem to be 
relevant to the contemporary world. No state today would 
accept a description as 'uncivilized' and international 
society in general has dropped the distinction between 
civilized and uncivilized nations (replacing it, one might 
add, by distinctions which are more political and materialist) 
The second situation - in which control over the 
conduct of a civil war has been lost by the participants - 
is not one that has become outmoded. The exceptional 
circumstance when Mill found intervention to be justified 
is still important today:
A case requiring consideration is that of protracted 
civil war, in which the contending parties are so 
equally balanced that there is no probability of a 
speedy issue; or if there is, the victorious side 
cannot hope to keep down the vanquished but by 
severities repugnant to humanity, and injurious to 
the welfare of the country.^
Mill placed two conditions on such intervention: firstly,
the concurrence of neighbouring countries in the undertaking;
and secondly, the imposition of a solution 'on equitable
2terms of compromise'. Stowell adopts a similar position in
1 op . c i t . , p . 3 5 .
2 1 o c . c i t .
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requiring agreement among 'the executive of the directing 
powers, acting in concert or separately as mandatories' but 
proposes 'such measures as seem best calculated to 
reestablish order and to secure respect for international 
law throughout the l a n d ' T h e  condition of agreement 
among outside powers which is common to both Mill and Stowell 
seems designed to prevent individual states from abusing 
the right of humanitarian intervention by furthering its 
particular ends. It assumes that collectively agreed action 
either will not abuse the right or will abuse it in such a 
way that all concerned will condone the action, whether 
willingly or reluctantly. To say that humanitarian 
intervention is humanitarian regardless of whether it is 
conducted by one state alone or by many is simply a truism; 
the important question is whether as a matter of fact states 
do abuse this right and whether the extent of this abuse 
negates the whole value of allowing intervention for such 
purposes. Certainly, humanitarian goals have on occasion 
served as a pretext for less altruistic activity but 
pretexts of some description will always be found when 
necessary, and there seems little sense in forbidding a 
generally desirable activity in order to stop the misuse of 
its name. One suspects that the requirement of agreement is 
in fact unnecessarily restrictive. States do experience 
strong humanitarian concerns at times and it seems unlikely 
that they would hold back from some action which they 
believed necessary to reduce human suffering simply for want 
of agreement. Moreover, states considering genuinely 
humanitarian intervention are not likely to ignore the 
possible side-effects if these threaten to be dangerous in 
any way; their good intentions may be assumed to apply to 
more than just those whose suffering has aroused concern.
1 Intervention in International Law, p . 350 .
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The potential for injury to the rights of the state 
divided by civil strife seems far greater where the second 
conditions of Mill and Stowell are concerned. This is not 
to say that such injury must therefore be avoided, merely 
that it is more likely to prove necessary. For an 
equitable compromise is precisely what the contending 
factions have been unable to agree upon and there is little 
reason to believe that a solution which outsiders judge to 
be fair and equitable will be any more acceptable to both 
parties. Again, the establishment of law and order in a 
country implies an outcome which restores any effective 
government without considering the attitudes of the 
contending factions. The central question here is again 
whether limits are in fact observed by states setting out 
on humanitarian intervention with goals of this nature in 
mind. On this score the presumption is perhaps the other 
way i.e. states will tend to go beyond purely humanitarian 
goals and into the political arena when they attempt to 
impose a settlement or to establish law and order.^ This 
is by no means always undesirable but it would be wise on the 
part of international society to demand to know in advance 
what other goals were being pursued or were likely to ensue 
even if not deliberately pursued. They may involve 
acceptable or unacceptable principles but in either case 
it is in the interests of most, if not all, to be clear on 
what political issues are at stake.
Where the regulation of humanitarian intervention 
might be expected to be more precise is in the matter of 
minimizing unnecessary suffering through military action and 
of alleviating suffering that has already been caused.
The reduction of unnecessary suffering is the more 
problematical. There are explicit and technical rules 
applying to international war which are widely considered
This experience has befallen the United Nations - see 
the following section.
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relevant, though not as formal obligations, to civil conflicts 
of certain dimensions. Intended to achieve the maximum 
reduction in human suffering with the least impairment of 
military effectiveness, such rules are generally precise in 
their requirements. But it is another question whether both 
sides will consider them appropriate. A guerrilla movement, 
for example, is unlikely to wear a uniform or recognition 
badges as the Hague Rules require. The direct alleviation 
of suffering is a clearly-defined medical and social task.
It is likely to affect the course of a conflict only in so 
far as it takes over functions that would otherwise have 
to be performed by one side or the other; moreover, such 
a consequence, if it is more than marginal, can easily be 
offset by comparable assistance to both sides rather than 
one. Humanitarian intervention of this kind, where the 
limits are relatively clear, appears least likely to raise 
objections from the parties to conflict or from international 
socie ty.
C: United Nations Intervention
The legal restrictions that have been placed on
intervention in internal affairs are directed essentially
at the behaviour of states:
As a matter both of history and of principle the 
prohibition of intervention must be regarded primarily 
as a restriction which International Law imposes upon 
States for the protection of other members of the 
international community. For this reason the notion 
and the prohibition of intervention cannot accurately 
extend to collective action undertaken in the 
general interest of States or for the collective 
enforcement of International Law.^
Before the establishment of the United Nations, which was
originally intended to have a measure of armed force at its
disposal, it was suggested that action taken by it would
not constitute intervention of the kind undertaken by
1 Oppenheim, International Law (vol. I, Peace), p.319.
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individual states and that a more appropriate term in these 
circumstances would be 'law enforcement'. ^  Given that the 
international community does hold special rights of 
intervention in the affairs of states, two important 
questions need to be asked. Firstly, how are these rights 
manifested in the workings of the United Nations; secondly, 
to what sort of purposes might such authority be put by the 
organization?
There is general agreement that intervention is
unquestionably proper when 'the whole body of civilized
2states have concurred in authorizing it'. However, it 
cannot be an explicit act of concurrence alone which creates 
the right of intervention for international society. In 
the first place, as we have seen, individual states may take 
up this right on behalf of the community and receive due 
approval after the event. The right, in other words, exists 
before states concur in its exercise. Secondly, the right 
of the international community to intervene in internal 
affairs depends on the acceptance by states that they have 
a common interest which transcends their particular 
interests and which is manifested in the fact that they 
are bound by international rules. This community interest 
is not established by an explicit, once-for-all act; 
indeed, states have never attempted to make the sort of 
pronouncement that would be required. Nor is it persuasive 
to argue that this community interest (and the rights and 
duties flowing from it) derives solely from informal or tacit 
assent to international rules. For these rules must be 
made definitive at some stage by the positive actions of 
states. The fiction of implicit consent, moreover, breaks 
down in the case of a state which rejects the bulk of 
international rules and yet remains bound by them. Clearly,
C.G. Fenwick, 'Intervention: Individual and Collective',
American Journal of International Law, vol. 39 (1945) , p.663.
Hall, Treatise on International Law, p .344 .2
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an additional factor is necessary to establish the community 
interest. It is to be found in the notion of political 
consensus. If there are enough states with sufficient 
political weight to secure acceptance of their views for a 
certain period of time, rights and duties may accordingly 
be established.^ States are bound by the history of their 
activities and the expectations which these have created, 
and it is evident that in international society in particular 
each member will not carry equal weight in the formation 
of the community interest.
From this it is clear that a simple voting majority 
in the United Nations cannot necessarily be taken as an 
expression of the authority of the international community 
which all states are obliged to respect. Equally, the 
failure of a measure to obtain a majority of votes on a 
particular occasion does not always mean that it thereby 
loses any binding power which it may have had. Certainly, 
a majority of this kind may provide an excellent indication 
of the extent to which states are bound by the provision 
concerned but a numerical majority does not in itself 
possess an arbitrary and unlimited power to authorize 
whatever it wishes. The manner in which the U.N. Congo 
operation received its authorization is a relevant example. 
For the most part it did enjoy numerical majorities in the 
General Assembly but these were shifting and unstable; 
ad hoc political groupings were formed to overcome the at 
times vehement opposition of leading powers, while little 
attempt was made to specify the precise standing of the 
operation. Moreover, many of its actions in the Congo 
itself were undertaken on the initiative of the personnel in 
the field. These considerations, however, do not detract 
from the legitimacy which the U.N. action derived from the
Rosalyn Higgins suggests that there has developed a 
notion of 'international concern' to designate situations 
(apart from threats to and breaches of the peace) in which 
members of the United Nations may properly take an interest. 
The Development of International Law through the Political 
Organs of the United Nations (London, 1963), pp.77-81.
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political consensus behind it and from its actual role in 
furthering the goals of the community as a whole. In so 
far as these conditions were absent, however, the operation 
did lack international authority. It is important not to 
lose sight of such a possibility for international society 
is founded on the sovereignty of its members and it cannot 
properly undertake to disregard the sovereignty of one of 
them, even though an international organization, except in 
pursuit of its fundamental purposes.
Intervention by an international organization such 
as the United Nations also raises the question of its 
conformity with the operating rules of the organization. The 
problem need not delay us here, except to note that the 
rules of the U.N. do not necessarily coincide with the rules 
of international society. Thus the U.N. Charter is primarily 
concerned with the maintenance of 'international peace and 
security' (Article 1, para. 1) and with facilitating measures 
to deal with 'any threat to the peace, breach of the peace 
or act of aggression' (Article 39). It has been argued that 
if the international repercussions of a civil conflict 
endanger international peace the Charter permits the U.N. 
to take action.1 Even if the Charter were not interpreted 
in this way, international society still possesses a 
right to intervene in civil conflicts. In such a case the 
U.N. may simply serve as a convenient instrument of the 
community. The General Assembly Resolution of 19 September 
1960 can be seen in this light when it called upon
The view put by the British representative in the Security 
Council on 11 August 1950 on the question of Korea has in 
fact found increasing acceptance: 'a civil war in certain
circumstances might well, under Article 39 of the Charter, 
constitute a "threat to the peace" or even a "breach of the 
peace", and if the Security Council so decided, there would 
be nothing whatever to prevent its taking any action it liked 
in order to put an end to the incident, even if it should 
involve two or more portions of the same international 
entity'. Cited by Miller, World Order and Local Disorder, 
p . 29 .
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all states to refrain from the direct and indirect 
provision of arms or other materials of war and 
military personnel and other assistance for military 
purposes in the Congo during the period of military 
assistance through the united Nations, except upon 
the request of the United Nations through the 
Secretary-General . ^
The U.N. thus claimed a monopoly of intervention on the basis 
not of its original Charter but of the international community 
acting through the organization.
It remains now to consider those purposes relating
to the internal political arrangements of a country for which
international society might use its authority to intervene
in civil strife. It is clear that in an ideologically
divided world, intervention to secure a particular form of
government is unlikely to be in accord with common rules.
The closest that international society has come to this is
in its opposition to colonial rule which does not, however,
go as far as prescribing particular forms of government to
take its place. Nevertheless, there have been occasions
when community intervention has been undertaken with
objectives which, while not being avowedly political,
2inevitably involved major political consequences. These 
are cases where anarchy has prevailed (or threatened to 
prevail) in a country and where the object has been to create
Resolution 1474 (E.S.-IV), 863rd Plenary Meeting.
2 There are those who maintain that since U.N. intervention 
depends in practice on an invitation from the legitimate 
government it must not obstruct the purposes of that 
government: 'The United Nations need not go to the
assistance of any country which invites its intervention but 
once it does so it owes an obligation to the government 
and the people of that country not to interfere in such a 
way as to prevent the legitimate government from fulfilling 
its mandate. In other words, it is impossible for the U.N. 
at one and the same time to preserve law and order and to be 
neutral between the legal authorities and the law-breakers'. 
Kwame Nkrumah, 23 September 1960, cited by Miller,
World Order and Local Disorder, pp.84-5.
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some form of political authority which can maintain law and 
order. This is going further than purely humanitarian 
purposes for it requires the making of political decisions 
e.g. selecting the party which is believed best able to 
restore order, a choice which must take into account the 
nature of that order. It remains an open question whether 
the U.N. will take a path involving the pursuit of political 
principles or whether it will have no option but to refrain 
from such objectives. The answer will depend on the 
international community's acceptance or rejection of some of 
the principles at present competing for endorsement by the 
society of states .
D: Intervention in Defence of International Rules
Governments which have come to power through 
revolution have frequently been met by hostility on the part 
of the existing members of international society. There are 
two fundamental reasons for such a reception. Firstly, 
there is the concern that a revolution constitutes a 
challenge to domestic order in other countries. The doctrines 
of revolutionary France, for example, were feared by many 
of the governments of Europe, but it was her conduct on the 
international scene that aroused greatest hostility. This 
indicates the second reason for condemning a revolutionary 
regime, in particular one that seeks to spread its principles 
by active intervention in the affairs of other countries.
For international society cannot accept a state which 
displays an intention to act on principles fundamentally 
hostile to the existing order. The French declaration of 
war against Austria in April 1792 came as a culmination of 
international revolutionary activities and helped the 
formation of a general coalition in Europe that lasted, 
albeit uncertainly, from 1793 to 1795. The French 
Revolution, however, was probably the last occasion that
1 See chapter V I .
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brought the international community to near-unanimity in 
opposing both the internal political principles of a 
revolutionary government as well as its international 
behaviour. After the settlement of 1815 the powers of Europe 
came to disagree on the former question, the Holy Alliance 
maintaining a vigorous opposition to internal political and 
social change, the more liberal powers concerning themselves 
with the foreign policy of states rather than their internal 
constitution. This disagreement began to take on the 
appearance of an ideological confrontation as conflict 
deepened between those who were prepared to accept change 
and those who were determined to prevent it. Since that time 
the international community has been unable to unite on the 
question of the form of government which states should adopt 
but has based its opposition to revolutionary governments 
primarily on their external behaviour.
While the Soviet regime established by the
Revolution of October 1917 still evoked protests from other
states about its political principles, intervention in the
ensuing civil war by the major powers found its strongest
justification in the Bolshevik rejection of the traditional
canons of international behaviour. 'The first acts of
government...were acts of propaganda only thinly disguised
as legislative activity,' Grzybowski argues, citing Trotsky's
description* of them as 'the program of the Party uttered in
the language of power' and therefore 'means of propaganda
rather than acts of administration'.  ^ Foreign policy was
viewed in the same light. Acceptance of the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk was explained as a fleeting concession to the
old international order, necessitated by extreme circumstances
2and undertaken only after tortured discussion. In particular,
K. Grzybowski, 'Propaganda and the Soviet Concept of World 
Public Order', in C.C. Havighurst (ed.), International 
Control of Propaganda (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1967), p.42.
2 E .H . Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution: 1917-1923 (v o1 . Ill,
Soviet Russia and the World) , (Harmondsworth, 1966) , pp.43-52 .
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Article II of the Treaty which stated that 'the contracting 
parties will refrain from agitation or propaganda against 
the government or military institutions of the other party' 
appeared quite contrary to Bolshevik principles and 
practice.^ Such restrictions, however, were not only ignored 
but the whole basis of obligation which they presupposed was 
rejected by an appeal to the justice of world revolution. 
Ioffe, who was Soviet plenipotentiary in Berlin in 1918 
and himself fostered subversive activities there,* 2 34
maintained that
The whole significance of the Russian revolution was 
that it represented the vanguard of the world socialist 
revolution, and that it could be victorious only as 
a world revolution. Therefore, it was clear from 
the start that this paragraph [Article II] could not 
be adhered to. For the Russian revolutionaries who 
had been accustomed for scores of years to revolutionary 
work in spite of all shackles, the way out was clear: 
What could not be done openly and legally had to be 
done conspiratorially and illegally.3
To the charge that such activity constituted unwarranted
interference in the internal affairs of other states, Karl
Radek replied by rejecting any such principle: 'This
principle of non-intervention was the principle which guided
legitimist Europe after the Congress of Vienna, while in the
struggle for liberation, international Communists all along
advocated the energetic intervention in the affairs of the 
4whole world'. In the face of this challenge which was
Text in Degras (ed.) , Soviet Documents, vol. I, pp.52-5.
2 For details see Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of 
Peacemaking, p.236; Carr, op. cit., pp.85-7.
3 Text in X.J. Eudin, H.H. Fisher (eds.) , Soviet Russia and 
the West: 1920 - 1927 (Stanford, 1957) , p.72n.
4 Open letter to Scheidemann, November 1918, cited by 
Mayer, op. cit., p.20.
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not restricted merely to words the rest of international 
society could not remain passive.
Russia was excluded from the comity of nations on
account of her transgressions; intervention against the
Bolshevik government could thus be justified as an attempt
to remove a regime that had taken the Russian state outside
the international pale and to replace it by one of more
orthodox character. The prevailing attitude was expressed
by the U.S. Secretary of State, Colby, in a Note to the
Italian Ambassador on 10 August 1920:
the existing regime in Russia is based upon the negation 
of every principle of honor and good faith, and every 
usage and convention, underlying the whole structure 
of international law,- the negation, in short, of every 
principle upon which it is possible to base harmonious 
and trustful relations, whether of nations or of 
individuals. The responsible leaders of the regime 
have frequently and openly boasted that they are 
willing to sign agreements and undertakings with 
foreign Powers while not having the slightest intention 
of observing such undertakings or carrying out such 
agreements.^
In the event the Bolsheviks retained power in the civil war
despite the Allied interventions which reached a peak in
1919. As the time of greatest danger began to pass the
regime was able to make contacts with other governments in
a effort to strengthen its own position. From 1920 onwards
treaties were concluded with several neighbouring states,
all containing clauses which prohibited the contracting
parties from assisting in any way organizations or groups
whose object was to attack the other party or which claimed
2to rule all or part of the territory of the other party.
Text in Eudin, Fisher, op. cit., p.68.
2 Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Finland agreed to these 
terms in 1920. Ibid., pp.8-14. Afghanistan, Turkey and 
Poland agreed in 1921. See Degras (ed.) , Soviet Documents, 
vol. I, p p . 23 3 , 2 37 ; and Eudin, Fisher, op. cit., p.14.
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Clearly, these agreements were designed to restrict 
outside attempts to overthrow the Soviet regime but they 
nevertheless indicate a realization that certain benefits 
could be secured by retreating from an out and out 
revolutionary policy. Diplomatic relations did not return 
completely to normal as the Soviet Government continued to 
support the activities of the Third International. Even so, 
some need was felt to stress the separateness of these two 
strands of policy, however disingenuous the argument might 
appear.^ International society, partly by design, partly 
by its very nature, thus compelled the Soviet government 
to adhere to at least some of the rules of respectability. 
Certainly, the revolutionary ambition had not been abandoned 
but it had ceased to be the single, determining motive of 
Soviet policy. The lesson to be drawn is that the society 
of states is prepared to assert a right of intervention 
against a party that demonstrates a total opposition to 
its fundamental rules.
E; Regional Intervention
The differences between a multilateral alliance, 
a sphere of influence and a region are not necessarily 
clear-cut in practice. The states of the American hemisphere, 
for example, are linked by alliance, they are under the 
dominating influence of the United States and they form a 
region or, some would maintain, two regions - North America
Litvinov's reply to Curzon's Note alleging Soviet 
violations of the Anglo-Russian Treaty is typical: 'The
mere facts of the Third International having for obvious 
reasons chosen Russia as the seat of its executive committee 
as the only land which allows full freedom to the spreading 
of communist ideas and personal freedom to Communists, and 
of some of the members of the Russian Government in their 
individual capacity belonging to the executive committee, 
give no...justification for identifying the Third 
International with the Russian Government'. Degras , op. 
c i t . , p . 2 5 8 .
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and Latin America. For present purposes a region will be
regarded as a group of nations linked by bonds which are
not simply inter-governmental arrangements e.g. by the
sharing of certain political values, experience of a
common history, possession of a common culture or outlook.^
The existence of such bonds does not, of course, rule out
the possibility of additional international arrangements.
As to the membership of a region this tends to be largely
self-defining : those states are members which believe
themselves to have more in common with other states in the
region than with states outside it. Nor need membership be
treated as a definite, all-embracing and exclusive status.
The Arab countries of North Africa, for example, feel at
one with black African states over their shared experience
of colonialism, their non-white colour and their economic
underdevelopment. Thus it was possible for them to see the
civil war in the Congo as one between fellow Africans, an
2attitude which was not rejected by black Africans. At 
the same time they enjoy strong religious and cultural ties 
with the Arab states of the Middle East and can claim to 
be at home in both regions.
Now this suggests a distinctive quality of a 
region, namely that its members may be capable of developing 
certain international norms amongst themselves. Such norms, 
of course, need not be shared by the rest of international 
society and may in fact clash with those of the larger 
community. Thus African states claim rights to act against 
white regimes on that continent and American states make 
comparable claims against communist governments; at the 
same time these rights are largely denied to outsiders.
A geographical criterion of proximity is sometimes 
suggested which would, for example, exclude the British 
Commonwealth; this criterion will be used here but does 
not seem as crucial as in the case of collective defence 
arrangements.
M a z r u i , Pax Africana, p .12 4.2
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In such cases the regional groups are demanding an exclusive 
jurisdiction primarily on account of the fact that they 
exist as a community. If international society as a whole 
enjoys a certain competence regarding the character of 
its members, then there is strong reason to allow smaller 
and probably more homogeneous international societies in 
the form of regions to exercise a similar competence. A 
multilateral alliance or a sphere of influence, by contrast, 
could not make such a claim. A region, however, may also 
be able to argue a case for acting in defence of its 
particular values against alien intrusion. It is not so 
much that their security is at stake but that qualities 
of domestic and international political life are threatened. 
The claims of a region to exercise jurisdiction over 
internal conflicts within its members may therefore be 
expected to manifest themselves in two ways: firstly, in
an attempt to deny the authority of outside states to 
intervene, and secondly, in the development of arguments 
for intervention by the regional powers themselves.
It has been the African continent which has most 
strongly manifested the distinctive qualities of a region 
although these have also been in evidence among the 
American countries and in the Arab Middle East. The new 
states of Africa have sought to develop a number of 
principles expressing opposition to non-African involvement 
in the continent. Mazrui identifies a 'general fear of 
factionalism' which constantly recurs in African political 
attitudes, receiving expression in the one-party state, in 
the mystique of a classless society, in the denigration of 
tribalism and in the frequent adoption of socialism/ For 
division is generally associated by Africans with colonialism 
as a tactic exploited by the imperalists in order first to
1 ibid • f p p .212-3.
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conquer and then to rule. Open conflict is thus the
traditional and ultimate reason for outside intervention^
and it is this that anti-factionalism seeks to avoid. On
occasions, of course, conflicts do erupt within African
states, the attempted secession of Katanga from the Congo
being a prime example. There was no possibility of an
African force being used to intervene and Lumumba's
invitation to the U.N. had to be approved for want of a
better alternative. Nkrumah, however, was one who saw that
unless U.N. action was made accountable to African countries
it could turn out to be as bad as the worst alternative:
unless at this juncture the United Nations acts in 
full consultation with the African states and in 
accordance with the needs of Africa, the same results 
will flow from the United Nations' intervention in the 
Congo as flowed from the intervention of the great 
powers in African affairs. 2
Certainly, there was disagreement between African states 
over the issue of Katanga but the exclusion of outsiders 
was a common aim; if the U.N. force in the Congo had to 
be tolerated, it was at least a body over which Africans 
could hope to exercise some form of control through their 
numbers in the organization itself.
Another significant feature of the Congo episode 
was the reaction among Africans to Tshombe's use of white 
mercenary soldiers both after 1960 and in 1964-5. There 
are, on the one hand, certain advantages in employing 
mercenaries: they take orders from their paymaster, the
local government or the rebel organization, which troops 
sent in by another country may not do; their services may 
be bought, in the same way as arms or training facilities 
are purchased abroad but without the risk of dependence on 
any particular country; and, if there is fighting to be 
done, mercenaries have the advantage of being strangers who
ibid., p.213; Zartman, International Relations in the New 
Africa, p.93.
2 Address to the General Assembly, 7 March 1961, cited by 
Mazrui, op. cit., p.204.
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will leave at the end of the war and will not be responsible
for the peace as well.  ^ On the other hand, white mercenaries
represent un-African, indeed anti-African, principles. Even
as employees of Africans they stand for outside intrusion in
African affairs and many of them, moreover, came from South
Africa, Rhodesia and Belgium, the very countries which
maintain the last colonial regimes on the continent. Hence
Nkrumah's impassioned letter to Tshombe on 12 August 1960:
you have assembled in your support the foremost 
advocates of imperialism and colonialism in Africa and 
the most determined opponents of African freedom. How 
can you, as an African do this?* 2
It was not that white soldiers threatened the security of
African states but that they endangered African values, in
particular those of anti-colonialism which ought not to be
compromised in any way. Intervention by outsiders of any
description was to be contrasted to intervention among
Africans themselves. While U.S. military support for Tshombe
in 1964, justified by that country as aid at the request
of a legitimate government, could be condemned as 'outside'
interference, the more radical states such as Ghana and
Algeria took the view that their own intervention was
3permissible as a matter between Africans. In this way 
levels of intervention are established and that among 
Africans is regarded as more acceptable than that undertaken 
by outsiders.
If intervention within a region is more valid than 
intervention from outside, then intervention by the region 
as a whole will be even more legitimate. In the Americas 
intervention in civil conflict has almost invariably been 
conducted by the United States as the dominant power in the 
area, but the landing of marines in the Dominican Republic
 ^ ibid., pp.205-7.
2 Cited ibid., p.38.
Miller , World Order and Local Disorder, p .114.3
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in April 1965 was followed by an attempt to enlist the
authority of the O tA sS. On 6 May the Organization voted
(by the narrowest of margins) to despatch an inter-American
force to the country headed by a Brazilian General who,
nominally at least, took command of 22,000 U.S. troops and
some 1700 troops from Latin American countries.1 It was
intended to make the operation appear more like a regional
one than simply the action of a great power intervening in
its sphere of influence. The African 'ambition to be his
2own policeman', on the other hand, has been a little more
realistic. While the Congolese strife saw no African
soldiers operating independently of the U ,N „, there was a
step in this direction after the East African mutinies in
January 1964 . First the Tanganyika Army and then in quick
succession the Kenya and Uganda Armies rebelled. The only
recourse for the governments of these countries was to
invite British troops to quell the mutineers, a move made
first by Uganda and Kenya and then with great reluctance by
3President Nyerere. The Tanganyikan President felt a great 
sense of humiliation at having to use British troops and 
promprly called on the O.A.U. for assistance. In the event 
a Nigerian battalion was sent to replace the British force 
and remained there until September. The ability of a 
regional organization to arrange for the despatch of troops 
in the event of civil strife and the general support for its 
actions evinced in this case may foreshadow a willingness 
to intervene in future conflicts in order to protect African 
values, especially if they are threatened from outside the 
continent„
There is a certain urgency felt by African countries 
to develop their own capacity for intervention in civil 
conflicts. The return of European troops always contains the
James, Politics of Peace-Keeping, p . 240. 
M a z r u i , Pax Africana , p .x .
3 Gutteridge, Military in African Politics, p.31.
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threat of involving the United States or the Soviet Union 
should the conflict become unmanageable."1’ The dangers 
were strongly sensed by many African states in the course 
of the Nigerian civil war. Among those lending assistance 
to Biafra were Portugal and France, a fact which led even 
moderate African leaders such as President Keita of Mali
2to denounce the 'imperialist' attempt to divide Nigeria,
The principle of secession was widely condemned while a 
careful watch was kept on the policies of those governments 
which were supporting Lagos, such as Britain, the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union. After an initial period of maintaining 
that the war was a purely Nigerian affair the O.A.U. came 
round to the view that it was necessarily an African affair 
and felt that it was entitled to promote moves for a 
settlement. However, the African states could not hope to 
meet the military needs of Lagos (or Biafra for that matter) 
which remained dependent on outside supplies. This 
points up a weakness of regional groups in dealing with 
their own affairs: if there is no great or middle power
among them, they are likely to lack the resources to act 
effectively; if there is such a power, it will be in a 
position to decide for itself when its capacity will be 
employed. At the present time the African region is seeking 
to declare external intervention illegitimate while lacking 
to a considerable degree the ability to provide an adequate 
substitute.
The development of regional principles of 
intervention is fraught with difficulties. There are the 
practical problems of limiting internal disorder and hence 
the opportunity for intervention from outside the region, 
and of generating a capacity to undertake intra-regional
Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa, p.94. 
Zartman also points out, however, that this threat may 
deter some states from resorting to conflict in the first 
place.
2 Whiteman, 'The O.A.U. and the Nigerian Issue', World 
Today (November 1968), p.450.
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intervention. Even more important, however, is the 
maintenance of agreed principles concerning the use of 
such a capacity. In the Americas the U.S, is strong 
enough to ensure an almost unanimous anti-communism and to 
set standards for the Latin American countries.'*' The 
Arab countries, on the other hand, have been divided by the 
divergent forces of B a 'ath socialism, Nasser-style 
revolutionism and traditional monarchy. Africa has enjoyed 
a limited unity in the 1960s but there are doubts about its 
durability. For the heart of the matter has been anti­
colonialism; all those regimes which took over from the 
European colonists enjoyed a legitimacy by virtue of that 
very fact itself. This legitimacy has been extended, 
perhaps unnaturally, by the cult of opposition to the 
remaining colonial-type regimes of Portugal, Rhodesia and 
South Africa. Even if anti-colonia1ism does not lose its 
force in the near future, a divergence among African States 
is still likely to emerge. Mazrui suggests that five
principles of legitimacy are applied to governments by
2African states of which two relate to racial issues.
Clearly, there is scope for disagreement, especially as 
states develop the national unity and strength for which 
they are presently striving. In this event regional 
intervention in civil strife may be ruled out of the question 
for want of agreement rather than want of ability.
Finally, it is necessary to mention the relationship 
between regional principles of intervention and the norms 
of international society as a whole. Article 52 of the 
United Nations Charter does encourage regional arrangements 
for dealing with disputes but Article 53 sees them as 
instruments of the Security Council rather than as independent
A resolution of the Punta del Este Conference in January 
1962 defined communism as 'incompatible with the principles 
of the Inter-Arnerican system'. Text in H.M. Pachter, 
Collision Course (New York, 1963) , p.164.
2 Pax Africana, pp.122-4.
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agencies acting according to their own rules. It is clear, 
however, that conflicts are liable to arise between the 
principles adopted by regional groupings and those of the 
U . N . One manifestation of this has been the United States' 
preference for describing action in the American hemisphere 
as 'collective self-defence' which according to Article 51 
is subject only to the subsequent control of the Security 
Council.  ^ Whatever the terminology, the fact is that 
regional groups do take action independently of the rest of 
international society. There is frequently some clash with 
community standards but this is reduced in importance partly 
by the limited geographical extent and partly also by the 
fact that a consensus of several states is behind it.
It is sometimes suggested that intervention by a
region ranks above national intervention but below U.N.
2intervention on a scale of legitimacy. While this view has
an obvious element of truth, it does seem to place an undue
emphasis on numbers without making full allowance for the
factors of interest and concern on the part of outside
states. States which form regions tend to feel more involved
in a conflict within one of their number than extra-
regional powers and it is natural that they should claim and
3be given a greater say in events. A potential clash 
between regional and universal organizations exists, for 
example, in the’South African situation where extensive and 
effective opposition to the incumbent government might give
Claude, Swords into Plowshares, pp.108-9,
2 R.A. Falk, 'The Legitimacy of Legislative Intervention by 
the United Nations', in R.J. Stanger (ed.), Essays on 
Intervention (Columbus, 1964), pp.40-44.
3 Similarly, even genuinely democratic societies do not work 
by numbers alone; the accepted existence of pressure groups 
of all kinds ensures that particular interests receive due 
attention.
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1rise to differences of approach. Thus the U.N, might seek
to isolate the conflict in order to limit international
violence while the 0 .A ,U . might seek to intensify and extend
it in order to ensure rebel victory. Both organizations, of
course, may have the same ultimate goal and it would be
desirable were both to agree on methods. But a question of
priority might arise and the interests of the African region
could not be nullified simply by greater numbers0 The
African states are commit ted to the overthrow of colonial-
type regimes, they must at present live with the white-
minority governments and they are seeking the 'liberation'
of black South Africans. In this case, as in others, the
interests of the region may appear to conflict with the
interests of international society at large. Yet the ability
and determination of a particular group of states to manage
affairs amongst themselves may provide the best guarantee
of preventing the entanglement of outside powers. At the
same time, it is possible that certain standards may be
adopted by the rest of international society as a result of
2policies pursued by states in regional groups. Interplay 
between the interests of states who are most closely bound 
up with a conflict and the interests of the community in 
general seems more likely to produce satisfactory results 
than a demand that the former be subordinate to the latter.
L.B. Miller, 'Regional Organization and the Regulation 
of Internal Conflict' , World Politics , vol. XIX (July 1967)/ 
p p . 587-8 .
2 Rules regarding the expropriation of foreign assets, 
for example, have been changed by the actions of many 
African and Asian states. See R. Higgins, Conflict of 
Interests (London, 1965), pp.55-8.
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CHAPTER V I ; INTERVENTION IN CIVIL STRIFE AND POLITICAL 
PRINCIPLES
Most states, and especially the more important ones, 
have some ideas about the sort of social and political 
conditions they would like to see exist in other states. They 
have, in other words, various principles or goals by which 
life in another country might be ordered; and one occasion 
for promoting these is the outbreak of civil strife when 
the potential for change is high. It is obvious that not 
all such principles are objects of amicable agreement between 
states although one may expect that some will be more 
productive of accord than others. At the very least one can 
assume that objections will be raised by the particular 
incumbent or insurgent to whose detriment the principle in 
question is being applied; thus intervention against colonial 
regimes may be generally approved by outside states but it 
is not likely to be welcomed by the colonists. At the other 
extreme is intervention designed to spread the ideology 
of one of the superpowers which tends to be the subject 
of bitter dispute both within the war-torn country and in 
international society.
Intervention in civil strife to promote political 
principles of whatever description may or may not be in 
accord with the fundamental rules of international society. 
Thus the sovereignty of the divided state may be respected 
in that assistance is invited by the incumbent government 
or by a properly recognized rebel movement; it is equally 
possible that the intervention will fail to satisfy either 
of these conditions. In practice it may be observed that 
principles of this kind do tend to be offered as the sole 
justification more often in cases of subversive intervention 
than in cases where the incumbent is supported; the reason 
is simply that political goals which favour the government 
in power are likely to be formally endorsed by an official 
invitation. Again, a genuine element of self-defence may
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be present as when an outside state intervenes in order to 
maintain its security and must perforce assist the cause of 
one side rather than the other. This possibility is 
particularly important in the contemporary world when 
intervention by one of the ideological powers may be in part 
defensive against another. It is not possible in present 
circumstances, however, for intervention in support of a 
political principle to be properly authorized by the 
international community as such. In seme circumstances 
international society may be entitled to disregard a state's 
sovereignty but this right does not extend to the imposition 
of political principles. It is clear in the case of, say, 
humanitarian intervention but there is no manifest consensus 
between states today concerning the proper political 
arrangements for a state. If the international community 
does at some point achieve such agreement, then intervention 
for purposes relating to the internal politics of a state 
may enjoy a long-unknown authority. Today the closest 
approach to this status has been made by the principle of 
anti-colonialism; its success in this direction, however, 
has been rather exceptional, being due, as will be argued 
in the following section, in large part to its multi-faceted 
nature. Intervention in pursuit of political principles, 
then, remains essentially a national and particular 
endeavour.
It is true, also, that intervention of this kind 
has behind it strong motive forces, whether it is for the 
more contentious objectives of an ideology or for the less 
contentious goals of anti-colonialism. This must be taken 
as a fact of international life and it is of little value 
here to inquire whether these pressures result from a 
selfish national interest or from genuinely altruistic 
concerns. Such criteria are of little relevance for the 
purpose of judging their relationship to international 
order. What is more useful is an examination not of the 
reasons for the existence of these political principles nor
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of their substantive content but of their import for 
international order. In what way do they clash with the 
basic rules of international society? Do they have any 
claims at all to legitimacy? How widely or narrowly might 
they be applied? How contentious are they in international 
politics? How do they fare in practice?
A; Anti-colonialism
One major political force that has emerged in the 
post-war period is anti-colonialism. Already in 1945 'a 
widespread attack upon the very existence of the colonial 
system had gathered momentum' and the 'nonwhite world had 
found its voice and begun to assert its interests'.^ One 
immediate effect was the Declaration Regarding Non-Self- 
Governing Territories, incorporated into the United Nations 
Charter as Chapter XI; it stated that the interests of the 
inhabitants of these territories were to be regarded as 
paramount and that promotion of their well-being was a 
'sacred trust'. These ideas were progressively interpreted 
as meaning that colonial territories must be granted 
independence, preferably sooner rather than later, a 
conclusion which received formal expression in the U.N» 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, passed by an overwhelming vote in 
the General Assembly (89 to none, 9 abstensions) in December 
1960. The vast majority of states were clearly opposed to 
the retention of colonial territories on anything other than 
a transitory basis. The opposition to colonialism has been 
fostered and developed not only in the General Assembly 
which proved an important arena for badgering the colonial 
powers and for pressing the U.N. into organized activity 
against colonial rule, but also in the colonial territories 
themselves (some resorting to armed revolt), in the states 
which were first to achieve independence, in some of the
1 Claude, Swords into Piowshare s , p . 3 2 9 .
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imperial powers where, public opinion moved away from the 
imperialist outlook, and in some of the interested bystanders 
such as the Latin American and the communist countries.
In Africa those anti-colonial movements actively
engaged in warfare were strongly in favour of the view that
violence was a legitimate instrument for furthering the
independence of African countries. At the first All-African
Peoples Conference in Accra in December 1958 it was the
Algerians who argued the case for general support of armed
insurrection while the majority of black Africans favoured
what the Conference Chairman, Tom Mboya, described as
'non-violent positive actions'. ^  The debate produced a
compromise resolution which recommended force only in
response to force and which was inde terminate on the nature
of the support to be given to anti-co1onia1 movements:
the All-African Peoples Conference in Accra declares 
its full support to all fighters for freedom in Africa, 
to all those who resort to peaceful means of 
nonviolence and civil disobedience as well as to all 
those who are compelled to retaliate against violence 
to attain national independence and freedom for the 
people.2
Only five years later resolutions of the founding conference 
of the Organization of African Unity were of a totally 
different character. The Heads of State set up a committee 
to co-ordinate assistance to liberation movements and to 
manage a Special Fund for that purpose; another resolution 
offered sanctuary and training for rebels in the territory 
of the independent states; and it was also decided to assist 
the liberation movements by facilitating the transit of 
material aid through the formation of groups of volunteers.3 
A variety of reasons can be found for this change of 
attitude. Some relate to the growing prospect of success
Cited by Mazrui, Pax Africana, p .208. 
loc. cit.
25 May 1963, text ibid., pp.230-3.
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which forcible methods then appeared to offer. Others 
relate to the increasing acceptance of decolonization as a 
desirable goal and a consequent impatience with less effective 
methods.
The anti-colonial principle, it is clear, has an 
important measure of international consensus behind it. But 
this consensus relates in the first place to the duties 
of the colonial powers. They are obliged to prepare their 
territories for independence and to relinquish control at 
the earliest appropriate time. While there is much 
disagreement, of course, over what the capacity for self- 
government entails in practice/'1' no doubt exists that 
independence must be accorded at some stage. Now anti­
colonialism in this sense has no immediate bearing on the 
political arrangements that are considered proper for the 
colony; it is a rule of international politics rather than 
a principle of internal politics, requiring simply the 
forsaking of overseas possessions by certain European and 
other white countries. It is in this form that anti­
colonialism is accepted by the vast majority of countries, 
although they tend to disagree about the urgency of the 
matter.
For some, however, this obligation on colonial 
powers has not seemed satisfactory, chiefly because it does 
not permit immediate and effective measures to achieve the 
goals envisaged. Accordingly, established international 
rules have sometimes been called upon to justify more 
forceful action. Thus it has been argued that the possession 
of colonies amounts to permanent aggression, an idea which 
first received concrete expression in the Indian seizure of 
Goa from Portugal in 1961. It takes as its starting-point 
the manner in which colonial territories were originally 
acquired. The first question concerns the status of the
For a discussion of various criteria see J.P. Plamenatz, 
On Alien Rule and Self-Government (London, 1960), ch.ii.
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territories subjugated by the powers: were they in any
sense sovereign states or were they beyond the pale of 
contemporary law? Alexandrowicz argues that it was the 
practice of European states before the nineteenth century to 
treat the rulers of certain Asian countries as independent 
sovereigns with whom treaties - chiefly concerning trade 
and the position of traders - were concluded on a footing of 
equality.  ^ It follows that these countries were members of 
the Family of Nations and that their subsequent reduction 
to colonial status amounted to a serious infringement of the 
rights accorded to them by that Family. This raises the 
question whether such actions constituted aggression or 
whether they could be considered in any way legitimate. The 
weight of the argument strongly suggests that the acquisition 
of colonies was not an international wrong by the standards 
of the time.
Firstly, different rules applied in the past 
concerning lawful and unlawful reasons for waging war, 
including wars of conquest. The establishment of colonial 
dependencies was certainly accepted by the majority of 
European states and although they were not the only members 
of the Family of Nations (according to Alexandrowicz1s 
argument) they were the most numerous and influential. 
Nineteenth century Europe, moreover, arrogated to itself 
the right to determine the content of international law and 
it became established positivist doctrine that the decision 
to resort to war was the political prerogative of states and 
not subject to legal regulation. Secondly, even if it is 
admitted that the seizure of colonies was unjust or illegal 
by standards prevailing at the time, such actions may have 
acquired a legitimacy by virtue of their effectiveness. 
Indeed, international law must contain some provision whereby
C.H. Alexandrowicz, 'New and Original States: The Issue
of Reversion to Sovereignty', International Affairs, vol. 45
(July 1969), p p .469-70.
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illegal actions, if successful and permanent in their effects, 
are acknowledged and granted some measure of protection; 
the reason is that no rules can ignore developments in the 
real world without losing their relevance and without 
encouraging disorder. Successful aggression, in short, 
ceases to be aggression if it is left undisturbed. The 
notion of 'permanent aggression' , however, rests on a totally 
different interpretation of these two points. It asserts, 
firstly, that aggression in the sense of illegitimate 
attack did occur and, secondly, that the permanent state 
of affairs achieved by it did not become legitimate with 
time but, on the contrary, remained an instance of aggression.
Mazrui, it is worth noting, attempts to distinguish 
between the illegitimacy of disturbing sovereignty which 
has been acquired as a result of aggression and the legitimacy 
of that sovereignty itself. The rule that conquests must 
be left undisturbed, he argues, does not mean that the rule 
of the conqueror is necessarily legitimate."'' This would be 
a convenient distinction in many ways, allowing subject 
countries to resist the ruling power but forbidding outside 
states to intervene in any conflict that might result, but 
it seems neither logical nor practical. Logically, 
sovereignty implies a capacity to rule over the citizens 
of a country as well as a right to freedom from outside 
interference. If sovereignty is recognized internal and 
external aspects must be accepted together, otherwise it is 
something less than sovereignty that is at issue; 
international society cannot tolerate a definition of 
sovereignty that includes the a priori illegitimacy of 
government. On the practical level, it seems unlikely that 
states will refrain from assisting rebel causes which are 
widely accepted as being just not only in terms of what they 
seek to achieve but also in terms of past wrongs which are 
to be righted. Restraint will be especially unlikely on the
1 Pax Africana, p .28.
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part of those very countries which have campaigned for 
acceptance of this view of colonialism in order to further 
their anti-colonial activities. The inconsistencies 
inherent in such a situation are illustrated by the case of 
Southern Rhodesia where many African states assert that 
Britain still has a 'colonial sovereignty' over the country 
and therefore remains responsible for it yet at the same time 
regard as proper any attempt to overthrow the established 
government.
We are thus in a position where colonial rule 
over what were formerly sovereign states or something like 
them can be treated as legitimate or, more doubtfully, as 
illegitimate and aggressive. But what is the position with 
regard to colonial territories which have never in their 
existence come anywhere near the condition of sovereignty?
Can one logically expect that their present status will 
differ in any significant way from that of states which 
enjoyed sovereignty prior to colonial subjection? Assuming 
that aggression is a wrong committed by one state against 
another, there can, of course, be no foundation to the claim 
that colonies of this kind were acquired by aggressive 
actions. Certainly, it would have occurred to no-one, 
colonizer or colonized, to use the term 'aggression' or 
its equivalent in this context. In fact, most colonies in 
Africa, America and Oceania were originally far less than 
independent sovereign states though not to the point of 
being terra nullius. While some local tribes and peoples 
were capable of negotiating with the white man and concluding 
meaningful agreements with him, this was not done on a 
basis of equality, much less of sovereign equality.
'Unequal' agreements and protectorates became common 
instruments of colonial domination and on occasions 
supremacy was established by military force alone. If these 
were not international crimes, it follows that there is no 
question of their being permanently criminal. It is not on 
the grounds of an original wrong perpetrated by the
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colonialists, therefore, that these colonies can claim their 
independence. This conclusion, moreover, is consistent with 
the view that colonies which happen to have been original 
states but which now precisely resemble other colonies also 
have no rights on account of ancient aggressions.
Even if these anti-colonial arguments based on 
past events did stand u p , there are still reasons for not 
putting them into effect. The reasons relate to the 
consequences likely to ensue from any attempts in this 
direction. For if the issue is one of aggression by the 
colonial power and it will not yield up its gains immediately, 
the obvious and natural response is a resort to force by 
the subject people themselves and by interested outsiders.
To put right what is illegal would seem not only legal in 
itself but also a worthy and desirable goal,’*' But it is 
an aim that tends to be blind to any limits on the means 
used to achieve it. In a just cause all means may come to 
appear justifiable and no compromise, however, reasonable, 
may be possible with a power permanently stigmatized as 
colonialist and aggressive. Indeed, no rights at all may be 
conceded to the colonizing power so that it is expected to 
forgo even such fundamental rights as that of self-defence. 
Thus a double standard may be introduced into international 
law with obligations applying to the less favoured countries 
and none to the more favoured. Rules must be concerned with 
the behaviour of states rather than with their status, 
especially if it is a status involving exclusion from the 
law. The net effect would probably be to produce more 
disorderly behaviour than orderly.
Anti-colonialism, however, contains other important 
elements which make for greater urgency of action. Retention 
of colonial power has been interpreted as a denial of 
fundamental human freedoms and hence as a proper object of
1 Mazrui, Pax Africana , pp.35-6.
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concern for the international community. Intervention 
against colonial regimes thus has some claim to be a form of 
humanitarian intervention. Also, on the African continent 
at least, there is a measure of regional solidarity which 
gives some basis for asserting a special interest in anti­
colonialism. The emotional force behind it is illustrated 
by Ben-Bella's dramatic declaration at the Addis Ababa 
Summit Conference in May 1963:
Ten thousand Algerian volunteers have been waiting for 
a chance to go to the assistance of their brothers in 
arms....A ransom had to be paid for Algeria's 
1iberation....So let us all agree to die a little, or 
even completely, so that the peoples still under 
colonial domination may be free and African unity 
may not be a vain word.^
This solidarity is all the more impressive by virtue of the 
fact that it combines both Arabs and Negroes. But there 
is an important and irreducible demand in anti-colonialism 
concerning the political arrangements of the territories 
to be given independence. Sovereign status alone is not 
enough for this is compatible with a colonialist minority 
remaining in power. Provision must be made for the native 
majority (for such it invariably is) to take over control 
of political institutions. It is not in itself a demand 
for democracy in the sense of majority rule since the system 
of government that actually emerges may be one-party 
domination or a personal dictatorship. The essential 
condition is that a small number of white men do not rule 
over a coloured population.
Thus it makes little difference to the anti­
colonialist whether a controlling white government is 
subordinate to an overseas power or enjoys full independence. 
The Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia, for 
example, did not satisfy anti-colonial demands by dint of the 
country ceasing to be a colony of Britain. Similarly, the
1 Cited ibid * 9 p. 111.
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Republic of South Africa remains an object of anti-colonial 
attack on account of its internal policy of white domination. 
Apartheid is condemned not so much for its insistence on 
separate development but as an instrument of control; at the 
same time it serves to increase the humanitarian appeal of 
anti-colonial goals. It is at this point, however, that 
anti-colonialism is revealed to be a political principle 
which does not enjoy universal approval. All states 
acknowledge a duty to grant independence to colonial 
countries but a substantial number object to the view that 
all white minority governments are illegitimate in the eyes 
of international society. Certainly, some of them may 
disapprove of such governments or feel concern for the 
rights of the oppressed population but they will not go 
as far as condemning them in a way that would deprive them 
of their international rights. In practice, this crucial 
political element in anti-colonialism has often been 
satisfied in the process of granting independence from the 
metropolitan power but its acceptance has been considerably 
less than complete.
The application of anti-colonial principles has in 
fact proceeded without undue disturbance to international 
order. Decolonization in one form or another has been 
continuous since the end of World War II, moving at varying 
speeds but now undoubtedly on the point of disappearing as 
a major issue of international society. In some parts of 
the world the attitudes which favoured wars for colonial 
liberation do seem to have carried over to some extent into 
the relations between independent states. The post-1945 
rebellions in South-East Asia, for example, were led by men 
who, accepting the rightness of armed struggle in their 
own countries, were likely to support the use of force 
against colonial regimes elsewhere. One such leader was 
Ho Chi Minh who achieved formal independence for North 
Vietnam in 1954 and who subsequently demonstrated his 
readiness to encourage the use of force against governments
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in South Vietnam and Laos. It is important to remember, 
however, that Hanoi has seen the struggles in these countries 
as in many ways a continuation of the movement for colonial 
independence, although directed against the United States 
and its 'puppets' rather than against the French. From 
other points of view, of course, North Vietnamese policies 
seem to be motivated by the desire for aggrandizement or by 
communist expansionism, the anti-colonial argument being 
seen in both cases as largely a disguise for ulterior 
ambitions.
South-East Asia is, however, an exceptional area 
on account of the communist element, the militance of North 
Vietnam and the presence of ancient rivalries between the 
peoples of the peninsula. The African experience, by 
contrast, is probably more typical of the anti-colonial 
movement as such. There the fundamental purpose of 
decolonization has been the elimination of rule by alien 
races and not the re-drawing of political boundaries or the 
establishment of governments based on particular ideologies. 
The overriding goal of national independence carried with it 
a demand for the undisturbed management of political affairs, 
a demand still to be found in the denunciation of neo­
colonialism i.e. continuation of colonial rule by indirect 
methods. This principle applies equally to other nations 
as well as one's own. It has been reinforced by the need 
of many states to experiment with various forms of government 
in order to cope with immediate problems of stability and 
development; few African countries have been sufficiently
confident of their own political principles to seek to 
impose them on others. Moreover, the measure of democratic 
principles inherited from the British and French militated 
against a crusading spirit. Nor has African nationalism, 
despite its origins in Pan-Negroism, made a special claim 
for the freedom of Negro minorities in countries outside the 
continent. The anti-colonial movement has thus achieved 
its goals for the most part without giving rise to doctrines 
making for intervention in other non-colonial countries.
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The anti-colonial movement is naturally still 
directed at the remaining European colonies in Africa and at 
a few small territories in other parts of the world. It has 
also been extended to include South Africa and Southern 
Rhodesia which are states in their own right rather than 
colonies. But this extension is limited and clearly defined, 
relying on the central fact that as a consequence of 
colonial occupation a small minority of white people rule a 
large majority of black. The goal in these cases is 
essentially to bring about self-government for the people 
as a whole and the fact that there is no overseas power 
ultimately responsible for the country is taken to be 
immaterial. Moreover, this difference between the situation 
of an independent state and that of a colony where sovereignty 
rests with a European power is one which makes intervention 
in the former case a less dangerous enterprise. For a 
civil conflict in an independent state does not automatically 
involve a major overseas power as do colonial wars. On the 
contrary, in the case of Southern Rhodesia the former 
colonial power is favourably disposed toward insurrection 
against the existing regime, while in South Africa the 
incumbent government would certainly receive little outside 
assistance in fighting a civil war. Again, it is important 
to note the negative goal in both these countries i.e. the 
elimination of governments of a clearly defined type; there 
are few, if any, positive prescriptions about what political 
arrangements are to replace them. Also, there is no question 
of branding a state as an aggressor or the like, to be 
regarded as outside all rules. It is a question rather of 
international society addressing itself to specific political 
realities and sanctioning the means for their elimination.
B :__ National Self-Determination and National Liberation.
The idea common to the principles of national self- 
determination and of national liberation is that in some 
circumstances at least the rights of a nation override the 
rights of a state. This idea has been employed as a
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justification for intervention in civil strife in that it 
provides certain grounds for the support or even recognition 
of rebel movements and for the elimination of alien and 
colonial rule. The present section will examine this 
principle as a basis of intervention with a view to assessing 
its potential impact on international order. In general, it 
will be argued that the self-determination of nations is an 
elusive principle with a high potential for disorder and 
that any attempts to give it a concrete application, as in 
the communist policies of national liberation, are likely to 
be discriminatory and contentious. A marked difference will 
emerge between Soviet attitudes on this question and the 
views of Western and African countries.
It is necessary only to mention the problems of 
definition which underlie any doctrine based on the rights 
of nations. Whereas the existence of a state may be 
demonstrated by reference to widely agreed objective criteria, 
the existence of a nation is more problematic since a host 
of criteria, mostly imprecise and often subjective, have been 
considered relevant. Again, it is possible for groups of 
people to make themselves into a state by easily recognizable 
means, while the processes whereby a nation is constituted 
remain obscure and uncertain. Essentially, the idea of a 
nation is grounded on the assertion that the individual 
members of a community share certain characteristics of birth, 
behaviour or belief which distinguish them from members of 
other such communities. As a nation, however, they do not 
act together as a political entity. The claim that they 
should in fact form a state may clash with the existing 
structure of states in two main ways. Firstly, a nation may 
be a minority within a state or be subject to another state 
and seek to win or exercise its rights as a nation. Secondly, 
the members of a nation may be citizens of a number of 
states and may wish to establish a political as well as a
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nation al unity. It will be apparent that only rarely do 
state boundaries coincide pe r f e c t l y  with the g e ographical  
limits of a nation; the principle of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  
has thus been one of change, and civil strife and inte rvention  
som etimes the oc casion of such change.
In general, states have p r e f e r r e d  in recent years to 
avoid stressing the rights of nations. For what is there 
about a nation to give it pr i o r i t y  as an ordering unit of 
human society? As to positive attributes, it would seem to 
posses s no more intrinsic merit in this respect than, say, 
the family, the tribe, the church or the state itself. 
Cer tainly, it offers a basis for a common life but other 
entities do this, albeit on varying scales. Moreover, there 
is no fundamental reason why a national life should not be 
ex pe r i e n c e d  wi thin or even across state borders. At this 
point, however, the negative side of the issue becomes 
apparent. People may be deprived of or unable to enjoy 
certain rights simply by virtue of the fact that they belong 
to a p a r t i c u l a r  nationality, the members of which form a 
m i n or it y in one or more states. In seeking control of the 
state which oppresses it or in attempting to break away 
from the pa rent state, a nation may thus be acting to protect 
itself. This does not, of course, amount to a right of self- 
defence such as the society of states grants to its members. 
Never th eless, some of these efforts have received support 
and en cou r a g e m e n t  from outside states in the name of the 
national principle. Some estimate of the nature and measure 
of that support is therefore necessary.
Since 1945 the concern of many states has been with 
p r o t e c t i o n  of the individual members of nations rather than 
en co u r a g e m e n t  of na tional independence as such. They have 
addre ssed themselves to the negative aspects of the question,
Ruper t Em erson also makes the d i s t inction be tween claims 
put forward by pe oples in this situation and those put forward 
by states. S e l f - D e t e r m i n a t i o n  Revisited in the Era of 
D e c o l o n i z a t i o n  (C a m b r i d g e , Mass., 1964), p.38.
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unlike, for example, some of the peacemakers of 1919. The 
latter managed to re-draw the map of Europe in such a way 
that only three per cent of the population lived under 
governments not of their own nationality; the hope was that 
the force of national feeling would be contained in the most 
effective way while allowing the liberty of the individual 
to flourish in the bosom of the nation. The U.N» Charter, 
by contrast, expresses respect for the 'principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples' (Article 1, para.2) 
but it neither equates this with the principle of national 
self-determination nor lays it down as an absolute rule.
The framers of the Charter were concerned with the destiny 
of the peoples then ruled by the colonial powers (despite 
disagreement as to the precise nature of that destiny) rather 
than with the rights of nations, dependent or otherwise.
This is also evident in Chapter XI of the Charter which 
refers to 'Non-Self-Governing Territories' and to 'their 
inhabitants'. Thus nations were only incidentally involved 
if the people of a dependent territory also happened to be 
a nation. So far as the status of this principle is concerned, 
it is improbable that the founder members of the U . N . 
intended it to be more than a declaration of intent, a 
political formula which created no binding obligations on 
themselves and no inalienable rights for their dependencies. 
Subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly, in particular 
the 1952 Resolution on 'The Right of Peoples and Nations to 
Self-Determination' and the 1960 'Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples', may have 
increased the measure of obligation on the colonial powers 
but they have not licensed the formation of states by any 
group of people which is considered to be a nation.'*' Despite
For a discussion of the status of the principle of self- 
determination at the U.N. see Higgins, The Development of 
International Law, pp.90-106.
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claims and arguments to the contrary, international society
has not granted either in theory or in practice the same
rights to nations as to states.'*’
The new states have been generally reluctant to
accord nations - if tribal, ethnic and linguistic groups can
be equated with the essentially European concept of 'nation* -
anything which might amount to a right to independence and
hence a right to resist state authority and to receive
external support. Although their anti-colonial arguments
have more than once moved in this direction, their purpose
has been clear in practice. 'The principle of self-
determination' , the Kenyan delegation to the Addis Ababa
conference argued, 'has relevance where the foreign domination
is the issue. It has no relevance where the issue is
2territorial disintegration by dissident citizens'. Both 
the communist doctrine of national liberation and the liberal 
notions of national self-determination have made little impact 
on African and Asian thinking on colonial questions. The 
reasons for this are partly historical, but the most 
significant factor seems to be that the scope of these 
principles is too broad, too indiscriminate to provide a 
useful weapon in the anti-colonial armoury. Self- 
determination, in short, is applied only to the freeing of
The 1969 session of the Special Committee on the Principles 
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States which discussed the principle of 
self-determination of peoples saw a divergence between those 
who maintained that rights inhered in the nation itself and 
those who, like the U.K. and U.S. delegates, argued that it 
was the state which had the duty to respect and possibly to 
implement the principle. G.A.O.R., XXIV, Supplement No.19, 
A/7619. In fact, the debate was largely about colonial 
territories rather than about nations as such and this 
distorted much of the argument.
2 Cited by Mazrui, 'Violent Contiguity and the Politics of 
Retribalization in Africa', Journal of International Affairs, 
vo1 . XXIII (1969), p.101.
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subject territories from colonial rule; after that point 
the national principle receives no further support and is 
in fact broadly condemned.
The reasons for this are evident, particularly in 
the case of African states. Many of them have large minority 
groups which could be accorded collective rights only at 
the risk of breaking up the existing state structure.
Nigeria fought a long and bitter civil war to prevent the 
culturally and linguistically distinct Ibo people from 
maintaining any claim to run their own affairs. Other African 
states were at first reluctant even to discuss the war,
1regarding it as a matter for the Federal Government alone.
Only four African countries went so far as to recognize 
Biafra. However the causes of the war were seen, most 
states regarded Nigeria as an example to be avoided and the
2Biafran claim to self-determination as one to be discouraged. 
The sole African state which has a completely homogeneous 
population is Somalia, a fact which causes unease in those 
countries with Somali minorities. To permit tribal minorities 
to secede, however, or even to grant them special privileges, 
would set a dangerous precedent. It would also bear an 
unfortunate resemblance to the practice of colonialists in
3distinguishing between individuals according to their race.
A meeting of Heads of State at Kinshasa on 11-14 September 
1967 took a clear stand on the sanctity of the status quo: 
'The Assembly, condemning every act of secession in any 
member-state, recognizing that this is an internal matter 
to be solved by the Nigerians themselves, and reaffirming 
its faith and confidence in the Federal Government of 
Nigeria ... resolves to send to the Federal Government of 
Nigeria an advisory mission consisting of six Heads of 
State in order to assure him of the Assembly's desire to 
safeguard the territorial integrity, unity, and peace of 
Nigeria'. Text in Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s , v o l . XVI 
( 1967-68) , p .22281.
For a discussion of the problems involved in applying the 
principle to Nigeria see S.K. Panter-Brick, 'The Right to 
Self-Determination: Its Application to Nigeria',
International A f f a i r s , vol. 4 4 (April 196 8) .
3 M a z r u i , Pax Africana, p p . 13 -14.
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What can be done is to guarantee equality of rights to 
individuals of all races and tribes thus removing the negative 
argument for self-determination, namely that minority groups 
must protect themselves. It is also a policy that is 
consistent with the view of anti-colonialism as a struggle 
for the rights of the individual.^
The Soviet Union has been a vocal supporter of 
national liberation in the post-war world, especially in 
the 1960s. Its concept of a nation, however, has been far 
from precise so that wars of national liberation have come 
to mean anything from the Korean War or the conflict in 
Vietnam to the armed struggles of colonial territories for 
independence. There is no attempt to define a common factor 
in all such cases except the assertion that the rights of a 
nation are at stake. The Soviet position thus coincides at 
times with the anti-colonia1 movement, at times with the 
breakaway of minority groups, at times with the forcible 
reunification of peoples claimed to belong to the same nation. 
In practice, the Soviet Union is by no means consistent in 
supporting causes of this nature. The reason for this is not 
simply the absence of a comprehensive definition of a nation 
which only needs to be applied rigorously but rather the 
function that national liberation must serve in the 
communist interpretation of the world.
When the new Soviet Republic first had the 
opportunity to look at the situation of its neighbours in 
the Middle East and Asia, it was after national minorities 
within Russia had been incorporated into the Russian state 
(as were, for example, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan). For those outside the Soviet 
Union the crucial distinction which Lenin proposed was that
The Kenyan delegation at Addis Ababa in 1963 dismissed 
Pan-Somalism as a 'tribalistic doctrine and declared its 
remedy for Somalis settled in Kenya: 'If they do not want
to live with us in Kenya, they are perfectly free to leave 
us and our territory....This is the only way they can 
legally exercise their right of self-determination'.
Cited ibid., p.12.
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b e tw ee n 'the oppressed, dependent and subject nations and
the oppressing, expl oiting  and sovereign nations'."*- It was
clear that the former would be candidates for Soviet
support even, Lenin suggested, if this meant the Communist
Int ern ational forming a temporary alliance with 'bourgeois-
democratic' m o v ements in order to remove imperialist c o n t r o l .^
Debate at the Congress led to the s u bstitution of the term
1 n a t i o n a l - r e v o l u t i o n a r y ' in order to make it clear that help
wou ld  be given to bourgeois liberation movements
only when they are genuinely revolutionary, and when 
their expo nents do not hinder our work of educating 
and o r g a nizing in a r e v o l utionary spirit the peasantry 
and the masses of the e x p l o i t e d . 3
In other words the pr imary task of the Communist Internationa l
was to liberate those nations and colonies controlled by
We st ern  i m p e rialism while main t a i n i n g  the poss i b i l i t y  of
communist leadership; national and colonial questions were
above all to be seen in the light of the confrontation
be twe en capitalism and communism. At the Twelfth Party
Congress in 1923 Stalin put the ma tter more bluntly:
It should be borne in mind that besides the right of 
nations to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  there is also the right 
of the w o r king class to cons olidate its power, and to 
this latter right the right of s e i f - det ermination is 
s u b o r d i n a t e ... . the right to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  cannot 
and must not serve as an obstacle to the exercise by 
the w o r k i n g  class of its right to d i c t a t o rship....^
Pr el iminary Draft Theses on the National and the Colonial 
Questions (5 June 1920, for the Second Congress of the 
Comm un ist I n t e r n a t i o n a l ) , Selected W o r k s , vol. Ill, p.423.
2 op . c i t . p . 4 2 7 .
3 Lenin, Report of the Commis sion on the National and the 
Colonial Questions (26 July 1920), ibid, p.458.
4 25 April 192 3 , text in X.J. Eudin, R.C. North (eds.) , 
Soviet Russia and the East: 1920-27 (Stanford, 1957)
p . 63 .
213
To all appearances this has remained the fundamental 
assumption of Soviet policy on national issues. It is not 
that there is anything unusual or reprehensible about this, 
but that subsequent Soviet presentation of the doctrine of 
national liberation has obscured its true function.
In 1947 the 'fighters for national liberation' were
again included on the Soviet side in Zhdanov's two-camp
thesis. Support for national liberation was recognized as
a contribution to the strength of the anti-imperialist
forces. After Stalin's death, however, the national
liberation movement came to be accorded importance in its
own right. Wars for national liberation were formally
classed as just wars which receive the sympathy and support
of all progressive mankind.1 * Nations also enjoyed the
rights of 'national sovereignty' , permitting them to act as
2states in certain respects. Implementation of the principle
of self-determination, moreover, became a significant
contribution to world peace; thus it was claimed that the
Vietnamese people, fighting to defend their national 
independence and their right to settle their vital 
national problem, the country's unification, have 
been making a tremendous contribution to the common 
cause of the people's struggle for peace, democracy 
and Socialism.3
There is an echo here of the ideas of the peace-makers of 
1919: if nations can be allowed to look after their own
affairs, they will be able to achieve internal harmony such 
that foreign policy will be moderate and peaceful. The 
difference is that 1919 saw a genuine attempt to establish 
national boundaries according to objective criteria while 
the Soviet Union has tended to be arbitrary in selecting those
Kozhevnikov (e d .) , International Law, p . 4 02.
 ^ See chapter III, section D.
3 S. Sanakoyev, 'Formation and Development of Socialist 
International Relations, International Affairs (Moscow), 
(October 1967), p.10.
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groups for which it claims the rights of a nation. 
Essentially, the objection to intervention based on a 
doctrine such as national liberation is that the occasions 
for it are not specified in advance and that consequently 
there cannot be even an opportunity for other states to 
agree to it. The traditional notions of national self- 
determination do at least attempt to clarify, however 
inadequately, the occasions when intervention will be 
considered proper.
C: Ideological Intervention
Intervention may be said to be ideological when it 
demonstrates a concern about the nature of the internal 
political arrangements of another country in terms of their 
relationship to a system of political beliefs held by the 
intervening state. In the contemporary world ideological 
intervention has come to imply actions by the Soviet Union, 
China or the United States to promote or prevent the 
establishment of governments according to their communist or 
democratic (in the minimum sense, at least, of non-communist) 
complexion. It should not be forgotten, however, that 
allies or friends of these great powers may also undertake 
such intervention along or, more probably, in combination 
with them. Now it is apparent that ideological intervention 
may at the same time reveal a concern with, for example, 
the distribution of power on the international scene as 
would appear to be the case with the Soviet interventions 
in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968; the reason 
is simply that in contemporary conditions the character 
of a regime is frequently seen to have a bearing on great 
power relations. The present section, however, is 
addressed to the nature of the principle which says that 
intervention for communism or for democracy (regardless of 
the international situation) is justified. It is concerned 
not with the substance of such principles, but with the 
implications for international order should they be applied.
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The substance of an ideology is, of course,
important in that it may provide a very strong motive for
intervention. The belief that a particular form of
government is superior to all others may appear a good
reason for seeking to ensure that other countries also
enjoy it. The concern of the Soviet Union to maintain
communist regimes in Eastern Europe whatever domestic
opposition may arise illustrates the inherent strength of
ideological beliefs. For the rulers of the Soviet Union
communist ideology is 'not only the rationale of their
absolute power but also a source of their inner security
and effectiveness'.  ^ It is important both to them personally
and to their position that the validity of Marxism be
demonstrated in some way, especially at a time when it
appears to be of decreasing relevance to a society where
'industrialization is accomplished and the state has shown
no signs of withering away or becoming, in essence, less
2authoritarian'. The field where ideology can be made to
prove itself is in its adoption by other countries, and
particularly in its successful application by the countries
of Eastern Europe. Moreover, since these countries are
supposedly founded on a political system which will
inevitably be adopted by all peoples, the pressure on Soviet
leaders to prevent a defection from the camp is even 
3stronger. Here ideology is not merely a different language 
of politics or a disguise for 'power politics'; it is a 
strong and deep-seated political force, one which accounts 
in part for Soviet readiness to intervene in Eastern Europe. 
It is a force which may be deterred from leading to action 
or be suppressed or transformed, but it has been a feature 
of the Soviet state since 1917.
A .B . Ulam, The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism (New York, 
1965) , p .74.
2 1o c . c i t .
3 This theme is more fully developed by N. Jamgotch, 
Soviet-East European Dialogue (Stanford, 1968). pp.34-56.
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The commitment of the United States to democratic 
government takes the same form as the Soviet commitment to 
communism although there are clearly great differences 
in content, in strength and in the domestic role that 
each ideology plays. The democratic ideology also lacks 
much of the internal coherence and systematic character of 
communism, consisting (perhaps by virtue of its very nature) 
of a disconnected and sometimes contradictory series of 
ideas about how a political system should be run. These 
ideas vary in their importance but many of them can and do 
serve as justifications for intervening in civil strife in 
other countries. At one time, for example, the United 
States was much troubled by the prospect of rebels in Latin 
American nations attempting to gain power for their private 
ends, believing this to be a perversion of good government.^ 
The central political principle of democracy, however, is the 
free conduct of political affairs within each country. It 
is not simply that individuals are absolutely free to do 
whatever they wish, including inviting assistance from 
abroad, but that the whole conduct of politics should be 
based on the consent of at least a majority of citizens and 
preferably of all of them.
On this view a civil conflict, involving attempts 
by contending factions to impose an outcome on each other, 
may well amount to something other than the free conduct of 
political affairs. President Johnson's assessment of the 
disturbances in the Dominican Republic in 1965 was of this 
nature:
On 12 March 1913 President Wilson declared that 'we can 
have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of 
government to advance their own personal interests or 
ambitions'. Cited by Thomas and Thomas, Non-Intervention, 
p.35. The Tobar doctrine, which was incorporated in the 
Central American Treaties of 1907 and 1923 and which was 
informally adopted by the United States, for a time laid 
down constitutional requirements to be fulfilled by new 
governments before they would be recognized. See Lauterpacht, 
Recognition in International L a w , p . 129.
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The revolutionary movement took a tragic turn.
Communist leaders, many of them trained in Cuba, seeing 
a chance to increase disorder, to gain a foothold, 
joined the revolution. They took increasing control.
And what began as a popular democratic revolution, 
committed to democracy and social justice, very 
shortly moved and was taken over and really seized 
and placed into the hands of a band of Communist 
conspirators.1
The charge that some of the conspirators came from abroad is 
not important at the moment; what is significant is the notion 
that a minority can frustrate the will of the majority by 
various methods and that this is a legitimate occasion for 
concern and possibly intervention on the part of outside 
states. It is typified in the sometimes unthinking claim 
that no people would freely choose a communist government.
Nor should it be imagined, however, that only the democrat 
believes in the possibility of a distortion of the proper 
conduct of a country's affairs, for the communist maintains 
that the interests of a nation as a whole can only be 
served when the proletariat can act as its political vanguard. 
In wishing to impose political principles on other societies 
both go beyond the fundamental requirement of respect for 
sovereignty; it is another argument altogether which says 
that one of these forms of government is more likely to 
produce respect for sovereignty than the other.
The Soviet Union and Communist China believe that 
their respective types of communist regime represent the 
highest stage of historical development and that they are 
the only ones that can guarantee the happiness of the whole 
population of a country. The United States and many 
Western countries are less dogmatic in believing that some 
form of representative democracy is most likely to promote
2 May 1965, Department of State Bulletin, vol. LII 
(17 May 1965), p .745.
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the welfare of individual citizens. Both ideologies 
nevertheless appear to have unlimited application. They 
are in principle relevant to every country in the world, 
either through the defence of established systems of 
government or through the promotion of new systems. All 
three powers have at times envisaged the extension of their 
system to the rest of the world, including the other great 
powers. In the early 1950s the United States gave serious 
consideration to the idea of 'rolling back' communism, while 
China has recently predicted that the 'countryside' of the 
world will eventually surround and capture the 'towns'. 
Perhaps the most persistent doctrine along these lines has 
been that expounded by the Soviet Union, for the notion of 
a world state has permeated communist thinking since Marx.'*' 
Ideological intervention thus contains no inherent limits 
as does intervention based on anti-colonial and, in some 
cases, nationality principles; these latter not only 
imply limited objectives but are relevant only in certain 
situations or to a few specified countries.
Now this absence of limits is not in itself 
productive of disorder. It might be the case, for example, 
that international society could agree on political 
principles to be followed by all governments and that it 
would undertake collective intervention to enforce them.
One may question whether an international society that 
agreed on ideological intervention would have any need for 
it, but the lesson is obvious. If there are two or more 
ideologies competing as principles for intervention, there 
can be no question of these principles also acting as 
international rules. That this has been true of the post­
war world is self-evident. What is also important about 
the rivalry between democratic and communist ideology as
E. Goodman, The Soviet Design for a World State (New 
York, 1960) , discusses this theme exhaustively but with 
undue emphasis on its practical significance.
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justifications for intervention, however, is its world-wide 
scope. There have been other ideological confrontations at 
earlier periods in history - the religious schisms in 
Europe of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the 
divisions which broke up the Concert of Europe after 1815, 
the totalitarian challenge of the 1930s - but they have all 
been confined to one part of the world, albeit the most 
influential. The result is that a potential exists for 
competitive intervention in each member of international 
society.
Certainly, all forms of intervention are liable 
to infringe the norms of sovereignty but there is some case 
for believing that ideological intervention is more likely 
to do this than most. It is partly a matter of the pressing 
nature of ideological concerns so that intervening states 
tend to be less troubled by the absence of alternative 
legitimation such as an invitation from the incumbent 
government which might reconcile the action with the 
sovereignty of the country. It is partly also that 
ideological intervention generally prescribes a particular 
form of government or at least proscribes a range of forms, 
leaving relatively little freedom of choice. Intervention 
by the Soviet Union has tended to be of the former variety. 
Thus one of the justifications for the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 was that the people of that country 
would not choose Western-type democracy of their own accord 
and that a communist system must therefore be secured. The 
socialist countries, according to a Tass statement on the 
day of the invasion, were 'unanimous that the support, 
consolidation and defence of the people's socialist 
gains is a common internationalist duty'.  ^ The position of 
the orthodox communist faction in Czechoslovakia, in other 
words, was to be guaranteed regardless of the demands of 
their opponents. This is not to say that other justifications 
of the Soviet intervention could not be found but that the
1 21 August 1968, text in The Times, 22 August 1968.
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ideological one involved the imposition of outcomes within 
a very narrow range.
The United States, for its part, has shown a
continual concern that other countries should not choose
the communist path, though not necessarily insisting on a
democratic form of government. Undoubtedly, this concern has
frequently coincided with fears about the international
consequences of communist victories in civil conflicts but
it would be unreasonable to deny altogether a sincere
commitment to non-communist forms of government as desirable
in themselves. The Truman and Eisenhower doctrines did not
ignore internal political questions although it may be
surmised that some of this was window-dressing. The nature
of American preferences is illustrated by a remark of
President Kennedy's in June 1961 at a time when rival groups
were struggling for control of the Dominican Republic after
the assassination of Trujillo:
There are three possibilities in descending order of 
preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation
of the Trujillo regime or a Castro regime. We ought 
to aim at the first, but we really can't renounce the 
second until we are sure that we can avoid the third.^
Later in the year the United States put on a show of naval
force off Santo Domingo which encouraged a rising against the
2new would-be dictator, Ramfis Trujillo. In other situations
where there has been a strong concern with international
implications it is difficult to say whether the same
response would have been made had the international element
been absent. Thus in April 1965 the risk that the Dominican
Republic might pass into the hands of rebels who might turn
out to be communist appeared sufficient reason for President
3Johnson to land U.S. Marines. One can only guess whether
Quoted by A.M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (London, 1965) ,
p . 6 6 0 .
2 ibid., p.662.
3 This view is developed by P.L. Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson 
and the World (London, 1966) , pp. 253-55 . See also J.N. Plank, 
'The Caribbean: Intervention, When and How', Foreign
Affairs, vol. 44 (October 1965) .
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that risk would have been acceptable had it simply been a 
question of internal Dominican politics alone. In any event, 
it is clear that justification of interventions of this 
kind is more likely to prove effective when based on the 
international issues than when expressed in ideological 
terms. For the international considerations are ones which 
can be more readily comprehended, though not necessarily 
publicly condoned, by other countries, even those of an 
opposite ideological persuasion.
Intervention which is undertaken purely and simply 
on account of ideological considerations is thus unlikely to 
command the support of international society. It is partly 
for this reason that Wight is able to place intervention 
to maintain existing governments at the bottom of the 
traditional moral scale.'*' However, it is clear that states, 
and in particular the great powers, will see a continuing 
need for undertaking ideological intervention and that 
there will be more than a few occasions when it will be in 
breach of fundamental international rules. Nevertheless, 
it is possible that such intervention may still be controlled 
by various means whether or not it accords with these rules. 
Manifestly illegal behaviour may still be subject to limits 
of a kind although the development of such restrictions is 
likely to be that much more difficult in a world where 
intervention is undertaken by states holding diverse and 
antagonistic political principles.
Below balance of power and humanitarian intervention. 
'Western Values in International Relations', in Butterfield, 
Wight (eds.) , Diplomatic Investigations, p . 116 .
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PART THREE : THE CONTROL OF INTERVENTION IN CIVIL STRIFE
The fact that there are various rules and principles 
relating to intervention in civil strife does not in itself 
tell us the full extent to which intervention actually 
contributes to or detracts from international order. The 
purposes of interventionary behaviour are nominally governed 
by the fundamental rules of international society but the 
measure of disregard for these rules is apparent in the 
readiness of states to rely for justification on the political 
principles discussed in chapter VI. What must also be 
considered are the procedures by which states are able to 
control acts of intervention on the part of others. These 
procedures, in so far as they are effective at all, can be 
used to discourage intervention which breaches basic rules 
and to encourage intervention which conforms with them; they 
can also be used, of course, to discourage intervention 
which in fact seeks to uphold the rules and so detract from 
international order. Part Three will discuss the means by 
which the act of intervention in civil strife can be 
controlled by other international activities. Control in 
this context does not necessarily mean the same thing as a 
diminution of intervention, although this is frequently the 
purpose of the actions concerned. It is also true that 
one method of control is to threaten and possibly to implement 
further intervention.
The methods of control are naturally many and 
varied but further intervention is prominent among them.
It is threatened or undertaken by third states and may 
involve them in the conflict at a number of levels. This 
form of control depends on the prudential calculations of 
the outside states concerning the likely consequences of 
the initial intervention and of subsequent reactions to 
it. Attention must also be given to the possible responses 
of the divided state itself for it too enjoys a potential 
for expanding the scale and scope of the original conflict.
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Chapter VII will deal with the most significant factors 
governing such calculations. A more formal type of control 
is discussed in chapter VIII i.e. the regulation of 
intervention in civil strife by specific provisions of 
international law. Here we are concerned not with the role 
of international law in determining the proper purposes 
of intervention, but with its function in governing acts 
of intervention and the responses of states to those acts.
The prohibition of some types of intervention, for example, 
may give rise to certain rights among third states or in 
the injured state itself; international law may thus 
influence the decisions of states along with their prudential 
calculations. Finally, a chapter will be devoted to the 
possibility of control over intervention in civil strife 
by an international body. In this field, the activities of 
the United Nations have not only been directed at 
intervention by individual states, but have also included 
intervention by the organization itself.
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CHAPTER VII ; INFORMAL CONTROLS ON INTERVENTION IN CIVIL 
STRIFE
There are as many motives for seeking to control 
intervention in civil strife as there are for undertaking 
it. This chapter will be concerned with the mechanisms 
of control and it is important to make clear that these 
procedures are essentially neutral as regards international 
order. Whether or not their use contributes to international 
order will depend on the purposes of the intervention that 
is subjected to such control. In practice, subversive 
intervention has been the activity which has aroused most 
concern and which has experienced many efforts at control.
If it is the case that this kind of intervention breaches 
fundamental international rules more often than not (and 
there are good grounds for this assumption), then the 
mechanisms of control will by and large promote international 
order. Thus the possibilities of controlling intervention 
which are discussed in this chapter may be necessary 
conditions for achieving a measure of international order.
Attention will be focused primarily on the control 
of subversive intervention for the reasons already mentioned, 
but it should not be forgotten that on some occasions states 
are anxious to prevent or limit the assistance given to 
incumbent governments. In either case, the basic problems 
of control are similar - how to bring another state to do 
something or to desist from doing something - although 
the particular methods may vary. The first section will 
examine the interrelationship between intervention in 
civil strife and the forms of military conflict, and 
especially the theory that the prevalence of intervention 
is a result of the nuclear stalemate between the superpowers. 
If the latter is in any way a cause of the former, then 
control of intervention will depend on policies at the 
highest strategic levels. In fact, it will be argued in 
the second section that the most important factors in
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Controlling Intervention are to be found in the potential 
of civil strife to expand by stages to higher levels of 
external involvement and intensity of conflict. The final 
section, in the light of the pressures for and against 
expansion, will consider the prospects for deterring and 
constraining intervention in civil strife.
A: Intervention and Military Conflict
Subversive intervention has come to be regarded 
by many as a staple of international relations, an ever­
present feature of international society which must be 
accepted because it can never be fully controlled, let 
alone prevented altogether.'*' The reaction of some has 
been to see the cause of this state of affairs in a 
world-wide communist conspiracy designed to undermine the 
governments of the Third World and the West through the 
flexible and elusive techniques of subversion. Such a 
conviction has found adherents not only in the United States
but also in France where the Army clung to it tenaciously
2during the Indochinese and Algerian campaigns. Soviet
commentators have also been ready to denounce a comparable
Western conspiracy of subversion whether against the new
nations in the form of neo-colonialism or against the
socialist countries by the 'new ideological subversion'
which the West is alleged to consider 'more refined and
3camouflaged' than the old military methods. These conspiracy 
theories attribute to subversive intervention a strong 
element of design and calculation; it is not our purpose
Raymond Aron observes that since only direct aggression in 
the sense of invasion by regular forces has been explicitly 
prohibited by the rules of the game, 'all other forms of 
aggression have been legalized, because they have been 
tolerated' . Peace and W a r , p .566.
2 R. Girardet, 'Civil and Military Power in the Fourth 
Republic', in S.P. Huntington (ed.), Changing Patterns of 
Military Politics (New York, 1962). G.A. Kelly, Lost
Soldiers (Cambridge, Mass. , 1965) , pp.9-10.
3 S. Sanakoyev, 'Internationalism and Socialist Diplomacy', 
International Affairs (Moscow) , (May 1965) , p.24.
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here to test the truth of these theories but to note that 
were this element in fact present the task of controlling 
intervention would be relatively simple. Calculated threats 
could be directed at calculating and cautious opponents.
In fact, simple observation indicates that the causes and 
hence the control of intervention, particularly subversive 
intervention, are more elusive than has been suggested.
Intervention in civil strife is frequently 
described as an instrument of policy in the same way as the 
military or diplomatic arm of states. This is especially 
the case with subversive intervention which tends to be 
contrasted favourably with the more overt use of armed 
force. Some of the inherent limits on a policy of 
subversive intervention were discussed in chapter II but 
it does also possess a number of advantages. The intervening 
state need make no overt commitment to a rebel movement.
It can send material assistance covertly and in small 
amounts. If troops are considered necessary, unofficial 
'volunteers' may go to the aid of the rebels. Alternatively, 
training and support may be given to exiles who may be 
genuine refugees from a conflict or nationals hired for the 
occasion. The aim behind such activities may be to promote 
a rebel victory at all costs, involving an ultimate threat 
of armed invasion; this was the situation when the Soviet 
Army was ranged along Czechoslovakia's borders in February 
1948. It may be to promote a rebel victory within certain 
limits such as those evidently reached by the United 
States when the Cuban exile brigade failed to establish 
itself on the beach at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. Again, 
subversive intervention may be intended simply to keep 
a country weak and disunited by maintaining the threat of 
rebel victory; this, Dinerstein suggests, was the Soviet 
aim in encouraging the Algerian rebels in the early years of 
their struggle against France.1 The least ambitious goal
H.S. Dinerstein, Sino-Soviet Conflict in the Underdeveloped 
Countries (Santa Monica, 1964) , p.12.
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of subversive intervention is to extract some political 
concession from the government under threat; rebel victory 
is purely incidental in this case since assistance is 
given to rebels simply to maintain the pressure on the 
government rather than to further its overthrow, Within 
this range of goals states are able to move from one to 
another as conditions change or their ultimate ambitions 
are modified or expanded.'*'
Commitments of this nature can be liquidated with 
a facility not shared by a policy involving the introduction 
of regular military forces. Moreover, whatever degree of 
control is exercised over the rebels generally remains 
unknown to those not directly involved although there is 
the possibility that it may be overestimated as well as 
underestimated. The responsibility of the intervening 
state for the original outbreak of civil strife and for its 
continuance is similarly obscure as are the intentions 
behind it. Subversive intervention thus appears to 
offer - in favourable conditions at least - a risk-free 
and economical means of pursuing a policy which can be 
promptly discontinued as and when necessary. Indeed, it may 
even prove to be the case that successful subversive 
intervention makes an armed invasion unnecessary.
These notions about subversive intervention are 
often linked with another major feature of the post-war 
period, namely the development of massive nuclear war 
capabilities by the two superpowers. The theory is that the 
intolerable nature of nuclear war and the serious risks of 
a conventional military conflict escalating to a nuclear 
level have prevented direct confrontations of this kind 
between the United States and the Soviet Union and that 
consequently competition between them has been diverted to
North Korean activity in South Korea between 1945 and 
1950 illustrates the range of possibilities inherent in 
subversive intervention. See G.D. Paige, 'Korea', in 
Black, Thornton (eds.) , Communism and Revolution, p p .219-28.
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less dangerous arenas. Hans Morgenthau attributes the 
phenomenon to
the recognition on the part of the two superpowers, 
armed with a large arsenal of nuclear weapons, that a 
direct confrontation between them would entail 
unacceptable risks, for it could lead to their mutual 
destruction.... Instead of confronting each other 
openly and directly, the United States and the 
Soviet Union have chosen to oppose and compete with 
each other surreptitiously through the intermediary 
of third parties.1
One of the most probable forms of this competition would 
appear to be subversive intervention, the advantages of 
which were discussed in the preceding paragraphs.
Essentially, such intervention permits advances to be made 
by small, discrete steps each of which would make a forcible 
response seem grossly disproportionate and incredible, 
especially if the threat or use of nuclear weapons were 
involved. The difficulties of bringing nuclear weapons or 
even conventional forces to bear in this situation are 
further compounded by the ambiguity surrounding the intentions 
and the precise degree of complicity and control attributable 
to the intervening state. Thus it is that a policy of 
subversive intervention seems rational and effective for a 
country confronting one of the major nuclear powers. China's 
encouragement of wars of liberation is frequently cited as 
the case of a state resorting to subversive intervention in 
order to challenge a power of great conventional and nuclear 
strength. The dangers of direct military clashes, in other 
words, appear to be a prime cause of the widespread practice 
of subversion.
'To Intervene or Not to Intervene' , Foreign Affairs, 
vol.45 (April 1967) , pp. 427-8 . President Kennedy put the 
argument in the following terms after his meeting with 
Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961: 'We no longer have a
nuclear monopoly. Their missiles, they believe, will hold 
off our missiles, and their troops can match our troops 
should we intervene in these so-called wars of liberation. 
Thus the local conflict they support can turn in their 
favour through guerillas or insurgents or subversion'.
New York Time s , 7 June 1961.
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Additional support for this view is to be found 
outside the relationships directly involving one or both of 
the superpowers. Smaller states in Africa, Asia and the 
Middle East have on occasions resorted to intervention in 
civil strife for fear that a conventional conflict would 
get out of hand. The countries of Western Africa are 
loath to engage in any conflict that might lead to the 
return of colonial forces or even, if the Europeans prove 
unable to cope with the situation, to the involvement of the 
superpowers; the consequence is seen to be a preference for 
less overt intervention in the affairs of their neighbours.’*' 
Similarly, Egypt appeared to have found a safe way of 
expanding her influence through intervention in the Yemeni 
civil war where conventional military attack would have 
been excessively dangerous. Clearly, it is not only the 
stronger powers that may be reluctant to undertake direct 
military action but also the weaker who fear that even with 
a local superiority of force they may ultimately suffer 
through the expansion of international conflict.
The idea that the conventional and nuclear levels 
of conflict can somehow cause increased conflict at a 
lower level, however, needs to be subjected to important 
qualifications. Indeed, it may prove to be the case that 
the extent of these criticisms necessitates abandoning the 
original hypothesis altogether. The first doubt concerns 
the assumption that animosity between the superpowers at the 
strategic level will perforce be diverted to other levels.
In fact, the phenomenon of the arms race and of continuous 
technological innovation indicates that competition at 
this level may still continue without the actual use of 
nuclear weapons. The threat of nuclear force remains the 
basis of Soviet-American relations as the several direct 
armed confrontations between them - over Cuba in 1962 and 
recurrently in Berlin, for example - have convincingly 
demonstrated.
1 Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa, p,94.
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A more important doubt is thrown on the original 
hypothesis by looking at the foundations of the antagonism 
between the central powers. Surely, this antagonism is not 
to be found solely or even mainly in their common possession 
of nuclear weapons such that all other animosity flows from 
this fact. On the contrary, it is the case that the United 
States and the Soviet Union are diametrically opposed on a 
wide range of political, ideological, economic and social 
issues and that these conflicts have led to their antagonistic 
nuclear postures. Thus the cold war, together with the 
competitive search for influence among the other nations 
of the world, would have come about in the total absence 
of nuclear weapons. These weapons undoubtedly added 
tensions to the Soviet-American relationship (and perhaps 
took some away) but they were instruments of policy rather 
than causes of policy. Subversive activities, indeed, ante­
date the emergence of the nuc1ear competition; the latter 
cannot therefore be a cause of the former. In short, it 
is the fundamental animosity between the superpowers that 
has encouraged both the resort to subversive activities and 
the antagonism at the strategic nuclear level.
What nuclear weapons appear to have done, in fact, 
is to limit the extent to which the superpowers can indulge 
in competition. The fear of nuclear war has tended to hold 
both back from risky military ventures and to deter 
them from pressing each other too far. The West, for example, 
has generally refrained from supporting counter-revolution 
in Eastern Europe while the communist countries have not 
exploited to the full their capacity to conduct subversion 
in both the West and the Third World.  ^ Clearly, both have 
found that, save in exceptional circumstances, subversive 
intervention as an effective means of competing with each
See M. Howard, 'War as an Instrument of Policy' , in 
Butterfield, Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations, p.211.
231
other is not without risk and that, while the risk may be 
less than that involved in military confrontation, it. is 
still far from acceptable. The notion that intervention, 
especially subversive intervention, is a safe policy for the 
superpowers clearly needs qualification, and this in turn 
throws further doubt on the supposition that these powers 
have resorted to intervention as a result of the dangers of 
nuclear or conventional military confrontation. The risks 
of intervention in civil strife are evidently real and seem 
to lie in the potential for expansion and escalation of 
the conflict.^
It is difficult to assess the impact of the 
cooperation that has been evident in recent years between 
the two superpowers in some areas of nuclear arms control.
The Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 
and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are the most striking 
illustrations of a movement towards stabilization and 
protection of the central balance. If, on the one hand, 
the primary cause of this collaboration is a general 
lowering of political and ideological tensions, it is to be 
expected that this will also mean a reduction in the pressures 
for intervention on the part of the two powers. The atmosphere 
which makes cooperation possible at the strategic level will 
at the same time diminish the propensity of each power to 
see the world in ideological terms and to see all changes in 
terms of threats and counter-threats. Moreover, the fact that 
agreements have been reached and appear to be working may 
itself increase mutual confidence to an even greater degree.
On the other hand, the existence of a stable and unchallenged 
central balance may remove certain of the risks attending 
intervention. Escalation of a conflict up to a point may 
remain likely, but if there is some guarantee that this 
point will not be passed, then it may be reached more quickly 
than would otherwise have been the case, American policy
1 See the following section.
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over Vietnam, for example, has amounted to a large-scale 
war against a member of the communist camp without a 
perceptible increase in the risk of a nuclear clash with 
the Soviet Union. The contemporary situation is thus one 
of paradox: intervention seems to be called for to a lesser
extent but to be simultaneously more feasible as a policy. 
Resolution of the paradox will be decided by the relative 
strengths of each factor.
This line of argument becomes evident in considering 
the nature of a disarmed world. The abolition of conventional 
and nuclear forces would certainly lead to a loss of many 
of the restraints that now exist in the conduct of foreign 
policy. For there would be no risk of forcible counter­
measures against states which sought to exploit the 
weaknesses of others. The only dangers would be offered 
by diplomatic or economic sanctions and by retaliatory 
intervention in the affairs of the offending state, and it 
is obvious that some major powers would be virtually 
invulnerable in these respects. Lesser states, however, 
would be liable to constant interventions since they would 
be hard put to take any retaliation against the stronger 
even with the assistance of influential allies. An unarmed 
world, in other words, promises to be more disorderly than 
an armed one. 'Nor,' as Osgood and Tucker argue,
could internal war substitute for the deterrent and 
other nonviolent uses of regular military establishments. 
Reliance upon subversion, coups d'etat, and revolution 
as the sole instruments of military power would not 
only be ineffective; it would create a chaos of 
intervention and violence that would undermine the 
order within states as well as destroy the order 
among them.^
The presence of military capabilities in contemporary 
international society, it is clear, serves important functions 
in the control of intervention which would be lost in a 
disarmed world.
R . E o Osgood, R.-W» Tucker, Force, Order,_and Justice
(B a11imo re, 1967), p p .21-2.
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The attitudes of the superpowers toward general
and complete disarmament have displayed an awareness of this
problem. In 1962, for example, Mikoyan pointed out to
Chinese critics of Soviet disarmament policy that it would
not make the national liberation struggle more difficult
but rather deprive the imperialists of the means of
'resisting the revolutionary actions of the proletariat
and the peasantry'.'*' At the same time the Soviet Union
must have realized that it would lose its own capacity to
deter American intervention against communist or pro-
Soviet regimes. It was natural for both powers to include
a prohibition of subversive intervention in the draft
treaties which they submitted to the Conference of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament which opened in
2Geneva on 15 March 1962. These provisions were to apply
from the start of the disarming process (which itself
produces distinct problems) and it seemed probable that
they would serve as indicators of the success or failure
of disarmament. For they emphasized 'the dependence of
disarmament upon a political foundation that is expected
to dilute progressively the intensity of global patterns 
3of conflict'; thus one of their functions, intended or
not, was 'to clarify the ground rules in a disarming world
and to identify the areas of prime disagreement that are
likely to breed antagonism and crises during the course
4of disarmament'. If it were the case that the high levels 
of military forces had caused the profusion of subversive
Pravda, 15 March 1962 , cited by T.W. Wolfe, Soviet
Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge, Mass. , 1964) , p. 235 .
2 See R . A . Falk, 'The Control of International Violence in 
a Disarming World', in Legal Order in a Violent World, 
p . 444 .
3 ibid., p .4 5 0 .
 ^ ibid., p.451.
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intervention in the post-war world, then disarmament would 
also mean the disappearance of these effects. On the contrary, 
disarmament would have to be accompanied by a diminution of 
international rivalries and of the competition for influence 
if the possibility of subversive intervention were not to 
prove a serious problem.
These conclusions concerning superpower relations 
and intervention in civil strife also apply, though perhaps 
with less force, to other areas of international relations. 
Simply restated, they are that intervention results primarily 
from pressures, motives and opportunities which are independent 
of the levels of conventional and nuclear armaments; 
and that where there is danger of intervention leading to 
conflict at these levels there is also an inhibiting effect 
on the resort to such actions. On the first score, it is 
apparent that the more complex and political the causes of 
both supportive and subversive intervention, the greater will 
be the problems of control. Most importantly, solutions of 
a purely military nature do not promise to be adequate.
Some of the manifold contributory causes of intervention 
have already been described: the domestic instability of
many states; the need of many such states for external 
support of various kinds; the political and ideological 
obligations which some states feel in the matter of aiding 
rebel movements or governments in the event of civil 
strife.^" Most significant of all, perhaps, is the antagonism 
which may exist between states regardless of their relative 
military capacities; in these circumstances subversion may 
present itself as a highly appropriate means of acting 
against a government which is reviled. Intervention, it is 
clear, has its own dynamics; subversive intervention in 
particular is not simply an instrument of policy which is 
selected because it happens to be more promising than
The policy of Communist China in South-East Asia, for 
example, displays these features and others besides.
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some other instruments. To deal with intervention as if it 
were simply a type of policy resembling and related to 
conventional or nuclear weapons is therefore likely to 
prove difficult and precarious. Nevertheless, as the 
following sections show in examining the truth of this 
conclusion, some success may be achieved in inhibiting 
intervention in civil strife by making use of its potential 
for expansion.
B: The Expansion and Escalation of Civil Strife
Intervention, particularly subversive intervention, 
it has been argued, is limited in various ways by the 
possibility of undesirable consequences. One type of 
undesirable result is the expansion of a civil conflict so 
that more states are involved and violence extends beyond 
the purely internal context to the international level.
Another unwanted consequence may be an escalation in the 
scale and forms of the conflict; it is not only that the 
number of combattants involved or the amount of munitions 
used may increase but also that increasingly destructive 
weapons may be employed, possibly to the point where nuclear 
weapons are threatened or actually used. Military escalation 
of this kind has been extensively dealt with by strategists 
and, although they have usually not given special attention 
to civil war situations, this topic will not be discussed 
here. For it seems that escalation of this sort has not 
proved to be a major problem of civil strife or at least 
that it has been subsumed under the broader problem of 
expansion in the former sense. The entry of outside 
states into a civil conflict and the crossing of international 
borders appear to be the more significant events and in fact 
they usually mean the involvement of more troops and more 
weapons. Except for a short analysis of the possibilities 
of using nuclear weapons in internal wars, therefore, this 
section will be confined to examining the factors working 
for and against the expansion of civil conflicts. It is
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in states' assessment of these factors that the inhibiting 
effects of expansion are to be found.
The value of nuclear weapons in civil conflicts 
as such seems to be doubtful although they are not without 
their uses in the international relationships which result 
from the expansion or the threatened expansion of civil 
strife. Quite apart from the question of availability, 
the inhibitions on their use are strong. Frequently, 
there are no clear lines of demarcation between incumbent 
and insurgent, especially in a guerri11a-type insurgency 
where there are no front-lines and no large formations of 
troops. The insurgents, even if geographically separated 
from the incumbents, are also likely to be intermingled 
with civilians who are not participating in the war. Thus 
anything except very low-yield nuclear weapons will almost 
certainly harm non-combattants (as conventional weapons do 
anyway) and possibly friendly forces as well as the 
opponent; nuclear weapons, in addition, are liable to 
devastate and contaminate the very country for which the 
factions are fighting. Even without these difficulties 
the political and moral restraints on resorting to nuclear 
weapons appear to be heightened in civil conflicts. For 
there is a vast difference between forcing enemy troops to 
surrender through the use of nuclear weapons and compelling 
fellow nationals to obey one's authority. It is perhaps 
for such reasons that nuclear weapons have in fact never 
been used in civil strife and that, as far as is known, 
their use has bever been threatened or even seriously 
considered.
The public attitudes of the United States, the 
Soviet Union and China reinforce this view. The U.S. 
ruled out the possibility of assisting the French with 
nuclear weapons at Dienbienphu'*’ and refrained from landing 
a rocket battery in the Lebanon in 1958. This battery had 
a nuclear as well as a conventional capability and might
B.B. Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place (Philadelphia, 1967) , 
p p .209, 306-7.
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have suggested an intention to use atomic weapons. The
Soviet Union, in supporting the application of the rules of
war to civil strife, has sought thereby to extend the alleged
2illegality of nuclear warfare to internal conflicts.
The Chinese too have argued vigorously against the usefulness
3of nuclear weapons in revolutionary struggles. At the
same time, however, the Chinese and Soviet arguments also
indicate a fear that nuclear weapons might be used by an
incumbent government against a revolutionary movement, for
their arguments about the illegality and impos sibility of
using nuclear weapons in civil strife apply to both sides.
Thus China appeared particularly concerned in the early
1960s by the American development of tactical nuclear
weapons that appeared more suited to internal war and her
constant reiteration of the no-first-use principle seems
to have been intended, amongst other things, to raise the
political cost to the U.S. of introducing such weapons into 
4civil wars. On the one hand, therefore, strong arguments 
may be found against the value of nuclear weapons in this 
context; on the other hand, the possibility of irrational 
or imprudent resort to these weapons is apparently large 
enough to arouse the concern of a number of countries. It 
may even be the case that in certain conflicts nuclear 
weapons could be wisely and effectively used. As long as 
such fears exist, even if largely unfounded, they can only 
serve to discourage states from participating in civil strife.
M.D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York, 1959) , 
pp.9-10; Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p.286.
2 B .A . Ramundo, Peaceful Coexistence; International Law 
in the Building of Communism (Baltimore, 1967), p .13 8 .
3 'Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace' , 
People 's Daily and Red Flag editorial, 18 November 1963, 
reprinted in Peking Review, 22 November 1963, pp.12-13.
4 A o L . Hsieh, Implications of the Chinese Nuclear Detonations 
(Santa Monica, 1965). p.15.
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The rest of this section will look at the ways in 
which a civil conflict can expand into something more than 
a struggle for power between two factions within a country. 
The process can be simply analysed. In the first stage 
external support is given to one or both of the contending 
parties in order to assist them in achieving their goals.
The pressures making for intervention have already been 
described, being found principally in the demands of the two 
factions and in the concerns that civil strife arouses among 
outside states. The pressures against intervention have 
been found in the limitations of the act of intervention 
itself and in the risk of escalating and expanding the 
conflict. These risks enter into the calculations of 
both the state considering intervention and the faction 
which would receive assistance; since their calculations 
are not necessarily the same the inhibiting effect on each 
of them may well vary. Thus a rebel movement may be 
reluctant to accept certain kinds of assistance or any 
assistance at all from a great power for fear that another 
power would go to the aid of the government or that it 
would lose its independence of decision to the intervening 
state. In this first stage, therefore, the danger is 
already evident that what is originally a purely civil 
conflict may turn into a proxy war fought either between two 
states intervening on opposing sides or between a state 
directing a rebel movement in another country and the 
government of that country. This danger is likely to persist 
or to increase as the original conflict moves through 
subsequent phases of expansion.
In the second stage one or both of the factions 
take action against the state giving aid to the opposing 
faction. Thirdly, an outside state cooperates with the 
faction it supports in order to attack the outside state 
supporting the other side; this form of joint action may 
be reciprocated. Finally, the outside parties may act 
independently against other intervening states at which point
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the original civil conflict has expanded into an international 
conflict between two quite different entities. Each of 
these stages, being defined by the identities of the parties 
in conflict, naturally includes a wide range of activities; 
external support, for instance, may mean diplomatic manoeuvres 
or the provision of large numbers of troops. Moreover, the 
stages may be closely interconnected. Thus extensive support 
for one of the factions may permit it to undertake operations 
against an outside state which would not otherwise have 
been possible, while the third and fourth stages are 
distinguished not so much by the operations actually 
undertaken as by the planning and intentions of the parties 
concerned. At each stage, however, there are certain 
pressures for expansion to another level and certain 
restraints. Controls therefore arise both from the 
restraints themselves and from the fear of moving to a 
higher level where further expansionary pressures may come 
into play.
The factors which might induce intervening states 
to turn a civil war into a proxy international war are 
complex and various. Some of these factors are a matter 
of conscious and deliberate decision on the part of the 
outside state, relating to its particular intentions and 
its strategic interests. Other factors may involve little 
or no choice. Thus, as the scale of a war increases and 
the supply of local resources diminishes, an intervening 
state may be unable to resist the demands of a faction for 
further assistance; again, a commitment to one side or 
another may develop to the point where it cannot be abandoned 
whatever the course of the conflict. These pressures are 
likely to be even greater in the event of two states 
assisting opposing sides for then the intervention tends to 
become competitive and limits on it more difficult to set.
Some factors also will relate to the way in which states 
perceive civil strife, in particular the emphasis they place 
on the distinction between internal and international wars.
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Soviet ideology, for instance, has traditionally
stressed the importance of the struggle between the forces
of imperialism and the forces of socialism in any war
rather than the distinction between civil and international
wars. The dimensions of an apparently internal conflict
therefore were to be fixed not by the national boundary
but by the relative strength of the socialist and imperialist
camps; such a conflict was from the start a proxy war in
the sense of being fought by detachments of each camp. A
change in Soviet thinking came in 1961, however, when
Khrushchev made a speech explicitly stressing the idea of
national boundaries around internal wars:
In modern conditions a distinction should be made 
between the following categories of wars: world wars,
local wars, liberation wars and popular risings. This 
is necessary in order to work out the correct tactics 
with regard to these wars.
These risings must not be identified with wars between 
states, with local wars, because the people in these 
risings are fighting for the implementation of their 
right to self-determination, for independent social 
and national development....Communists fully support 
such just wars and march in the front ranks of the 
people waging liberation struggles.^
The Soviet Union still wished to identify itself closely
with revolutionary movements and to continue to assist some
of them but it was taking pains to point out that this was
not the same thing as war fought on behalf of the socialist
camp against the imperialist camp. This change in outlook
was evidently brought about by the newly-perceived dangers
in the expansion of civil conflict. The United States, too,
has shown an inclination to interpret civil conflicts as
wars between the Free World and Communism and hence between
the U.S. on one hand and the Soviet Union or China on the
other. The difference between Soviet and American views,
however, is that the U.S. tends to regard the international
element in civil conflict as deliberately and improperly
introduced by the other side, whereas for the Soviet Union
Speech on 6 January 1961, text in D. Floyd, Mao Against 
Krushchev (New York, 1963 ) , pp.307 , 309 .
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this factor is naturally and inevitably present. In either 
case, it seems that few civil conflicts escape interpretation 
as proxy wars of some sort.
One significant limit on the assistance given to 
either side in a civil war would seem to be the distinction 
between supplying military equipment on the one hand and 
the despatch of regular troops on the other. Yet this limit 
has not been widely accepted as a significant restraint 
on intervening states, especially in the case of assistance 
to incumbent governments. Its general observance in practice 
has probably been more incidental than deliberate.
The reason for this seems to be that the transition from 
one form of assistance to another can be made very 
gradually in small, inconspicuous stages; the only major 
constraint appears to be on making a large jump from one 
end of the scale to the other. Thus whether assistance is 
given to insurgents or incumbents it is a simple step to 
send a small number of advisers with any military equipment 
that is being supplied, and it may be a necessary step to 
ensure that proper use can be made of the aid given. The 
advisers may be civilians or military personnel. Their 
tasks may extend to combat instruction and to advice on 
the conduct of operations. There were, for example, numbers 
of Chinese technical assistance specialists and military 
advisers with the Vietminh in their campaigns against the 
French.'*' The American commitment to South Vietnam in the 
early 1960s grew through the despatch of more and more 
military assistance personnel who accompanied government 
troops on combat missions, flew armed helicopters and 
conducted small-scale bombing raids, and who numbered over 
16,000 by the end of 1963.* 2
Zas1o f f , Role of the_Sanctuary in Insurgency, p .20.
2 Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp.422-4, 458, 536. See also
D. Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire (London, 1965) , 
p.81 and generally on the significance of American advisers 
in the w a r .
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The subsequent decision to introduce ground troops
specifically for the purpose of combat was therefore not a
dramatic and clearly distinguishable stage in the expansion
of the civil war in South Vietnam although it was to have
far-reaching results. The massive American military
involvement in Vietnam, however, was caused not so much by
the initial introduction of troops as by the deepening
political and strategic commitment to the country of which
the despatch of regular forces was largely a symptom. At
the end of the decade, by contrast, the United States came
to adopt the policy of not sending ground troops to any of
the countries of South-East Asia. President Nixon outlined
his proposals for dealing with subversive intervention
in the following terms on 3 November 1969:
In cases involving other types of aggression, we shall 
furnish military and economic assistance when requested 
in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we 
shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume 
the primary responsibility of providing the manpower 
for its defense.
It is a policy which might itself serve to establish as a 
salient limit on intervention the introduction of regular 
combat forces into a civil war. But the doubt remains 
whether this would act as a particularly useful constraint 
on the expansion of such conflicts.
Once there is external support for insurgents 
the character of a civil conflict has been changed, or 
rather a new feature has been added. The contest is now in 
part one between the incumbent government and the intervening 
state, a development which raises the possibility of 
expanding the conflict to the second stage. At one extreme 
the government may choose to regard support to the rebels 
as an act of war against itself and respond accordingly.
The initiation of an international war, however, whether 
formally declared or not, is a serious matter at any time
1 International Herald Tribune , 5 November 1969.
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and may in this context increase the freedom of action 
enjoyed by the enemy state in so far as the latter may 
be led to increase its support for the rebels and to 
undertake direct action against the incumbent. The 
internationalization of a conflict in this way, furthermore, 
may attract the attention of states not immediately involved, 
a development which could work either to the advantage or 
the disadvantage of the incumbent. The repercussions of a 
declaration of war in these circumstances are clearly far 
from certain, especially in view of the fact that the 
rights of an incumbent in this situation are much disputed.
In practice incumbents have usually treated 
external support for a rebel movement as an unfriendly 
act which is, however, something less than an armed attack 
or an act of aggression. It is certainly difficult, 
if not impossible, for a government to ignore altogether 
outside support for insurgents, particularly when another 
state is providing an active sanctuary on its territory, 
allowing rebels to train and re-group there and supplying 
them with arms. Such a sanctuary is a symbol of the 
international character of the war. To the incumbents it 
means that an outside state is acting as an ally of the 
insurgents, while to the rebels an external sanctuary implies 
a guarantee that however they fare within the country their 
claim to power can be kept alive from outside. There are 
consequently strong military and political pressures on the 
incumbents to deny the insurgents the support and status they 
have won from abroad; at the same time the rebels will 
be equally concerned to retain them. The government may be 
able to cut off external support by actions within its 
national boundaries or may at least be satisfied with an 
attempt in this direction as was France for a number of 
years over Tunisian assistance to the F.L.N. In this case 
France was content for a while to intercept supplies that 
came by sea and to construct frontier barriers along the 
borders with Tunisia and Morocco which were effective to
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a certain extent/ Measures of this sort, however, tend to 
be too passive since they fail to eliminate the original 
source of assistance and encouragement.
The actual importance of a sanctuary will vary
from case to case but it seems that the longer an incumbent
is denied victory the greater the pressure to carry the
conflict into the intervening state. There are good and
bad reasons for doing so. On the negative side, a sanctuary
may be blamed for rebel successes or government defeats
for which it was not in fact responsible; in this way the
government may underestimate or overlook its own deficiencies
and mistakes in the desire to find a simple, once-for-all
solution to its problems. In 1962, for example, President
Kennedy concluded that South Vietnam (and the U.S.) would
blame North Vietnamese infiltration for any misfortunes
even if the flow was reduced to a minimum:
No matter what goes wrong or whose fault it really is, 
the argument will be that the Communists have stepped 
up their infiltration and we can't win unless we hit 
the north. Those trails are a built-in excuse for 
failure, and a built-in argument for escalation/
On the positive side, an active sanctuary may be causing a
great deal of harm which could only be tackled within the
country at an excessive cost, whether in political, military
or economic terms. In these circumstances attacks on the
intervening state could be the only means of winning the war
open to the incumbent; it would be faced with the task
either of physically preventing assistance from reaching
the rebels or of raising the costs to the intervening state
sufficiently to dissuade it from continuing its policy.
P. Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to 
Algeria (London, 1964), p.35.
Quoted by Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p.439.2
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The consequences of such actions can be assessed 
in a number of ways. The immediate objectives of the attack 
may be achieved or they may not. If they are achieved, the 
intended effects may or may not follow. Thus a sanctuary 
which is believed to be playing a major role in an insurgency 
may be destroyed without result if the belief was erroneous. 
Equally, a genuinely important sanctuary may be effectively 
attacked but lead to a stiffening of will in the intervening 
state and a greater subsequent level of commitment to the 
rebel movement. For the response of the defending government 
may be taken in as many ways as was the original intervention. 
Counter-measures tend to be just as ambiguous regarding 
the intentions behind them and the relationship they 
initiate between the states concerned may range from 
one of war to one of unfriendliness marked by occasional 
violent clashes. The problem is essentially that no clear 
or salient limit usually exists once an attack has been 
made across an international border; in the case of an 
outside sanctuary the only limit, unless it is geographically 
distinct, is the extreme one of its abandonment by the 
rebels and the government concerned. This uncertainty and 
ambiguity may also have a bearing on the willingness or 
reluctance of other states to involve themselves. France 
encountered such problems when she finally struck at 
Tunisia in February 1958:
The effort by the French to destroy the rebel sanctuary 
in Tunisia weakened the international position of the 
French and commensurately strengthened the bargaining 
position of the Algerian nationalist movement, which 
has always sought to have the Algerian problem 
"internationalized".1
On the other hand, of course, expansion of a civil conflict 
may turn out to be a success for the defending government
V. Ney, 'Guerrilla War and Modern Strategy', in F.M. Osanka 
(ed.) , Modern Guerrilla Warfare (New York, 1962) , p.34.
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in terms of its direct physical results or of its less 
tangible effects such as an increase in the morale of its 
troops or greater respect from the civilian population.
The possibility that this may prove to be the case undoubtedly 
encourages incumbents to expand a war in this way; the 
possibility that such expansion might eventuate itself 
discourages subversive intervention in the first place.
In the third stage of expansion a defending 
government and its ally or allies combine in order to 
attack an intervening state. The transition to this stage - 
often called collective defence - is not clearly signposted.
It has been pointed out that the mere act of giving aid to 
a government may free some of its forces for use in attacks 
against the state aiding the insurgents. Also, the use to 
which military supplies are put by an incumbent cannot 
always be controlled by its ally so that the latter may 
unwittingly supply the means of retaliation. It is 
frequently the case, however, that an ally comes to the 
assistance of an incumbent because it believes that the 
insurgents are being helped from outside and that this is 
what must be counteracted. It will therefore tend to 
respond to the problem of a sanctuary in the same way as 
the incumbent. The actual role which the ally may play in 
the counter-measures ranges from participation in the 
planning process to the conduct of attacks with its own 
troops in combination with those of the incumbent. There 
seem to be few salient limits within this range except 
the crossing of an international frontier by the ally's 
regular forces although in military terms this may be little 
different from assistance rendered on the incumbent's own 
territory. The ally of the incumbent enters into the same 
uncertain relationship with the state that is supporting 
the rebels, a relationship which may never be clarified or 
may lead to the fourth stage of expansion.
The transition to the fourth stage is again difficult 
to define. Essentially, it involves an attack by one 
intervening state on another, an international war or
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condition of hostility distinct in terms of its major 
antagonists from the original civil conflict. Yet this 
situation may emerge imperceptibly from a situation where an 
outside state is combining with a government to attack 
another. There are no obvious points in the scale or scope 
of such operations at which a combined effort becomes a 
particular one. Nor is a clear guide to be found in the 
effects of attacks by one intervening state on another; 
these attacks may reduce the capacity of the other to 
intervene or cause it to halt its intervention but they may 
be only incidental results. For the important element in 
this stage of expansion is the purpose of the attacking state, 
in particular whether that purpose is related solely to 
preventing the other state from intervening in the civil 
conflict. The existence of any other intentions indicates 
that the situation is one of international war in part if 
not in whole. Thus some have argued that American attacks 
on North Vietnam amounted to war on that state since they 
were designed to inflict a punishment for earlier 
transgressions and to discourage future support for rebels 
in other Asian countries (apart from South Vietnam) as well 
as to assist the government of the South.1 Now the upholding 
of international agreements, the punishment of aggression 
or the maintenance of peace in the future may be laudable
On 1 March 1967 President Johnson wrote to Senator Jackson 
setting out three reasons for bombing North Vietnam. Two 
related to the sanctuary provided by the North for the 
Vietcong and to the infiltration into the South but a third 
had only an indirect connection with the war: 'We are
bombing North Viet Nam because it is violating two solemn 
international agreements. In 1954 Hanoi agreed that North 
Viet Nam would not be "used for the resumption of hostilities 
or to further an aggressive policy". In 1962 Hanoi 
agreed to withdraw all its military forces from Laos; to 
refrain from reintroducing such forces; and not to use the 
territory of Laos to interfere in the internal affairs of 
other countries. ' Text in Falk (ed . ) , Vietnam War and 
International L a w , p.604.
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and proper purposes in such a situation but they do produce
a relationship between the states involved which is distinct
from the one arising out of collective actions by a
government and its ally against a state undertaking subversive
intervention.^ Inevitably, the United States position with
regard to North Vietnam remained ambiguous as long as it
was attempting both to assist the South Vietnamese government
against intervention by the North and to deal with North
Vietnam as an aggressor and violator of international
agreements. That the situation was not unequivocally resolved
into one of international war stemmed largely from the fact
that North Vietnam was in no position to respond directly
against the United States mainland, although when it did
attack American ships on the high seas in the Gulf of
Tonkin in August 1964 it was charged with 'acts of deliberate 
2aggression'. For it is at this stage that the intervening 
states may feel free to attack each other as and how they 
choose.
C: Deterrence and Defence
The pressures for and against the expansion of 
civil conflicts have been considered at some length. The 
inhibitions on expansion appear to have been sufficiently 
great in most cases to prevent the conflict expanding as 
far as the fourth stage. The major exception has been the 
struggle for the control of South Vietnam the origins of 
which, however, are more complex than simply civil war plus 
outside involvement. The present section will look at the 
ways in which the processes of expansion and escalation can 
be deliberately employed either to deter a state from 
undertaking subversion intervention or to deter a state 
from coming to the assistance of an incumbent fighting a
For the significance of this distinction in international 
law see chapter VIII, section C.
2 Statement to the U.N. Security Council by Adlai Stevenson, 
5 August 1964, text ibid., p.574.
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civil war (whether or not the rebels are receiving external 
support). A deterrent effect may be achieved by a variety 
of activities ranging from actual participation in a civil 
conflict at the one extreme to the threatened use of nuclear 
weapons at the other. Attention will be given to the 
conditions under which these activities are likely to succeed 
or fail in their intended effect. The purpose of deterring 
intervention before or after the outbreak of civil strife, 
it should be noted, differs from the aim of deterring or 
preventing the occurrence of civil strife itself; this 
objective, though it may be wished for in some quarters, is 
beyond the present subject-matter.
The deterrence of subversive intervention is not 
a simple task but it is a possible one. The continuation 
of outside support for the communist rebels in Greece in 
the late 1940s, for example, appears to have been successfully 
deterred by the British and American posture in the 
Mediterranean. In February 1948 Stalin told visiting 
Yugoslav leaders:
The uprising in Greece will have to fold up.
What, do you think that Great Britain and the United 
States - the United States, the most powerful state 
in the world - will permit you to break their line of 
communication in the Mediterranean? Nonsense. And 
we have no navy. The uprising in Greece must be 
stopped, and as quickly as possible.1
The Soviet leader was clearly persuaded of the risks involved 
in allowing Yugoslavia, Bulagaria and Albania to maintain 
their active sanctuary for the Greek rebels. Stalin's 
precise assessment of the potential threats is not known 
for certain but the dangers in such a context are of two 
basic sorts. Firstly, there is the controlled or uncontrolled 
expansion of the civil conflict to the stages of counter­
intervention or forcible response by the incumbent, and
M. Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (Harmondsworth, 1963) ,
p p .140-1.
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possibly to subsequent stages. Secondly, there is the 
possibility of the defending government or, more likely, 
of a powerful ally responding at places and with measures 
not directly related to the civil conflict itself. These 
measures may take the form of mere diplomatic protest or they 
may involve massive military retaliation against the 
intervening state; here subversive intervention is the 
occasion for rather than the immediate cause of any counter­
measures that are threatened. A third form of deterrent 
effect to be analysed in this section may be achieved by 
successful counter-intervention in the conflict itself so 
that the intervening state is deterred from supporting 
rebel movements in other countries at some future time.
This last category differs from the preceding two in that the 
outside state is deterred not from intervention in the 
country where a civil war is being fought but from intervention 
elsewhere by an example of successful defence by an incumbent 
against externally-assisted insurgents. The possibilities 
of achieving deterrence in each of these ways will be 
considered in turn.
The dangers of expansion and military escalation
present the first sort of deterrent to subversive intervention.
In this the mere threat of counter-intervention on the side
of the incumbent may suffice, especially when it promises to be
effective and overwhelming. Thus during a tour of Hungary
in 1958 Khrushchev indicated that Soviet troops would again
be used to suppress any future revolts in Eastern Europe,
issuing a strong warning both to potential rebels and to
those states which might attempt to help them:
We declare that if a new provocation is unleashed 
against any socialist country, the provocateurs will 
have to deal with all the countries of the socialist 
camp. The Soviet Union is always ready to come to the 
aid of its friends, to give the proper rebuff to the 
enemies of socialism when they try to violate the 
peaceful labour of the peoples of the socialist 
countries.^
The warning implied not only that any intervention would be
Pravda , 9 April 1958, cited by Goodman, Soviet Design for
a Wo rId State , p . 3 4 7 .
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repulsed but also that serious and permanent harm would be 
done to the anti-communist cause. The effect of this on 
Western decision-makers, in so far as they have considered 
the chances of encouraging successful revolts against 
communist regimes, can only have been one of deterrence.
For counter-intervention is only one of the first
results that might ensue from an attempt at subversive
intervention; a civil conflict always carries the potential
for expansion to subsequent and more dangerous stages.
Khrushchev's speech in January 1961 which distinguished
world wars, local international wars and liberation wars
also sought to distinguish the risks involved. Previously,
Soviet doctrine had been that any small conflict could
grow into world war, indeed was likely to escalate into a
vastly destructive nuclear war. In the late 1950s, however,
this position seriously undermined the credibility of the
Soviet undertaking to support revolution in other countries
for it seemed that the Russians were deterring themselves
from this through their fear of nuclear war (and the Chinese
were not slow to point this out). It was thus a change of
posture when in 1961 Khrushchev stressed that local and
liberation wars carried greatly different risks:
A small imperialist war, independent of which of the 
imperialists begins it, may grow into a world thermo­
nuclear and rocket war. We must therefore combat both 
world wars and local wars.
Revolutionary wars, on the other hand, were considered 'not 
only admissible but also inevitable'.’*’ In other words, 
Khrushchev was arguing that the Soviet Union would not be 
deterred from supporting revolution because the danger of 
expansion was not high (at least not any more). Yet the 
risk is always present that a policy of subversive intervention 
might lead to a local international war which on Soviet 
assumptions is liable to escalate rapidly into nuclear war;
1 6 January 1961, text in Floyd, Mao Against Krushchev, p.308.
25 2
and as long as that risk is pr e s e n t  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
det err ence remains. It is this very risk which, according 
to Co mm unist Chinese denunciations, the Soviet Union has 
not been p r e pared to run for the sake of national liberation.
This risk has also been a focal point of the U .S . 
effort to discourage the Soviet Union and other communist 
countries from subversive intervention. The crucial p r oblem 
is to indicate the seriousness with which such inte rvention  
will be treated. Thus it is m a i n t a i n e d  that indirect 
aggression, like all aggression, is liable to be treated in 
the same way as an armed attack, evoking the same sort of 
forcible counter-measures. This has been the force of 
numerous treaty r e l a t ionships formed by the United States 
with So uth-East Asian, Latin American and Middle Eastern 
countries'^ and of unilateral d e c l arations such as the Truman 
and E is enhower Doctrines. It need not be clear in such cases 
whethe r the United States would act simply to de fend the 
go ve rnm ent concerned (to the point of forcible response 
across a frontier) or w h e ther it would seek to inflict 
p u n i sh ment on the wrong-doer. The deterrent effect may 
indeed be greater if the response to subversive i n t e r vention 
is not clarified in advance while com m i t m e n t  to the government  
in que st ion is made clear and unequivocal. This latter, of 
course, may be achieved not only by open treaties and by 
milit ary  and economic assistance in normal times but also 
by the more subtle processes of political commitment. In 
short, it would seem that the greater the com m i t m e n t  to a 
gov er nm ent and the gr eater the readiness to use armed force 
in its defence, the more likely is an ally to deter subversive 
inte rv ention against that government.
The T u r k l s h -Arnerican Treaty of 1958, for example, affirms 
a common d e t e r m i n a t i o n  'to resist aggression, direct and 
indirect' and pr ovides for the use of U.S. troops in the 
event of such a g g r ession against Turkey. Identical treaties 
exist with Iran and Pakistan. See S.J. Deitchman,
Limited War and A m e r i c a n  Defense Policy (Cambridge, Mass., 
1969). p p . 56-7.
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The deterrence of subversive intervention, however, 
has proved more difficult in practice than the preceding 
analysis might indicate» In the first place, there is the 
ambiguity that tends to surround any act of subversive 
intervention. The source of assistance to rebels may not 
be known with certainty, and especially the identity of the 
state chiefly responsible for this assistance. Thus in the 
course of the Algerian rebellion it was difficult to know 
which outside state had to be threatened in order to deter 
further aid to the rebels: was it only Morocco and Tunisia,
or was Egypt the guiding hand, or was the Soviet Union the 
true instigator as many Frenchmen believed? It is not 
necessary, of course, to specify a particular state in 
advance in order to deter a certain action for the threat may 
be addressed to all; but it must be possible to discover who 
is to be punished in the event of that action taking place 
since collective punishment is scarcely feasible. Even when 
the complicity of an outside state is demonstrated, however, 
ambiguities remain. For the intervening state may not be 
completely free to abandon its policy or, if it does so, 
may be unable to demonstrate convincingly that it has in fact 
complied with the threat. It may, for example, have developed 
a deep commitment to a revolutionary movement which it 
cannot lightly relinquish. Again, it may not possess full 
control over the uses to which its own territory is being 
put by the rebels in a neighbouring country. More 
importantly, the state wishing to deter subversive intervention 
may be looking for a cessation of the internal conflict as 
a sign of compliance; even if the intervening state was 
originally responsible for the outbreak of the conflict, it 
is rarely in a position to call a halt once the rebellion 
is under way. Moreover, even the ending of all traffic 
scross a border does not necessarily mean that all assistance 
has stopped since it may continue in more covert forms such 
as propaganda, diplomacy and the transmission of instructions. 
These difficulties of deterrence are to be contrasted with 
the situation of armed attack where the aggressor is clearly
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identifiable and where the abandonment of the attack is 
under the control of the latter and easily demonstrated to 
the deterring state.
A second set of difficulties in deterring subversive 
intervention relates to the credibility of the threat rather 
than the problems involved in actually carrying it out. 
Subversive intervention may be undertaken by a series of 
small steps each of which appears minor and unimportant in 
itself although together they amount to a serious problem 
for an incumbent government; these steps, moreover, may be 
easily reversible so that the level of provocation can be 
lowered or raised at will. Against such tactics it is 
difficult to issue a credible threat since the immediate 
issue in question will appear quite out of proportion to 
the response that is threatened; naturally, if the 
threatened response is itself small, the deterrent effect 
is accordingly less likely to be achieved. It is for this 
reason that nuclear weapons have proved of little value in 
deterring subversive intervention in any direct way, not 
simply because they have no immediate value in civil war 
itself. This impotence of the militarily strong in the 
face of subversive activities tends to produce what has 
been aptly called a fear of being 'nibbled to death'.
But the threat to the intervening state may be 
made equally flexible and subtle. The risk to the intervener 
may be presented, though usually not explicitly, as the 
possibility of a series of counter-measures being taken, 
each of which involves a small increase in the amount of 
force being used and in the dangers inherent in the 
situation. The deterring state need not be sure of coming 
out on top in such a contest, indeed there may be a possibility 
that it will lose out altogether. What this state must 
convey to the intervening state is that an intolerable risk 
to the latter does exist as long as it cannot be certain of 
winning. Even if the deterring state is likely to suffer as 
much as or more than the other, the risk may still be judged
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unacceptable by the latter although the threat may be that 
much less credible- The threat in these circumstances is not 
of an all. or nothing response, to be carried out or not 
carried out in specified conditions, but involves creating 
a risk of intolerable damage to the would-be intervener.
Thus the deterring state must still demonstrate a readiness 
to persist either in running the existing risk of uncontrolled 
expansion or in raising the risks deliberately through the 
various stages of expansion to the point of direct 
confrontation with the intervening state. In either case 
the threat is made more credible in that something is 
left to ch a n c e /  Credibility, therefore, does not depend 
simply on the capacity to carry out a threat safely 
although it may well be enhanced if this is shown to be the 
case. Some consideration must be given to the overall 
military and political relationship between the deterring 
state and the one to be deterred, for this may influence 
the credibility of the threats that are issued and in turn 
the decisions which each takes at various points in the 
initiation and expansion of the conflict.
It is convenient to discuss this aspect of deterrence 
along with those threats that involve responses not 
immediately related to the conflict concerned. For the latter 
type of threat, if directed at the territory of the other 
state, involves an instantaneous expansion to the fourth 
stage. Also relevant here are the calculations of the 
intervening state which seeks to deter counter-intervention 
by threats of further and more dangerous expansion. Decisions 
on all these questions are determined in part by the way in 
which states perceive their relative strengths at the levels 
of military conflict to which civil strife might ultimately 
or immediately expand.
For a general analysis of threats of this kind see 
T.C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass., 
1960), c h . viii.
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The deterring state, first of all, can most credibly 
threaten a would-be intervener with direct and immediate 
military action against its territory when the former has 
an overwhelming military preponderance (assuming the other 
difficulties arising in the case of subversive intervention 
can be solved). The smaller the margin of superiority 
possessed by the deterring state the more difficult it is 
to make the threat credible. For the action threatened 
cannot be shown to have a direct relevance to the interests 
of the state issuing it; once intervention has occurred 
or continues to occur deterrence has failed and the only 
purpose in still carrying out the threat would be to increase 
credibility in future situations. Thus the more credible 
response is to move to the next stage of expansion by 
counter-intervention since this both raises the risk of an 
ultimate confrontation between the intervening states and 
at the same time tackles the immediate problem which the 
original intervention has created. The decision to engage 
in counter-intervention also becomes easier the greater 
the margin of military superiority, although it may also 
be made from a position of inferiority; indeed relative 
military weakness may compel choice of the threat of gradual 
expansion rather than the threat of immediate retaliation.
It is, however, a great oversimplification to talk 
in terms of military superiority and inferiority and to 
assume that states can be certain of their relative strengths, 
if only because the efficacy of military capabilities can 
only be known when they are actually employed. Another 
dimension of uncertainty is added to decision-making by 
the fact that military capacity is a highly complex thing 
which may be strong in some respects but weak in others.
Thus a state may be powerful in terms of conventional 
forces, but weak in terms of nuclear capacity; it must 
therefore consider not only the risks involved in expansion 
up to the conventional level but also the further risk of 
escalation to the nuclear level. The Soviet Union, for 
instance, appears to have believed that local wars would
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almost certainly escalate into global nuclear war since the 
United States, being inferior in conventional forces, was 
likely to introduce nuclear weapons at an early point in the 
conflict. Expansion of an internal conflict even to the 
level of a local war where it was apparently superior thus 
seemed excessively dangerous to the Soviet Union; its 
calculations of the risk of engaging in subversive intervention 
therefore depended essentially on the likelihood of local war 
resulting, a possibility which seems to have been considered 
as generally low. On the other hand, once American troops 
had been introduced into particular countries, the Soviet 
Union has displayed great circumspection. The deterring 
state, therefore, must not only assess the risks to itself 
but also have some knowledge of the way in which the 
intervening state is likely to assess the risks.
Now a state engaging in intervention is also 
concerned with calculations of this kind and an interesting 
example has arisen in the case of Communist China which, it 
might be surmised, will be interested in using its nuclear 
capabilities to deter states from coming to the aid of 
certain governments engaged in civil strife. The question 
is whether acquisition of nuclear weapons will increase or 
decrease China's ability to assist revolutionary movements 
by reducing the likelihood of counter-intervention or 
retaliation against itself; essentially the question 
concerns the effect of China's growing military strength 
in general but the presence of nuclear weapons in the equation 
makes for added complexity. On the one hand, it is argued 
that China's nuclear capability will facilitate subversive 
policies. It may intimidate other governments in Asia and 
inhibit their response against rebel movements or against 
the state assisting them; it may also cause an incumbent to 
delay requests to an ally for assistance and cause the ally 
to limit or even refrain from counter-intervention. In short, 
an increased Chinese military capability is likely to 
multiply the dangers inherent in those internal conflicts in
258
which that country is interested and to add to its
willingness to raise the stakes in such a situation.
Moreover, China has consistently stressed the encouraging
effect which her nuclear programme is believed to have on
wars of national liberation. The earlier nuclear tests
were accompanied by announcements expressing general support
for revolutionary struggles’^ but these became more specific
after mid-1966 in that particular conflicts were mentioned.
The nuclear missile test of October 1966, for instance,
was followed by a reference to the struggle in Vietnam:
China's purpose in developing nuclear weapons is 
precisely to oppose the nuclear monopoly and nuclear 
blackmail by the United States and the Soviet Union 
acting in collusion. The possession by the Chinese 
people of guided missiles and nuclear weapons is a 
great encouragement to the heroic Vietnamese people 
who are waging a war of resistance against U.S. 
aggression. . . .2
It seems that Chinese declaratory policy at least has become 
firmer with the development of nuclear weapons; if it is 
accompanied by a hardening of actual policy, China's ability 
to deter counter-intervention against the revolutionary 
movements she supports may also have increased.
On the other hand, the growth in China's military 
strength, in particular her acquisition of nuclear weapons, 
may impose some limitations on that country's policy. The 
fact that any conflict in which China engages might become 
a nuclear one may induce her adversary to pre-empt Chinese 
use of these weapons by launching an immediate nuclear 
attack. The Soviet Union or the United States would be 
favourably situated to make such an attack since both have
See, for example, the first 'Detonation Statement' in 
Peking Review, 16 October 1964, pp.ii-iii. See also Hsieh, 
Chinese Nuclear Detonations, pp.6-7.
2 Peking Review, 28 October 1966, p.iii. The announcement 
after the H-bomb test in September 1969 claimed it as an 
encouragement to the Thai people and the Palestinian guerrillas 
as well as to the Vietnamese. Ibid., 10 October 1969, p«21.
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a massive nuclear arsenal dwarfing that of China as well 
as a measure of anti-missile protection. However remote 
this possibility - and it may not seem very remote to China - 
it is one which must be considered in assessing the risks of a 
harder policy. In addition the development of nuclear 
weapons may deprive China of whatever protection she might 
have received from the Soviet Union in the event of an 
American move against her. Nuclear weapons may also increase 
fears of China, especially among the nearby Asian countries, 
and consequently stimulate resistance rather than inhibit it. 
Nor, as the Chinese have made abundantly clear, is there 
any role for nuclear weapons in wars of liberation since 
the human factor is paramount.'*' This, like the insistence 
on the no-first-use principle, does indicate that China is 
aware of the dangers of expansion and escalation and that her 
increased strength cannot easily be exploited to further 
policies of intervention.
Another means of deterring subversive intervention
by threats unrelated to the conflict in question deserves
mention. It is the threat of responding by the same methods
against governments friendly towards the intervening state
or against that state itself. Such a threat was implicit
in the American policy of liberation propounded in the
early 1950s by John Foster Dulles who incorporated it
into the Republican Party platform of 1952:
We shall again make liberty into a beacon light of 
hope that will penetrate the dark places. It will mark 
the end of the negative, futile and immoral policy 
of "containment" which abandons countless human 
beings to a despotism and godless terrorism....
The policies we espouse will revive the contagious, 
liberating influences which are inherent in freedom. 
They will inevitably set up strains and stresses within 
the captive world which will...mark the beginning of
the end.2
See Lin Piao, 'Long Live the Victory of People's War', 
Peking Review, 3 September 1965, p.27.
Cited by Gerson, Pulle s , pp.87-8.2
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Though President Eisenhower was always careful to insist
that only peaceful means were intended, the policy did
signify that an intolerable increase in Soviet subversion
might be met by an American response in kind. The
credibility of this threat was probably enhanced by the
obscure operation in Iran against Mossadegh in 1953 and by
the support given to an exile invasion of Guatemala in
1954.^ This posture was very different from the contemporary
doctrine of massive retaliation for it promised to be a
flexible and gradual means of response to what was called
indirect aggression and one in which the dangers could be
more easily controlled. Furthermore, it appeared to be
quite credible and could be justified by pointing to the
2persistent Soviet use of such methods.
While the explicit policy of liberation was later
dropped by the United States there does remain an implicit
threat that counter-subversion might be employed if
subversive intervention by the Soviet Union or other
communist countries were to reach too high a level. This
was one of the lessons that could be drawn from the
otherwise unsuccessful Bay of Pigs landing in 1961. In
Europe the implicit threat of a like response against Eastern
countries may have served to restrain Soviet subversion in 
3the West. But such a policy is not without disadvantages
D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change : 1953-1956 (New York,
1963), pp.163-4, 420-7. Allen W. Dulles, The Craft of
Inte11igence (New York, 1965), pp.207-8.
2 See Dulles, op. cit., p.217 where he argues that Soviet 
policy forces the U.S. to resort to subversive operations 
and that consequently 'we cannot safely limit our response 
to the Communist strategy of take-over solely to those cases 
where we are invited in by a government still in power'.
3 A possible form of arms control has been suggested whereby 
one power refrains from supporting insurgents in the first 
country in return for the other power halting aid to rebels 
in a second country. There are, however, several problems 
in doing this once the insurgencies are under way. See 
M.H. Halperin, D.H. Perkins, Communist China and Arms 
Control (New York, 1965) , pp.94 ff.
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apart from the fact that the two sides may not be equally
vulnerable to these tactics. Chief amongst such drawbacks
is that it tends to debase the proclaimed standards of
international relations. Thus Fisher argues that
participation in subversive movements by the United 
States would remove whatever inhibitions the Communist 
nations now feel against engaging in subversive conduct. 
We would, in effect, be discarding the rules altogether 
because our opponents observe them less fully than we 
do . ^
Nor is there any guarantee that the threat, if it had to be 
carried out, would necessarily benefit the United States 
more than the Soviet Union; the credibility of the threat 
is thus seriously impaired. Nevertheless, the role of this 
kind of threat in deterring subversive intervention should 
not be ignored altogether, especially among countries which, 
like many of the new African states, are themselves 
internally vulnerable.
A third form of deterrent effect may result from 
the actual participation of outside states in a civil 
conflict. Thus the ally of an incumbent government may 
seek to demonstrate that it will go to the aid of other 
governments subjected to subversive intervention and that 
such assistance will be sufficient to ensure defeat of the 
rebels. In this way, it is believed, a state will be 
deterred from subversive intervention against other states; 
indeed, quite different states may be deterred from this 
activity by a demonstration of its consequences. One of the 
American purposes in South Vietnam, for instance, has been 
to show to North Vietnam in particular but others in general 
that subversive intervention will not be allowed to
R. Fisher, 'Intervention: Three Problems of Policy and
Law', in Falk (ed.), Vietnam War and International Law, 
pp . 139-40.
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succeed. The deterrent effect, however, may also work 
in the opposite direction. If an incumbent is receiving 
outside support, a third state which favours the rebel cause 
may intervene on its behalf; implicit in this may be a 
threat to assist rebel movements against other governments 
that are receiving outside aid. These types of threat assume 
an importance when intervention has occurred on both sides 
of a civil war and when one or both of the intervening 
states believe there may be another such conflict elsewhere 
in which the other would be likely to intervene. This 
purpose may not be evident at the time of the initial 
interventions for, as we have seen, involvement in civil 
strife results from a variety of concerns and may also be 
designed to generate threats relating to the future course 
of that conflict itself. But where outside states see 
it as relevant in some way to other possible conflicts 
each is likely to attempt to teach certain lessons to the 
other.
There is a strong suspicion, however, that states 
are slow or reluctant to learn such lessons, and perhaps 
with good reason. Ideally, the lesson needs to be clear 
and unambiguous. An ally coming to the defence of an 
incumbent must either ensure the victory of the latter or 
impose a cost on the state supporting the rebels sufficiently 
high to make a repeated effort elsewhere seem unattractive. 
This is only the first step, however, for next the 
deterring state must show that it is capable of producing 
the same results in another civil conflict and that it
'The greatest contribution that Vietnam is making - right 
or wrong is beside the point - is that it is developing in 
the United States an ability to fight a limited war, to 
go to war without the necessity of arousing the public ire. 
In that sense, Vietnam is almost a necessity in our history, 
because this is the kind of war we'll most likely be facing 
for the next fifty years'. Secretary of Defence McNamara, 
cited by R.E. Osgood, 'The Reappraisal of Limited War', 
in Problems of Modern Strategy - I , Adelphi Paper no.54 
(London, 1969), p.45n,
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intends to do so should the need arise. The difficulties 
in satisfying both of these conditions are considerable; 
it should be noted, moreover, that the aim is only to prevent 
subversive intervention not to prevent the outbreak of 
internal war itself.
On the one hand, the deterring state must 
demonstrate its capacity to intervene successfully both in 
the ongoing conflict and in any future conflicts. Since 
the nature of the latter remains largely hypothetical no 
certain proof can be offered that success will be achieved 
there also. What is more easily demonstrated, however, is 
the capacity to inflict injury directly against the state 
engaged in subversive intervention, for while the outcome 
of an internal war is usually heavily dependent on 
uncontrollable local factors such direct responses can 
be made at the will of the state concerned (assuming it has 
the necessary capacity). This policy may not win existing 
or future civil wars but it may discourage a state from 
assisting rebels elsewhere. On the other hand, the deterring 
state must demonstrate an intention to respond against 
future subversive intervention. It may be simpler to do this 
by threatening direct retaliation against the intervening 
state, but much depends on the risks involved in launching 
an attack across international frontiers; what may 
be relatively safe against one country may be dangerous 
against another, while even if the same country is involved 
the risks can never be identical the second time. It is 
likely to be still more difficult to demonstrate an intention 
to participate in future wars if involvement in the first 
has incurred great costs, since the threat is then to 
do something which will cause injury and loss to the state 
carrying it out as well as to the other. The United States, 
for instance, eventually found it impossible to undertake 
to repeat elsewhere the effort it invested in defending 
the South Vietnamese government; France, by contrast, was 
quite determined to fight in Algeria immediately after her
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defeat in Indochina, being convinced that both conflicts 
were guided by the same hand. In neither case, however, 
can successful deterrence of subversive intervention be 
said to have been achieved.
There is also the danger that the deterring state, 
having placed special emphasis on the role of outside 
support for the rebels in a particular conflict, subsequently 
fails either to suppress the rebellion or to inflict 
sufficient injury on the intervening state. Thus it may 
be argued that
by emphasizing the existence of large-scale North 
Vietnamese aid, and even direction, for the war in 
the South, the United States has magnified its 
failures unnecessarily .... under present conditions 
of stalemate, the United States would, in retrospect, 
have done better to underestimate the North Vietnamese 
and Chinese involvement, as it has sensibly made 
light of Soviet involvement.1
While defence of the South Vietnamese government may have
been facilitated by this policy, the effect for future
conflicts may be rather to encourage support for rebel
movements and deter assistance to incumbents. This is the
sort of result which a state engaging in subversive
intervention seeks when attempting to deter support for
other governments under attack. Essentially, what must
be done is either to defeat the incumbents or to impose high
costs on defence so that counter-intervention will not
appear an attractive proposition. In this form of
deterrence the state promoting rebellion is in a favourable
position compared with the one seeking to deter such support.
For the former may choose to assist only those rebel movements
which have a good chance of success and which require a
minimum of outside assistance; the state seeking to deter
this assistance must consequently prepare to do battle
R. Hunter, P. Windsor, 'Vietnam and United States Policy 
ln Asia', International_Affairs, vol.44 (April 1968), p . 211 ,
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even on the most unfavourable ground. In this sense the 
initiative is with the state supporting rebellion. The 
other state is nevertheless free to assist any existing 
government to consolidate its position before civil strife 
actually erupts; this may be compared with having first 
innings on a pitch chosen by the opposition. But it 
remains true that the more difficult the defence of an 
incumbent, the more likely are states to be deterred from 
coming to the assistance of another government engaged in 
civil strife.
United States policy has usually shown an awareness 
of the difficulties involved in deterring subversive 
intervention against its allies and friends. The doctrines 
of containment and of massive retaliation were intended 
amongst other things to prevent the need for defence 
against subversive intervention from ever arising, partly 
by threats against the Soviet Union and other communis t 
countries, partly by stiffening the political fibre of 
the nations under protection. The inadequacies of these 
policies in dealing with situations where internal conflicts 
with outside support were already under way became 
increasingly apparent towards the end of the 1950s and 
President Kennedy's term of office began a period of 
intense concern with America's capacity to fight and win 
internal wars, especially guerrilla wars. Special warfare, 
as it was called, required 'a whole new kind of strategy, a 
wholly different kind of force, and therefore a 
wholly new and wholly different kind of military training'.'*' 
More specifically, it required troops trained and equipped 
for anti-guerrilla warfare and a capacity to deploy them 
rapidly in any country where they were needed. The fact 
that for various reasons these forces have failed in their
Address at West Point, 6 June 1962, Public Papers of 
the Presidents : 1962 (Washington, 1963) , p.454.
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immediate objective of suppressing guerrilla movements in 
parts of Asia does not necessarily mean that they have also 
failed to deter subversive intervention in other parts. By 
denying success for a certain period of time and at a 
sufficiently high cost to the insurgents the United States 
has demonstrated a capacity to carry out particular actions; 
if this capacity were combined with an evident intention to 
intervene against subversive intervention in the future 
a deterrent effect could still be achieved. Deterrence can 
clearly be attained where intervention in civil strife is 
concerned, but it is bound up with defence against 
intervention in a close and complex fashion.
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CHAPTER VIII : LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERVENTION IN CIVIL
STRIFE
International society, it was argued in Part Two, 
has certain basic principles whereby intervention in civil 
strife is forbidden in some circumstances but permitted in 
others. From time to time, however, states have felt the 
need for specific and formal prohibition of certain types 
of intervention. The formulation of international legal 
rules against some, though not all, intervention in civil 
strife thus serves as a distinct form of control over this 
kind of behaviour. The element of control achieved depends 
partly on the binding quality of international law and 
partly on the fact that a breach of international law opens 
the way to sanctions against the law-breaker by whichever 
states are concerned enough to enforce the law, In practice, 
the type of intervention which governments have usually 
sought to prohibit has not unnaturally been subversive 
intervention. But it should also be noted that some 
states have sought condemnation of certain types of 
intervention which support incumbents. The Soviet Union, 
for example, has at times denounced as aggression American 
assistance to governments involved in civil conflicts, 
especially in the case of colonial and national liberation 
struggles.
The legal control of intervention in civil strife 
is clearly subject to a number of tensions. In the first 
place, there is a possible tension between legal regulation 
of intervention and the requirements of international 
order. A particular legal formulation may be arrived at 
by some route which would permit a state to act in 
contravention of fundamental rules or forbid it to act in 
ways necessary to uphold these rules. ^ There is also a
For this reason many international ag re erne nts make the 
proviso that none of their terms shall be taken to impair 
the inherent rights of self-defence held by the contracting 
parties.
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frequent element of contradiction between the policies that 
states actually pursue and the positions they adopt when 
discussing the legality or illegality of intervention in 
the abstract. Thus legal pronouncements governing 
intervention do not necessarily correspond with the reality 
of the situation. Partly on account of these factors, legal 
regulation has achieved relatively little in the way of 
control over intervention; this chapter will therefore 
look more at the difficulties of such regulation rather than 
examining its effectiveness. Nevertheless, legal activity 
is not without some success, firstly, in creating a sense 
of obligation among states to refrain from certain kinds of 
behaviour and, secondly, in clarifying the conditions 
under which resort to less formal means of control is 
likely to serve international order. The first section 
will therefore consider the attempt that states have made 
to prohibit subversive intervention, while subsequent sections 
will deal with the right of counter-intervention enjoyed 
by outside states and with the rules applicable to the 
responses of all kinds that may be made by third parties or 
by the injured state itself.
A: The Prohibition of Subversive Intervention.
The encouragement by outside states of subversive 
activities abroad had long been a natural concern of 
governments. The earliest ambassadors were received only 
with great suspicion for it was believed - often rightly - 
that they would engage in conspiracy and stir up discontent.^ 
Writing in the eighteenth century, Vattel put the issue in 
unequivocal terms: 'It is in violation of the Law of Nations
to call on subjects to revolt when they are actually
2obeying their sovereign, although complaining of his rule'.
See also Chapter I, section C.
The Law of Nations , book II, ch. iv, section 56.
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This precedent of condemning the initiation of civil strife 
has since been followed in the treaty practice of states, not 
least of the Soviet Union in the 1920s, so that even before 
the post-war era it was an accepted point of international 
law. Since 1945 this doctrine has been repeated in a series 
of international declarations and agreements, none of them 
constituting a formal and universal treaty but together 
establishing beyond doubt the illegality of encouraging 
civil strife in other countries. The most important 
provisions are to be found in the General Assembly Essentials 
of Peace Resolution, 1949, the Peace Through Deeds 
Resolution, 1950, and the Declaration on the Inadmissibility 
of Intervention, 1965; in the International Law Commission 
Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, 1949, 
and the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security 
of Mankind, 1954; and in the Charters of the Organization 
of American States, 1948, and of the Organization of African 
Unity, 1963.1 The fomenting of civil strife has also 
found its way into definitions of aggression and will be 
considered later from this point of view.
The clarity of the general prohibition on subversive 
intervention, however, tends to dissolve when removed from 
the level of an abstraction. It is not simply that states 
may wilfully distort or ignore this prohibition in 
determining their policies but also that there exists an 
underlying difficulty in legal regulation of this nature.
What is forbidden is a particular kind of international 
activity which is condemned regardless of its purposes or 
effects. But for some this activity may serve as a means 
to desirable ends, perhaps defined in terms of political 
principles which are less than universally accepted, but 
perhaps also defined in terms of fundamental international 
rules. Thus the act of subversive intervention may be
1 For the relevant parts of these documents, see Appendix.
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justified as a legitimate form of self-defence or as a right 
deriving from the due recognition of a rebel movement.^
This conflict arises as long as subversive intervention is 
defined in factual terms rather than as a legal concept 
tailored to exclude acts based on self-defence, on the 
recognition of rebels or on the authority of the 
international community. Clearly, a legal approach to 
subversive intervention is possible, but such is the dis­
agreement among states about the correlative rights and 
duties that it has proved of little import in practice.
If international society is to regulate intervention that 
disrupts its basic rules, it must first agree on those rules 
and on the circumstances in which the act of intervention 
does and does not conform to them. Simple prohibition of a 
defined activity is unlikely to prove adequate in the 
contemporary world.
Another aspect of the general prohibition of
subversive intervention among states is the practice of
enacting domestic legislation to prevent private citizens
from engaging in activities hostile to foreign governments.
United States law, for instance, provides penalties for any
person who 'within the United States, knowingly begins or
sets on foot or provides or prepares a means for or
furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or
naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence
against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or
state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom
2the United States is at peace'. Comparable provisions are 
to be found in the domestic laws of most other states. The 
responsibility of states in this field, however, is not 
absolute but extends only to the exercise of 'due diligence' 
to prevent injurious acts and, in the event of injuries
At the 1969 session of the U.N. Special Committee on 
Principles of International Law, for instance, several 
states made the point that the proposed condemnation of 
subversive activities could not apply in the cases of 
colonial liberation and/or self-determination. G.A.O.R., 
XXIV, Supplement No. 19, A/7619, paras. 120-23.
2 18, United States Code, Annotated Section 960, cited by 
Deitchman, Limited War and American Defense Policy, p.243.
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nonetheless being committed by its citizens, to the
punishment of offenders.^
The practical import of such laws seems to be
closely related to political considerations. In the first
place, their purpose may be not so much to fulfil obligations
under international law as to prevent individual citizens
from embarrassing their government in its relations with
other states. It does not follow that they are therefore
of no consequence but it does mean, secondly, that the
decision to prosecute under laws of this kind is not
automatic. More than once a blind eye has been turned to
subversive activities which are covertly approved by a
government. That degree of sophistication may even be
reached where neutrality laws are enforced against certain
individuals in order to divert attention from a government's
connection with other subversive activities that are being
pursued at the same time. This may, for instance, have
been the motive for the arrest and indictment of a leading
anti-Castro Cuban under United States neutrality laws
2twelve days before the Bay of Pigs landing. Nor is it the 
case that states feel bound to discourage all activities 
on the part of their subjects which might in some way lead 
to civil strife in other countries. For example, the 
conduct of propaganda which states believe to be truthful 
is not likely to be forbidden simply because it may injure 
the position of certain other governments. In this area, 
as in others , the legal regulation of intervention remains 
subject to political realities.
B: The Right of Counter-Intervention
When one state is already intervening in a civil 
conflict, other states may decide to intervene themselves. 
This is frequently called counter-intervention, meaning 
simply further or subsequent intervention. An action of
Oppenheim, International Law (vol. I, Peace), p.365.
D. Wise, T.B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York, 
1964) , p . 46.
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this kind may have a variety of purposes: it may be
designed to offset the effects of the earlier intervention 
or it may seek to promote objectives of the intervening 
state whether these are legitimate or otherwise. A state 
may, of course, simultaneously attempt to counter a prior 
intervention and, say, to impose its political principles 
on the country concerned; indeed, it is difficult in 
practice to do one thing without the other. Whatever the 
purposes of counter-intervention, however, the act itself 
is a potential form of control over intervention in that 
it may deter or dissuade other states from intervening. 
Counter-intervention in this sense, then, is one of the 
informal controls discussed in chapter VII.
The right of counter-intervention, however, is a 
different matter; it refers to the circumstances in which 
intervention by a third state can be considered legitimate 
and to the proper purposes of this intervention. Clearly, 
intervention cannot be permitted solely on the grounds that 
some other state has already intervened in a conflict; 
in this case it would be permissible to act against 
intervention which was properly invited, which was in self- 
defence or which was authorized by the international 
community. The society of states cannot put itself in the 
position of allowing certain acts and their negation at one 
and the same time. (If this does appear to happen on some 
occasions, it is because there is ambiguity or dispute 
about what is allowable.) The right of counter-intervention 
for the individual state, therefore, must rest in part upon 
a prior infraction of one of these fundamental rules and 
will thus contain an element of sanction against the law­
breaking state.
The fact that an intervening state has infringed 
certain rules, however, does not set others at liberty to 
intervene however and whenever they wish. Some regard must 
be paid to the purposes of counter-intervention which, 
logically, need to be confined to offsetting the effects of 
earlier intervention. This initial intervention, if it is 
not justifiable by the standards of international society, 
may be accounted an infringement of the sovereignty of the
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divided state. Counter-intervention, therefore, must be 
designed to restore or uphold that sovereignty.^ Any goals 
which a state may harbour above and beyond this, require 
justification in the same way as any act of intervention.
Now it may be difficult in practice for a state to 
demonstrate that it is concerned solely with the proper 
object of counter-intervention. The initial act of 
intervention may have deprived the legitimate government of 
the capacity to issue a reque s t for counter-intervention 
or may have led to civil strife on a scale which throws 
doubt on the incumbent's legitimacy. Equally, intervention 
in favour of the incumbent may deny rebels the success 
which they would otherwise have achieved and which would have 
won for them certain rights. In these circumstances 
counter-intervention must take place without due invitation 
from either side but on the assumption that one could have 
been given in the absence of the initial intervention.
Clearly, an assessment of the effect of the first intervention 
on the course of the war is required; at best, this is 
likely to be extremely difficult; at worst, it will be 
imprecise and prejudiced. Moreover, it cannot be assumed 
that counter-intervention will always require the victory 
of the side receiving assistance. Its true purpose is to 
offset external interference in the conflict which is 
thereby to be allowed to run its own course. Thus the side 
that received assistance in the first place might still 
emerge as victor by virtue of its own resources. States 
contemplating counter-intervention are entitled to resist 
the improper intervention of another state but they may 
not pass judgement on the domestic faction that received 
aid. The latter may have broken the laws of the country 
concerned but it has committed no wrong which falls in the 
province of international society.
'It is incontestable that a grave infraction [of 
international law] is committed when the independence of a 
state is improperly interfered with; and it is consequently 
evident that another state is at liberty to intervene in 
order to undo the effects of illegal intervention, and to 
restore the state subjected to it to freedom of action'. 
Hall, Treatise on International Law , p . 3 4 2 .
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All this, of course, makes difficult demands on the 
state undertaking counter-intervention, demands which are 
not always satisfied in practice. The right of counter­
intervention, if it is to contribute to the maintenance of 
basic international rules, must place considerable 
restrictions on the nature and extent of the actions 
permitted under it. The difficulty is that international 
society has a manifest need for such an institution yet 
its members do not easily remain within its bounds. If the 
immediate result is an increase in the measure of improper 
intervention, the longer-term effect may nevertheless be 
a decrease. For intervention which counters intervention, 
whether legitimately or otherwise, may well act as a form 
of control over intervention in general, bringing into play 
considerations of prudence and a potential for deterrence.
The actual result cannot be known without an examination 
of the manner in which intervention is or is not controlled 
in international society.
Finally, the limits placed by the time factor on 
the right of counter-intervention require some consideration. 
If, for any reason, counter-intervention is permitted at 
one point in time, it does not necessarily follow that it 
will remain permissible for an indefinite period. There is 
the idea, for example, that counter-intervention should be 
limited to the time when the initial intervention is taking 
place. The main strength of this position is that it 
restricts the potential for recurrent intervention: once
intervention has been completed there is no further 
justification for acting against it. There is a parallel 
in the doctrine that aggression ceases to be aggression 
when it is successful, that success is of the essence in 
international politics. This argument, however, excludes 
from consideration as counter-intervention both pre-emptive 
intervention and intervention after the event. Certainly, 
pre-emptive intervention belongs logically to the category 
of intervention in self-defence since there would otherwise
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be no limit to the countering of what has not yet occurred, 
but there are serious disadvantages in setting a time 
limit to counter-intervention. Some of these were aired 
when the United Nations considered the question of Franco 
Spain in 1946. Thus the Chilean representative among 
others maintained that the best way to enforce the 
principle of non-intervention was to eliminate the results 
of earlier intervention by the totalitarian powers in the 
Civil War: "To carry out the principle logically, we
desire that Spain should succeed in wiping out the effects 
of this intervention'.'*" Another significant factor is that 
the initial intervention may be accomplished in a short 
space of time, leaving no moment for counter-measures; 
it may, moreover, remain unknown to the outside world 
until it is successful or it may be discontinued as soon 
as it does become public. In these circumstances especially 
there is much to be said for extending the right of 
counter-intervention in time both from the point of view of 
law enforcement and of discouraging intervention.
It would seem desirable, however, that the right 
of counter-intervention should not be extended for all 
time. The example of Spain was a case in point for the 
Franco regime had governed the country for seven years, 
unchallenged from within or without. To permit disturbance 
of such a situation would be to release immense potential 
for disorder. Yet some latitude in counter-intervention is 
required and this would seem to be secured by the test of 
acquiescence to the original act of intervention. This 
criterion, would also serve to limit the number of states 
entitled to undertake counter-intervention. Whether or 
not success is achieved by the initial intervention, other 
states may seek to contest this action and may do so for 
a considerable length of time. The fact of non-acquiescenee 
may be said to keep alive the right of counter-intervention. 
It is clear, however, that mere protest is not sufficient
12 December 1946, G.A.O.R., I P t . 2, 57th Plenary
Meeting, V.R., p.1169.
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for this is little more than an expression of opinion and 
actual policy may amount to acceptance of the situation.
Thus the reaction of the West to the Soviet involvement in 
the 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia was to lodge 
diplomatic protests but at the s ame time to continue trading 
and diplomatic relations. In effect, the West has been 
estopped from intervening against the coup by virtue of 
its own actions (or inaction). ^  The doctrine of the 
liberation of the Soviet satellite countries proposed by 
Dulles in the early 1950s may be seen in part as an attempt 
to maintain or, more accurately, revive the right of 
counter-intervention in Eastern Europe, although it proved 
to be more a declaration of political faith than an active 
attempt to contest Russian intervention in that part of the 
world. Naturally, resort may be made to other methods in 
the hope of restoring the original situation but it seems 
desirable that once a government has acquiesced in the 
initial intervention the right of counter-intervention 
should be los t .
The test of acquiescence as the touchstone of 
counter-intervention thus combines the factors of time and 
of effective action. A right of counter-intervention is 
retained as long as meaningful counter-measures are 
sustained. If the initial intervention is immediately 
successful, it may still be contested but the difficulties 
of counter-intervention will be that much greater; a 
successful intervention thus achieves a certain factual 
immunity which contributes to its legal and moral immunity. 
On the other hand, a powerful state which believes itself 
capable of effective counter-intervention is free to 
pursue this policy both during and after the first 
intervention. The effect of the rule of acquiescence is to 
permit resort to counter-intervention in those cases where
See Thomas and Thomas, Non-Intervention, p.287. Plamenatz 
points out that in such a situation individuals may be 
morally entitled to do what is not permitted to their 
governments and even what their governments forbid. On 
Alien Rule, p . 26n .
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it is most desired and most likely to be successful. The 
right of intervention granted by such a rule is thus more 
limited in practice than its abstract formulation would 
suggest.
C: Responses to Intervention
In the period between the world wars the
initiation of civil strife and the support of rebels in other
countries does not seem to have been a major concern in
international relations except insofar as it was related to
the expansionism of Italy and Germany. The overriding
problem was generally regarded as the use of force and the
threat to use force. The Covenant of the League of Nations,
in particular Article 10, was clearly addressed to these
questions; similar concerns were evident in the Locarno
Treaty and the Briand-Ke1logg Pact as well as in the attempts
to define aggression at the League."1' Consequently, the
definitions of aggression and of indirect aggression centred
2on military attack or the threat of attack. When in the 
late 1930s Mussolini and Hitler sent troops to aid General 
Franco's rebellion their actions were seen by many in terms 
of a military invasion rather than intervention. Thus the 
Soviet Ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky, addressed the
J . Stone, Aggression and World Order (Berkely, 1958) 
chapter ii, has a brief history of these attempts.
2 On the usage of the term 'aggression' before and after 
World War I see I. Brownlie, International Law and the 
Use of Force by States (London, 1963), pp.351-2. The term 
'indirect aggression' usually signified a threat of force; 
in the draft Anglo-Franco-Soviet Agreement of 23 July 1939, 
for example, it was understood to refer to 'action accepted 
by the State in question under threat of force by another 
Power and involving the abandonment by it of its 
independence or neutrality'. Text in Lord Strang, Home and 
Abroad (London, 1956) , p.314. See also A. Wolfers,
Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, 1962) p.254, for the
French usage of 'agression indirecte ' with reference to 
the growth of German power through conquests in Eastern 
Europe.
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Non-Intervention Committee on 24 March 1937:
taking into account the magnitude of the armed 
forces set in motion by the Italian Government, 
there is every reason to describe its actions 
as an Italian military invasion of a foreign 
country, an invasion which is a flagrant case of 
unprovoked military aggression against another 
country as understood by international law and 
the Covenant of the League of Nations.1
The subsequent attempts by Hitler to stir up German subjects
of Czechoslovakia proved to be even more closely related to
military attack.
The years after 1945 saw a world-wide confrontation
between the United States and the Soviet Union and their
respective allies. It was a 'cold war' in which the
initiation of civil strife and the external support of
rebels took on an unprecedented significance for all powers
concerned since these methods promised to achieve the same
results as armed aggression but without the same risks or
costs. In February 1946 U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes
warned that 'The Charter forbids aggression, and we cannot
allow aggression to be accomplished by coercion or pressure
2or by subterfuges such as political infiltration'. In the
following years communism became for America synonymous with
the fomenting of internal unrest and communist governments
with subversive policies. But such fears were not confined
to the United States alone. Soviet Russia had set up
communist regimes in Eastern Europe which were potentially
vulnerable to subversive intervention by the Western Powers,
a fact which Secretary of State Dulles was eager to stress
in the early 1950s. Indeed the Soviet Union could claim a
1ong-established concern with subversive intervention dating
back to the 1920s and to the provisions of the Note sent by
Litvinov to President Roosevelt on the establishment of
3relations between the USSR and the U.S. in 1933. It was 
Degras (ed.) , Soviet Documents , vol.III, p.239.
2 Speech, 28 February 1946, Department of State Bulletin 
vol. XIV (10 March 1946) , p. 35 7 .
3 16 November 1933, text in Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents, 
vol. Ill, p.36.
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with reference to this agreement that the Soviet Union
objected to the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951
which appropriated $100 million for the purposes of
organizing into NATO units refugees from communist
countries.  ^ Nor has concern with subversive activities
been limited to the superpowers and their allies. The
non-aligned countries have also displayed their fears and
interests, in particular at the United Nations where the
2problem of subversion has frequently cropped up. It is 
against this background that the efforts to regulate 
intervention through legal procedures must be seen.
Now one of the ways in which control over such 
activities has been sought is to equate them with 
aggression for this is universally acknowledged to be an 
inexcusable crime affecting the interests of all. At this 
point it matters little that states have as yet found no 
agreed definition of aggression; all that is necessary is 
that subversive intervention be accepted as one form of 
aggression or as in some way equivalent to it. The 
arguments for regarding it as such will be considered 
first. A widely-adopted view, exemplified in the statement 
by Secretary Byrnes, maintains that subversive intervention 
can achieve the same results as aggression and that it is 
therefore comparable as an instrument of policy. In this 
light subversive intervention appears as a means of over­
throwing a government and possibly gaining control of a 
country. Thus President Eisenhower in a Message to 
Congress on 15 July 1958 attributed to the United Arab 
Republic a desire to 'overthrow the legally constituted 
Government of Lebanon and to install by violence a 
government which would subordinate the independence of
3Lebanon to the policies of the United Arab Republic'.
Soviet Note, 21 November 1951, Department of State 
Bulletin, vol. XXV (3 December 1951) , pp.910-11.
2 For a brief account of U.N. discussions see Higgins, 
Development of International Law, pp. 189-95 .
3 Department of State Bulletin, vol. XXXIX (4 August 1958) ,
p . 18 2 .
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Although the central core of the idea of aggression has 
always been armed attack against a state's territory, this 
argument stresses the fact that there are other equally 
effective ways by w h ich a state might lose its independence 
or its political identity.
In the second place, certain instances of subversive 
intervention do appear remarkably similar to armed attack 
although lacking the formal qualifications. This point has 
been repeatedly emphasized by the United States Administration 
with regard to the North Vietnamese policy of sending units 
of their regular forces into South Vietnam. A Department 
of State Memorandum entitled 'The Legality of United States 
Participation in the Defense of Vietnam', dated 4 March 1966, 
maintained that
Most recently, Hanoi has begun to infiltrate 
elements of the North Vietnamese army in increasingly 
larger numbers. Today, there is evidence that nine 
regiments of regular North Vietnamese forces are 
fighting in organized units in the South.
....In these circumstances, an "armed attack" 
is not as easily fixed by date and hour as in the 
case of traditional warfare. However, the infiltration 
of thousands of armed men clearly constitutes an 
"armed attack" under any reasonable definition.
A comparable argument was presented by Premier Khrushchev
in condemning the American role in the Bay of Pigs landing
in 1961:
An armed aggression has been started against Cuba.
It is an open secret that the armed bands which have 
invaded that country have been prepared, equipped, 
and armed in the United States. The planes which 
bomb Cuban towns belong to the United States of 
America, the bombs which they drop have been put at 
their disposal by the American Government.2
It would seem logical therefore to include such acts of
Text in Falk (ed.) , Vietnam War_and International L a w ,
p .584.
2 Message to President Kennedy, 18 April 1961, text in 
Department of State Bulletin, vol. XLIV (8 May 1961)
p . 6 6 2 .
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subversive intervention in any definition of aggression and 
this is what a considerable number of states have sought 
to do .
Members of the United Nations first turned their
attention to defining aggression in November 1950 on the
initiative of the Soviet Union.'1' By the end of 1952 a
novel development had emerged in the demand of a number
of Latin American countries, to be followed shortly by
several Asian states and the Soviet Union, for a definition
which covered actions other than direct military attack.
What they had in mind were those activities which could
endanger the political integrity or independence of a state
through economic or ideological pressure or through assistance
to rebel groups. Thus the Iranian delegate to the U.N.
Special Committee for Defining Aggression of 1953 sought
to include as a form of aggression 'direct or indirect
incitement to civil war, threats to internal security,
and incitement to revolt by the supply of arms or by 
2other means'. Thus 'indirect aggression' as it was often 
called was claimed to be simply a particular type of aggression 
to be treated with equal gravity rather than as something 
related to aggression but less serious because it was 
'indirect ' .
The Soviet draft definition presented in 1956 
illustrates the changed approach to the problem of aggression, 
especially when this draft is compared with that put forward
See Stone, Aggression and World Order, p.46, and for a 
history of U.N. efforts to define aggression, chapter iii.
2 Cited ibid., p.60.
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by the Soviet Union in 1933. Then the emphasis was squarely 
on military action against the territory of other states 
and this section of the definition was substantially retained 
in the 1956 draft. However, a new paragraph was added 
which declared that state guilty of 'indirect aggression' 
which:
(a) Encourages subversive activity against another 
State (acts of terrorism, diversionary acts, etc.);
(b) Promotes the fomenting of civil war within another 
State;
(c) Promotes an internal upheaval in another State
or a change of policy in favour of the aggressor.2
The later draft also added paragraph 1 (f) condemning the
'support of armed bands organized in [a state's] territory 
which invade the territory of another State'. This provision 
recalled the wording of earlier Soviet treaties but took 
on a new relevance in the light of outside assistance to 
anti-colonial and national-liberation rebellions which the 
Soviet Union did not, of course, wish to outlaw. These 
Soviet proposals around which debate in both the League 
and the United Nations has largely centred reveal not only 
changing concerns but also the increased difficulties in 
definition that the new concerns create. Whereas direct 
aggression refers to military acts such as invasion or 
bombardment which can be relatively easily identified,
The earlier proposal declared as an aggressor any state 
that first took one of the following actions:
(a) Declaration of war against another State;
(b) The invasion by its armed forces of the territory of 
another State without declaration of war;
(c) Bombarding the territory of another State by its 
land, naval or air forces or knowingly attacking the 
naval or air forces of another State;
(d) The landing in, or introduction within the frontiers 
of another State of land, naval or air forces 
without the permission of the government of such a 
State...;
(e) The establishment of a naval blockade of the coast 
or ports of another State.
Text ibid., p . 3 4 .
2 Text ibid., p.201.
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indirect aggression must focus on elusive political processes 
such as the encouragement of subversive activity or the 
fomenting of civil war. These concepts are not self- 
explanatory and their interpretation has in fact tended to 
remain in the province of individual states. Moreover, 
much of this kind of activity is scarcely distinguishable 
from the day-to-day policies of states which, while not at 
war with each other, are openly antagonistic. In these 
circumstances the mere advocacy of one's own form of 
government or social system might amount, as states have 
frequently charged in practice, to indirect aggression.
A further point about these Soviet definitions is that 
the acts specified as direct aggression may be justified if 
they are taken in response to a similar act by another state 
(or possibly in anticipation of such an act) while the 
acts falling under the definition of indirect aggression do 
not seem to have any justification at all. In other words, 
the Soviet draft of 1956 seeks to include all subversive 
intervention in its definition and to prohibit it in all 
circumstances; military measures, by contrast, are seen 
to have a definite and accepted place in international 
relations.
The attempt to prohibit subversive intervention 
by its inclusion in a definition of aggression has not been 
without its opponents or its genuine difficulties. In the 
first place, the notion of aggression has in the twentieth 
century come to be inextricably bound up with the moral and 
legal orders as well as with the political and military 
orders.  ^ Since aggression has in practice proved to be a 
disputed and elusive concept, unnecessary problems are 
invited by attempting to make the regulation of subversive 
intervention dependent upon it. Secondly, although the end
Q. Wright, 'The Prevention of Aggression', American Journal 
of International L a w , vol. L (1956), pp.516-7.
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results of aggression and subversive intervention may be 
identical and although they may both constitute an equal 
danger to international peace, the methods employed in each 
case differ significantly« While both may be equally serious 
matters, it is the particular activities constituting each 
that must in fact be controlled. Accordingly, Wright argues 
for a distinction between the two on the grounds that the 
remedies for each are distinct in practice and ought to be 
kept so. He finds support for this view in the U.N. Charter 
of which Articles 2 (4), 39 and 51 prohibit only the threat
or use of armed force or an armed attack rather than other 
hostile acts such as infiltration or subversion.^ Wright 
is particularly concerned that the Charter should not be 
construed so as to permit the use of military force in 
response to non-military acts, however hostile they might 
appear. Subversive intervention, the argument concludes, 
is an important problem but it must be dealt with by 
appropriate measure.
The difficulties inherent in the question whether
or not subversive intervention may be best treated as
aggression (in the sense of an illegal armed attack) can
be avoided in part, though not in full, by looking at the
matter from another angle. This involves inquiring about
the limits of self-defence on the part of the state subjected
to such intervention and about the rights of third states
2to assist in this defence. Unfortunately, however, current
Q. Wright, 'Subversive Intervention', American Journal of 
International Law, vol. LIV (1960), p.529.
2 Bowett argues persuasively that while the purpose of the 
concept of aggression is to define the circumstances in 
which international peace and security are threatened, the 
function of the concept of self-defence is to define those 
situations in which the individual state may take independent 
action to protect itself against another state. Thus the 
right of self-defence still exists whether or not there
is agreement upon a definition of aggression.
Self-Defence in International Law, pp.256, 261.
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international law on this topic is by no means clear. The
existence of a right of self-defence is beyond doubt but
of its interpretation little is certain. There is agreement,
first of all, that a state may take measures to protect
itself against actions by another state which are likely
to foment civil strife or to assist rebel groups. But do
such measures properly extend to the use of force against the
territory of the intervening state? It is at this point
that the characterization of subversive intervention -
whether as armed attack or as something else - again becomes
crucial; if it is regarded as tantamount to armed attack
on the part of the intervening state, then appropriate
forceful measures against it are clearly permissible. The
interpretation of the term 'armed attack' in documents such
as the North Atlantic Treaty and the u.N. Charter thus
becomes of great potential significance. The NATO powers
agreed in 1949 to treat an armed attack on one of their
number as an attack against them all. This prompted the
following question from Senator Fulbright during the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on the Treaty:
Would an internal revolution, perhaps aided and abetted 
by an outside state, in which armed force was being 
used in an attempt to drive the recognized government 
from power be deemed an "armed attack" within the 
meaning of article 5 .
Secretary of State Acheson believed that it would be so 
regarded, a belief which appears to have been shared by at 
least some of his successors. The merit of this position 
is that the notion of armed attack is not at all self-evident 
and that an excessively narrow interpretation might restrict 
the legitimate rights of self-defence (and possibly of 
collective defence). A wide interpretation of the term 
'armed attack' as used in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter is
Cited by R.W. Tucker, The Just War (Baltimore, 1960) 
p . 41n.
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suppo rted by some writers on similar grounds.
Now it will be noted that those who take this view
are not nece ssarily m a i n t a i n i n g  that every case of subversive
i nt er ve ntion a u t o m atically cons titutes an armed attack,
rather that some cases are of sufficient importance as to
justify forcible counter-measures. Dulles reco gnized the
danger of expanding the notion of self-defence too far:
if you open the door to saying that any country 
which feels it is being t h r e atened by subversive 
activities in another country is free to use armed 
force against that country, you are opening the door 
to a series of wars over the world.^
Falk main tains that to treat i ntervention as armed attack
'so broadens the notion of armed attack that all nations will
be able to make plausible claims of self-defense in almost
3every situation of p r o t r a c t e d  internal conflict'. It is 
apparent that what is relevant here is the question of what 
in te rnational law should be, for no definitive statement can 
be ex pected as to what i n t e r n ational law actually is. On the 
one hand, certain instances of subversive i ntervention are 
likely to resemble armed attack in many respects and the 
victims are in practice likely to treat it as such; if 
their political inte grity is t h r e atened by the actions of 
the intervening state, it seems difficult to deny a right 
of forcible response although its exercise might not always 
be c o n s idered judicious. Moreover, the br oader the definition  
of armed attack i,e, the wider the c ircumstances in which 
app ro priate armed c o u n t e r - m e a s u r e s  are legitimate, the 
greater the legal d e t e r r e n t  (and possibly the political and
See, for example, J.N. Moore, 'International Law and the 
United States Role in Viet Nam: A R e p l y ' , in Falk ( e d . ) ,
Viet nam War and International L a w , pp.418-9.
2 U.S. Senate, Hearings on the Eis e n h o w e r  Doctrine, 1957, 
cited by R .A . Falk, 'International Law and the United States 
Role in the Viet Nam War' , ibid. , p» 364 .
3 i b i d . , p . 377 .
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military deterrent) to the conduct of large-scale subversive 
intervention. On the other hand, a broad definition of armed 
attack is liable to be abused by the supposed victims, 
perhaps as a matter of deliberate policy, perhaps inadvertently 
through the natural exaggeration of the seriousness of 
subversive intervention. There is the further point that 
subversive intervention has not usually achieved the same 
results as an armed attack without being accompanied by 
the threat or use of armed force in a more direct fashion; 
thus in more serious instances the resort to forceful self- 
defence is likely to be permitted by virtue of this threat 
or use of force on the part of the intervening state. That 
international law is unsure on these issues is due essentially 
to the inability of states to agree either on the actual 
balance of these probabilities or on the desirability of 
coming down on one side or the other. Legal argument can 
only clarify the terms of the choice, if a choice is to be 
made at all.
The problems of self-defence against a policy of 
subversive intervention become clearer when that policy is 
contrasted with an act of dictatorial intervention in the 
sense of a display or use of force designed to coerce the 
decision-makers of another state. The first point of 
contrast concerns the complicity of the outside state. 
Dictatorial intervention is usually overt so that its author 
is known to be a particular state or group of states; even 
if it is covert, the identity of its author will naturally 
be obvious to the decision-makers of the state concerned. 
Subversive intervention, on the other hand, may be conducted 
in ways which make proof of external complicity extremely 
difficult. The movement of material supplies or infiltrators 
across a border is often difficult to track down, depending 
on the nature of the frontier, and there are further problems 
in determining the precise origin of such movements once
♦
they are detected. Indeed, there may be no visible evidence 
at all to be found if subversive intervention takes the form
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of commands and instructions from outside. 'Conversely,1
as Brownlie points out, 'because of difficulties of proof,
accusations of complicity can be made all too easily 1 . On
several occasions the United Nations has undertaken the
task of ascertaining the facts in cases where assistance
to rebels has been alleged. Significantly, however, the
purpose of bodies such as the Security Council Sub-Committee
on Laos in 1959, the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans
and the U.N. Observer Group in the Lebanon was less to
discover facts in an impartial fashion than to find evidence
in order to bring accusations against the states known to 
2be intervening. The fact that complicity in cases of 
subversive intervention may be a matter of uncertain knowledge, 
of unsupported and unsupportable charges and counter­
charges, clearly hampers the exercise of self-defence. If 
the guilty cannot be identified beyond reasonable doubt, 
there is a case for not allowing forceful action against 
anyone.
A second point of contrast relates to the measure 
of responsibility that a state may be presumed to bear for 
each of these activities. Dictatorial intervention is 
manifestly at the initiative of the outside state. A 
particular case of civil strife, however, may originate in 
a variety of internal and external causes and, provided that 
it is not purely external in origin, the state concerned must 
take some responsibility for it. Now once civil conflict is 
under way the rebel movement may request outside assistance 
or even be in a position to demand it. In these circumstances 
the responsibility of the outside state for its policy of 
subversive intervention would seem to be less than that 
borne by a state undertaking dictatorial intervention.
Moreover, the degree of control enjoyed by the intervening
International Law and the Use of Force, p . 3 6 9 n .
2 James, Politics of Peace-Keeping, pp.202-4, 211-3 and
216-29.
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state may differ widely as between dictatorial and subversive
intervention. In the former case, interference is carried
out by a state's own forces under its immediate command;
the operation is begun, pursued and ended according to the
policy of the intervening state, the matter of success or
failure being irrelevant at this point. Subversive
intervention, on the other hand, probably never gives occasion
for complete control.'*' The degree of control exercised
over a rebel movement varies according to a multitude of
circumstances and to the stage which the conflict has
reached (or failed to reach). Civil strife may be initiated
by another state but subsequently continue under its own
steam and beyond the influence of the intervening state.
In such a case the purpose of counter-measures ceases to be
immediate defence and becomes either punishment or
deterrence. It is questions such as these which have
aroused much acrimonious debate over the origins of the
insurgency in South Vietnam in 1959-60. Scholars and
statesmen have disagreed on whether a signal or order of
some kind was given by North Vietnam, on the willingness
or reluctance of the North to become involved in the South,
on the responsibility for the conditions in South Vietnam
which made initiation and maintenance of the insurgency
possible, on the extent of North Vietnamese direction of
the subsequent campaigns and so on. Such questions
are ones of fact but their very intractability in many cases
of subversive intervention makes hazardous any straightforward
assertion of a right to take forcible measures against the
intervening state. Equally, a test of effective support and
2control on the part of the intervening state is inadequate
See chapter II, section B.
See Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force , p,370 .
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for the practical needs of the defending state unless 
effective control refers to something less than total 
direction. In the event the intervening state may be only 
partly responsible for the outbreak of civil strife (and 
even if it was responsible may no longer exercise any 
control); it may be unable to call off the conflict or find 
it impossible to cease giving assistance. To authorize 
forceful self-defence in these conditions may sometimes be 
a necessary procedure but it is also a potentially dangerous 
one.
The third point of contrast concerns the purposes 
which lie behind dictatorial and subversive intervention.
The former has relatively clear goals which are necessarily 
made known to the victim who is thus in a position to make 
an appropriate response. Of course, this state may be unable 
to react at all or may take excessive counter-measures, but 
it does know the precise purposes of the intervening state 
that have to be denied or accepted. In the case of assistance 
to rebels, the goals of the outside state may be clear 
neither to the victim nor to the faction which is being 
supported; indeed, the purposes of the intervening state 
may remain undefined or may change over time according to 
the progress or lack of progress of the rebels. Again, the 
achievement of particular objectives through a policy of 
subversive intervention may depend on the degree of control 
that can be exercised over the rebels and this, as we have 
seen, is itself highly problematical. Subversive intervention, 
in other words, is not a precise and obvious instrument of 
policy in the way that dictatorial intervention often is.
A response in the form of an armed attack may thus be far 
from meeting like with like. Moreover, discussion of the 
purposes of subversive intervention raises normative 
questions which tend in practice to confuse the issue of 
forceful self-defence. Thus the international community 
may approve certain goals such as the overthrow of 
racialist governments and consequently show a reluctance 
to grant the right of self-defence to those countries against
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which subversive intervention is being conducted for such
a purpose. A similar position may be taken by individual
states with regard to more contentious goals such as national
and colonial liberation. These aberrations cannot be taken
as diminishing in any way the fundamental right of self-
defence in international society but they do hinder its
clarification and development so far as the response to
subversive intervention is concerned.
If it is granted that forcible measures of self-
defence are sometimes permitted against an outside state
which is assisting rebels, they must still satisfy certain
criteria relating to their extent, purpose and timing."^
Here discussion will focus on the problems of applying the
rule of proportionality to actions taken against an external
sanctuary which is being used by rebel forces. A government
is at liberty to take any measure within its own borders in
2order to counter the effects of subversive intervention ,
and interception of external aid may also take place on 
3the high seas. Now it may be argued that action against 
a rebel sanctuary is itself a proportionate response; 
forces are sent against the territory of another state but 
only against those areas where rebels are in fact receiving 
succour. But then a response against the central government 
of the intervening state might also be considered proportionate 
to the threat since it is from there that support to the
See the fuller list of criteria in chapter IV, section A.
2 France erected extensive frontier barriers along Algeria's 
borders with Morroco and Tunisia to cut off assistance to 
the rebels. See Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare , p.35.
3 Oppenheim, International Law (vol. I, Peace) , p.301n. 
Britain, for instance, took action against ships in the 
Mediterranean that were carrying supplies to the EOKA 
organization.
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rebels is directed and organized. Clearly, proportionality 
is something less than self-evident. It depends in part on 
generally accepted standards which themselves derive from 
ideas of reasonableness, from prudence and from law. Thus 
it has been rare for a state engaging in subversive 
intervention to be subjected to a direct attack intended 
to compel a reversal of policy or to cause the government to 
fall. Moreover, even the more limited actions against 
external sanctuaries have generally been designed to relate 
directly to the supply of assistance and have usually 
been accompanied by attempts at justification. The fact 
that justification is felt to be both desirable and possible 
is an indication that certain rules governing such responses 
do exist, whether in explicit form or not.
In any given case much will depend on the actual
importance of a rebel sanctuary to the course of the conflict.
The most that may be said as a general rule is that it is
not indispensable for the success of insurgents as the
examples of China and Cuba indicate. On the other hand,
geographical contiguity, especially with an easily penetrable
frontier, may offer great advantages to an intervening
state and to the faction it supports. The minimum
proportionate response on the part of an incumbent government
might be thought to be the exercise of a right of hot pursuit
against rebels retreating over a frontier. Yet this is not
2established in state practice. The reason for this would 
seem to lie partly in the consideration that the state to 
which the rebels have retreated may not be one that is 
actively giving assistance and partly in the risks involved 
in an armed crossing of an international border. These risks
For discussions of this question see Tanham, Communist 
Revolutionary Warfare; J,J. McCuen The Art of Counter- 
Revolutionary War (London, 1966); Zasloff, Role of the 
Sanctuary in Insurgency.
2 Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force, p,372n; 
Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law, pp.38-41.
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may be considered worth taking at s ome point but this is 
more likely when there is time to muster sufficient forces 
to make an effective strike and when careful calculations 
can be made in advance. A hot pursuit, by contrast, is 
almost certain to involve only a small body of troops in 
circumstances which make full consideration of the risks 
extremely difficult; the simple pursuit of rebel soldiers, 
moreover, does not touch the broader problem of the 
interventionary policy of the assisting state.
What measures, then, do constitute a proportionate
response to the existence of an active sanctuary?^ Practice
indicates that an action by the defending states in order to
compel a change of policy or a change of government in the
intervening country is not an established right. Yet in
some cases this has appeared to be the only effective
response against persistent and elusive intervention. Even
when actions are directed against the actual sources of
support and against supplies in transit, many questions
remain unanswered. Must the defending state, for example,
merely prevent particular items of assistance reaching its
territory or is it entitled to render the granting of aid
or the movement of supplies physically impossible? Is it
governed by rules comparable to those applying to contraband 
2in time of war such that it may intercept supplies anywhere
in the intervening state that are destined for the rebels and
3that are necessarily or potentially of value to the enemy?
Essentially the same problems are raised, though less 
acutely, by a passive sanctuary.
2 Oppenheim, International Law (vol . II, Disputes, War and 
Neutrality) , pp.798-813.
3 Contraband, of course, is normally carried by neutral 
countries which for obvious reasons tend to be well-disposed 
towards one of the belligerents. An intervening state that 
supports an active sanctuary cannot be a neutral in the 
legal sense but neither is it considered to be at war with 
the state in civil conflict.
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Alternatively, the response of the defending state may be 
proportional to the importance of the sanctuary in assisting 
the rebel cause. In this case not only the impact of 
material support but also the political and psychological 
functions of a sanctuary need to be taken into account.
The difficulty here is, firstly, that such assessments are 
exceedingly complex and tentative and the defending state in 
particular will find objective judgments not only hard to 
make but also difficult to carry out. In the second place, 
the importance of a sanctuary is a concept difficult to 
express precisely, and, even if some measure of importance 
is agreed upon, it is not immediately obvious what 
responses would be proportional to this measure. It is 
evident by now that the provisions of international law, 
such as they are, can play only a minor role compared with 
the political and prudential calculations that come into 
play in this type of situation. Certainly, rules do 
develop out of concrete policies but the complex and unique 
characteristics of each case of this kind militate against 
the development of specific and accepted standards of 
conduct.
Problems also arise where collective defence 
against subversive intervention is at issue. The first 
doubt is whether such action is properly classed as 
collective defence. Bowett maintains that the concept 
should be reserved for those cases where two or more states 
are attacked at the same time and exercise their individual 
rights of self defence in concert; it would not be applied 
to a situation where one state defends another against 
subversive intervention or even against armed aggression.^
Yet there are numerous instances in state practice of 
assistance against alleged subversive intervention being 
claimed as collective defence e.g. the Soviet action in 
Hungary in 1956 and the American landings in the Lebanon in 
1958. The notion of collective defence in such circumstances
1 Self-Defence in International L a w , pp.206ff.
295
also underlies many treaty arrangements of the United
States as well as the Warsaw Pact.'*" Now the difficulty
with applying the idea of collective defence in a case of
subversive intervention is that it grants the same rights
to the ally as to the victim. These rights, however, are
far from clear and it would be inviting abuse to extend
them to third states. For the freedom to assist any
country in a situation which may be one of self-defence (for
the ally will make the judgment) creates virtually unlimited
2rights to resort to force.
Moreover, even in the case of genuine self-defence
against subversive intervention, the extent of the
assistance which may be given to an incumbent is uncertain
under international law. Three major criteria have been
regarded as legally relevant. Firstly, aid to an incumbent
may have to be confined to off-setting the assistance
received by an insurgent from another state. This implies
neutralization of the effects of such intervention within
the territory of the country concerned but it might also
mean preventing outside assistance from reaching the
3rebels in order to allow a 'fair' contest. In this case 
measures against the territory of the intervening state may 
be necessary. Secondly, aid to a requesting government 
may in fact be subject to a territorial limitation. Thus 
Brownlie argues that:
foreign assistance to the government will be 
confined to measures on the territory of the 
requesting state unless the foreign aid to the 
rebels amounts in fact and in law to an 
"armed attack".^
The purpose of such a limitation is to avoid expanding what 
is initially an internal conflict with some outside
See also chapter IV, section D which discusses collective 
defence from the point of view of justifying intervention 
in civil strife.
2 Bowett, op.cit, pp.217-8.
3 *■See also section B on the nature of counter-intervention.
4 Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force, p.327.
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participation into an international war between the 
intervening states i.e. those aiding the rebels and those 
supporting the incumbents. If, however, the original 
conflict amounts to an armed attack, then it is already 
international and the involvement of further states may 
serve a law-enforcement function. One of the justifications 
of American bombing of North Vietnam has hinged on the claim 
that the latter had launched an armed attack or aggression 
against South Vietnam. If this claim could not be 
substantiated, the United States was, failing alternative 
justification, in breach of the criterion of territorial 
limitation on assistance to an incumbent. The disadvantage 
of such a rule, however, is that it restricts the powers 
of deterrence or punishment which third states might otherwise 
bring to bear on the intervening state in cases short of 
armed attack.
A third criterion relates to the type of 
assistance which an ally may extend to an incumbent. A 
possible rule is that any type or quantity of aid may be 
given other than that which could involve the personnel of 
the outside state in actual combat.''' This norm has some 
support in state practice but its legal standing is even 
more dubious than the two previous criteria. As Farer 
points out, the Soviet Union and China have followed this 
principle in assisting insurgents^ but the matter of aiding 
an incumbent is rather different. The latter is usually 
in a better political position to request the help of 
foreign troops, especially from a state allied by treaty; 
its need for troops is also likely to be greater than that 
of the rebels, particularly in the case of a guerrilla-type 
insurgency where the ratio required for a government 
victory is generally put at ten to one. The chief merit of 
such a norm would be that as long as outside powers had
T. Farer, 'Intervention in Civil Wars: A Modest Proposal'
in Falk (ed.) , Vietnam War and International L a w , p p .518-9.
2 ibid., p p .520-1.
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not committed their forces, a victory for the other faction 
would remain much more acceptable politically and 
psychologically.  ^ So far, however, it has not attracted 
much attention as a binding criterion.
In conclusion, the situation of subversive 
intervention may be characterized as one of uncertainty 
about the complicity, the responsibility and the intentions 
of the intervening state. In these circumstances it has 
inevitably proved difficult to apply the notions of 
aggression or self-defence even in cases of large-scale 
intervention. Certainly, the victim cannot be denied a 
right to act in self-defence but it is unnecessary to 
assume that subversive intervention must amount to an 
armed attack or aggression before this right becomes 
operable. At the same time, the measures to be taken in 
response do not automatically include actions against the 
territory of the intervening state. A number of rules 
may limit such responses on the part of the victim itself 
or of its allies. International law offers no unequivocal 
canons on this subject so that their interpretation is 
partly a matter of preference as to what the law ought to 
be. In this vein, it seems that a sounder approach to the 
problem of subversive intervention is to be found in the 
closer definition of those rights of states which are in 
fact impaired in the event of outside assistance being given 
to rebels. At present these rights are summed up in 
phrases such as 'political integrity' or 'independence' .
More extensive definition with reference to subversive 
intervention would, it is suggested, clarify the 
circumstances in which a right of self-defence might be 
exercised in protection of these rights and the circumstances 
in which an ally might come to the aid of an incumbent.
This approach thus focuses attention more on the actual 
harm caused or threatened by subversive intervention than on 
the rights of retaliation possessed by the victim and his
1 ibid., p .519.
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friends. It also sees subversive intervention as a 
relatively common feature of international society and as 
an international transgression usually far less serious 
than armed attack or aggression.
The legal regulation of subversive intervention 
has not proved particularly effective in the post-war period 
and its future prospects remain obscure. At the same time, 
the possibility, indeed the probability, should not be 
overlooked that the legal regime - such as it is - has 
caused many states to refrain from or to diminish their 
subversive activities. The mere fact that almost all 
states are able to subscribe to a general prohibition and 
that many favour including it in a definition of aggression 
indicates a certain consensus about how states would 
conduct international relations if they were free to choose. 
But in addition to these legal controls there exist also 
important political and strategic controls over intervention 
of both the subversive and supportive kinds. These controls 
are more informal than the ones that have been under 
discussion here for they must cope with situations which 
are not only of great complexity but which also arouse the 
most vital concerns of the governments involved. Even the 
apparently simpler concept of aggression has 'proved 
unworkable without reference to the concomitant non-military 
components';'*' there factors such as provocation, preventive 
attack, economic policies and so on have had to be taken into 
account. In the case of subversive intervention an 
additional number of highly complex and elusive factors 
must also be reckoned with. It seems probable that 
international society will in practice continue to rely 
largely on informal political and strategic methods in 
dealing with the problem of intervention rather than on more 
formal arrangements.
1 Stone, Aggression and World Order , p . 5 9 n .
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CHAPTER IX : THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERVENTION IN CIVIL
STRIFE
The limits on the ability of the United Nations 
to control intervention in civil strife or to regulate it 
are considerable. The international organization has no 
standing armed forces, only small ad hoc bodies of troops, 
with which to deter or punish intervention; nor is it a 
legislative organ which can lay down binding rules for 
its members. It might be further argued that the Charter 
places additional restrictions on the scope of its 
activities by excluding, for example, matters within the 
domestic jurisdiction of states;'*’ certainly the Charter 
provisions may be widely interpreted (as they have tended 
to be in practice) but the task of ensuring liberal 
interpretation itself involves political costs and makes 
for inconsistency in actions. These limitations clearly 
derive from the nature of the U.N. itself for it is a 
creature of international politics rather than an independent 
participant; the organization can occasionally step beyond 
the broad consensus of international society but never for 
any distance or any length of time. Again, whatever action 
the United Nations takes with regard to civil conflicts 
(excepting humanitarian endeavours) is not somehow devoid 
of political content simply because it is international; some 
states and some of the parties involved are likely to raise 
strong objections to its activities and purposes.
Within these limitations the U.N. has performed 
two important functions in the control of intervention in 
civil strife. The first has involved a United Nations 
presence in countries divided by internal hositi1ities, 
notably the Congo after its independence in 1960 and Cyprus 
in 1964. In these cases one of the purposes was to prevent 
the internal situation from deteriorating to a point where 
outside intervention became inevitable. The Congo, it was
See Rajan, United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction, 
pp.473-97; Higgins, The Development of International Law, 
part II.
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feared, would become an arena for an East-West confrontation 
if a minimum of law and order were not established, while in 
Cyprus intervention by Greece and Turkey seemed probable in 
the event of widespread armed clashes between the two 
communities on the island. The influence of the U.N. on the 
outcome of these two situations differed greatly but the ONUC 
and UNFICYP operations shared the important characteristic 
of attempting to 'refrigerate' the conflicts.1 A certain 
measure of success appears to have been achieved in both 
cases but the opportunities for repeating this are likely 
to be limited. Apart from the more concrete problem of 
assembling the necessary forces there are two sets of 
crucial factors to be reckoned with.
The first concerns whether the members of the
United Nations will be willing to see it attempt the task
of isolating the conflict from the international political
situation. The major powers may wish to intervene themselves
or at least keep the way open for such intervention. In
September 1959, for example, the government of Laos
requested a U.N. force to assist it in fighting rebels
assisted by North Vietnam, but the Western powers were
clearly concerned that if intervention did become necessary
it would have to be undertaken by them and not by an
international agency which was likely to prove ineffective
2and to pursue goals differing from those of the West.
A situation which major powers believe they can or must 
handle themselves, especially one within a sphere of interest, 
is not likely to be handed over to the U.N. Those that are 
turned over to the organization are thus likely to be ones 
where there is no major power able or ready to intervene 
effectively as in Cyprus or where outside powers have no 
strong interest in intervention as in the Congo. While it 
may seem that the United Nations is trying to prevent 
intervention which states do not wish to undertake anyway,
James, Politics of Peace-Keeping, pp.320n, 354-68.
2 ibid., pp.200-1.
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its presence may nonetheless quieten fears that other 
states will intervene and thereby reduce the pressure to 
get in first» Thus the Congo operation, which was formally 
directed at securing the withdrawal of Belgian troops and 
at restoring the conditions of law and order, also served 
to discourage any thoughts the great powers might have had 
about intervening.
The second set of political considerations concerns 
the nature of the situations with which the organization 
has to deal. It is of little use for the U.N, to seek to 
contain a conflict which demands political and material 
resources beyond its capacity; and a United Nations presence 
which fails to prevent national intervention is likely to 
increase the dangers involved rather than decrease them. 
Moreover, U.N. intervention is certain to prove more 
politically contentious in some cases than in others; thus 
restoration of law and order in the Congo aroused greater 
hostility internally and internationally than did supervision 
of an armed truce in Cyprus.In the former case the U.N. 
learned that it could not hope to establish a working 
political system where the basic conditions were lacking.
In 1964 U Thant described the limitations on U.N. action:
The current difficulties in the country reflect 
conflicts of an internal political nature, with 
their main origins found in the absence of a genuine 
and sufficiently wide-spread sense of national 
unity among the various ethnic groups composing the 
population of the Congo. There is little 
assistance that the United Nations Force can render 
in that kind of situation since the solution of the 
conflict depends entirely on the willingness and 
readiness of the Congolese political leaders and 
traditional chiefs and their respective followers 
to merge their factional interests in a true effort 
toward national conciliation.1
In other words, the U.N. at least can achieve little in the
face of factors found in any deep-seated civil conflict,
The force which was despatched to Cyprus in 1964 had a less
ambitious task i.e., to supervise an unofficial dividing
29 June 1964, cited by Miller, Wor1d Order and Local 
Disorder, p p .113 - 4.
302
line between the Greek and Turkish communities in the hope 
of preventing the outbreak of civil war. It was not designed 
to further the cause of either side (though both believed 
it worked in their favour) but to facilitate a negotiated 
settlement by containing violence at a low level« Thus 
U.N. success depended on the presence of the elements of 
a settlement which were to be given an opportunity to come 
into play. At the time of U.N. intervention the 
situation in Cyprus was not one of actual warfare but was 
likely to degenerate in this direction if no remedial 
action were taken. The rule of the United Nations was thus 
to prevent the probable recurrence of civil war rather than 
to impose its own objectives.
The less contentious the purposes of the U.N. , 
the greater would seem to be its chances of providing a 
substitute for national intervention. At the same time, 
however, such action must remain politically relevant.
This is the force of Falk's suggestion that 'the United 
Nations should be encouraged to anticipate the outbreak of 
a civil war by intervening to secure basic human rights'.^ 
International society has a proper interest in the fate 
of the individual, but the guarantee of his fundamental 
rights demands important qualities of the society in which 
he lives. The growing international concern with human 
rights indicates that states may be more and more prepared 
to accept pressures directed to such ends. This is not to 
say that protection of the individual citizen will 
necessarily prevent civil war, rather that it provides a 
channel whereby international society might find it possible 
to minimize the extent of conflict within states. It is 
significant in this regard that the general condemnation of 
governments based on racialist principles finds its 
strongest arguments in the rights of the individual, a 
point on which such regimes are highly vulnerable. Even
'World Revolution and International Order', in Friedrich 
(e d .) , Revolution, p .171.
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communist countries are prepared to subscribe to the concept 
of individual rights, though they have fixed and perverse 
notions about how they are best served. Of course, human 
rights cannot be pursued to the point of ignoring altogether 
the rights of states, but in that the former are taken up 
by the society of states there is a guarantee that this will 
not occur.
It may be that intervention by the U.N. to secure 
human rights will prove possible without an invitation from 
the incumbent government or some group in authority. Up to 
now an invitation has been a prerequisite of U.N. action 
and this has limited the scope of the organization. For 
governments frequently prefer to invite in a powerful and 
trusted ally, especially when they believe themselves 
victims of subversive intervention. Even in the case of a 
purely internal conflict, the U.N. may prove a less 
reliable partner since its objectives are likely to be 
determined by political bargaining among its members. 
Moreover, intervention by a friendly state tends to be 
simply an extension of existing relations rather than a 
new step in a totally different direction. Both internal 
and international factors thus contrive to reduce the United 
Nations' capacity for controlling intervention in civil 
strife.
If the United Nations has little scope in 
controlling intervention in civil strife through active 
involvement on its own account, it does have an important 
second string to its bow. This is the part it can play in 
discussing and proclaiming rules relating to intervention.
It is not that the U.N. is a legislative body but that it 
is a place where the great majority of states can make known 
their attitudes toward intervention and can learn the 
attitudes of others. If norms governing intervention are 
to be developed by international society, then the U.N. 
promises to be one of the most significant channels. 
Moreover, the organization is in a position to encourage 
intervention for specific purposes such as de-colonization
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and to discourage intervention of other kinds. In 
addition, certain cases have prompted an indirect concern 
with the propriety of responses made by states to alleged 
intervention by others. Thus UNOGIL was in part a test of 
the United States claim to have acted in defence of Lebanon. 
The implication was that absence of the alleged infiltration 
and subversion would undermine the basis of American support 
for Chamoun; equally, proof of infiltration would serve to 
condemn Syria and the U.A.R. In both the verbal and active 
elaboration of rules, it is clear, the U J ,  has important 
qualities as a near-un1versal organization but it is these 
very qualities which prevent it from moving very far ahead 
of the consensus of international society.
R.A, Falk has developed this theme at length in a number 
of works e .g . ’The Legitimacy of Legislative Intervention 
by the United Nations', in Stanger (ed . ) , Essays on 
Intervention.
PART FOUR
INTERNATIONAL ORDER
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CHAPTER X : CIVIL STRIFE AND CONCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
ORDER
The role that civil strife plays - or ought to 
play - in international society is subject to various 
interpretations. In the first place, internal conflicts 
may be seen as something quite apart from the relations 
between states. They are simply occasions on which the 
citizens of a state happen to disagree about their political 
arrangements, giving no cause for the disruption or 
disturbance of international relations and hence no cause 
for intervention. The intention is to insulate
international and domestic politics from each other although 
it is possible that successive internal changes will 
eventually produce major changes in the international system. 
On this view, the primary rules of international society 
are to be interpreted in such a way as to maintain this 
insulation; at the same time the formal and informal 
processes available for controlling intervention may be 
managed so as to secure the minimum of external 
interference in civil strife. Principles such as the duty 
of non-intervention will come to the fore in this context.
An alternative view is that members of 
international society ought to make certain provisions for 
regulating the internal affairs of those of their number 
that experience civil strife. There are strong practical 
arguments for the proposition that since governments need 
to secure their own internal position they have a right to 
call upon others for assistance. Equally, states are at 
liberty, though not obliged, to render such assistance.
This may in fact occur simply in the course of normal 
relations between governments and carry over into periods 
of domestic conflict. Internal order, moreover, may be 
regarded as essential to the continued stability of the 
international system in the face, for example, of a 
threatened series of changes within states, The essence 
of this second conception of the role of civil strife is 
that international rules should assist governments to protect 
thems elves.
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The third type of relationship sees the 
international system as subordinate to internal conflict. 
Civil strife becomes a means of changing international 
relationships immediately and directly (rather than through 
long-term transformation) and the promotion of civil strife 
therefore enjoys a primacy over other norms of international 
society. An international system based on this kind of 
relationship would be characterized by uninhibited inter­
vention in civil strife on the part of competing powers.
In practice, only a few states adopt this conception of 
world politics at any one time and their purpose is 
usually to bring a new system into being, based perhaps on 
a proselytizing religion or on a revolutionary ideology.
The means of achieving this is to assist new regimes into 
power which accept the proposed system. But once the 
process is complete in whole or in part the new regimes 
are not likely to promote conflicts within each other; 
indeed, given the likely homogeneity between them, it is 
probable that they will develop arrangements to guarantee 
each other's internal security, assuming of course that a 
recognizable international system still remains.
The importance of developing these archetypal 
relationships between civil strife and international order 
is that they throw light on the various purposes which 
states may have in promoting or preventing intervention in 
civil strife. The first relationship conceives of civil 
strife as continuing independently of the international 
system; the second sees the relations of states 
contributing to the maintenance of internal order; and the 
third envisages civil conflicts as an overriding purpose 
of foreign policy. In practice, of course, these 
conceptions are not held in their entirety by particular 
states but appear in varying proportions in the attitudes 
of all states that concern themselves with intervention and 
civil strife. What may be the case is that some states 
incline more to one conception than to others and with this 
in mind the attitudes of the Soviet Union, the United States 
and Communist China will be examined. The more these three
308
diverge in their conceptions the more difficult it will be 
for them to agree on rules governing intervention in civil 
strife since each will be pursuing different goals; and 
the more likely are they to attempt to enforce their 
conceptions regardless of existing rules.
First of all, however, some consideration needs 
to be given to the context in which these views about: 
the role of civil strife are held. The first section will 
therefore look at the extent to which civil strife in 
different countries is in any case interconnected. The 
major powers hold differing views about the universality of 
internal conflict and the conditions that make it possible,
A particular instance of strife may thus be seen to have a 
variety of implications for other situations of potential 
conflict. The nature of this interdependence, actual and 
perceived, is clearly a significant factor in determining 
states' attitudes toward the role of civil strife and 
therefore of intervention in international society.
A: The Interdependence of Civil Strife
Outsiders will almost inevitably be able to find 
some lessons in every case of civil strife and the conclusions 
they draw may have a bearing on the likelihood of civil 
conflict in their own or other countries. Every such conflict 
is an example showing what can be achieved under certain 
circumstances and by certain methods; the situation 
elsewhere may be sufficiently similar and the methods 
sufficiently appropriate to demonstrate that a rebellion 
could be successful. Recent history provides several 
instances when civil strife appears to have occurred in 
waves; the reform coups in Latin America, the Asian 
revolutionary wars in the late 1940s, the coups in the Middle 
and Far East in 1958 and 1960, the East African mutinies 
in 1964, Three possible explanations for the existence 
of such waves are mentioned by Huntington,'*' The first,
'Patterns of Violence in World Politics' , in Huntington 
(ed.), Military Politics, pp.44-7.
309
positing the presence of a common directing force, he 
dismisses as manifestly insufficient; the second, which he 
calls 'isolated parallelism' i.e. the existence of similar 
but unrelated conditions in a number of countries, fails to 
explain the approximate simultaneity of these outbreaks; 
the third and, in his view, most complete explanation is 
that the power of example operates over and above the 
similarity of conditions. An outside state which wishes 
to prevent a particular civil conflict from serving as an 
example to rebels in other countries must therefore first 
consider the extent of the similarity in conditions and, 
if this is sufficiently great, intervene in order to 
demonstrate that the incumbent can win in such circumstances. 
(Alternatively, of course, the outside state may attempt 
to change conditions at home if it has the ability to do 
so.) Equally, a revolutionary movement or outside 
government may wish to prove that victory for the rebels 
is possible whatever the opposition.
It is an exceedingly difficult matter to determine 
whether the conditions in a country which is experiencing 
civil conflict are replicated in other countries to an 
extent which would permit rebels there to initiate civil 
strife; the task is even more problematical when elements 
of active outside instigation are also present, especially 
in the case of a communist movement where the power of 
example and the power of command are closely intertwined. 
What, to give a specific example, are the essential features 
of the post-1954 insurgency in South Vietnam which must 
be looked for elsewhere? Do they include the experience of 
alien rule by the French, the awakening of nationalism, the 
inadequacies and unpopularity of the regime of President 
Diem, the presence of an armed and organized communist 
minority? Or was the example of the Vietminh in North 
Vietnam itself an inspiration to the South Vietnamese 
insurgents (and how much was this dependent on the 
organizational relationship between the Vietminh and the 
Viet cong) ?
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The answers to these questions will depend in large 
measure on the theories of revolution that are held by the 
onlooker. Such theories may range from the one extreme of
manipulation by a small number of revolutionaries to the 
other extreme of social forces - political, economic and 
psychological - operating in a grand and irreversible 
manner. Whatever the nature of the theory, moreover, suitable 
conditions for conflict tend to appear widespread; 
manipulation is, by its very nature, possible anywhere, while 
the grand theories are usually based on interpretations of 
existing social change. Even so, factors may exist which 
are unique to certain countries or regions so that comparisons 
are doubtful or impossible; their presence may mean that 
civil strife fails to occur as predicted or occurs when it 
is not predicted. For example, Harris has described as a 
'geographical fiction' the idea that South East Asia has an 
identity of its own and that the states of the region are 
therefore similar; it is, on the contrary, divided in 
political tradition between south Asia and east Asia with the 
result that an ideology which takes hold in Vietnam may 
well prove alien in Laos and Cambodia.^ Finally, even if 
it is known what conditions would permit rebellion elsewhere, 
there remains the problem of discovering whether they are 
in fact present in other countries; it is not only in the 
extreme case of the coup d'etat that the task of gathering 
sufficient intelligence for prediction has in practice 
proved insuperable.
The next requirement for the intervening state is 
to ensure that the government it supports can retain its 
position against the rebels. If this is not achieved, the 
demonstration effect will be twofold: the rebels will
provide an example of successful civil war tactics and the 
incumbents will have demonstrated the inadequacy of the 
methods it employed. If, on the other hand, the incumbent
1 R. Harris, Independence and After (London, 1962) , p .10 .
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government retains its position, a negative demonstration 
has been made. There is, however, no guarantee that it 
will have a negative effect, for rebels in other countries, 
even if they believe themselves in identical circumstances, 
may initiate civil strife in the hope that chance factors 
will favour them or that extra outside assistance will 
become available. Intervention to achieve a demonstration 
effect thus appears a somewhat doubtful proposition. The 
case of South Vietnam has nevertheless proved fruitful for 
those wishing to draw lessons from it."^ South Vietnam has 
been a proving-ground for military technology, tactics and 
ideas (as well as political experimentation) in much the same 
way that the Spanish Civil War exercised the fascist armies 
and air forces. In these circumstances civil war takes on 
an extra dimension of international competition, the 
participants resembling salesmen who are trying to convince 
bystanders of the superiority of their wares.
Little has been said so far about how the example 
of a successful revolution can actually influence rebels in 
another country. Two very broad ways can be identified 
without attempting to go into the realms of individual and 
social psychology. The first mode of influence is at the 
rational, intellectual level. Mao Tse-tung, for example, 
wrote at length on the strategy and tactics employed by the
The result of an Arnerican sell-out in that country is 
foreseen by Thompson in the following terms: 'With the
failure of Western methods of defence in Vietnam, all Western 
methods will be downgraded even in the political, economic 
and technical fields. The development of freedom and 
democracy through plural economic and political societies 
and the concept of free enterprise, will cease to be 
attractive because they will appear to render states 
vulnerable to subversive attack'. R. Thompson, No Exit from 
Vietnam (London, 1969) , p.196. On the other side of the 
fence Lin Piao has reached a similar conclusion: 'The United
States has made South Vietnam a testing ground for the 
suppression of people's war. It has carried on this experiment 
for many years, and everybody can now see that the U.S. 
aggressors are unable to find a way of coping with people's 
war ' . 'Long Live the Victory of People's War ' , Peking Review,
3 September 1965, p.27.
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communists in the Chinese civil war; some of this knowledge
was available to Ho Chi Minh and General Giap when they
began their struggle against the French; and, again, some
of their precepts were learned by the Vietcong in South
Vietnam. Obviously, no civil conflict - even the coup
d'etat about which it has almost become possible to write a
standard manual - is purely a matter of applying existing
knowledge and techniques. Each civil conflict of any size
generates its own tactics and possibly its own strategy ;
thus Mao's original doctrines were not adopted without
change by the Vietminh and Vietcong. It is clearly wrong
to apply unreflectively methods learned in one country to
other situations; this has been the substance of the
criticisms of Mao Tse-tung's position on revolution which
have been made in recent years by orthodox communists (among
others). Thus the Yugoslav Marxist, Kardelj, argues that
Chinese policy is this matter necessarily reflects 'a
specific complex of objective and subjective factors in
2present-day Chinese society' . The Chinese idea that the
advanced countries - or 'towns' - of the world can be
surrounded and defeated by the underdeveloped lands - or
'countryside' - is similarly condemned by a Soviet commentator
as being largely the 'result of attempts to transplant the
experience of the Chinese revolution mechanically to the
3international arena'. A model of revolution, therefore, 
requires interpretation on the part of those following it, 
a task which may prove beyond the capacity of some. The 
abortive attempts in Latin America to imitate Castro's
C. Johnson, 'The Third Generation of Guerrilla Warfare', 
Asian Survey , vol. VIII (June 1968).
2 E. Kardelj, Socialism and War (London, 1961), p.20.
3 I. Shatalov, 'In a Single Revolutionary Torrent' , 
International Affairs (Moscow) , (September 1967) , p.22.
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revolution seem to bear this out, though naturally there
are additional reasons for their failure. Indeed, as
early as 1936 Mao Tse-tung himself had warned against
following too closely the precepts and military manuals
that had come out of the revolutionary war in Russia:
these laws and manuals embody the specific 
characteristics of the civil war and the Red Army in 
the Soviet Union, and ...if we copy and apply them 
without allowing any change, we shall...be 'cutting 
the feet to fit the shoes' and be defeated.1
The second factor in the influence that one civil 
conflict may have on another is at the moral and emotional 
level. That this involves a somewhat arbitrary distinction 
is indicated by Stalin's remarks on the role of revolutionary 
theory:
Revolutionary theory is a synthesis of the experience 
of the working-class movement throughout all lands - 
the generalised experience... But theory becomes the 
greatest force in the working-class movement when it 
is inseparably linked with revolutionary practice: 
for it, and it alone, can give the movement confidence, 
guidance, and understanding of the inner links between 
events.^
Knowledge in the abstract may thus be inseparably bound up
with confidence in action. Nevertheless, the encouragement
which one rebel group can receive from another (whether
before or after the latter's advent to power) is certainly
real, although intangible and difficult to assess. The
most obvious example is the victory of the Chinese Communists
in 1949 which undoubtedly 'stiffened the Vietminh will to 
3fight'. There the effect was immediate and direct, with both 
Chinese and Vietnamese fighting a similar sort of war in the 
name of the same doctrine and with the promise of considerable 
material aid from the former in the near future. The effect
'Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary W a r ' , 
Selected Works, vol. I, p .181.
2 The Foundations o f Leninism (1924), extracts in Strategy 
and Tactics, p .87.
3 Z a s1o f f , Role of the Sanctuary in Insurgency, p .13.
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diminishes, however, over time and distance and as 
differences in the situations increase. The CPSU, for 
instance, fifty years after the October Revolution still 
asserts the relevance of its experience to the communist 
parties of Asia, Africa and Latin America where conditions 
are far different from those of Russia in 1917. The Soviet 
appeal has in fact been diluted to cheering from the side­
lines, and only occasionally does it extend to shouting 
advice or running onto the field. As a Soviet writer puts 
i t :
The Socialist camp influences the working-class 
movement in the capitalist countries mostly by the 
sheer force of its example. Its support is moral 
support in the fight against reaction and imperia1ism. 
The success of the Socialist countries adds strength 
to the faith of the working people of the capitalist 
world in the justice of Socialism and Communism.^
The encouragement that a revolutionary model can 
provide has been an important feature of the Chinese view 
of revolution for many years and will be discussed in some 
detail in a subsequent section. The Chinese case probably 
represents the extreme example of a revolution attempting 
to impress itself upon the world, but nearly every revolution 
that is undertaken in the name of some universal political 
principle manifests this tendency. Neither intellectually 
nor emotionally can such revolutions be ignored. If it 
is feared that a particular revolution will set too 
powerful an example, then it is likely that intervention to 
prevent it succeeding at all will prove a fruitless task; 
for the strength of its appeal seems to reflect the strength 
of the revolutionary movement itself.
1 T. Timofeyev, 'The Building of Communism and the Working- 
Class Movement' , International Affairs (Moscow) , (July 1959) , 
p.9, emphasis in original.
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B: Soviet Conceptions of the Role of Revolution in
International Relations
In the last years of Stalin's rule Soviet spokesmen
frequently pointed out that the October Revolution had
followed the First World War and that socialist revolutions
in Europe and Asia had followed the second; the conclusion
was that a third world war would carry socialism still
further.  ^ This did not mean that the Soviet Union was
prepared to start a war in order to achieve these results;
it was rather a warning to the West that it could only
expect to lose by going to war. Subsequently, however, the
Soviet position has been almost completely reversed. The
first steps away from the old doctrine were taken by
Krushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 when he
maintained that world war was not 'fatalistically inevitable'
2on account of the great strength of the socialist camp.
Thereafter, Societ statements reveal a growing awareness that
3war would not lead to revolution. The change can be 
justified in doctrinal terms as a return to the idea that
See, for example, Malenkov's report to the Nineteenth Party 
Congress in October 1952: 'The facts of history cannot be
ignored. And the facts show that as a result of the First 
World War Russia dropped out of the capitalist system, while 
as a result of the Second World War a whole series of 
countries in Europe and Asia dropped out of the capitalist 
system. There is every reason to assume that a Third World 
War will bring about the collapse of the world capitalist 
system'. Cited by Goodman, Soviet Design for a World State, 
p .184 .
2 Text in Floyd, Mao Against Krushchev, pp.229-30.
3 By 1960 an article in the CPSU journal Kommunis t explicitly 
rejected the old notions about war and revolution: 'The
working class does not think of creating a Communist 
civilization on the ruins of the centres of world culture, 
on desolated territories contaminated by thermonuclear fallout, 
which would be the inevitable consequences of such a 
war....It is therefore obvious that a contemporary nuclear 
war...can in no way be a factor that would accelerate the 
revolution and bring nearer the victory of socialism*. A. 
Belyakov, F. Burlatsky, 'Lenin's Theory of the Socialist 
Revolution and the Present Time' (September 1960) , cited by 
R.L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy (London, 1966) , p.194.
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revolution is essentially the resolution of internal social 
contradictions by forces within the society concerned; 
revolution and international war are not to be confused for 
the latter might create new contradicat ions as a result of 
the vast destruction of productive resources and the stimulus 
to imperialism and capitalism.^ These doctrinal arguments, 
however, reflect a significant change in Soviet attitudes 
toward the role of revolution in international relations.
The reasons for the increasing confidence of the
Soviet Union in its ability to secure peace after the
launching of the Sputnik in 1957 need not be elaborated here.
Essentially what happened was that Russia acquired a
capacity to launch a second strike at the North American
continent and this was believed to act as a strong deterrent
2against an attack on itself. Once the Soviet Union had some 
say in prevention of nuclear war it became possible to 
emphasize the dangers of such an event, and the greater the 
dangers were made out to be the more powerful was the 
deterrent effect on the West expected to be. Nevertheless,
See E. Kardelj, Socialism and War, p p .8 4 , 18 0.
2 This change is reflected in Soviet descriptions of the 
distribution of world power. Before 1959 the basic term 
of reference was the neutral 'distribution of power' rather 
than equilibrium or preponderance. With the missile 
developments of 1959-61 the most common Soviet assertion 
was that a preponderance or favourable balance of power 
existed, a position from which the socialist camp believed 
it could determine to an increasing extent the content 
of international relations. See Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives
on International_Relations, pp,16 5ff., 179-80. While this
claim was modified in late 1961 to one of equilibrium and 
again in 1964 back to one of distribution, Russia remained 
firm in the conviction that it could secure a favourable 
international environment through its strategic posture.
Thus the Soviet achievement in the Cuban missile crisis was 
represented (with some element of truth) as deterrence of 
a U.S. invasion and preservation of the Cuban revolutionary 
movement. See, for example, Khrushchev's address to the 
Sixth Congress of the East German Communist Party, 16 
January 1963, text in Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev, p.353.
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this position raised two problems. Firstly, some reliance 
had to be placed on the rationality and reasonableness of 
Western decision-makers. Secondly, the Soviet Union had to 
maintain some commitment to world revolution both in 
ideological and in real terms. It was not sufficient simply 
to proclaim support for revolution; the Soviet Union also 
had to demonstrate that it was providing genuine and 
important assistance. Clearly these two problems required 
policies that were to some extent incompatible but a 
solution was found in the 'general line’ of peaceful 
coexistence. It amounted in essence to an attempt to 
separate the sphere of relations between states, which were 
to be kept peaceful and even amicable, from the sphere of 
internal politics where socialist revolution could progress 
freely.
The contemporary policy of peaceful coexistence
originated in Khrushchev's speech to the Twentieth Congress
in 1956. His fundamental proposition was that countries
with different social systems could coexist without war and
that relations could be improved on this basis. When Chinese
views on this question subsequently diverged, the Soviet
Union pointed out the dangers of a return to the cold war:
Who does not know that the ruling circles of the 
imperialist states exploit the situation of the cold 
war to whip up chauvinism, war hysteria and unbridled 
anti-communism , to put in power the most rabid 
reactionaries and pro-fascists , to suspend democracy 
and to do away with political parties, trade unions 
and other mass organizations of the working class?!
It was also pointed out that peaceful coexistence was 'not
the result of a deal, but an objective law governing the
2present stages in the development of society'. Peaceful
'Open letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU to 
Party Organizations and all Communists in the Soviet Union' , 
Pravda, 14 July 1963, text in Floyd, op. cit., p.438.
2 G. Starushenko, 'The National-Liberation Movement and the 
Struggle for Peace' , International Affairs (Moscow) , (October 
19 63) , p .4.
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coexistence was thus represented both as inevitable 
between states and as simultaneously favourable to the 
progress of socialism within states.
The policy of peaceful coexistence requires not
only that international relations be conducted peacefully
but also that they be kept apart from political developments
within states. Under no circumstances/ therefore, can
peaceful coexistence govern the relations between social
classes within states.'*' Nor can revolutionary progress
be held back by the condition of international relations.
Revolution, it is argued, depends on essentially internal
factors and is not exportable in the same way as ballistic
missiles or baggage trains. Advice and encouragement might
be given from outside but the choice of the path to socialism
2is to be made by the people themselves. Since the causes 
of revolution are internal, the West cannot justifiably object 
to the policy of peaceful coexistence on the grounds that 
the Soviet Union is simultaneously provoking civil strife.
See, for example, 'Open letter from the Central Committee 
of the CPSU to Party Organizations and all Communists in 
the Soviet Union' , Pravda , 14 July 1963, text in Floyd,
op. cit., p.436.
2 A letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 
Central Committee of the C C P , dated 30 March 1963, maintained 
that: '...the working out of forms and methods of fighting
for socialism in each separate country is the internal 
affair of the working class of that country and of its 
communist vanguard. No other fraternal party, whatever 
its membership, experience and authority, can lay down the 
tactics, forms and methods of the revolutionary struggle in 
other countries.... The enthusiasm of the revolutionary 
masses in the struggle for the victory of a socialist 
revolution cannot be kept back when objective and subjective 
conditions are ripe. It would be tantamount to death. But 
a revolution cannot be artificially instigated if conditions 
for it are not yet ripe.' Text in W.E. Griffith, The Sino- 
Soviet Rift (London, 1964) pp.248-9.
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Any attempt by the West to make peaceful coexistence 
conditional on the non-occurrence of revolution is therefore 
wrong-headed and in fact impossible,  ^ For revolutionary 
change - in accord with the most fundamental communist 
doctrines - is held to be inevitable in both the Third Wo rid 
and the capitalist West itself, and much attention has been 
given to the ways in which such change might occur.
It is not sufficient, however, for the Soviet Union
to claim that peaceful coexistence merely permits revolutionary
progress to be made; some demonstration that genuine
assistance is being given must also take place. At the
most general level pursuit of peaceful coexistence is
formally equated with support for revolution. 'Peaceful
coexistence,' according to one writer, 'does not exclude
revolutionary changes in society but presupposes them, does
not slow down the world revolutionary process but accelerates 
2it'. This formal equation is founded on the supposed common 
interests of the socialist camp, the international working- 
class and the national liberation movement which together 
constitute the anti-imperialist forces; whatever is in the 
interest of one of these must consequently be in the interest 
of the others for they have merged into a 'single revolutionary 
stream'. It is accordingly a serious heresy, one of which 
China has frequently been accused, to deny that such common 
interests exist and to maintain that the national liberation 
movement has distinct and possibly clashing interests of its 
own. To adopt this position is, in the Soviet view, to 
isolate the national liberation movement from its most 
powerful source of support - the socialist camp led by 
the Soviet Union.
V. Matveyev, 'Wars of Liberation and Diplomacy', 
International Affairs (Moscow), (March 1963), p.71.
2 N. Inozemtsev, 'Peaceful Coexistence is the Major Question 
of Our Time', Pravda , 17 January 1962, text in A. Dallin
(e d .) , Diversity in International Communism (New York, 1963), 
p . 629 .
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The claim that the Soviet example provides moral
support for revolutionary movements is a little more specific
but at some point the Soviet Union is required to acknowledge
a willingness to give direct practical aid to revolutionary
movements if this proves necessary. The 'duty to support the
sacred struggle of the oppressed peoples' expressed in the
CPSU Programme cannot be ignored entirely. Yet even in
this regard serious qualifications are made in an effort
to ensure that the policy of peaceful coexistence is not
misunderstood. Thus an authoritative Soviet work on military
strategy merely states a general duty of assistance: 'The
CPSU has an international duty to aid countries in winning
and strengthening their national independence, and to
assist all nations fighting for the complete destruction
of the colonial s y s t e m ' T h e  revised second edition of
the work mentions the giving of material support but fails
to elaborate in any way: 'The Soviet Union fulfils its
duty consistently and steadfastly, helping nations in
their struggle against imperialism not only ideologically
2and politically, but also in a material sense'. According 
to Soviet doctrine assistance to world revolution thus 
includes the relatively innocuous support of countries 
already independent and the widely approved aiding of anti- 
colonial. movements. There is an obvious reluctance to 
make doctrinal commitments to rebellions other than anti­
colonial ones and it is a reluctance which has to a certain
3extent been matched by practice.
Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky (ed . ) , Military Strategy (London , 
1963), p.177.
2 Cited by Wolfe, Soviet Strategy, p.126.
3 See, for example, Wolfe, op. cit . , p p .107-8.
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Such a duty, however, may be extended to creating
the conditions of civil conflict in other states rather than
simply assisting those rebel movements which have got under
way. The Soviet Union must, for example, maintain some
life in the idea that communist parties in other countries
have a chance of coming to power through revolution, though
it is an idea that has been steadily diluted to the point
of referring to constitutional changes in some cases.
Khrushchev first introduced the possibility of peaceful
transition to communism into communist dogma in his main
political report to the 20th Congress of the CPS U :
There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist 
countries the violent overthrow of the dictatorship 
of the bourgeoisie and the sharp aggravation of 
class struggle connected with this are inevitable.
But the forms of social revolution vary. It is not 
true that we regard violence and civil war as the only 
way to remake society.
At the same time the present situation offers the 
working class in a number of capitalist countries a 
real opportunity to unite the overwhelming majority 
of the people under its leadership and to secure the 
transfer of the basic means of production into the 
hands of the people .
This amounted to a doctrinal retreat on a narrow front, and 
it was perhaps an ambiguous retreat at that. For Soviet 
leaders have never been specific about which countries will 
experience peaceful transition; the option of revolution 
remains open even in those new states which have been 
considered the most likely candidates for peaceful transition. 
The example of peaceful transition to communism which is 
frequently held up by the Soviet Union - the events in 
Czechoslovakia in February 1948 - is hardly one that would 
be understood by Western states to be peaceful.
1 Text in Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev, p .2 3 0.
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A more substantial contribution to the progress
of revolution is perhaps to be found in the Soviet claim
that it plays an important part in preventing the export
of counterrevolution by the West. Peaceful coexistence, by
stressing the internal nature of revolution, is held to
isolate the interventionary policies of imperialism and
thereby to facilitate their prevention. The Soviet Union,
in other words, depicts itself as upholding the rule of
non-intervention in internal conflicts:
The imperialists charge at every crossroads that 
the Communists export revolution. The imperialist 
gentlemen need this slander to camouflage in at 
least some way their claim to the right to export 
counter-revolution.
The attempts of the imperialists to interfere in the 
affairs of peoples rising in revolution would 
constitute nothing less than acts of aggression - a 
threat to world peace. We must state outright that 
in the event of imperialist export of counter­
revolution the Communists will call on the peoples 
of all countries to rally, to mobilize their forces, 
and, relying on the might of the world socialist 
system, firmly to repel the enemies of freedom, the 
enemies of peace.^
The terms of the threat were clearly that the expansion of 
internal struggles by the West was liable to produce 
disastrous consequences. It is here that Khrushchev's 
distinction between revolutionary and local wars comes in 
for the latter are regarded as subject to rapid and inevitable 
escalation.* 2 By controlling these risks the Soviet Union 
is in a position to counter even the so-called 'small wars' 
doctrine developed by the U.S. in the early 1960s. This 
doctrine was seen as an attempt to develop a capacity to 
intervene against revolutionary movements within other
Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee to the Twenty 
Second Congress of the CPSU, 17 October 1961, text in Dallin 
(ed.) , Diversity in International Communism, pp . 14-15.
2 The rigidity of this formula, however, has never been 
absolute. See Wolfe, Soviet Strategy, pp.118-24.
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countries.^ The United States was therefore charged with
the responsibility of risking world war if it resorted to
intervention against the progress of revolution, To the
extent that the U.S. has been deterred in this there is
some truth in the claim that 'prevention of the export of
counter-revolution is one of the most effective forms of
aid to national-1iberation revolutions by the Soviet 
2Union'. It is also true, however, that when the United 
States has undertaken intervention of this kind the Soviet 
Union has for the most part proved reluctant to raise the 
risks significantly. The Soviet notion of regulating 
intervention in order to permit the free development of 
internal forces thus appears to have been forced upon it 
to some extent by its reluctance to initiate and promote 
civil strife and by its inability to check intervention by 
the United States.
C: The United States View of Revolution and International
Order
The United States has no single body of doctrine 
in which its assessment of the place of civil strife in 
international relations is presented for all to see. In 
attempting to discover American notions about the 
relationship between civil strife and international order 
reliance must be placed on the words and deeds of statesmen 
while bearing in mind that ideas have not remained static 
and unchallenged in the changing circumstances of the 
post-war world. As far as revolution itself is concerned
'It was not officially admitted that the "small wars" 
were aimed against the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America fighting for independence. The theory was brought 
out initially simply as a way of avoiding the use of the 
much too destructive nuclear weapons. But the experience 
of the very first "small wars" of U.S. imperialism 
has shown that they are patently aimed against the 
national-liberation movement and are in no sense a substitute 
for nuclear war'. Y. Oleshchuk, ' "Small Wars" and the 
Aggression in Viet-Nam' , International Affairs (Moscow) ,
(May 1966), p .36.
2 G. Starushenko, 'The National-Liberation Movement and the 
Struggle for Peace' , International Affairs (Moscow) , (October 
1963 ) , p .6.
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certain themes appear to have pervaded American thinking for
some considerable time. Perhaps the strongest of these is
the significance attached to economic factors as an
explanation of revolution, an attitude which goes back at
least as far as the Russian Revolution. In 1918, for example,
Secretary of State Lansing echoed President Wilson's views
in describing Bolshevism as 'the madness of famished men'
for which food was the 'great cure' . ^  Since then economic
development has come to be seen as a way of producing
political stability and this has served as a major article
2of faith in American foreign aid programmes. The 
'revolution of rising expectations', it is assumed, can be 
carried through by instruments such as the Alliance for 
Progress which will enable those expectations to be met.
A closely related belief is that this revolution can be 
achieved by peaceful means since it is essentially a matter 
of distributing the benefits of economic growth rationally 
and fairly. What is more, this idea of revolution seems 
to have gained widespread acceptance as the desirable norm 
of international change to the point of regarding violent
3methods as per s e unacceptable. The adequacy of the 
economic interpretation of revolution need not be examined
Cited by Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking,
p .260.
2 See R.A. Packenham, 'Po1itical-Development Doctrines in 
the American Foreign Aid Program' , World Politics, vol . 
XVIII (January 1966) .
3 On 5 July 1962 President Kennedy presented his views of 
the future: 'The stirrings of revolution can be felt in
this hemisphere. It will either be peaceful or violent.
We want it to be peaceful'. Press conference, Public 
Papers of the Presidents: 1962 (Washington, 1963) , p.540.
Some years later Senator Fulbright wrote of the dangers 
of excessive optimism on this score: '...we seem to be
narrowing our criteria of what constitute "legitimate" and 
"acceptable" social revolutions to include only those which 
meet the all but impossible tests of being peaceful, 
orderly, and voluntary - of being, that is, in what we 
regard as our own shining image'. The Arrogance of Power 
(London, 1967), pp.76-7.
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here except to note that it has clearly failed to fulfil
1its own expectations.
Almost inseparable from this conception of
revolution is the idea that outside forces can exploit
economic backwardness in order to initiate and sustain civil
conflict. In a large number of cases that outside element
is believed to be communism which is encouraging, advising,
influencing, assisting or directing the rebel movement.
We are less concerned here with the degree of truth in this
assumption than in the fact that it is commonly held and
that certain consequences usually flow from its being held.
The theme of communism as a force that exploits local
aspirations and legitimate grievances has been particularly
persistent. One part of President Truman's State of the
Union Message in 1953, for example, has remained pertinent
long after the passing of the cold war era: 'Where the
forces of nationalism, independence, and economic change
were at work throughout the great sweep of Asia and Africa,
the Communists tried to identify themselves with the cause
of progress, tried to picture themselves as the friends of
2freedom and advancement'. Where nationalism is present 
communism is believed capable of diverting and exploiting 
it for its own purposes, yet where it is absent communism 
is seen to have a free hand altogether. One of the results 
is that revolutions which combine communism and nationalism 
in some proportion have tended to meet with uniform 
hostility from the United States (save for the notable 
exception of Yugoslavia).
See, for example, Stanley Hoffman, The State of War (New 
York, 1965), p.188; H .A . Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice 
(New York, 1962), pp.337-8. More profound reasons for the 
American failure to understand revolution are suggested by 
Kissinger, op. cit. , pp.338-9; C.B. Macpherson,
’Revolution and Ideology in the Late Twentieth Century', 
in Friedrich (ed.) , Revolution , pp.151-3; H. Arendt,
On Revolution (New York, 1963 ) , p.8.
2 7 January 1953, Department of State Bulletin, vol. XXVIII, 
(19 January 1953 ) , p.90.
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The involvement of communism in revolution leads
on to another theme in American thinking which concerns the
means by which outside elements can guide and assist rebel
movements. A number of writers have noted the Western
preoccupation with the 'strategy and tactics' of world
communism and the tendency to attribute to them a remarkable
efficacy in the matter of overthrowing governments.^
Certainly, there appears to have been no danger of the United
States underestimating the threat of non-military activities
2in international relations. At times, even, communism 
itself has been seen simply as a set of techniques for 
carrying out revolution. This concern with methods may be 
part of a broader 'instrumentalist bias' in foreign-po1icy 
thinking,a tendency to see all challenges in terms of
3concrete problems to be solved by practical means. Whether 
or not this is generally the case, it seems to have been 
true of the response to guerrilla warfare in the 1960s 
which was regarded by many as a new weapon (or at least an 
updated one) in the communist arsenal for which counter­
techniques had to be developed. Some writers went so far 
as to propose guerrilla warfare as an offensive weapon which 
the United States could use against communist countries.
These were perhaps the more extreme reactions but they 
indicate the trend of much American thinking on the subject.
The themes that have been identified in American 
thinking about revolution are closely bound up with that
See, for example, V.V. Aspaturian, 'The Challenge of 
Soviet Foreign Policy', in.M.A. Kaplan (ed. ) , The 
Revolution in World Politics (New York, 1962), p . 2 16 ;
S.P. Huntington, 'Patterns of Violence in World Politics', 
in Huntington (ed . ) , Military Politics, pp.43-4.
2 Speaking before the House of Foreign Affairs Committee 
on 26 June 1951, Secretary of State Acheson placed the 
methods of political manipulation on a par with the more 
usual weapons of war: 'The Politburo... has carried on
and built on the imperialist tradition. What it has added 
consists mainly of new weapons and new tactics - the weapons 
of conspiracy, subversion, psychological and ideological 
warfare, and indirect aggression, and tactics skilfully 
designed to employ these weapons'. Department of State 
Bulletin, vol. XXV (9 July 1951), pp.48-9.
3 R.C. Tucker, 'Russia, The West, and World Order' , World 
Politics , vol. XII (October 1959) , pp.2-3.
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country's ideas about the role that civil strife plays and
ought to play in international relations. The distinction
between what is the case and what ought to be the case
creates a genuine dilemma in the American outlook; this
dilemma is less easily perceived in the actual conduct of
affairs but even more troublesome. The United States
proclaims support for the rule of non-intervention as a
matter of principle but at the same time argues that the
fact of frequent outside involvement creates strong and valid
reasons for intervention on its part. In 1965 Secretary of
State Rusk expressed this problem with reference to
communist support for wars of national liberation;
International law does not restrict internal 
revolution within a state, or revolution against 
colonial authority. But international law does 
restrict what third Powers may lawfully do in 
support of insurrection. It is these restrictions 
which are challenged by the doctrine, and violated 
by the practice, of "wars of liberation". It is 
plain that acceptance of the doctrine of "wars of 
liberation" would amount to scuttling the modern 
international law of peace which the [U.N.] Charter 
p rovides.1
But this is not the full extent of the dilemma, for in 
theory justifications are available for intervention that 
seeks to counter prior intervention by another state.
It is in practice that the dilemma emerges. The 
United States has found the prevention of intervention, 
particularly that of a covert and subversive kind, an 
exceedingly difficult task once an internal conflict has 
broken out. It has therefore seemed rational to assist 
incumbent governments to create political stability in 
their countries in order to minimize the likelihood of 
civil strife breaking out in the first place. But assistance 
of this kind cannot distinguish between the prevention of 
externally-inspired conflicts and the prevention of purely 
internal strife; its effect is to serve both of these
Address, American Society of International Law 
Proceedings (April 1965), p.251.
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causes whether they are openly avowed or not.^ The more 
obvious political and military interests of the United 
States in maintaining stability among its allies need not 
be elaborated here. American economic aid policy which 
dispenses funds not exceeded by any other state also 
contains an implicit commitment to the avoidance of civil 
strife. It is not simply that economic development in 
the recipient countries requires a measure of internal 
order but also that, in the American view, economic aid 
will have a significant and inevitable impact on the 
political domain. Aid of this kind, regardless of the 
reasons for which it is given, can only appear to be heading 
off internal conflict, and especially conflict involving 
violence and warfare. Whatever the results that have been 
achieved in this direction, the legitimacy of such purposes 
in American foreign policy has remained largely unquestioned.
The United States has also been much concerned 
with international rules relating to intervention, in 
particular defence against and deterrence of intervention.
In general, it has proclaimed support for those rules which 
prohibit intervention in civil strife and which facilitate 
coping with intervention when it does occur. Probably the 
most important instance has been the development of the 
notion of indirect aggression. Essentially, this has meant 
that any rebellion instigated or supported from outside 
can be treated as an act of aggression to be dealt with in 
the same way as any breach of the peace. Writing in 1951 
George Kennan charged that America's 1egalistic-mora1istic 
approach to international affairs ignored the more subtle
President Nixon, for example, explained American concern 
with promoting the independence of other states in 
characteristically ambiguous fashion: 'I mean the
independence that comes with the economic strength, with 
political stability, and also with the means insofar as 
any threat internally that may occur in those countries - 
the ability to handle those internal problems without 
outside assistance, except that kind of assistance which
is limited to material support.....' Speech at Manila,
27 July 1969, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 
vol. 5, p .104 0.
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and covert means of undermining the independence of states.
In subsequent years, however, the United States response to 
the problem of subversive intervention itself took on a 
markedly legalistic appearance in the sense that actions of 
this kind were branded indiscriminately as illegal and 
were to be met with the most stringent sanctions. Indirect 
aggression thus became in American eyes an international 
transgression wherever it occurred and regardless of 
particular circumstances. An important consequence of this 
approach, however, was that a rebel movement with a measure 
of outside support was considered to have no legitimacy at 
all compared with the incumbent government simply by virtue 
of its receiving outside aid. Given the fact that in the 
post-war era a great number of rebel movements have made 
use of external assistance, the effect of the American 
position has been to advocate international rules which 
limit the potential for internal change. The United States 
and the Soviet Union have both tended to see civil strife 
as an expression of ideological confrontation, but while 
Soviet policy has generally sought to increase the 
possibilities for internal change American policy, whether 
by design or by accident, has been directed toward the 
prevention of such change, and especially change of a 
violent kind .
D; Communist China's Conception of Revolution and 
International Relations
For China the cause of war in modern times is 
imperialism of which the United States is the most aggressive 
and violent representative. The nature of imperialism is 
eternally corrupt and can never change, even if, as has 
been the case in recent years, the forces for peace are 
predominantly stronger than the forces of imperialism and 
war. The way to achieve world peace, therefore, is to 
combat imperialism directly, relying on the masses and
G.F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (New York, 
1952) , p .85 .
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despising American nuclear blackmail. Two main points can
be discerned in the Chinese position, firstly that
the struggle for the defence of world peace and 
the national-liberation movements and the peoples' 
revolutionary struggles in various countries 
support each other and cannot be separated;
and secondly that
the emergence of nuclear weapons has not changed 
and cannot change the fundamental Marxist-Leninist 
principles with regard to war and peace. 1
The function of revolution in international relations is
thus to bring about the defeat of American imperialist
policies, and this is a task to be pursued regardless of
the apparent dangers.
The struggle between imperialism and national
liberation is the most significant area of conflict in
contemporary international relations:
Today the national liberation revolutions in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America are the most important 
forces dealing imperialism direct blows. The 
contradictions of the world are concentrated in 
Asia, Africa and Latin A m e r i c a .* 2
The editorial goes on to assert that the main area of
struggle will at some time in the future shift to the
countries of Western Europe and North America, a point at
which the end of imperialism will be in sight. Meanwhile,
the contradiction between the socialist and imperialist
camps well be significant but it will not be decisive;
for the international system can only be transformed by
internal struggles which must not be compromised by the
foreign policies of the communist states. Thus peaceful
coexistence between countries with different social systems
is permissible only in strictly limited circumstances.
In China's view this pplicy brings certain benefits in
These views are fully and vigorously set out in a People ' s 
Daily editorial of 31 December 1962, 'The Differences 
Between Comrade Togliatti and U s ' , reprinted in Peking 
Review, 4 January 1963 , p p .11,12.
2 Editorial in Peop1e ' s Daily and Red Flag, 21 October
1963 , cited by S.R. Schram, Mao T s e-1ung, second edition 
(Harmondsworth, 1967), p.312, who believes that Mao had
a hand in writing the editorial.
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that it exposes and isolates the aggressive forces of
imperialism and contributes to 'a peaceful international
environment for socialist construction1 23.'*' It is, however,
inapplicable not simply to class revolution but also to
2national liberation struggles. The priority thus accorded 
to revolution implies an obligation to assist revolution 
whatever the existing rules of international society and 
whatever controls other states might seek to place on such 
intervention.
’We support the revolutionary wars of the
oppressed people,' the Chinese argue, 'because all these
3revolutionary wars are just wars'. The justness of a 
revolutionary war lies in the participation of the masses 
in a struggle for freedom from oppression and exploitation, 
and since there can be no higher principle than this it 
is always right to assist such struggles. The Soviet policy 
line of distinguishing wars according to the level of risk 
involved is consequently seen as a betrayal of revolution 
which the Soviet Union attempts to cover up by emphasizing 
the destructiveness of war. China, by contrast, maintains 
that reliance on revolution can overcome the military 
strength of the United States and that in any case it is 
not as dangerous as the Russians make out. The revolutionary, 
first of all, need not fear nuclear threats but should 
rely on his own strength:
See the Letter from the Central Committee of the CCP to 
the CPSU Central Committee, 'A Proposal Concerning the 
General Line of the International Communist Movement' , 14
June 1963, text in Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, p . 2 7 6.
2 'It should never be extended to the relations between 
oppressed and oppressor nations, between oppressed and 
oppressor countries or between oppressed and oppressor 
classes, and never be described as the main content of the 
transition from capitalism to socialism, still less should 
it be asserted that peaceful coexistence is mankind's road 
to socialism..,..Peaceful coexistence cannot replace the 
revolutionary struggles of the people'. Ibid., p.275.
3 'Long Live Leninism' , Red Flag , 16 April 1960, text in
Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev, p . 2 7 0 .
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Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary people have 
never been paralysed with fear by the nuclear weapons 
in the imperialists' hands and so abandoned their 
struggle against imperialism and its lackeys. We 
Marxist-Leninists do not believe either in the 
theory that weapons decide everything, nor do we 
believe in the theory that nuclear weapons decide 
everything.1
Secondly, 'history has proved that even when imperialism is 
armed with nuclear weapons it cannot frighten into
2submission a revolutionary people who dare to fight 1 2340 
Revolutionary war, moreover, cannot be as dangerous as the 
Soviet Union claims since it has occurred more than once 
in recent years.^
Now while China claims greater experience in
revolutionary war and greater willingness to assist
revolutionary movements than the Soviet Union, it still
follows traditional communist doctrine concerning the
importance of internal factors. In the first place, the
question whether armed methods are to be used at all must
be 'an internal affair of each country, one to be determined
only by the relation of classes in that country, a matter
to be decided only by the Communists of that country 
4themselves'. No outside power should attempt to impose 
either peaceful or violent methods on a people seeking its 
own liberation (more specifically, the Soviet Union should 
not encourage the belief that peaceful transition to 
communism is always a possibility). In the second place,
People's Daily editorial, 15 December 1962, text ibid., 
p . 335 .
2 'The Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us' , 
Peking Review, 4 January 1963, p.14.
3 'The Khrushchev revisionists maintain that a single 
spark in any part of the globe may touch off a world 
nuclear conflagration and bring destruction to mankind.
If this were true, our planet would have been destroyed 
time and time again. There have been wars of national 
liberation throughout the twenty years since World War 
II. But has any single one of them developed into a world 
war?' Lin Piao, 'Long Live the Victory of People's War', 
Peking Review, 3 September 1965, p.27.
4 'Long Live Leninism', Red Flag, 16 April 1960, text in 
Floyd, op, cit., p.270.
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a revolutionary war must be conducted primarily by the 
masses themselves and must not rely on foreign aid, even 
that given by socialist countries; it is self-reliance that 
makes victory possible,' China can thus perhaps be 
excused for not giving more assistance than it actually 
does since the main burden of revolution must be carried by 
the country itself. This seems to be partly a
rationalization of the fact that China does take into account 
American military strength in determining the level of 
assistance to revolutionary movements, but at the same time 
China, unlike the Soviet Union, has openly and unequivocally 
identified itself with such movements, especially those in 
Asia. An increase in China's military power vis-a-vis 
the United States might thus reinforce the Chinese conception 
of revolution as the main determinant of international 
relations rather than lead to its abandonment. Nevertheless, 
the effects of a viable Chinese nuclear force remain 
uncertain in this regard; what is evident is that development 
so far has not caused or permitted China to move perceptibly 
closer to the Soviet position on the role of internal war in 
world politics.
The persistence of Chinese views is evident from 
the length of time for which they have been held. Already 
in 1936 Mao Tse-tung was claiming that the Chinese
revolution would be a decisive factor in the world
2situation. Three years later Mao was prepared to assert 
that the example of 'new-democratic revolution' was 
'developing in all other colonial and semi-colonial countries
3as well as in China'. There was a growing awareness of
Lin Piao, op. cit., p „22.
2 'When the Chinese revolution comes into full power, the 
masses of many colonial countries will follow the example 
of China and win a similar victory of their own'.
Interview with Edgar Snow, extract in Schram, The Political 
Thought of Mao Tse-tung, p.374.
'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party' 
(December 1939) , Selected Works, vol. II, p.326.
3
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novel elements in the Chinese revolution which were 
relevant to other countries as well but the influence of 
Soviet ideology remained predominant. This was most 
obvious in the continued emphasis on the proletariat as 
the leading revolutionary class despite its manifest 
weakness and small size . ^  The Chinese revolution, moreover, 
was still considered 'part of the proletarian-socialist 
world revolution' which had 'the proletariat of the 
capitalist countries as its main force and the oppressed
2peoples of the colonies and semi-co1onies as its allies'. 
Clearly, the Chinese Communists were as yet in no position 
to become an independent source of revolutionary teaching 
although the seeds of a new doctrine were there.
The victory of Communist forces on the mainland
in 1949 promised to be a powerful demonstration of the
success of Mao's revolutionary strategy; a working model
could now be offered to other countries. The significance
of this was not lost on the Chinese from the moment that
victory was in sight. At the Conference of the Youth and
Students of South East Asia held in Calcutta in February
1948, the Chinese delegation noted the special
relationship between the revolution in China and the
revolution in South East Asia:
the victory of the Chinese people would facilitate 
the struggle of the peoples of South East Asia and 
would greatly encourage their fight. The 
liberation campaign of the Chinese people cannot be 
separated from the liberation campaign of the 
peoples of South East Asia. The affinity between 
them is much closer than that between other 
regions. Effort for strengthening their unity is 
urgent.3
It was at this conference that the new Moscow line on armed 
uprisings in South East Asia was apparently passed on to 
Asian communist leaders; the speech of the Chinese
 ^ ibid., pp.329-30.
2 Mao VTse-tung, 'On New Democracy' (January 1940) , ibid. , 
p p .343, 346.
Cited by Brimmel, Communism in South East Asia, p.259.3
3 35
delegation, however, indi cated that this part of the world 
was not to be an e xclusively Russian sphere of influence. 
India, for example, was included among those nations which 
could learn from the Ch i n e s e  experience.'*' The Chinese 
C o m m u n i s t  success could be most strongly pressed in Asia 
but the earlier, more far-reaching thesis that Ch inese 
me th od s could be used by all subject peoples to achieve 
their liberation was not forgotten.
On 16 Nov e m b e r  1949, Liu Shao-chi addr essed a
WFTU Conf erence in Peking:
The course followed by the Chinese people in 
defeating i m p e r ialism and its lackeys and in founding 
the People's Republic of China is the course that 
should be followed by the peoples of the various 
colonial and semicolonial countries in their fight 
for national independence and d e m o c r a c y . 2
In June 1951 it was openly pro c l a i m e d  that Mao Tse-tung had
added to the 'treasury of M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t  thought', a claim
whi ch only Stalin had made before. It amounted to
a r e s t a t e m e n t  in mode r n  terms of two of the 
fundamental postulates of the old Chinese view of 
the world: that China was the centre of civlization,
the model which less advanced states and peoples 
should copy if they were to be accepted in the pale, 
and that the ruler of China was the expounder of 
orthodox doct rine.^
It is perhaps more surprising therefore that China's claim 
to prov ide the example for the nations of Africa and Latin 
A m e ri ca  as well as Asia should have been little heard 
during the 1950s than that it should be highly vociferous 
in the period since then. In October 1959, when the
In a teleg r a m  to the Indian Com m u n i s t  Party dated 19 
N o v em be r 1949, Mao Ts e-tung referred to the Indian people 
as one of the great A s ian peoples, claiming that 'in many 
respects, her past fate and her path to the future resemble 
those of China', Text in Schram, The Political Thought of 
Mao T s e - t u n g , p.379.
2 Cited by R. Lowenthal, ' C h i n a ' , in Z* B rzezinski ( e d . ) , 
Afric a a nd the Com m u n i s t  World (Stanford, 1964) , p .14 3.
3 C.P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the 
World , revised edition, (London, 1969) , pp.48-9.
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ide ol ogical clash with the Soviet Union had begun to emerge, 
Lui Shao-chi again argued for the general relevance of the 
Chin ese  revolution:
The Chinese r e v o lution has a great attraction for 
the peoples in all b a c kward countries that have 
suffered, or are suffering, from imperialist 
oppression. They feel that they should also be 
able to do what the C h inese have d o n e .1
Cl ea rly  foreshadowed is the Chinese doctrine of the 1960s
that the centre of world r e v o lution has shifted to the
co unt ries of Asia, Africa and Latin America; it is a natural
ex te ns ion of the view of China as the leader of world
d e v e l o p m e n t s .
'The Victory of M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m  in China', cited by 
L o w e n t h a l , op. cit., p.145.
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CHAPTER XI : ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Civil strife has been a frequent and persistent 
phenomenon of the post-war world. While internal conflicts 
have not been absent in other periods, they do appear to 
have become more prominent in recent years. On the one hand, 
there are many new factors making for increased strife 
within states, whether more immediate ones - such as greater 
opportunities to seize power in a greater number of 
countries - or more deep-seated ones, in particular the 
"revolution of modernization" which has betokened rapid 
social and economic changes accompanied by severe political 
stresses. On the other hand, outside states have come to be 
closely concerned about conflicts within other countries.
In many cases such conflicts include a measure of external 
participation, not only in that they may be instigated from 
outside or that rebel movements may receive assistance but 
also in that incumbent governments may rely on international 
alliances or agreements to maintain their position at home.
In these circumstances it is likely that the pressures for 
internationalization of a conflict in some degree will 
prove greater than both the limitations on intervention 
itself and the inhibitions that states feel about undertaking 
it. Whether these conflicts are put down to external origins 
or whether they naturally and inevitably bring in outside 
parties, it is clear that civil strife has become an 
important part of international relations and a complex 
problem for international society.
Today there are some 130 states claiming to be 
sovereign and hence to have the right to be free from 
outside interference in the management or mismanagement of 
their affairs. Each is a potential arena for civil strife 
which, when it occurs, must be regarded as in the first place 
internal rather than international. Yet the reality is that 
internal conflicts do tend to involve outside powers and 
that international society does recognize certain rights of 
intervention, namely those based on self-defence and on the 
authority of the international community. The status of
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sovereignty is thus under considerable pressure in the 
circumstances of the contemporary world. The rule requiring 
respect for sovereignty is frequently either disregarded or 
overriden by other rules; what is more, the fact that it 
has fallen into some disrepute may have the effect of 
reducing the inhibitions on intervention felt by those 
states which have hitherto upheld it. There may thus be 
some wisdom in placing less emphasis on the sovereignty of 
states, in particular at a time of domestic conflict, and 
in developing rules for governing the intervention that in 
any case seems likely to occur.
Not all intervention in civil strife, of course, 
amounts to a breach of sovereignty. There are many 
circumstances in which aid to an incumbent is considered 
proper, though perhaps fewer in which rebel movements may 
be legitimately assisted. These cases are generally held 
consistent with the maintenance of respect for the 
sovereignty of the state concerned. Although civil strife 
is in many senses a continuation of domestic politics, it 
is clear that outside participation is not therefore 
debarred completely; indeed, it would be odd to expect that 
all outside influences on a state should cease on the 
outbreak of civil strife. At the same time, most states 
are not content with purely neutral rules about when 
assistance may be properly given to an incumbent or 
insurgent; they are also interested in promoting the 
victory of one faction over the other. Civil strife 
necessarily involves a challenge to authority within the 
state and it is this that international society has found 
most problematical. For such reasons the rules of 
international law developed prior to World War I have proved 
incapable of governing the interventionary activities of 
states today.
Rules w h ich are more relevant and which offer a 
greater likelihood of regulating intervention might be 
developed in two related areas. The first concerns the 
credentials of an incumbent government in inviting outside 
assistance during a civil conflict. There is not only the
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more technical question of whether the actual request is 
what it appears to be but also the issues raised by the 
political aims that lie behind acceptance of such an 
invitation. Similar matters are brought up in the other 
area where rules might be developed, namely the conditions 
for the recognition of rebels. States are concerned not 
simply with their actual progress towards replacing the 
existing government but also with their political ambitions. 
What is required in the case of both incumbents and 
insurgents is evidently a certain measure of agreement on 
the social or political principles that ought to be promoted; 
it is not suggested that states are in fact likely to 
achieve such agreement, although there have been some steps 
in this direction with anti-colonial doctrines. On the 
contrary, states will probably continue to intervene for 
contentious political and social ends, but it does seem 
desirable to accept that any effective rules concerning 
invitations to intervene and the recognition of rebels 
would have to contain a normative element. This element 
would relate to the political arrangements to be made 
within states or to the identity of members of international 
society (which groups of people ought to constitute states 
and which not?). It is, perhaps, the latter issue where 
there is greater potential for agreement, but for the moment 
all that can be said is that the traditional rules on these 
matters have lost their force because they do not satisfy 
the concerns of states as they exist today.
Apart from the rule requiring respect for 
sovereignty, there are two other fundamental rules which 
contribute to the purposes of international society. In 
theory, it is possible that these rules, relating to the 
right of self-defence and the authority of the international 
community, could require actions which breach the sovereignty 
of individual states. In practice, too, respect for 
sovereignty in all circumstances has never been a .feature 
of international politics. There are good reasons for 
maintaining that this is even more true of the contemporary 
world. The institution of self-defence has been especially
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affected. It is not that internal conflicts have come to 
be very much more dangerous by way of direct threats to 
the nationals, property or territory of other states; but 
that the outcome of almost any conflict tends to be seen by 
the major powers as important to their global position.
This is due in part to the fact that rival states may 
already be participating (or be on the point of 
intervening) but in part also to the nature of the 
ideological confrontation. Even a purely internal conflict 
may produce radical changes in foreign policy that arouse 
the concern of others; the idea of non-alignment which 
still survives today may be interpreted as to some extent 
an attempt to reduce such concerns by guaranteeing a 
continuity and an impartiality in foreign policy. In present 
circumstances it is difficult to define the proper limits 
of self-defence not only because of the resulting complexity 
in the notion of self-defence but also because the major 
powers are in any case prepared to act on their own 
assessment of the threat posed by a particular conflict.
True, intervention in self-defence is a measure for 
guaranteeing one's own sovereignty but there is no certainty 
that such measures will make the sovereignty of all more 
secure in either the short or long term.
Intervention by the international community is less 
problematical, being limited in scope and in frequency. The 
occasions for humanitarian intervention, for U.N. action and 
for the maintenance of minimum standards of international 
conduct have been few in practice and, since they generally 
have a consensus of states behind them, do not rele.ase 
great potential for international conflict. If the 
international community is to play a significant role in 
governing intervention, it will have to be through its 
elaboration and development of the political and social 
goals that states may properly pursue. Of even greater 
significance may the role that regions are able to play in 
this regard, chiefly on account of that very homogeneity 
which defines their existence. Despite the many 
difficulties some such groups of states may prove capable
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of developing both the appropriate rules and the means to 
enforce them.
There seems little indication that a diminution 
in civil strife will result either from developments 
within states or from international arrangements. 
Modernization on a global scale is unlikely to be carried 
through rapidly to a point where each political system is 
capable of dealing with pressing economic, social, ethnic 
and other problems without serious threat of breakdown or 
collapse. Offence will doubtless remain the stronger 
form of warfare within the state in that small numbers can 
initiate and sustain a rebellion even against a we11-equipped 
and popular government (not that many states are so 
fortunately endowed). Nor do the internal forces for change 
appear to be of the sort that could be easily repressed or 
contained by an international concert of governments 
committed to social conservatism; it is evident, moreover, 
that most governments do not believe such a policy 
desirable, let alone feasible. Both the Soviet Union and 
China anticipate political revolution of one sort or another 
in the countries of the world, while the United States does 
not view economic development and political reform with 
disfavour. What is more, civil strife in one country 
cannot be prevented from serving as an example to others so 
that certain pressures for resort to civil conflict are 
always likely to be present as long as strife persists in 
some countries. Internal conflict is a problem which 
international society cannot simply suppress either as a 
practical matter or on principle, for this would be to deny 
far more of the meaningful content of sovereignty than does 
intervention in civil strife itself.
Granted that civil strife will continue to occur, 
it seems equally probable that intervention will also 
persist. The question for international society is how 
far it can tolerate unregulated intervention without 
having to change its character. It is clear that unlimited 
instigation of civil strife in other countries would be 
highly destructive of international order since governments
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must generally accept each other's right to govern if they 
are to achieve any common purposes. Yet there are great 
difficulties in distinguishing between provocation of civil 
strife and subsequent participation in it. Some would 
argue that outside instigation of a conflict is impossible 
unless the conditions for it already exist and that the 
act of instigation is therefore unimportant. Others would 
maintain that the prospect of outside aid is itself an 
encouragement to rebellion and that skilled manipulation is 
usually capable of causing some kind of conflict. It is 
here that empirical investigation could throw much light on 
the actual dangers likely to arise from the instigation of 
civil strife. They are perhaps much less than is 
indicated by the vigour with which states are prepared to 
denounce activities of this kind; it may indeed be more 
true to say that civil strife is a cause of intervention than 
to say that, intervention is a cause of civil strife.
If this assumption is correct save for a few 
instances - and the discussion of the pressures for the 
internationalization of internal conflicts indicates that 
there are some grounds for accepting it - then intervention 
appears in a rather less dangerous light. Thus most states 
could expect their sovereignty to be respected as long as 
they refrained from civil strife; intervention would then 
be in some senses a penalty for misbehaviour. Moreover, 
the disregard of sovereignty which may come with involvement 
in an existing conflict is sometimes a substitute for 
harmful actions which might otherwise have been taken later. 
This is most obvious when civil strife breaks out in the 
sphere of influence of a great power and one faction is 
intent on policies contrary to the interests of that power. 
Were the latter not to intervene during the course of the 
conflict it could be expected to take strong measures in 
the event of victory by the faction antagonistic to it.
Such measures might be anything from interference in internal 
affairs to full-scale military attack but are in any case 
likely to amount to a breach of sovereignty. It may also be 
noted that, while sovereignty is a status either possessed 
or not possessed (political units are either members of
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international society or not m e m b e r s ) , countries vary in 
the degree to w h ich their hold on this status is a secure 
one. Those states which are sovereign more by courtesy 
than by virtue of their own internal capacities must 
expect to be subjected to international pres sures of one 
kind or another. There seems no reason why international 
society should deplore disr egard of sove reignty in the 
event of civil strife more than in other circumstances.
Intervention in civil strife may also serve a 
vital function in p r o v iding an area of foreign policy 
activity which the major powers believe relevant and 
important to their view of the world but which is not 
ex ces sively dangerous. The issues involved in civil 
conflicts are frequently similar to those for which these 
powers are prepared to threaten the use of force against 
each other, even to the point of risking annihilation.'*'
It is not that the greater dangers of nuclear war have caused 
an increased concern with civil strife but that 
inter ve ntion would in any event have assumed an important 
place in the armoury of the great powers, given their 
ideological and political antagonisms. On the contrary, 
there seems to be some case for not r estricting 
i nt er ve ntion lest this should lead to more immediately 
dang ero us international activities. This argument seems 
all the stronger in view of the fact that it is generally 
the we aker countries which are subjected to intervention.
Civil strife and intervention, however, do not 
make up a self-contained area in the life of international 
society. For the very fact that the ideas of the major 
powers about civil strife and i n t e r v e n t i o n  form a 
significant part of their view of the world means that they 
cannot treat these matters as minor ones. A second factor 
m i l i ta ting against the sepa ration of civil strife and 
int er vention from the rest of i nternational relations is to
Arendt suggests that the idea of freedom has appeared in 
nuclear strategy like a deus ex m a c hina in order to justify 
what appears unjustifiable. On R e v o l u t i o n , p.4.
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be found in the pressures for such activities to expand by 
involving more states and to escalate to higher levels of 
violence. These risks can be manipulated to some extent as 
a means of controlling intervention but they are nevertheless 
risks, perhaps gaining in effect the more dangerous and 
devastating they appear to be. While intervention in 
civil strife usually consists of something less than the 
overt movement of regular forces across an international 
frontier, there is no guarantee that it will remain below 
this level indefinitely. On the other hand, the record 
indicates that intervention in civil strife does not 
normally lead to high levels of international violence 
although it may produce 'proxy' wars with outside states 
assisting rival factions. Conflicts of this kind, 
moreover, being symptoms of a deeper rivalry between states 
over the nature of international order, may also serve to 
exacerbate such antagonism.
The more that intervention is undertaken for such 
conflicting purposes, the more it is likely to be in breach 
of the primary rules of international behaviour; and the 
more necessary do direct controls over the activity itself 
appear to be. As far as international law is concerned, 
specific prohibitions on subversive intervention have been 
liberally enacted. All governments are naturally prepared 
to condemn such activity but they just as naturally disagree 
about when intervention is subversive and when not and about 
the circumstances in which exceptions to the rule are 
permitted.'*' The problem of intervention in civil strife,
Before the U.N. General Assembly passed the Declaration 
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Dome s tic 
Affairs of States by 109 votes to 0 in December 1965, the 
U.K. announced its abstention on the grounds that 'to put 
the stamp of the United Nations on a document that would be 
open to varying and contradictory interpretations would 
bring the Organization into disrepute'. Official Records, 
XX, 1st Committee, 1398th Meeting, S.R., para.2. Malta 
declined to vote at all, arguing that several states were 
intervening at the same time as they were voting for the 
Declaration. Ibid., Plenary Session, 1408th Meeting, P.V., 
para. 88.
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moreover, appears to be of an importance and a complexity 
which makes simple legal regulation impractical; all cases 
promise to be hard cases and hence to make no law at all. 
Undoubtedly states do take into account in their decisions 
what they believe to be the specific provisions of 
international law as well as the more fundamental rules of 
international society but there is uncertainty not only 
about the weight which will be attached to these 
considerations but also about the actual content of what 
is to be considered.
It is the less formal controls over intervention 
in civil strife that must therefore be relied upon as the 
primary means of ensuring that the purposes of international 
society are promoted or at least not totally disregarded. 
Considerations of prudence inevitably enter into the 
foreign policy calculations of any state, and it is through 
this that a divided state and its friends can hope to limit 
intervention in particular cases. Efforts of this kind 
have helped to ensure that involvement in civil strife is 
usually not too overt or blatant. Thus there is some 
acceptance of aid given to groups of genuine exiles or 
refugees that are working against their government, while 
the despatch of regular troops still remains a serious 
move. The most extreme form of involvement - the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons - has so far been ruled out 
altogether, though here the legal and moral factors may 
have counted for as much as political and military 
considerations. Nevertheless, the dangers of expansion and 
escalation remain in the minds of those involved in civil 
strife and of those contemplating involvement.
True, controls of this kind are designed in the 
first instance to serve the interests of the states 
exercising them, but it appears not unusual for them to be 
directed also at upholding the fundamental rules of 
international society. On occasions, of course, such 
activities will detract from the measure of international 
order. For they consist of the whole range of means 
available in varying degree to all states for the control of
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intervention by others. Some of these means have proved 
more susceptible to explicit regulation than others. 
Counter-intervention, for example, is generally accepted 
as being legitimate only within broad limits. For the most 
part, however, with the notable exception of certain U.N. 
activity, they remain uncoordinated and within the province 
of individual states. Moreover, these procedures are likely 
to vary according to the needs of each particular case and 
inevitably meet with differing degrees of success. Their 
elusive character, however, should not be taken to mean 
that such mechanisms of control are necessarily ineffective.
Within the not so very narrow confines set by 
formal and informal controls on intervention the United 
States, the Soviet Union and China pursue their own 
conceptions of international order. Despite this 
theoretical divergence all three have in practice 
maintained the distinction between internal and international 
politics. The Soviet Union and China have from whatever 
motives asserted the independence and individuality of 
revolution within each country and they have not considered 
their aid to rebel movements a departure from this position. 
Similarly, the U.S. begins from the assumption that 
internal and international politics are distinguishable, 
although it has from time to time maintained that a 
particular civil conflict displays the features and 
character of an international war. The U.S. has also been 
prepared to act on this view in some cases but in general 
regards such action as a departure from the desired norm.
All three powers, in other words, accept the idea of a 
world of sovereign states (although each expects something 
different from them) and therefore see intervention in civil 
strife as a distinct activity which crosses the boundary 
between internal and international politics. Naturally, 
they find many occasions and almost as many justifications 
for embarking on actions of this kind but the underlying 
notion of a world of separate states seems firmly established. 
As long as intervention is distinguished from other sorts 
of activity on the international scene, it does not betoken
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the dissolution of international society into a global 
politics where sovereign states have ceased to be the prime 
units of action.
Intervention in civil strife has become a 
recurrent fact with which states must live. In some cases 
it may accord with the clear purposes of international 
society, in others it will not. At all events, external 
participation in civil strife is a means whereby states put 
into practice their ideas about what these purposes ought 
to be. In the contemporary world states are much 
concerned with political arrangements adopted by others 
and expound a variety of principles which they sometimes 
seek to impose on others. Disagreement over them has been 
limited in various ways by the difficulties inherent in the 
act of intervention, by a residual respect for fundamental 
rules and for the specific provisions of international law 
and by considerations of prudence. It is easy enough to 
find instances where states have been able and willing to 
disregard these limits, but this has also been true of 
other international activities such as the threat and use 
of armed force. Intervention in civil strife is a result, 
and an important one, of the interdependence of states and 
of their unequal interaction. The problem for international 
society is not so much this interdependence and inequality 
among its members as their heterogeneity; for it is this 
which might lead them into actions which will destroy the 
fundamental rules necessary for their coexistence.
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General Assembly Essentials of Peace Resolution. 
Resolution 290 (IV), 1 December 1949.
The General Assembly 
Calls upon Every Nation
3. To refrain from any threats or acts, direct or 
indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence 
or integrity of any State, or at fomenting civil strife 
and subverting the will of the people in any State
General Assembly Peace through Deeds Resolution. 
Resolution 380 (V), 17 November 1950.
The General Assembly
Condemn!ng the intervention of a State in the internal 
affairs of another State for the purpose of changing its 
legally established government by the threat or use of 
force,
1. Solemnly reaffirms that, whatever the weapons used, 
any aggression, whether committed openly, or by 
fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign 
Power, or otherwise, is the gravest of all crimes 
against peace and security throughout the world.
General Assembly Declaration on the Inadmissibility 
of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and 
the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty.
Resolution 2131 (XX), 21 December 1965.
1. No State has the right to intervene, directly 
or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the 
internal or external affairs of any other State.
Consequently, armed intervention and all other 
forms of interference or attempted threats against 
the personality of the State or against its political, 
economic and cultural elements, are condemned.
2. No State may use or encourage the use of 
economic, political or any other type of measures to 
coerce another State in order to obtain from it 
the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign 
rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind. 
Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, 
finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or 
armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow 
of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil 
strife in another State.
3. The use of force to deprive peoples of their 
national identity constitutes a violation of their 
inalienable rights and of the principle of non­
intervention .
Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States.
Report of the International Law Commission, 9 June 
1949 .
(GAOR, IV, Supplement 10, Doc. A/925)
1. Every State has the right to independence 
and hence to exercise freely, without dictation by 
any other State, all its legal powers, including 
the choice of its own form of government.
3. Every State has the duty to refrain from 
intervention in the internal or external affairs 
of any other State.
4. Every State has the duty to refrain from 
fomenting civil strife in the territory of another 
State, and to prevent the organization within 
its territory of activities calculated to foment such 
civil strife.
Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security 
of Mankind.
Report of the International Law Commission, 28 July 1954. 
(GAOR, IX, Supplement 9, Doc. A/2693).
The following acts are offences against the peace 
and security of mankind:
4. The organization, or the encouragement of the 
organization, by the authorities of a State, of armed 
bands within its territory or any other territory for 
incursions into the territory of another State, or 
the toleration of the organization of such bands in 
its own territory, or the toleration of the use by 
such armed bands of its territory as a base of 
operations or as a point of departure for incursions 
into the territory of another State, as well as direct 
participation in or support of such incursions.
5. The undertaking or encouragement by the 
authorities of a State of activities calculated to 
foment civil strife in another State, or the 
toleration by the authorities of a State of organized 
activities calculated to foment civil strife in 
another State .
6. The undertaking or encouragement by the 
authorities of a State of terrorist activities in 
another State, or the toleration by the authorities 
of a State of organized activities calculated to carry 
out terrorist acts in another State.
6. Charter of the Organization of American States
Signed at the Ninth International Conference of 
American States, Bogota, 30 April 1948.
15. No State or group of States has a right to 
intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any 
other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not 
only armed force but also any other form of 
interference or attempted threat against the 
personality of the State or against its political, 
economic and cultural elements.
7. Charter of the Organization of African Unity
Signed at the Summit Conference of Independent 
African States, Addis Ababa, 25 May 1963
The Member States . . . solemnly affirm and declare
their adherence to the following principles:
2. non-interference in the internal affairs of 
S t a t e s  ;
5. Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, 
of political assassination as well as of subversive 
activities on the part of neighbouring States or 
any other State . . . .
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